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63 results for "harmony"
1. Plato, Theaetetus, 176a, 176c, 176b (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 105, 108
176b. ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ πάνυ τι ῥᾴδιον πεῖσαι ὡς ἄρα οὐχ ὧν ἕνεκα οἱ πολλοί φασι δεῖν πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπιτηδευτέον, τὸ δʼ οὔ, ἵνα δὴ μὴ κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι· ταῦτα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὧδε λέγωμεν. θεὸς οὐδαμῇ
2. Plato, Apology of Socrates, 283e-285c (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 67
3. Plato, Cratylus, 439d, 439c (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 322
4. Plato, Laws, 12.968a, 1.631b-d, 12.966e, 12.967d-e, 4.716c-d, 1.626d-e, 653c-673a, 700a, 700b, 795a, 795b, 795c, 795d, 795e (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 117
5. Plato, Phaedo, 60e, 80a, 80b, 60e-61b (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 322
6. Plato, Philebus, 45e, 45d (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 67
7. Plato, Statesman, 283e-285c (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 67
8. Plato, Timaeus, 27c, 27d, 27e, 28a, 28b, 47b, 47c, 69d, 69e, 77b, 77c, 80b, 89e, 90c, 90d, 28c-29a (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 109
9. Plato, Republic, 4.444d, 4.441e-442c, 4.436b, 10.613b, 3.413c-414b, 4.436a-439e, 4.439a-d, 4.439e-440a, 4.441a-d, 4.441e, 4.443e, 1.347b-d, 6.500c-e, 7.540a, 4.444b-e, 3.397a-400e (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 67
10. Aristotle, Politics, 1339a-1342b (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 318
11. Aristotle, Physics, 8.6.258b10-8.10.267b26, 8.5.256a4-258b9, 8.4.254b7-256a3 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 128
12. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1106b8-1107a8, 1109a20-24, 1115a6-17, 1117a22-28, 1125b31-1126a9, 1138b18-20, 1108a31-36 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 67, 116
13. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 12.8.1074a35-12.9.1075a10 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 128
14. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 4.29, 4.34-4.35 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 227, 390, 392, 393, 451
4.29. itaque illa duo, morbus et aegrotatio, ex totius valetudinis corporis conquassatione et perturbatione gignuntur, vitium autem integra valetudine ipsum ex se cernitur. sed in animo tantum modo cogitatione possumus morbum ab aegrotatione seiungere, vitiositas autem est habitus aut adfectio in tota vita inconstans et a se ipsa dissentiens. ita fit, ut in altera corruptione opinionum morbus efficiatur et aegrotatio, in altera inconstantia et repugtia. non enim omne vitium paris habet dissensiones, paris h. dissensiones Bentl. partis h. dissentientis X (-ent V c, ent in r. ). ceterum totus locus negle- genter a Cic. scriptus ut eorum, qui non longe a sapientia absunt, adfectio est illa quidem discrepans sibi ipsa, dum est insipiens, sed non distorta nec prava. morbi autem et aegrotationes aegrotationis X ( corr. K 2 ) partes sunt vitiositatis, sed perturbationes sintne eiusdem partes, quaestio est. 4.34. Quando, ut ut Man. et aliis locis de virtute et diximus et saepe dicendum erit—pleraeque enim quaestiones, quae ad vitam moresque pertinent, a virtutis fonte forte V 1 ducuntur d icuntur K 1 —, quando igitur virtus est adfectio animi constans St. fr. 3, 198 conveniensque, laudabiles efficiens eos, in quibus est, et ipsa per se sua sponte separata etiam utilitate laudabilis, ex ea proficiscuntur honestae voluntates sententiae actiones omnisque recta ratio (quamquam ipsa virtus brevissume brevissumme G 1 V recta ratio dici potest). huius igitur virtutis virtus KR contraria est vitiositas—sic enim malo quam malitiam appellare eam quam Graeci kaki/an kakian X appellant; nam malitia certi cuiusdam vitii nomen est, vitiositas omnium—; ex qua concitantur concitantur Camerar. cogitantur perturbationes, quae sunt, ut paulo ante paulo ante cf. § 22 diximus, turbidi animorum concitatique motus, aversi a ratione et inimicissimi mentis vitaeque tranquillae. inportant enim aegritudines anxias atque acerbas animosque adfligunt et debilitant metu; idem item K 2 inflammant adpetitione nimia, quam tum cupiditatem quantum c. GK 1 V 1 tum libidinem dicimus, inpotentiam quandam animi a animi a s V 3 anima X temperantia et moderatione plurimum dissidentem. 4.35. quae si quando adepta erit adepta erit Lb. ea deptaretur K ( m. 2 potius quam 1 ) eademptaretur GRV id quod ei fuerit concupitum, tum ecferetur ecferetur We. (effertur Dav. ) fertur Gr. fert X alacritate, ut nihil ei constet, quod agat, ut ille, qui voluptatem voluptatem eqs. Trabea fr. II eundemque Cic. in verbis nihil ei ei B ( e corr. ) Bentl. est X ( ē. K esse V 3 ) quod s quid X constet ( Com. inc. 37 ) respicit, cf. fin. 2, 14 animi nimiam summum esse errorem arbitratur. eorum igitur malorum in una virtute posita sanatio est. Quid autem est non miserius solum, sed foedius etiam et deformius quam aegritudine quis adflictus debilitatus iacens? cui miseriae proxumus est is qui qui q: V (: in r. V c ) adpropinquans aliquod malum metuit exanimatusque examinatusque K Non. pars pendet animi. aliquod ... 23 animi Non. 498, 2 quam vim mali significantes poëtae impendere apud inferos saxum Tantalo faciunt ob scelera Trag. inc. 110 animique inpotentiam et superbiloquentiam. animique 25 superbiloquentiam Non. 175, 31 ea communis poena stultitiae est. omnibus enim, quorum mens abhorret a ratione, ratio V 1 semper aliqui talis aliqui talis Gron. (aliquis talis Victorius ) cf. p. 432, 7 aliquid aliis W terror impendet.
15. Cicero, On Divination, 1.126 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 420
1.126. Ex quo intellegitur, ut fatum sit non id, quod superstitiose, sed id, quod physice dicitur, causa aeterna rerum, cur et ea, quae praeterierunt, facta sint et, quae instant, fiant et, quae sequuntur, futura sint. Ita fit, ut et observatione notari possit, quae res quamque causam plerumque consequatur, etiamsi non semper (nam id quidem adfirmare difficile est), easdemque causas veri simile est rerum futurarum cerni ab iis, qui aut per furorem eas aut in quiete videant. 1.126. Consequently, we know that Fate is that which is called, not ignorantly, but scientifically, the eternal cause of things, the wherefore of things past, of things present, and of things to come. Hence it is that it may be known by observation what effect will in most instances follow any cause, even if it is not known in all; for it would be too much to say that it is known in every case. And it is probable that these causes of coming events are perceived by those who see them during frenzy or in sleep. [56]
16. Posidonius Apamensis Et Rhodius, Fragments, 30 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 325
17. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.16-3.17, 3.20-3.21, 3.50-3.61, 3.73, 4.46 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 325, 389, 390, 391
3.16. Bene facis, inquit, quod me adiuvas, et istis quidem, quae modo dixisti, utar potius Latinis, in ceteris subvenies, si me haerentem videbis. Sedulo, inquam, faciam. sed 'fortuna fortis'; quare conare, quaeso. quid enim possumus hoc agere divinius? Placet his, inquit, quorum ratio mihi probatur, simulatque natum sit animal—hinc hinc RN hin A huic BEV enim est ordiendum ordiendum est BER —, ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque, eaque Gz. eque ABERN et ad ea V quae conservantia sint sint Iw. Mue. II p. 19; sunt eius status, diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus, quae interitum videantur adferre. id ita esse sic probant, quod ante, quam voluptas aut dolor attigerit, salutaria appetant parvi aspernenturque contraria, quod non fieret, nisi statum suum diligerent, interitum timerent. fieri autem non posset ut appeterent aliquid, nisi sensum haberent sui eoque se diligerent. ex quo intellegi debet principium ductum esse a se diligendo. 3.17. in principiis autem naturalibus diligendi sui del. Urs plerique Stoici non putant voluptatem esse ponendam. quibus ego vehementer adsentior, ne, si voluptatem natura posuisse in iis rebus videatur, quae primae appetuntur, multa turpia sequantur. satis esse autem argumenti videtur quam ob rem illa, quae prima sunt adscita adscita asserta BE natura, diligamus, quod est nemo, quin, cum utrumvis liceat, aptas malit et integras omnis partis corporis quam, eodem usu, inminutas aut detortas habere. rerum autem cognitiones, quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones quas vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones BE om. ARNV vel, si haec verba aut minus placent aut minus intelleguntur, katalh/yeis appellemus licet, eas igitur ipsas propter se adsciscendas arbitramur, quod habeant quiddam in se quasi complexum et continens veritatem. id autem in in V om. rell. parvis intellegi potest, quos delectari videamus, etiamsi eorum nihil intersit, si quid ratione per se ipsi invenerint. 3.20. Progrediamur igitur, quoniam, quoniam qui ideo BE (discerpto, ut vid., q uo in qi io cf. ad p. 104,24 et ad p. 31, 25) inquit, ab his principiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere debent quae sequuntur. sequitur autem haec prima divisio: Aestimabile esse dicunt—sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus appellemus Bentl. appellamus — id, quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit, quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi a)ci/an vocant, illi ... vocant Pearc. ille ... vocat contraque inaestimabile, quod sit superiori contrarium. initiis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum primum primum enim BE ('suspicari aliquis possit enim ortum esse ex hominis' Mdv.) est officium—id enim appello kaqh=kon —, ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria. qua qua AVN 2 que BN 1 q (= quae) ER inventa selectione et item reiectione sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, intelligi BE intellegit A intelligit RNV quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici. 3.21. prima est enim conciliatio hominis ad ea, quae sunt secundum naturam. simul autem cepit intellegentiam vel notionem potius, quam appellant e)/nnoian illi, viditque rerum agendarum ordinem et, ut ita dicam, concordiam, multo eam pluris aestimavit extimavit V estimabit (existim. E extim. N) ABERN quam omnia illa, quae prima primū (ū ab alt. m. in ras. ) N primo V dilexerat, atque ita cognitione et ratione collegit, ut statueret in eo collocatum summum illud hominis per se laudandum et expetendum bonum, quod cum positum sit in eo, quod o(mologi/an Stoici, nos appellemus convenientiam, si placet,—cum igitur in eo sit id bonum, quo omnia referenda sint, sint ABERNV honeste facta honeste facta Mdv. omnia honeste (honesta B) facta ipsumque honestum, quod solum solum BE om. rell. in bonis ducitur, quamquam post oritur, tamen id solum vi sua et dignitate expetendum est; eorum autem, quae sunt prima naturae, propter se nihil est expetendum. 3.50. quod si de artibus concedamus, virtutis tamen non sit eadem ratio, propterea quod haec plurimae commentationis commendationis (comend., cōmend.) ARNV et exercitationis indigeat, quod idem in artibus non sit, et quod virtus stabilitatem, firmitatem, constantiam totius vitae complectatur, nec haec eadem in artibus esse videamus. Deinceps explicatur differentia rerum, quam si non ullam non ullam AV, N 2 (ul ab alt. m. in ras. ), non nullam R non nulla B nonulla E esse diceremus, confunderetur omnis vita, ut ab Aristone, neque ullum sapientiae munus aut opus inveniretur, cum inter res eas, quae ad vitam degendam pertinerent, nihil omnino interesset, neque ullum dilectum adhiberi oporteret. itaque cum esset satis constitutum id solum esse bonum, quod esset esset om. A honestum, et id malum solum, quod turpe, tum inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen, quod differret, esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum. alia neutrum RNV aliane verum A alia neutrumque BE 3.51. quae autem aestimanda essent, eorum in aliis satis esse causae, quam ob rem quibusdam anteponerentur, ut in valitudine, ut in integritate sensuum, ut in doloris vacuitate, ut gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum, gloriae, divitiarum, similium rerum ' ipsius Ciceronis in scribendo lapsus' Mdv. similium rerum in usu O. Heinius in Fleckeis. Annal. Philol. XCIII, 1866, p. 246 alia alii AR autem non esse eius modi, itemque eorum, quae nulla aestimatione digna essent, partim satis habere causae, quam ob rem reicerentur, ut dolorem, morbum, sensuum amissionem, paupertatem, ignominiam, similia horum, partim non item. hinc est illud exortum, quod Zeno prohgme/non, contraque quod a)poprohgme/non nominavit, cum uteretur in lingua copiosa factis tamen nominibus ac novis, quod nobis in hac inopi lingua non conceditur; quamquam tu hanc copiosiorem etiam soles dicere. Sed non alienum est, quo facilius vis verbi intellegatur, rationem huius verbi verbi ( post huius) om. A faciendi Zenonis exponere. 3.52. Ut enim, inquit, nemo dicit in regia regem ipsum quasi productum esse ad dignitatem (id est enim id est enim Mdv. idem enim est ( in N enim ab alt. m. superscr. ; V om. enim) prohgme/non ), sed eos, qui in aliquo honore sunt, sunt R sint quorum ordo proxime accedit, ut secundus sit, ad regium principatum, sic in vita non ea, quae primo loco primo loco O. Heinius ibid. p. 245 pri- morie A p'mori e loco BE primove R primorie (o corr. in a) N primore V sunt, sed ea, quae ' In primorie latet primo ordine, quam vocem adscripsit qui haec ad antecedentia quorum ordo proxime accedit ut secundus sit accommodare studeret' H. A. Koch p. 37. Cf. etiam p. 110, 5 sq. secundum locum optinent, prohgme/na, id est producta, nominentur; quae vel ita appellemus—id erit verbum e verbo—vel promota et remota vel, ut dudum diximus, praeposita vel praecipua, et illa reiecta. re enim intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus. 3.53. quoniam autem omne, quod est bonum, primum locum tenere dicimus, necesse est nec bonum esse nec malum hoc, quod praepositum praepositum edd. propositum vel praecipuum nominamus. idque ita definimus; quod sit indifferens cum aestimatione mediocri; quod enim illi a)dia/foron dicunt, id mihi ita occurrit, ut indifferens dicerem. neque enim illud fieri poterat ullo modo, ut nihil relinqueretur in mediis, quod aut secundum naturam esset aut contra, nec, cum id relinqueretur, nihil in his poni, quod satis satis om. A aestimabile esset, nec hoc posito non aliqua esse esse P. Man. esset praeposita. recte igitur haec facta distinctio est, atque etiam ab iis, quo facilius res perspici possit, hoc simile ponitur: 3.54. Ut enim, inquiunt, si hoc fingamus esse quasi finem et ultimum, ita iacere talum, ut rectus adsistat, qui ita talus erit iactus, ut cadat rectus, praepositum quiddam habebit ad finem, qui aliter, contra, qui aliter contra edd. qualiter qui contra AR qui aliter qui contra BENV neque tamen illa praepositio tali ad eum, quem dixi, finem pertinebit, sic ea, quae sunt praeposita, referuntur illa quidem ad finem, sed ad eius vim naturamque nihil pertinent. 3.55. Sequitur illa divisio, ut bonorum alia sint ad illud ultimum pertinentia (sic enim appello, quae telika/ dicuntur; nam hoc ipsum instituamus, ut placuit, pluribus verbis dicere, quod uno uno dett., om. ABERNV non poterimus, ut res intellegatur), alia autem efficientia, quae Graeci poihtika/, alia utrumque. de pertinentibus nihil est bonum praeter actiones honestas, de efficientibus nihil praeter amicum, sed et pertinentem et efficientem sapientiam sapientiam deft. sapientem volunt esse. nam quia sapientia est conveniens actio, est in illo est in illo Dav. est illo ABERN 1 est cum illo N 2 cum illo V pertinenti genere, quod dixi; quod autem honestas actiones adfert et efficit, id efficiens dici potest. secl. Mdv. 3.56. Haec, quae praeposita dicimus, partim sunt per se ipsa praeposita, partim quod aliquid efficiunt, partim utrumque, per se, ut quidam habitus oris et vultus, ut status, ut ut et BE aut NV motus, in quibus sunt et praeponenda sunt et praeponenda RNV sunt et ponenda A et praeponenda sunt BE quaedam et reicienda; alia ob eam rem praeposita dicentur, quod ex se aliquid efficiant, ut pecunia, alia autem ob utramque rem, ut integri sensus, ut bona valitudo. 3.57. De bona autem fama—quam enim appellant eu)doci/an, aptius est bonam famam hoc loco appellare quam gloriam—Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes detracta detracta detractate quidem BE utilitate ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse dicebant; quibus ego vehementer assentior. qui autem post eos fuerunt, cum Carneadem sustinere non possent, hanc, quam dixi, bonam famam ipsam propter se praepositam et sumendam esse dixerunt, esseque esseque BENV esse A om. R hominis ingenui et liberaliter educati velle bene audire a parentibus, a propinquis, a bonis etiam viris, idque propter rem ipsam, non propter usum, dicuntque, ut ipsam non dicuntque propter usumque ut BE liberis consultum velimus, etiamsi postumi futuri sint, propter ipsos, sic futurae post mortem famae tamen esse propter rem, etiam detracto usu, consulendum. 3.58. Sed cum, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse dicamus, consentaneum tamen est fungi officio, cum id officium nec in bonis ponamus nec in malis. est enim aliquid in his rebus probabile, et quidem ita, ut eius ratio reddi possit, ergo ut etiam probabiliter acti ratio reddi possit. est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit. ex quo intellegitur officium medium quiddam quiddam Mdv. quoddam esse, quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis. quoniamque in iis iis edd. his rebus, quae neque in virtutibus sunt neque in vitiis, est tamen quiddam, quod usui possit esse, tollendum id non est. est autem eius generis actio quoque quaedam, et quidem talis, ut ratio postulet agere aliquid et facere eorum. quod autem ratione actum est, actum est Mdv. actum sit ABEN fit V id officium appellamus. est igitur officium eius generis, quod nec in bonis ponatur nec in ratione ... ponatur nec in om. R contrariis. 3.59. Atque Atque dett. Atqui (At qui) perspicuum etiam illud est, in istis rebus mediis aliquid agere sapientem. iudicat igitur, cum agit, officium illud esse. quod quoniam numquam fallitur in iudicando, erit in mediis rebus officium. quod efficitur hac etiam conclusione rationis: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit autem etiam del. Lamb. inchoatum, ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito iuste fit fit Lamb. facit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. quoniamque quoniamque quandoque RV non dubium est quin in iis, iis V his quae media dicimus, dicamus A sit aliud sumendum, aliud reiciendum, quicquid ita fit aut aut autem A ut BE dicitur, omne omne Grut. omni officio continetur. ex quo intellegitur, quoniam se ipsi ipsi BE ipsos omnes natura diligant, tam insipientem quam sapientem sumpturum, quae secundum naturam sint, reiecturumque contraria. ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis, ex quo efficitur versari in iis, iis edd. his quae media dicamus. 3.60. Sed cum ab his omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes, in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem. in quo enim plura sunt quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est de vita excedere. ex quo ex quo RV e quo (equo) apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser. 3.61. nam bonum illud et malum, quod saepe iam dictum est, postea consequitur, prima autem illa naturae sive secunda sive contraria sub iudicium sapientis et dilectum cadunt, estque illa subiecta quasi materia materie BE sapientiae. itaque et manendi in vita et migrandi ratio omnis iis iis edd. in V his rebus, quas supra dixi, metienda. nam neque virtute retinetur ille in add. Se. vita, nec iis, qui qui que BER sine virtute sunt, mors est oppetenda. et et Urs. ut saepe officium est sapientis desciscere a vita, cum sit beatissimus, si id oportune facere possit, quod est convenienter naturae. sic naturae sic B naturae vivere sic ( etiam E) enim censent, oportunitatis esse beate vivere. itaque a sapientia praecipitur se ipsam, si usus sit, sapiens ut relinquat. quam ob rem cum vitiorum ista vis non sit, ut causam afferant mortis voluntariae, perspicuum est etiam stultorum, qui idem miseri sint, officium esse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte rerum earum, earum rerum BE quas secundum naturam esse dicimus. et quoniam excedens e vita et manens aeque miser est nec diuturnitas magis ei magis ei ei (et E) magis BE vitam fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur iis, qui pluribus naturalibus frui possint, esse in vita manendum. 3.73. physicae quoque quoque quidem BE non sine causa tributus idem est honos, propterea quod, qui convenienter naturae victurus sit, ei ei V et ABER ei et N proficiscendum est ab omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione. nec vero potest quisquam de bonis et malis vere iudicare nisi omni cognita ratione naturae et vitae etiam deorum, et utrum conveniat necne natura hominis cum universa. quaeque sunt vetera praecepta sapientium, qui iubent tempori parere parere pariete R et sequi sequi et deum et se BE deum et se noscere et nihil nimis, haec sine physicis quam vim habeant—et habent maximam— videre nemo potest. atque etiam ad iustitiam colendam, ad tuendas amicitias et reliquas caritates quid natura valeat haec una cognitio potest tradere. nec vero pietas adversus adversus advorsum Non. deos nec quanta iis iis Mdv. his expiatione ( explatione L 1 ut vid. Lindsay ) Non. gratia debeatur sine explicatione naturae intellegi potest. nec vero ... potest Non. p. 232 s. v. advorsum 4.46. Minime vero illud probo, quod, cum docuistis, ut vobis videmini, bonum solum bonum solum BERV solum bonum N esse, quod honestum sit, tum rursum rursus RV dicitis initia proponi necesse esse apta esse apta NV est acta BER et accommodata naturae, quorum ex selectione ex selectione Ald. nepos, ex electione RN exelectione BEV virtus possit existere. non enim in selectione virtus ponenda erat, ut id ipsum, quod erat bonorum ultimum, aliud aliquid aliquod BE adquireret. nam omnia, quae sumenda quaeque legenda aut optanda sunt, inesse debent in summa bonorum, ut is, qui eam adeptus sit, nihil praeterea desideret. videsne ut, quibus summa est in voluptate, perspicuum sit quid iis iis edd. his faciendum sit aut non faciendum? ut nemo dubitet, eorum omnia officia quo spectare, quid sequi, quid fugere debeant? sit hoc ultimum bonorum, quod nunc a me defenditur; apparet statim, quae sint officia, quae actiones. vobis autem, quibus nihil est aliud propositum nisi rectum atque honestum, unde officii, unde agendi principium nascatur non reperietis. 3.16.  "Thanks for your assistance," he said. "I certainly shall use for choice the Latin equivalents you have just given; and in other cases you shall come to my aid if you see me in difficulties." "I'll do my best," I replied; "but fortune favours the bold, so pray make the venture. What sublimer occupation could we find?" He began: "It is the view of those whose system I adopt, that immediately upon birth (for that is the proper point to start from) a living creature feels an attachment for itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion they urge that infants desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction. But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse to action. < 3.17.  Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I very strongly agree with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature's prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice, would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than maimed or distorted although equally serviceable. "Again, acts of cognition (which we may term comprehensions or perceptions, or, if these words are distasteful or obscure, katalēpseis), — these we consider meet to be adopted for their own sake, because they possess an element that so to speak embraces and contains the truth. This can be seen in the case of children, whom we may observe to take pleasure in finding something out for themselves by the use of reason, even though they gain nothing by it. < 3.20.  "To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value — axia as the Stoics call it — this they pronounce to be 'valuable' (for so I suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term 'valueless.' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are 'things to be taken' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly 'things to be rejected,' the first 'appropriate act' (for so I render the Greek kathēkon) is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by 'appropriate action'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. < 3.21.  Man's first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he has understanding, or rather become capable of 'conception' — in Stoic phraseology ennoia — and has discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems this harmony far more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and desirable for its own sake; and that inasmuch as this consists in what the Stoics term homologia and we with your approval may call 'conformity' — inasmuch I say as in this resides that Good which is the End to which all else is a means, moral conduct and Moral Worth itself, which alone is counted as a good, although of subsequent development, is nevertheless the sole thing that is for its own efficacy and value desirable, whereas none of the primary objects of nature is desirable for its own sake. < 3.50.  But even if we allowed wealth to be essential to the arts, the same argument nevertheless could not be applied to virtue, because virtue (as Diogenes argues) requires a great amount of thought and practice, which is not the case to the same extent with the arts, and because virtue involves life-long steadfastness, strength and consistency, whereas these qualities are not equally manifested in the arts. "Next follows an exposition of the difference between things; for if we maintained that all things were absolutely indifferent, the whole of life would be thrown into confusion, as it is by Aristo, and no function or task could be found for wisdom, since there would be absolutely no distinction between the things that pertain to the conduct of life, and no choice need be exercised among them. Accordingly after conclusively proving that morality alone is good and baseness alone evil, the Stoics went on to affirm that among those things which were of no importance for happiness or misery, there was nevertheless an element of difference, making some of them of positive and others of negative value, and others neutral. < 3.51.  Again among things valuable — e.g. health, unimpaired senses, freedom from pain, fame, wealth and the like — they said that some afford us adequate grounds for preferring them to other things, while others are not of this nature; and similarly among those things which are of negative value some afford adequate grounds for our rejecting them, such as pain, disease, loss of the senses, poverty, disgrace, and the like; others not so. Hence arose the distinction, in Zeno's terminology, between proēgmena and the opposite, apoproēgmena — for Zeno using the copious Greek language still employed novel words coined for the occasion, a licence not allowed to us with the poor vocabulary of Latin; though you are fond of saying that Latin is actually more copious than Greek. However, to make it easier to understand the meaning of this term it will not be out of place to explain the method which Zeno pursued in coining it. < 3.52.  "In a royal court, Zeno remarks, no one speaks of the king himself as 'promoted' to honour (for that is the meaning of proēgmenon), but the term is applied to those holding some office of state whose rank most nearly approaches, though it is second to, the royal pre‑eminence; similarly in the conduct of life the title proēgmenon, that is, 'promoted,' is to be given not to those things which are in the first rank, but to those which hold the second place; for these we may use either the term suggested (for that will be a literal translation) or 'advanced' and 'degraded,' or the term we have been using all along, 'preferred' or 'superior,' and for the opposite 'rejected.' If the meaning is intelligible we need not be punctilious about the use of words. < 3.53.  But since we declare that everything that is good occupies the first rank, it follows that this which we entitle preferred or superior is neither good nor evil; and accordingly we define it as being indifferent but possessed of a moderate value — since it has occurred to me that I may use the word 'indifferent' to represent their term adiaphoron. For in fact, it was inevitable that the class of intermediate things should contain some things that were either in accordance with nature, or the reverse, and this being so, that this class should include some things which possessed moderate value, and, granting this, that some things of this class should be 'preferred.' < 3.54.  There were good grounds therefore for making this distinction; and furthermore, to elucidate the matter still more clearly they put forward the following illustration: Just as, supposing we were to assume that our end and aim is to throw a knuckle-bone in such a way that it may stand upright, a bone that is thrown so as to fall upright will be in some measure 'preferred' or advanced' in relation to the proposed end, and one that falls otherwise the reverse, and yet that 'advance' on the part of the knuckle-bone will not be a constituent part of the end indicated, so those things which are 'preferred' are it is true means to the End but are in no sense constituents of its essential nature. < 3.55.  "Next comes the division of goods into three classes, first those which are 'constituents' of the final end (for so I represent the term telika, this being a case of an idea which we may decide, as we agreed, to express in several words as we cannot do so in one, in order to make the meaning clear), secondly those which are 'productive' of the End, the Greek poiētika; and thirdly those which are both. The only instances of goods of the 'constituent' class are moral action; the only instance of a 'productive' good is a friend. Wisdom, according to the Stoics, is both constituent and productive; for as being itself an appropriate activity it comes under what I called the constituent class; as causing and producing moral actions, it can be called productive. < 3.56.  "These things which we call 'preferred' are in some cases preferred for their own sake, in others because they produce a certain result, and in others for both reasons; for their own sake, as a certain cast of features and of countece, or a certain pose or movement, things which may be in themselves either preferable or to be rejected; others will be called preferred because they produce a certain result, for example, money; others again for both reasons, like sound senses and good health. < 3.57.  About good fame (that term being a better translation in this context than 'glory' of the Stoic expression eudoxiā) Chrysippus and Diogenes used to aver that, apart from any practical value it may possess, it is not worth stretching out a finger for; and I strongly agree with them. On the other hand their successors, finding themselves unable to resist the attacks of Carneades, declared that good fame, as I have called it, was preferred and desirable for its own sake, and that a man of good breeding and liberal education would desire to have the good opinion of his parents and relatives, and of good men in general, and that for its own sake and not for any practical advantage; and they argue that just as we desire the welfare of our children, even of such as may be born after we are dead, for their own sake, so a man ought to study his reputation even after death, for itself, even apart from any advantage. < 3.58.  "But although we pronounce Moral Worth to be the sole good, it is nevertheless consistent to perform an appropriate act, in spite of the fact that we count appropriate action neither a good nor an evil. For in the sphere of these neutral things there is an element of reasonableness, in the sense that an account can be rendered of it, and therefore in the sense that an account can also be rendered of its performance; and this proves that an appropriate act is an intermediate thing, to be reckoned neither as a good nor as the opposite. And since those things which are neither to be counted among virtues nor vices nevertheless contain a factor which can be useful, their element of utility is worth preserving. Again, this neutral class also includes action of a certain kind, viz. such that reason calls upon us to do or to produce some one of these neutral things; but an action reasonably performed we call an appropriate act; appropriate action therefore is included in the class which is reckoned neither as good nor the opposite. < 3.59.  "It is also clear that some actions are performed by the Wise Man in the sphere of these neutral things. Well then, when he does such an action he judges it to be an appropriate act. And as his judgment on this point never errs, therefore appropriate action will exist in the sphere of these neutral things. The same thing is also proved by the following argument: We observe that something exists which we call right action; but this is an appropriate act perfectly performed; therefore there will also be such a thing as an imperfect appropriate act; so that, if to restore a trust as a matter of principle is a right act, to restore a trust must be counted as an appropriate act; the addition of the qualification 'on principle' makes it a right action: the mere restitution in itself is counted an appropriate act. Again, since there can be no question but that class of things we call neutral includes some things worthy to be chosen and others to be rejected; therefore whatever is done or described in this manner is entirely included under the term appropriate action. This shows that since love of self is implanted by nature in all men, both the foolish and the wise alike will choose what is in accordance with nature and reject the contrary. Thus there is a region of appropriate action which is common to the wise and the unwise; and this proves that appropriate action deals with the things we call neutral. < 3.60.  But since these neutral things form the basis of all appropriate acts, there is good ground for the dictum that it is with these things that all our practical deliberations deal, including the will to live and the will to quit this life. When a man's circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life. This makes it plain that it is on occasion appropriate for the Wise Man to quit life although he is happy, and also of the Foolish Man to remain in life although he is miserable. < 3.61.  For with the Stoics good and evil, as has repeatedly been said already, are a subsequent outgrowth; whereas the primary things of nature, whether favourable or the reverse, fall under the judgment and choice of the Wise Man, and form so to speak the subject-matter, the given material with which wisdom deals. Therefore the reasons both for remaining in life and for departing from it are to be measured entirely by the primary things of nature aforesaid. For the virtuous man is not necessarily retained in life by virtue, and also those who are devoid of virtue need not necessarily seek death. And very often it is appropriate for the Wise Man to abandon life at a moment when he is enjoying supreme happiness, if an opportunity offers for making a timely exit. For the Stoic view is that happiness, which means life in harmony with nature, is a matter of seizing the right moment. So that Wisdom her very self upon occasion bids the Wise Man to leave her. Hence, as vice does not possess the power of furnishing a reason for suicide, it is clear that even for the foolish, who are also miserable, it is appropriate to remain alive if they possess a predomice of those things which we pronounce to be in accordance with nature. And since the fool is equally miserable when departing from life and when remaining in it, and the undesirability of his life is not increased by its prolongation, there is good ground for saying that those who are in a position to enjoy a preponderance of things that are natural ought to remain in life. < 3.73.  "The same honour is also bestowed with good reason upon Natural Philosophy, because he who is to live in accordance with nature must base his principles upon the system and government of the entire world. Nor again can anyone judge truly of things good and evil, save by a knowledge of the whole plan of nature and also of the life of the gods, and of the answer to the question whether the nature of man is or is not in harmony with that of the universe. And no one without Natural Philosophy can discern the value (and their value is very great) of the ancient maxims and precepts of the Wise Men, such as to 'obey occasion,' 'follow God,' 'know thyself,' and 'moderation in all things.' Also this science alone can impart a conception of the power of nature in fostering justice and maintaining friendship and the rest of the affections; nor again without unfolding nature's secrets can we understand the sentiment of piety towards the gods or the degree of gratitude that we owe to them. < 4.46.  "Another point to which I take great exception is that, when you have proved, as you think, that Moral Worth alone is good, you then turn round and say that of course there must be advantages adapted to our nature set before us as a starting point, in exercising choice among which advantages virtue may be able to come into existence. Now it was a mistake to make virtue consist in an act of choice, for this implies that the very thing that is the ultimate Good itself seeks to get something else. Surely the sum of Goods must include everything worth adopting, choosing or desiring, so that he who has attained it may not want anything more. In the case of those whose Chief Good consists in pleasure, notice how clear it is what things they are to do or not to do; no one can be in doubt as to the proper scope of all their duties, what these must aim at and what avoid. Or grant the ultimate Good that I am now upholding, and it becomes clear at once what one's duties are and what actions are prescribed. But you, who have no other standard in view but abstract right and morality, will not be able to find a source and starting point for duty and for conduct. <
18. Cicero, On Duties, 3.16-3.17, 3.20-3.21, 3.50-3.61, 3.73, 4.46 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 325, 389, 390, 391
3.16. Itaque iis omnes, in quibus est virtutis indoles, commoventur. Nec vero, cum duo Decii aut duo Scipiones fortes viri commemorantur, aut cum Fabricius aut Aristides iustus nominatur, aut ab illis fortitudinis aut ab hoc iustitiae tamquam a sapiente petitur exemplum; nemo enim horum sic sapiens, ut sapientem volumus intellegi, nec ii, qui sapientes habiti et nominati, M. Cato et C. Laelius, sapientes fuerunt, ne illi quidem septem, sed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque sapientium. 3.17. Quocirca nec id, quod vere honestum est, fas est cum utilitatis repugtia comparari, nec id, quod communiter appellamus honestum, quod colitur ab iis, qui bonos se viros haberi volunt, cum emolumentis umquam est comparandum, tamque id honestum, quod in nostram intellegentiam cadit, tuendum conservandumque nobis est quam illud, quod proprie dicitur vereque est honestum, sapientibus; aliter enim teneri non potest, si qua ad virtutem est facta progressio. Sed haec quidem de iis, qui conservatione officiorum existimantur boni. 3.20. Erit autem haec formula Stoicorum rationi disciplinaeque maxime consentanea; quam quidem his libris propterea sequimur, quod, quamquam et a veteribus Academicis et a Peripateticis vestris, qui quondam idem erant, qui Academici, quae honesta sunt, anteponuntur iis, quae videntur utilia, tamen splendidius haec ab eis disseruntur, quibus, quicquid honestum est, idem utile videtur nec utile quicquam, quod non honestum, quam ab iis, quibus et honestum aliquid non utile et utile non honestum. Nobis autem nostra Academia magnam licentiam dat, ut, quodcumque maxime probabile occurrat, id nostro iure liceat defendere. Sed redeo ad formulam. 3.21. Detrahere igitur alteri aliquid et hominem hominis incommodo suum commodum augere magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam dolor, quam cetera, quae possunt aut corpori accidere aut rebus externis. Nam principio tollit convictum humanum et societatem. Si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est, eam quae maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis societatem. 3.50. Sed incidunt, ut supra dixi, saepe causae, cum repugnare utilitas honestati videatur, ut animadvertendum sit, repugnetne plane an possit cum honestate coniungi. Eius generis hae sunt quaestiones: si exempli gratia vir bonus Alexandrea Rhodum magnum frumenti nurerum advexerit in Rhodiorum inopia et fame summaque annonae caritate, si idem sciat complures mercatores Alexandrea solvisse navesque in cursu frumento onustas petentes Rhodum viderit, dicturusne sit id Rhodiis an silentio suum quam plurimo venditurus. Sapientem et bonum virum fingimus; de eius deliberatione et consultatione quaerimus, qui celaturus Rhodios non sit, si id turpe iudicet, sed dubitet, an turpe non sit. 3.51. In huius modi causis aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et gravi Stoico, aliud Antipatro, discipulo eius, homini acutissimo. Antipatro omnia patefacienda, ut ne quid om-nino, quod venditor norit, emptor ignoret, Diogeni venditorem, quatenus iure civili constitutum sit, dicere vitia oportere, cetera sine insidiis agere et, quoniam vendat, velle quam optime vendere. Advexi, exposui, vendo meum non pluris quain ceteri, fortasse etiam minoris, cum maior est copia. Cui fit iniuria? 3.52. Exoritur Antipatri ratio ex altera parte: Quid ais? tu cum horninibus consulere debeas et servire humanae societati eaque lege natus sis et ea habeas principia naturae, quibus parere et quae sequi debeas, ut utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque communis utilitas tua sit, celabis homines, quid iis adsit commoditatis et copiae? Respondebit Diogenes fortasse sic: Aliud est celare, aliud tacere; neque ego nune te celo, si tibi non dico, quae natura deorum sit, qui sit finis bonorum, quae tibi plus prodessent cognita quam tritici vilitas; sed non, quicquid tibi audire utile est, idem mihi dicere necesse est. 3.53. Immo vero, inquiet ille, necesse est, siquidem meministi esse inter homines natura coniunctam societatem. Memini, inquiet ille; sed num ista societas talis est, ut nihil suum cuiusque sit? Quod si ila est, ne vendendum quidem quicquam est, sed dodum. Vides in hac tota disceptatione non illud dici: Quamvis hoc turpe sit, tamen, quoniam expedit, faciam, sed ita expedire, ut turpe non sit, ex altera autem parte, ea re, quia turpe sit, non esse faciendum. 3.54. Vendat aedes vir bonus propter aliqua vitia, quae ipse norit, ceteri ignorent, pestilentes sint et habeantur salubres, ignoretur in omnibus cubiculis apparere serpentes, male materiatae sint, ruinosae, sed hoc praeter dominum nemo sciat; quaero, si haec emptoribus venditor non dixerit aedesque vendiderit pluris multo, quam se venditurun putarit, num id iniuste aut improbe fecerit. 3.55. Ille vero, inquit Antipater; quid est enim aliud erranti viam non monstrare, quod Athenis exsecrationibus publicis sanctum est, si hoc non est, emptorem pati ruere et per errorem in maximam fraudem incurrere? Plus etiam est quam viam non monstrare; nam est scientem in errorem alterum inducere. Diogenes contra: Num te emere coegit, qui ne hortatus quidem est? Ille, quod non placebat, proscripsit, tu, quod placebat, emisti. Quodsi, qui proscribunt villain bonam beneque aedificatam, non existimantur fefellisse, etiamsi illa nec bona est nec aedificata ratione, multo minus, qui domum non laudarunt. Ubi enim iudicium emptoris est, ibi fraus venditoris quae potest esse? Sin autem dictum non omne praestandum est, quod dictum non est, id praestandum putas? Quid vero est stultius quam venditorem eius rei, quam vendat, vitia narrare? quid autem tam absurdum, quam si domini iussu ita praeco praedicet: 'Domum pestilentem vendo'? 3.56. Sic ergo in quibusdam causis dubiis ex altera parte defenditur honestas, ex altera ita de utilitate dicitur, ut id, quod utile videatur, non modo facere honestum sit, sed etiam non facere turpe. Haec est illa, quae videtur utilium fieri cum honestis saepe dissensio. Quae diiudicanda sunt; non enim, ut quaereremus, exposuimus, sed ut explicaremus. 3.57. Non igitur videtur nec frumentarius ille Rhodios nec hic aedium venditor celare emptores debuisse. Neque enim id est celare, quicquid reticeas, sed cum, quod tu scias, id ignorare emolumenti tui causa velis eos, quorum intersit id scire. Hoc autem celandi genus quale sit et cuius hominis, quis non videt? Certe non aperti, non simplicis, non ingenui, non iusti, non viri boni, versuti potius, obscuri, astuti, fallacis, malitiosi, callidi, veteratoris, vafri. Haec tot et alia plura nonne inutile est vitiorum subire nomina? 3.58. Quodsi vituperandi, qui reticuerunt, quid de iis existimandum est, qui orationis vanitatem adhibuerunt? C. Canius, eques Romanus, nec infacetus et satis litteratus, cum se Syracusas otiandi, ut ipse dicere solebat, non negotiandi causa contulisset, dictitabat se hortulos aliquos emere velle, quo invitare amicos et ubi se oblectare sine interpellatoribus posset. Quod cum percrebruisset, Pythius ei quidam, qui argentariam faceret Syracusis, venales quidem se hortos non habere, sed licere uti Canio, si vellet, ut suis, et simul ad cenam hominem in hortos invitavit in posterum diem. Cum ille promisisset, tum Pythius, qui esset ut argentarius apud omnes ordines gratiosus, piscatores ad se convocavit et ab iis petivit, ut ante suos hortulos postridie piscarentur, dixitque, quid eos facere vellet. Ad cenam tempori venit Canius; opipare a Pythio apparatum convivium, cumbarum ante oculos multitudo; pro se quisque, quod ceperat, afferebat, ante pedes Pythi pisces abiciebantur. 3.59. Tum Canius: Quaeso, inquit, quid est hoc, Pythi? tantumne piscium? tantumne cumbarum? Et ille: Quid mirum? inquit, hoc loco est Syracusis quicquid est piscium, hic aquatio, hac villa isti carere non possunt. Incensus Canius cupiditate contendit a Pythio, ut venderet; gravate ille primo; quid multa? impetrat. Emit homo cupidus et locuples tanti, quanti Pythius voluit, et emit instructos; nomina facit, negotium conficit. Invitat Canius postridie familiares suos, venit ipse mature; scalmum nullum videt, quaerit ex proximo vicino, num feriae quaedam piscatorum essent, quod eos nullos videret. Nullae, quod sciam, inquit; sed hic piscari nulli solent; itaque heri mirabar, quid accidisset. 3.60. Stomachari Canius; sed quid faceret? nondum enim C. Aquilius, collega et familiaris meus, protulerat de dolo malo formulas; in quibus ipsis, cum ex eo quaereretur, quid esset dolus malus, respondebat: cum esset aliud simulatum, aliud actum. Hoc quidem sane luculente ut ab homine perito definiendi. Ergo et Pythius et omnes aliud agentes, aliud simulantes perfidi, improbi, malitiosi. Nullum igitur eorum factum potest utile esse, cum sit tot vitiis inquinatum. 3.61. Quodsi Aquiliana definitio vera est, ex omni vita simulatio dissimulatioque tollenda est. Ita, nec ut emat melius nec ut vendat, quicquam simulabit aut dissimulabit vir bonus. Atque iste dolus malus et legibus erat vindicatus, ut tutela duodecim tabulis, circumscriptio adulescentium lege Plaetoria, et sine lege iudiciis, in quibus additur EX FIDE BONA . Reliquorum autem iudiciorum haec verba maxime excellunt: in arbitrio rei uxoriae MELIUS AEQUIUS, in fiducia UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER. Quid ergo? aut in eo, QUOD MELIUS AEQUIUS, potest ulla pars inesse fraudis? aut, cum dicitur INTER BONOS BENE AGIER, quicquam agi dolose aut malitiose potest? Dolus autem malus in simulatione, ut ait Aquilius, continetur. Tollendum est igitur ex rebus contrahendis omne mendacium; non illicitatorem venditor, non, qui contra se liceatur, emptor apponet; uterque, si ad eloquendum venerit, non plus quam semel eloquetur. 3.73. Periclitemur, si placet, et in iis quidem exemplis, in quibus peccari volgus hominum fortasse non putet. Neque enim de sicariis, veneficis, testamentariis, furibus, peculatoribus hoc loco disserendum est, qui non verbis sunt et disputatione philosophorum, sed vinclis et carcere fatigandi, sed haec consideremus, quae faciunt ii, qui habentur boni. L. Minuci Basili, locupletis hominis, falsum testamentum quidam e Graecia Romamn attulerunt. Quod quo facilius optinerent, scripserunt heredes secum M. Crassum et Q. Hortensium, homines eiusdem aetatis potentissimos; qui cum illud falsum esse suspicarentur, sibi autem nullius essent conscii culpae, alieni facinoris munusculum non repudiaverunt. Quid ergo? satin est hoc, ut non deliquisse videantur? Mihi quidem non videtur, quamquam alterum vivum amavi, alterum non odi mortuum; 3.16.  Accordingly, such duties appeal to all men who have a natural disposition to virtue. And when the two Decii or the two Scipios are mentioned as "brave men" or Fabricius is called "the just," it is not at all that the former are quoted as perfect models of courage or the latter as a perfect model of justice, as if we had in one of them the ideal "wise man." For no one of them was wise in the sense in which we wish to have "wise" understood; neither were Marcus Cato and Gaius Laelius wise, though they were so considered and were surnamed "the wise." Not even the famous Seven were "wise." But because of their constant observance of "mean" duties they bore a certain semblance and likeness to wise men. < 3.17.  For these reasons it is unlawful either to weigh true morality against conflicting expediency, or common morality, which is cultivated by those who wish to be considered good men, against what is profitable; but we every-day people must observe and live up to that moral right which comes within the range of our comprehension as jealously as the truly wise men have to observe and live up to that which is morally right in the technical and true sense of the word. For otherwise we cannot maintain such progress as we have made in the direction of virtue. So much for those who have won a reputation for being good men by their careful observance of duty. < 3.20.  That rule, moreover, shall be in perfect harmony with the Stoics' system and doctrines. It is their teachings that I am following in these books, and for this reason: the older Academicians and your Peripatetics (who were once the same as the Academicians) give what is morally right the preference over what seems expedient; and yet the discussion of these problems, if conducted by those who consider whatever is morally right also expedient and nothing expedient that is not at the same time morally right, will be more illuminating than if conducted by those who think that something not expedient may be morally right and that something not morally right may be expedient. But our New Academy allows us wide liberty, so that it is within my right to defend any theory that presents itself to me as most probable. But to return to my rule. < 3.21.  Well then, for a man to take something from his neighbour and to profit by his neighbour's loss is more contrary to Nature than is death or poverty or pain or anything else that can affect either our person or our property. For, in the first place, injustice is fatal to social life and fellowship between man and man. For, if we are so disposed that each, to gain some personal profit, will defraud or injure his neighbour, then those bonds of human society, which are most in accord with Nature's laws, must of necessity be broken. < 3.50.  But, as I said above, cases often arise in which expediency may seem to clash with moral rectitude; and so we should examine carefully and see whether their conflict is inevitable or whether they may be reconciled. The following are problems of this sort: suppose, for example, a time of dearth and famine at Rhodes, with provisions at fabulous prices; and suppose that an honest man has imported a large cargo of grain from Alexandria and that to his certain knowledge also several other importers have set sail from Alexandria, and that on the voyage he has sighted their vessels laden with grain and bound for Rhodes; is he to report the fact to the Rhodians or is he to keep his own counsel and sell his own stock at the highest market price? I am assuming the case of a virtuous, upright man, and I am raising the question how a man would think and reason who would not conceal the facts from the Rhodians if he thought that it was immoral to do so, but who might be in doubt whether such silence would really be immoral. < 3.51.  In deciding cases of this kind Diogenes of Babylonia, a great and highly esteemed Stoic, consistently holds one view; his pupil Antipater, a most profound scholar, holds another. According to Antipater all the facts should be disclosed, that the buyer may not be uninformed of any detail that the seller knows; according to Diogenes the seller should declare any defects in his wares, in so far as such a course is prescribed by the common law of the land; but for the rest, since he has goods to sell, he may try to sell them to the best possible advantage, provided he is guilty of no misrepresentation. "I have imported my stock," Diogenes's merchant will say; "I have offered it for sale; I sell at a price no higher than my competitors — perhaps even lower, when the market is overstocked. Who is wronged?" < 3.52.  "What say you?" comes Antipater's argument on the other side; "it is your duty to consider the interests of your fellow-men and to serve society; you were brought into the world under these conditions and have these inborn principles which you are in duty bound to obey and follow, that your interest shall be the interest of the community and conversely that the interest of the community shall be your interest as well; will you, in view of all these facts, conceal from your fellow-men what relief in plenteous supplies is close at hand for them?" "It is one thing to conceal," Diogenes will perhaps reply; not to reveal is quite a different thing. At this present moment I am not concealing from you, even if I am not revealing to you, the nature of gods or the highest good; and to know these secrets would be of more advantage to you than to know that the price of wheat was down. But I am under no obligation to tell you everything that it may be to your interest to be told." < 3.53.  "Yea," Antipater will say, "but you are, as you must admit, if you will only bethink you of the bonds of fellowship forged by Nature and existing between man and man." "I do not forget them," the other will reply: but do you mean to say that those bonds of fellowship are such that there is no such thing as private property? If that is the case, we should not sell anything at all, but freely give everything away." In this whole discussion, you see, no one says, "However wrong morally this or that may be, still, since it is expedient, I will do it"; but the one side asserts that a given act is expedient, without being morally wrong, while the other insists that the act should not be done, because it is morally wrong. < 3.54.  Suppose again that an honest man is offering a house for sale on account of certain undesirable features of which he himself is aware but which nobody else knows; suppose it is unsanitary, but has the reputation of being healthful; suppose it is not generally known that vermin are to be found in all the bedrooms; suppose, finally, that it is built of unsound timber and likely to collapse, but that no one knows about it except the owner; if the vendor does not tell the purchaser these facts but sells him the house for far more than he could reasonably have expected to get for it, I ask whether his transaction is unjust or dishonourable. < 3.55.  "Yes," says Antipater, "it is; for to allow a purchaser to be hasty in closing a deal and through mistaken judgment to incur a very serious loss, if this is not refusing 'to set a man right when he has lost his way' (a crime which at Athens is prohibited on pain of public execration), what is? It is even worse than refusing to set a man on his way: it is deliberately leading a man astray." "Can you say," answers Diogenes, "that he compelled you to purchase, when he did not even advise it? He advertised for sale what he did not like; you bought what you did like. If people are not considered guilty of swindling when they place upon their placards For Sale: A Fine Villa, Well Built, even when it is neither good nor properly built, still less guilty are they who say nothing in praise of their house. For there the purchaser may exercise his own judgment, what fraud can there be on the part of the vendor? But if, again, not all that is expressly stated has to be made good, do you think a man is bound to make good what has not been said? What, pray, would be more stupid than for a vendor to recount all the faults in the article he is offering for sale? And what would be so absurd as for an auctioneer to cry, at the owner's bidding, 'Here is an unsanitary house for sale'?" < 3.56.  In this way, then, in certain doubtful cases moral rectitude is defended on the one side, while on the other side the case of expediency is so presented as to make it appear not only morally right to do what seems expedient, but even morally wrong not to do it. This is the contradiction that seems often to arise between the expedient and the morally right. But I must give my decision in these two cases; for I did not propound them merely to raise the questions, but to offer a solution. < 3.57.  I think, then, that it was the duty of that grain-dealer not to keep back the facts from the Rhodians, and of this vendor of the house to deal in the same way with his purchaser. The fact is that merely holding one's peace about a thing does not constitute concealment, but concealment consists in trying for your own profit to keep others from finding out something that you know, when it is for their interest to know it. And who fails to discern what manner of concealment that is and what sort of person would be guilty of it? At all events he would be no candid or sincere or straightforward or upright or honest man, but rather one who is shifty, sly, artful, shrewd, underhand, cunning, one grown old in fraud and subtlety. Is it not inexpedient to subject oneself to all these terms of reproach and many more besides? < 3.58.  If, then, they are to be blamed who suppress the truth, what are we to think of those who actually state what is false? Gaius Canius, a Roman knight, a man of considerable wit and literary culture, once went to Syracuse for a vacation, as he himself used to say, and not for business. He gave out that he had a mind to purchase a little country seat, where he could invite his friends and enjoy himself, uninterrupted by troublesome visitors. When this fact was spread abroad, one Pythius, a banker of Syracuse, informed him that he had such an estate; that it was not for sale, however, but Canius might make himself at home there, if he pleased; and at the same time he invited him to the estate to dinner next day. Canius accepted. Then Pythius, who, as might be expected of a moneylender, could command favours of all classes, called the fishermen together and asked them to do their fishing the next day out in front of his villa, and told them what he wished them to do. Canius came to dinner at the appointed hour; Pythius had a sumptuous banquet prepared; there was a whole fleet of boats before their eyes; each fisherman brought in in turn the catch that he had made; and the fishes were deposited at the feet of Pythius. < 3.59.  "Pray, Pythius," said Canius thereupon, "what does this mean? — all these fish? — all these boats?" "No wonder," answered Pythius; "this is where all the fish in Syracuse are; here is where the fresh water comes from; the fishermen cannot get along without this estate." Inflamed with desire for it, Canius insisted upon Pythius's selling it to him. At first he demurred. To make a long story short, Canius gained his point. The man was rich, and, in his desire to own the country seat, he paid for it all that Pythius asked; and he bought the entire equipment, too. Pythius entered the amount upon his ledger and completed the transfer. The next day Canius invited his friends; he came early himself. Not so much as a thole-pin was in sight. He asked his next-door neighbour whether it was a fishermen's holiday, for not a sign of them did he see. "Not so far as I know," said he; "but none are in the habit of fishing here. And so I could not make out what was the matter yesterday." < 3.60.  Canius was furious; but what could he do? For not yet had my colleague and friend, Gaius Aquilius, introduced the established form to apply to criminal fraud. When asked what he meant by "criminal fraud," as specified in these forms, he could reply: "Pretending one thing and practising another" — a very felicitous definition, as one might expect from an expert in making them. Pythius, therefore, and all others who do one thing while they pretend another are faithless, dishonest, and unprincipled scoundrels. No act of theirs can be expedient, when what they do is tainted with so many vices. < 3.61.  But if Aquilius's definition is correct, pretence and concealment should be done away with in all departments of our daily life. Then an honest man will not be guilty of either pretence or concealment in order to buy or to sell to better advantage. Besides, your "criminal fraud" had previously been prohibited by the statutes: the penalty in the matter of trusteeships, for example, is fixed by the Twelve Tables; for the defrauding of minors, by the Plaetorian law. The same prohibition is effective, without statutory enactment, in equity cases, in which it is added that the decision shall be "as good faith requires." In all other cases in equity, moreover, the following phrases are most noteworthy: in a case calling for arbitration in the matter of a wife's dowry: what is "the fairer is the better"; in a suit for the restoration of a trust: "honest dealing, as between honest parties." Pray, then, can there be any element of fraud in what is adjusted for the "better and fairer"? Or can anything fraudulent or unprincipled be done, when "honest dealing between honest parties" is stipulated? But "criminal fraud," as Aquilius says, consists in false pretence. We must, therefore, keep misrepresentation entirely out of business transactions: the seller will not engage a bogus bidder to run prices up nor the buyer one to bid low against himself to keep them down; and each, if they come to naming a price, will state once for all what he will give or take. < 3.73.  Let us put our principle to the test, if you please, and see if it holds good in those instances in which, perhaps, the world in general finds no wrong; for in this connection we do not need to discuss cut-throats, poisoners, forgers of wills, thieves, and embezzlers of public moneys, who should be repressed not by lectures and discussions of philosophers, but by chains and prison walls; but let us study here the conduct of those who have the reputation of being honest men. Certain individuals brought from Greece to Rome a forged will, purporting to be that of the wealthy Lucius Minucius Basilus. The more easily to procure validity for it, they made joint-heirs with themselves two of the most influential men of the day, Marcus Crassus and Quintus Hortensius. Although these men suspected that the will was a forgery, still, as they were conscious of no personal guilt in the matter, they did not spurn the miserable boon procured through the crime of others. What shall we say, then? Is this excuse competent to acquit them of guilt? I cannot think so, although I loved the one while he lived, and do not hate the other now that he is dead. <
19. Cicero, On Fate, 28-29, 42-43, 30 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
20. Cicero, Academica Posteriora, 40-42 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 425
21. Seneca The Younger, De Constantia Sapientis, 7.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 337
22. Plutarch, Letter of Condolence To Apollonius, 102d, 102c (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 67
102c. Indeed, though there are many emotions that affect the soul, yet grief, from its nature, is the most cruel of all. They say: To many there doth come because of grief Insanity and ills incurable, And some for grief have ended their own life. The pain and pang felt at the death of a son has in itself good cause to awaken grief, which is only natural, and over it we have no control. For I, for my part, cannot concur with those who extol that harsh and callous indifference, which is both impossible and unprofitable. For this will rob us of the kindly feeling which comes from mutual affection and which above all else we must conserve.
23. Plutarch, On The Obsolescence of Oracles, 434d, 416e- (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 146
24. Plutarch, Instituta Laconica, 238b (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 337
238b. Then the choir of men in the prime of life would sing in response, And that are we; look, if you will, and see. And the third choir, that of the boys, would sing, And better far 'tis certain we shall be. Moreover the rhythmic movement of their marching songs was such as to excite courage and boldness, and contempt for death; and these they used both in dancing, and also to the accompaniment of the flute when advancing upon the enemy. In fact, Lycurgus coupled fondness for music with military drill, so that the over-assertive warlike spirit, by being combined with melody, might have concord and harmony. It was for this reason that in time of battle the king offered sacrifice to the Muses before the conflict, so that those who fought should make their deeds worthy to be told
25. Plutarch, Marius, 441b, 441c, 444b, 444e, 444e-445, 445a, 451d, 451e, 446-447a (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 285
26. Plutarch, Platonic Questions, 1003a (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 146
27. Plutarch, Table Talk, 633a (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 337
28. Plutarch, Agesilaus, 36.2-36.3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 67
36.3. οὐ μὴν ἐφρόντιζε τούτων ὁ Ἀγησίλαος, οὐδὲ ᾤετο παρʼ ἀξίαν εἶναι λειτούργημα δημόσιον οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀνάξιον ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ζῆν ἄπρακτον ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ καθῆσθαι περιμένοντα τὸν θάνατον, ὅθεν ἀθροίσας ἀθροισας with Coraës and S: ἤθροισε . μισθοφόρους ἀφʼ ὧν ὁ Τάχως αὐτῷ χρημάτων ἔπεμψε, καὶ πλοῖα πληρώσας, ἀνήχθη, τριάκοντα συμβούλους ἔχων μεθʼ ἑαυτοῦ Σπαρτιάτας, ὡς πρότερον. 36.3.  Agesilaüs, however, paid no heed to these considerations, nor did he think any public service beneath his dignity; it was more unworthy of him, in his opinion, to live an idle life in the city, and to sit down and wait for death. Therefore he collected mercenaries with the money which Tachos sent him, embarked them on transports, and put to sea, accompanied by thirty Spartan counsellors, as formerly.
29. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 2.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 292
2.1. Κἀγὼ ἐλθὼν πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, ἦλθον οὐ καθʼ ὑπεροχὴν λόγου ἢ σοφίας καταγγέλλων ὑμῖν τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ θεοῦ, 2.1. When I came to you, brothers, I didn't come with excellence ofspeech or of wisdom, proclaiming to you the testimony of God.
30. New Testament, Romans, 7.14-7.25 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 286
7.14. οἴδαμεν γὰρ ὅτι ὁ νόμος πνευματικός ἐστιν· ἐγὼ δὲ σάρκινός εἰμι, πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν. 7.15. ὃ γὰρ κατεργάζομαι οὐ γινώσκω· οὐ γὰρ ὃ θέλω τοῦτο πράσσω, ἀλλʼ ὃ μισῶ τοῦτο ποιῶ. 7.16. εἰ δὲ ὃ οὐ θέλω τοῦτο ποιῶ, σύνφημι τῷ νόμῳ ὅτι καλός. 7.17. Νυνὶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζομαι αὐτὸ ἀλλὰ ἡ ἐνοικοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία. 7.18. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ οἰκεῖ ἐν ἐμοί, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου, ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ θέλειν παράκειταί μοι, τὸ δὲ κατεργάζεσθαι τὸ καλὸν οὔ· 7.19. οὐ γὰρ ὃ θέλω ποιῶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ ὃ οὐ θέλω κακὸν τοῦτο πράσσω. 7.20. εἰ δὲ ὃ οὐ θέλω τοῦτο ποιῶ, οὐκέτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζομαι αὐτὸ ἀλλὰ ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία. 7.21. Εὑρίσκω ἄρα τὸν νόμον τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοὶ ποιεῖν τὸ καλὸν ὅτι ἐμοὶ τὸ κακὸν παράκειται· 7.22. συνήδομαι γὰρ τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον, 7.23. βλέπω δὲ ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου ἀντιστρατευόμενον τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοός μου καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζοντά με [ἐν] τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου. 7.24. ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος· τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου; 7.25. χάρις [δὲ] τῷ θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν. ἄρα οὖν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ τῷ μὲν νοῒ δουλεύω νόμῳ θεοῦ, τῇ δὲ σαρκὶ νόμῳ ἁμαρτίας. 7.14. For we know that the law is spiritual, but I am fleshly, sold under sin. 7.15. For I don't know what I am doing. For I don't practice what I desire to do; but what I hate, that I do. 7.16. But if what I don't desire, that I do, I consent to the law that it is good. 7.17. So now it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwells in me. 7.18. For I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwells no good thing. For desire is present with me, but I don't find it doing that which is good. 7.19. For the good which I desire, I don't do; but the evil which I don't desire, that I practice. 7.20. But if what I don't desire, that I do, it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwells in me. 7.21. I find then the law, that, to me, while I desire to do good, evil is present. 7.22. For I delight in God's law after the inward man, 7.23. but I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is in my members. 7.24. What a wretched man I am! Who will deliver me out of the body of this death? 7.25. I thank God through Jesus Christ, our Lord! So then with the mind, I myself serve God's law, but with the flesh, the sin's law.
31. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 2.2.5-2.2.6, 3.8.3-3.8.5, 3.9.1-3.9.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 181, 337
32. Seneca The Younger, On Leisure, 17.4-17.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 337
33. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 41.2, 66.39-66.40, 75.9-75.12, 90.46, 92.29-92.30, 107.11-107.12, 121.19-121.21 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 390, 392, 428, 451, 452
41.2. This is what I mean, Lucilius: a holy spirit indwells within us, one who marks our good and bad deeds, and is our guardian. As we treat this spirit, so are we treated by it. Indeed, no man can be good without the help of God. Can one rise superior to fortune unless God helps him to rise? He it is that gives noble and upright counsel. In each good man A god doth dwell, but what god know we not.[1] 66.39. To explain my thought briefly, the material with which a good is concerned is sometimes contrary to nature, but a good itself never is contrary, since no good is without reason, and reason is in accordance with nature. "What, then," you ask, "is reason?" It is copying nature. "And what," you say, "is the greatest good that man can possess?" It is to conduct oneself according to what nature wills. 66.39. To explain my thought briefly, the material with which a good is concerned is sometimes contrary to nature, but a good itself never is contrary, since no good is without reason, and reason is in accordance with nature. "What, then," you ask, "is reason?" It is copying nature.[15] "And what," you say, "is the greatest good that man can possess?" It is to conduct oneself according to what nature wills. 75.9. First come those who have not yet attained wisdom but have already gained a place near by. Yet even that which is not far away is still outside. These, if you ask me, are men who have already laid aside all passions and vices, who have learned what things are to be embraced; but their assurance is not yet tested. They have not yet put their good into practice, yet from now on they cannot slip back into the faults which they have escaped. They have already arrived at a point from which there is no slipping back, but they are not yet aware of the fact; as I remember writing in another letter, "They are ignorant of their knowledge." It has now been vouchsafed to them to enjoy their good, but not yet to be sure of it. 75.9. First come those who have not yet attained wisdom but have already gained a place near by. Yet even that which is not far away is still outside. These, if you ask me, are men who have already laid aside all passions and vices, who have learned what things are to be embraced; but their assurance is not yet tested. They have not yet put their good into practice, yet from now on they cannot slip back into the faults which they have escaped. They have already arrived at a point from which there is no slipping back, but they are not yet aware of the fact; as I remember writing in another letter, "They are ignorant of their knowledge."[6] It has now been vouchsafed to them to enjoy their good, but not yet to be sure of it. 75.10. Some define this class, of which I have been speaking, – a class of men who are making progress, – as having escaped the diseases of the mind, but not yet the passions, and as still standing upon slippery ground; because no one is beyond the dangers of evil except him who has cleared himself of it wholly. But no one has so cleared himself except the man who has adopted wisdom in its stead. 75.10. Some define this class, of which I have been speaking, – a class of men who are making progress, – as having escaped the diseases of the mind, but not yet the passions, and as still standing upon slippery ground; because no one is beyond the dangers of evil except him who has cleared himself of it wholly. But no one has so cleared himself except the man who has adopted wisdom in its stead. 75.11. I have often before explained the difference between the diseases of the mind and its passions. And I shall remind you once more: the diseases are hardened and chronic vices, such as greed and ambition; they have enfolded the mind in too close a grip, and have begun to be permanent evils thereof. To give a brief definition: by "disease" we mean a persistent perversion of the judgment, so that things which are mildly desirable are thought to be highly desirable. Or, if you prefer, we may define it thus: to be too zealous in striving for things which are only mildly desirable or not desirable at all, or to value highly things which ought to be valued but slightly or valued not at all. 75.11. I have often before explained the difference between the diseases of the mind and its passions. And I shall remind you once more: the diseases are hardened and chronic vices, such as greed and ambition; they have enfolded the mind in too close a grip, and have begun to be permanent evils thereof. To give a brief definition: by "disease" we mean a persistent perversion of the judgment, so that things which are mildly desirable are thought to be highly desirable. Or, if you prefer, we may define it thus: to be too zealous in striving for things which are only mildly desirable or not desirable at all, or to value highly things which ought to be valued but slightly or valued not at all. 75.12. "Passions" are objectionable impulses of the spirit, sudden and vehement; they have come so often, and so little attention has been paid to them, that they have caused a state of disease; just as a catarrh, when there has been but a single attack and the catarrh has not yet become habitual, produces a cough, but causes consumption when it has become regular and chronic. Therefore we may say that those who have made most progress are beyond the reach of the "diseases"; but they still feel the "passions" even when very near perfection. 75.12. Passions are objectionable impulses of the spirit, sudden and vehement; they have come so often, and so little attention has been paid to them, that they have caused a state of disease; just as a catarrh,[7] when there has been but a single attack and the catarrh has not yet become habitual, produces a cough, but causes consumption when it has become regular and chronic. Therefore we may say that those who have made most progress are beyond the reach of the "diseases"; but they still feel the "passions" even when very near perfection. 90.46. What, then, is the conclusion of the matter? It was by reason of their ignorance of things that the men of those days were innocent; and it makes a great deal of difference whether one wills not to sin or has not the knowledge to sin. Justice was unknown to them, unknown prudence, unknown also self-control and bravery; but their rude life possessed certain qualities akin to all these virtues. Virtue is not vouchsafed to a soul unless that soul has been trained and taught, and by unremitting practice brought to perfection. For the attainment of this boon, but not in the possession of it, were we born; and even in the best of men, before you refine them by instruction, there is but the stuff of virtue, not virtue itself. Farewell. 90.46. What, then, is the conclusion of the matter? It was by reason of their ignorance of things that the men of those days were innocent; and it makes a great deal of difference whether one wills not to sin or has not the knowledge to sin.[28] Justice was unknown to them, unknown prudence, unknown also self-control and bravery; but their rude life possessed certain qualities akin to all these virtues. Virtue is not vouchsafed to a soul unless that soul has been trained and taught, and by unremitting practice brought to perfection. For the attainment of this boon, but not in the possession of it, were we born; and even in the best of men, before you refine them by instruction, there is but the stuff of virtue, not virtue itself. Farewell. Tellus in longas est patefacta vias! Cf. § 46, summing up the message of Seneca's letter. Serraco veniente abies, atque altera pinum Plaustra vehunt, nutant alte populoque mitur. Compare also the "towering tenements" of § 92.29. Though by means of reason he can lead a life which will not bring regrets, yet there resides in this imperfect creature, man, a certain power that makes for badness, because he possesses a mind which is easily moved to perversity. Suppose, however, the badness which is in full view, and has previously been stirred to activity, to be removed; the man is still not a good man, but he is being moulded to goodness. One, however, in whom there is lacking any quality that makes for goodness, is bad. 107.11. Lead me, O Master of the lofty heavens, My Father, whithersoever thou shalt wish. I shall not falter, but obey with speed. And though I would not, I shall go, and suffer, In sin and sorrow what I might have done In noble virtue. Aye, the willing soul Fate leads, but the unwilling drags along.[2] 107.12. Let us live thus, and speak thus; let Fate find us ready and alert. Here is your great soul – the man who has given himself over to Fate; on the other hand, that man is a weakling and a degenerate who struggles and maligns the order of the universe and would rather reform the gods than reform himself. Farewell. 121.19. People may ask: "How can an animal at birth have an understanding of things wholesome or destructive?" The first question, however, is whether it can have such understanding, and not how it can understand. And it is clear that they have such understanding from the fact that, even if you add understanding, they will act no more adequately than they did in the first place. Why should the hen show no fear of the peacock or the goose, and yet run from the hawk, which is a so much smaller animal not even familiar to the hen? Why should young chickens fear a cat and not a dog? These fowls clearly have a presentiment of harm – one not based on actual experiments; for they avoid a thing before they can possibly have experience of it. 121.20. Furthermore, in order that you may not suppose this to be the result of chance, they do not shrink from certain other things which you would expect them to fear, nor do they ever forget vigilance and care in this regard; they all possess equally the faculty of avoiding what is destructive. Besides, their fear does not grow as their lives lengthen. Hence indeed it is evident that these animals have not reached such a condition through experience; it is because of an inborn desire for self-preservation. The teachings of experience are slow and irregular; but whatever Nature communicates belongs equally to everyone, and comes immediately.
34. Diogenes of Oenoanda, Fragments, 54.3.10-54.3.15 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 423
35. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.3.1-1.3.9, 1.6.19-1.6.43, 1.7.25-1.7.33, 1.8.7, 1.13.1-1.13.5, 1.14.9-1.14.14, 1.22.9-1.22.10, 1.27.6-1.27.7, 2.23.9-2.23.11, 2.23.18, 2.23.42, 3.3.14-3.3.19, 3.8.1-3.8.2, 3.20.1-3.20.19, 3.24.19-3.24.25, 3.24.68-3.24.75, 3.24.112-3.24.118, 4.1.128-4.1.134, 4.4.33-4.4.41, 4.7.12-4.7.32, 4.8.30-4.8.32 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 92, 292, 320, 325, 413, 431, 433, 457
36. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 53.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
37. Musonius Rufus, Fragments, 40, 42, 8, 38 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 292, 431, 433
38. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 1.7, 4.23, 4.41, 7.9, 9.36-9.39, 10.14 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 92
39. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, 10.4, 14.3-14.6, 15.1, 28.2-28.3, 30.5 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 67, 128, 133
40. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On The Soul, 87-91 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 128
41. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Supplement To On The Soul (Mantissa), 2.106-2.110 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 128
42. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.5.3-4.5.18, 4.6.2-4.6.5, 4.6.12-4.6.27, 4.7.12-4.7.17, 5.5.16-5.5.21, 5.5.26-5.5.35, 5.6.1-5.6.2, 5.6.19-5.6.22, 5.6.29-5.6.32, 5.7.81-5.7.88, 5.9.7-5.9.8, 6.1.4-6.1.27, 6.8.67-6.8.82, 8.4.26, 8.9.15-8.9.17 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 58, 67, 72, 220, 285, 320, 325, 327, 336
43. Posidonius Olbiopolitanus, Fragments, 30 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 325
44. Galen, On The Use of Parts, 4.13 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 58
45. Numenius of Apamea, Fragments, 12 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 133
46. Numenius of Apamea, Fragments, 12 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 133
47. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 6.8.25-6.8.38 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
48. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.85-7.89, 7.108, 7.130, 7.135, 7.147 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 220, 225, 227, 325, 390, 392, 393, 394, 411, 413, 438, 451
7.85. An animal's first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are, The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it. 7.86. As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal's existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically. 7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. 7.88. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions. 7.89. By the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chrysippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of man, whereas Cleanthes takes the nature of the universe alone as that which should be followed, without adding the nature of the individual.And virtue, he holds, is a harmonious disposition, choice-worthy for its own sake and not from hope or fear or any external motive. Moreover, it is in virtue that happiness consists; for virtue is the state of mind which tends to make the whole of life harmonious. When a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness of external pursuits or sometimes to the influence of associates. For the starting-points of nature are never perverse. 7.108. Zeno was the first to use this term καθῆκον of conduct. Etymologically it is derived from κατά τινας ἥκειν, i.e. reaching as far as, being up to, or incumbent on so and so. And it is an action in itself adapted to nature's arrangements. For of the acts done at the prompting of impulse some, they observe, are fit and meet, others the reverse, while there is a third class which is neither the one nor the other.Befitting acts are all those which reason prevails with us to do; and this is the case with honouring one's parents, brothers and country, and intercourse with friends. Unbefitting, or contrary to duty, are all acts that reason deprecates, e.g. to neglect one's parents, to be indifferent to one's brothers, not to agree with friends, to disregard the interests of one's country, and so forth. 7.130. Their definition of love is an effort toward friendliness due to visible beauty appearing, its sole end being friendship, not bodily enjoyment. At all events, they allege that Thrasonides, although he had his mistress in his power, abstained from her because she hated him. By which it is shown, they think, that love depends upon regard, as Chrysippus says in his treatise of Love, and is not sent by the gods. And beauty they describe as the bloom or flower of virtue.of the three kinds of life, the contemplative, the practical, and the rational, they declare that we ought to choose the last, for that a rational being is expressly produced by nature for contemplation and for action. They tell us that the wise man will for reasonable cause make his own exit from life, on his country's behalf or for the sake of his friends, or if he suffer intolerable pain, mutilation, or incurable disease. 7.135. Body is defined by Apollodorus in his Physics as that which is extended in three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth. This is also called solid body. But surface is the extremity of a solid body, or that which has length and breadth only without depth. That surface exists not only in our thought but also in reality is maintained by Posidonius in the third book of his Celestial Phenomena. A line is the extremity of a surface or length without breadth, or that which has length alone. A point is the extremity of a line, the smallest possible mark or dot.God is one and the same with Reason, Fate, and Zeus; he is also called by many other names. 7.147. The deity, say they, is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect or intelligent in happiness, admitting nothing evil, taking providential care of the world and all that therein is, but he is not of human shape. He is, however, the artificer of the universe and, as it were, the father of all, both in general and in that particular part of him which is all-pervading, and which is called many names according to its various powers. They give the name Dia (Δία) because all things are due to (διά) him; Zeus (Ζῆνα) in so far as he is the cause of life (ζῆν) or pervades all life; the name Athena is given, because the ruling part of the divinity extends to the aether; the name Hera marks its extension to the air; he is called Hephaestus since it spreads to the creative fire; Poseidon, since it stretches to the sea; Demeter, since it reaches to the earth. Similarly men have given the deity his other titles, fastening, as best they can, on some one or other of his peculiar attributes.
49. Origen, Against Celsus, 2.20 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
2.20. Let us see how he continues after this: These events, he says, he predicted as being a God, and the prediction must by all means come to pass. God, therefore, who above all others ought to do good to men, and especially to those of his own household, led on his own disciples and prophets, with whom he was in the habit of eating and drinking, to such a degree of wickedness, that they became impious and unholy men. Now, of a truth, he who shared a man's table would not be guilty of conspiring against him; but after banqueting with God, he became a conspirator. And, what is still more absurd, God himself plotted against the members of his own table, by converting them into traitors and villains! Now, since you wish me to answer even those charges of Celsus which seem to me frivolous, the following is our reply to such statements. Celsus imagines that an event, predicted through foreknowledge, comes to pass because it was predicted; but we do not grant this, maintaining that he who foretold it was not the cause of its happening, because he foretold it would happen; but the future event itself, which would have taken place though not predicted, afforded the occasion to him, who was endowed with foreknowledge, of foretelling its occurrence. Now, certainly this result is present to the foreknowledge of him who predicts an event, when it is possible that it may or may not happen, viz., that one or other of these things will take place. For we do not assert that he who foreknows an event, by secretly taking away the possibility of its happening or not, makes any such declaration as this: This shall infallibly happen, and it is impossible that it can be otherwise. And this remark applies to all the foreknowledge of events dependent upon ourselves, whether contained in the sacred Scriptures or in the histories of the Greeks. Now, what is called by logicians an idle argument, which is a sophism, will be no sophism as far as Celsus can help, but according to sound reasoning it is a sophism. And that this may be seen, I shall take from the Scriptures the predictions regarding Judas, or the foreknowledge of our Saviour regarding him as the traitor; and from the Greek histories the oracle that was given to Laius, conceding for the present its truth, since it does not affect the argument. Now, in Ps. cviii., Judas is spoken of by the mouth of the Saviour, in words beginning thus: Hold not Your peace, O God of my praise; for the mouth of the wicked and the mouth of the deceitful are opened against me. Now, if you carefully observe the contents of the psalm, you will find that, as it was foreknown that he would betray the Saviour, so also was he considered to be himself the cause of the betrayal, and deserving, on account of his wickedness, of the imprecations contained in the prophecy. For let him suffer these things, because, says the psalmist, he remembered not to show mercy, but persecuted the poor and needy man. Wherefore it was possible for him to show mercy, and not to persecute him whom he did persecute. But although he might have done these things, he did not do them, but carried out the act of treason, so as to merit the curses pronounced against him in the prophecy. And in answer to the Greeks we shall quote the following oracular response to Laius, as recorded by the tragic poet, either in the exact words of the oracle or in equivalent terms. Future events are thus made known to him by the oracle: Do not try to beget children against the will of the gods. For if you beget a son, your son shall murder you; and all your household shall wade in blood. Now from this it is clear that it was within the power of Laius not to try to beget children, for the oracle would not have commanded an impossibility; and it was also in his power to do the opposite, so that neither of these courses was compulsory. And the consequence of his not guarding against the begetting of children was, that he suffered from so doing the calamities described in the tragedies relating to Œdipus and Jocasta and their sons. Now that which is called the idle argument, being a quibble, is such as might be applied, say in the case of a sick man, with the view of sophistically preventing him from employing a physician to promote his recovery; and it is something like this: If it is decreed that you should recover from your disease, you will recover whether you call in a physician or not; but if it is decreed that you should not recover, you will not recover whether you call in a physician or no. But it is certainly decreed either that you should recover, or that you should not recover; and therefore it is in vain that you call in a physician. Now with this argument the following may be wittily compared: If it is decreed that you should beget children, you will beget them, whether you have intercourse with a woman or not. But if it is decreed that you should not beget children, you will not do so, whether you have intercourse with a woman or no. Now, certainly, it is decreed either that you should beget children or not; therefore it is in vain that you have intercourse with a woman. For, as in the latter instance, intercourse with a woman is not employed in vain, seeing it is an utter impossibility for him who does not use it to beget children; so, in the former, if recovery from disease is to be accomplished by means of the healing art, of necessity the physician is summoned, and it is therefore false to say that in vain do you call in a physician. We have brought forward all these illustrations on account of the assertion of this learned Celsus, that being a God He predicted these things, and the predictions must by all means come to pass. Now, if by by all means he means necessarily, we cannot admit this. For it was quite possible, also, that they might not come to pass. But if he uses by all means in the sense of simple futurity, which nothing hinders from being true (although it was possible that they might not happen), he does not at all touch my argument; nor did it follow, from Jesus having predicted the acts of the traitor or the perjurer, that it was the same thing with His being the cause of such impious and unholy proceedings. For He who was among us, and knew what was in man, seeing his evil disposition, and foreseeing what he would attempt from his spirit of covetousness, and from his want of stable ideas of duty towards his Master, along with many other declarations, gave utterance to this also: He that dips his hand with Me in the dish, the same shall betray Me.
50. Stobaeus, Anthology, 1.79.1-1.79.12, 2.59.4-2.59.11, 2.60.5-2.60.8, 2.60.31-2.60.33, 2.111.18-2.111.20, 4.503.5-4.503.10 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 222, 224, 393, 394
51. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.102, 1.527, 2.913, 2.921, 2.933, 2.974, 2.1021, 2.1027, 3.39, 3.54, 3.56, 3.58, 3.62, 3.71, 3.178, 3.278, 3.459, 3.510  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 220, 225, 285, 317, 336, 392, 393, 394, 411, 413, 420, 421, 423, 428, 438
52. Cleanthes, Hymn To Zeus, 1, 16-19, 2, 20-21, 3-6, 15  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428
53. Arius Didymus, Fragments, 11m, 5b1-5b6, 5b4, 8-8a, 9b-10, 5b1  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 222, 224, 226, 227, 393, 394, 451
54. Calcidus, In Tim., 144  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 421
55. Plutarch, An. Procr., 1030a, 1030b, 1024d-1025a  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 146
56. Hierocles, Aa, 376  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 391, 392
57. Hierocles, Ee, 7.40-7.50  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 390
58. Papyri, Pherc. 1497/Xxviii, 142.1-142.14  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 324
59. Philodemus, Mus., Bk. 4, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 115.1, 115.2, 115.3, 115.4, 115.5, 115.6, 115.8, 115.9, 115.10, 115.11, 115.12, 117.11, 117.12, 117.13, 117.14, 117.42-118.1, 142.1, 142.2, 142.3, 142.4, 142.5, 142.6, 142.7, 142.8, 142.9, 142.10, 142.11, 142.12, 142.13, 142.14  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 320
60. Papyri, Pherc. 1497/Ib, 115.1-115.6, 115.8-115.12  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 317, 318
61. A Tius, Plac., 1.7.33, 4.21.1  Tagged with subjects: •harmony / symphony / orchestration Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 285, 413
62. Papyri, Pherc. 1417/Iii, 117.11, 117.12, 117.13, 117.14, 117.42-118.1  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 320
63. Various, Long And Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 41g, 46b, 54a, 54u, 55l, 55m, 55s, 59i, 59j, 61a, 61h, 61o, 62a-k, 62b, 62c, 63c, 65g, 61b  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 225, 393