1. Hebrew Bible, Leviticus, 19.14 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 153| 19.14. "לֹא־תְקַלֵּל חֵרֵשׁ וְלִפְנֵי עִוֵּר לֹא תִתֵּן מִכְשֹׁל וְיָרֵאתָ מֵּאֱלֹהֶיךָ אֲנִי יְהוָה׃", | 19.14. "Thou shalt not curse the deaf, nor put a stumbling-block before the blind, but thou shalt fear thy God: I am the LORD.", |
|
2. Plato, Euthydemus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 58 | 280e. Cleinias, for making a man happy—in the possession of these goods and using them? Soc. |
|
| 3. Plato, Gorgias, 468 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 174 |
4. Cato, Marcus Porcius, On Agriculture, 102, 141, 30 (3rd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 127 | 30. And now Pompey returned with great prestige from his expedition, and since the splendour and warmth of his reception led him to believe that he could get whatever he wanted from his fellow citizens, he sent forward a demand that the senate postpone the consular elections, in order that he might be present in person and assist Piso in making his canvass. The majority of the senators were inclined to yield. Cato, however, who did not regard the postponement as the chief matter at issue, but wished to cut short the attempt and the expectations of Pompey, opposed the measure and changed the opinions of the senators, so that they rejected it. This disturbed Pompey not a little, and considering that Cato would be a great stumbling-block in his way unless he were made a friend, he sent for Munatius, Cato's companion, and asked the elder of Cato's two marriageable nieces to wife for himself, and the younger for his son. Some say, however, that it was not for Cato's nieces, but for his daughters, that the suit was made. When Munatius brought this proposal to Cato and his wife and sisters, the women were overjoyed at thought of the alliance, in view of the greatness and high repute of Pompey; Cato, however, without pause or deliberation, but stung to the quick, said at once: "Go, Munatius, go, and tell Pompey that Cato is not to be captured by way of the women's apartments, although he highly prizes Pompey's good will, and if Pompey does justice will grant him a friendship more to be relied upon than any marriage connection; but he will not give hostages for the glory of Pompey to the detriment of his country." At these words the women were vexed, and Cato's friends blamed his answer as both rude and overbearing. Afterwards, however, in trying to secure the consulship for one of his friends, Pompey sent money to the tribes, and the bribery was notorious, since the sums for it were counted out in his gardens. Accordingly, when Cato told the women that he must of necessity have shared in the disgrace of such transactions, they admitted that he had taken better counsel in rejecting the alliance. However, if we are to judge by the results, it would seem that Cato was wholly wrong in not accepting the marriage connection, instead of allowing Pompey to turn to Caesar and contract a marriage which united the power of the two men, nearly overthrew the Roman state, and destroyed the constitution. None of these things perhaps would have happened, had not Cato been so afraid of the slight transgressions of Pompey as to allow him to commit the greatest of all, and add his power to that of another. |
|
| 5. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 15.60, 15.108 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 60, 171 |
6. Cicero, De Finibus, 3.48, 3.59-3.77, 4.74, 4.77 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 55, 174 | 3.48. So it would be consistent with the principles already stated that on the theory of those who deem the End of Goods, that which we term the extreme or ultimate Good, to be capable of degree, they should also hold that one man can be wiser than another, and similarly that one can commit a more sinful or more righteous action than another; which it is not open for us to say, who do not think that the end of Goods can vary in degree. For just as a drowning man is no more able to breathe if he be not far from the surface of the water, so that he might at any moment emerge, than if he were actually at the bottom already, and just as a puppy on the point of opening its eyes is no less blind than one just born, similarly a man that has made some progress towards the state of virtue is none the less in misery than he that has made no progress at all."I am aware that all this seems paradoxical; but as our previous conclusions are undoubtedly true and well established, and as these are the logical inferences from them, the truth of these inferences also cannot be called in question. Yet although the Stoics deny that either virtues or vices can be increased in degree, they nevertheless believe that each of them can be in a sense expanded and widened in scope. 3.59. "It is also clear that some actions are performed by the Wise Man in the sphere of these neutral things. Well then, when he does such an action he judges it to be an appropriate act. And as his judgment on this point never errs, therefore appropriate action will exist in the sphere of these neutral things. The same thing is also proved by the following argument: We observe that something exists which we call right action; but this is an appropriate act perfectly performed; therefore there will also be such a thing as an imperfect appropriate act; so that, if to restore a trust as a matter of principle is a right act, to restore a trust must be counted as an appropriate act; the addition of the qualification 'on principle' makes it a right action: the mere restitution in itself is counted an appropriate act. Again, since there can be no question but that class of things we call neutral includes some things worthy to be chosen and others to be rejected; therefore whatever is done or described in this manner is entirely included under the term appropriate action. This shows that since love of self is implanted by nature in all men, both the foolish and the wise alike will choose what is in accordance with nature and reject the contrary. Thus there is a region of appropriate action which is common to the wise and the unwise; and this proves that appropriate action deals with the things we call neutral. 3.60. But since these neutral things form the basis of all appropriate acts, there is good ground for the dictum that it is with these things that all our practical deliberations deal, including the will to live and the will to quit this life. When a man's circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life. This makes it plain that it is on occasion appropriate for the Wise Man to quit life although he is happy, and also of the Foolish Man to remain in life although he is miserable. 3.61. For with the Stoics good and evil, as has repeatedly been said already, are a subsequent outgrowth; whereas the primary things of nature, whether favourable or the reverse, fall under the judgment and choice of the Wise Man, and form so to speak the subject-matter, the given material with which wisdom deals. Therefore the reasons both for remaining in life and for departing from it are to be measured entirely by the primary things of nature aforesaid. For the virtuous man is not necessarily retained in life by virtue, and also those who are devoid of virtue need not necessarily seek death. And very often it is appropriate for the Wise Man to abandon life at a moment when he is enjoying supreme happiness, if an opportunity offers for making a timely exit. For the Stoic view is that happiness, which means life in harmony with nature, is a matter of seizing the right moment. So that Wisdom her very self upon occasion bids the Wise Man to leave her. Hence, as vice does not possess the power of furnishing a reason for suicide, it is clear that even for the foolish, who are also miserable, it is appropriate to remain alive if they possess a predomice of those things which we pronounce to be in accordance with nature. And since the fool is equally miserable when departing from life and when remaining in it, and the undesirability of his life is not increased by its prolongation, there is good ground for saying that those who are in a position to enjoy a preponderance of things that are natural ought to remain in life. 3.62. "Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. 3.63. From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâpen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâpen, which swims out of the seaâpen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. 3.64. "Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and lawâabiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves. And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar Greek line) that they care not if, when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake. 3.65. "This is the feeling that has given rise to the practice of making a will and appointing guardians for one's children when one is dying. And the fact that no one would care to pass his life alone in a desert, even though supplied with pleasures in unbounded profusion, readily shows that we are born for society and intercourse, and for a natural partnership with our fellow men. Moreover nature inspires us with the desire to benefit as many people as we can, and especially by imparting information and the principles of wisdom. 3.66. Hence it would be hard to discover anyone who will not impart to another any knowledge that he may himself possess; so strong is our propensity not only to learn but also to teach. And just as bulls have a natural instinct to fight with all their strength and force in defending their calves against lions, so men of exceptional gifts and capacity for service, like Hercules and Liber in the legends, feel a natural impulse to be the protectors of the human race. Also when we confer upon Jove the titles of Most Good and Most Great, of Saviour, Lord of Guests, Rallier of Battles, what we mean to imply is that the safety of mankind lies in his keeping. But how inconsistent it would be for us to expect the immortal gods to love and cherish us, when we ourselves despise and neglect one another! Therefore just as we actually use our limbs before we have learnt for what particular useful purpose they were bestowed upon us, so we are united and allied by nature in the common society of the state. Were this not so, there would be no room either for justice or benevolence. 3.67. "But just as they hold that man is united with man by the bonds of right, so they consider that no right exists as between man and beast. For Chrysippus well said, that all other things were created for the sake of men and gods, but that these exist for their own mutual fellowship and society, so that men can make use of beasts for their own purposes without injustice. And the nature of man, he said, is such, that as it were a code of law subsists between the individual and the human race, so that he who upholds this code will be just and he who departs from it, unjust. But just as, though the theatre is a public place, yet it is correct to say that the particular seat a man has taken belongs to him, so in the state or in the universe, though these are common to all, no principle of justice militates against the possession of private property. 3.68. Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows, it follows from this natural disposition, that the Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage. As for the principles and habits of the Cynics, some say that these befit the Wise Man, if circumstances should happen to indicate this course of action; but other Stoics reject the Cynic rule unconditionally. 3.69. "To safeguard the universal alliance, solidarity and affection that subsist between man and man, the Stoics held that both 'benefits' and 'injuries' (in their terminology, ÅphelÄmata and blammata) are common, the former doing good and the latter harm; and they pronounce them to be not only 'common' but also 'equal.' 'Disadvantages' and 'advantages' (for so I render euchrÄstÄmata and duschrÄstÄmata) they held to be 'common' but not 'equal.' For things 'beneficial' and 'injurious' are goods and evils respectively, and these must needs be equal; but 'advantages' and 'disadvantages' belong to the class we speak of as 'preferred' and 'rejected,' and these may differ in degree. But whereas 'benefits' and 'injuries' are pronounced to be 'common,' righteous and sinful acts are not considered 'common.' 3.70. "They recommend the cultivation of friendship, classing it among 'things beneficial.' In friendship some profess that the Wise Man will hold his friends' interests as dear as his own, while others say that a man's own interests must necessarily be dearer to him; at the same time the latter admit that to enrich oneself by another's loss is an action repugt to that justice towards which we seem to possess a natural propensity. But the school I am discussing emphatically rejects the view that we adopt or approve either justice or friendship for the sake of their utility. For if it were so, the same claims of utility would be able to undermine and overthrow them. In fact the very existence of both justice and friendship will be impossible if they are not desired for their own sake. 3.71. Right moreover, properly so styled and entitled, exists (they aver) by nature; and it is foreign to the nature of the Wise Man not only to wrong but even to hurt anyone. Nor again is it righteous to enter into a partnership in wrongdoing with one's friends or benefactors; and it is most truly and cogently maintained that honesty is always the best policy, and that whatever is fair and just is also honourable, and conversely whatever is honourable will also be just and fair. 3.72. "To the virtues we have discussed they also add Dialectic and Natural Philosophy. Both of these they entitle by the name of virtue; the former because it conveys a method that guards us for giving assent to any falsehood or ever being deceived by specious probability, and enables us to retain and to defend the truths that we have learned about good and evil; for without the art of Dialectic they hold that any man may be seduced from truth into error. If therefore rashness and ignorance are in all matters fraught with mischief, the art which removes them is correctly entitled a virtue. 3.73. "The same honour is also bestowed with good reason upon Natural Philosophy, because he who is to live in accordance with nature must base his principles upon the system and government of the entire world. Nor again can anyone judge truly of things good and evil, save by a knowledge of the whole plan of nature and also of the life of the gods, and of the answer to the question whether the nature of man is or is not in harmony with that of the universe. And no one without Natural Philosophy can discern the value (and their value is very great) of the ancient maxims and precepts of the Wise Men, such as to 'obey occasion,' 'follow God,' 'know thyself,' and 'moderation in all things.' Also this science alone can impart a conception of the power of nature in fostering justice and maintaining friendship and the rest of the affections; nor again without unfolding nature's secrets can we understand the sentiment of piety towards the gods or the degree of gratitude that we owe to them. 3.74. "However I begin to perceive that I have let myself be carried beyond the requirements of the plan that I set before me. The fact is that I have been led on by the marvellous structure of the Stoic system and the miraculous sequence of its topics; pray tell me seriously, does it not fill you with admiration? Nothing is more finished, more nicely ordered, than nature; but what has nature, what have the products of handicraft to show that is so well constructed, so firmly jointed and welded into one? Where do you find a conclusion inconsistent with its premise, or a discrepancy between an earlier and a later statement? Where is lacking such close interconnexion of the parts that, if you alter a single letter, you shake the whole structure? Though indeed there is nothing that it would be possible to alter. 3.75. "Then, how dignified, how lofty, how consistent is the character of the Wise Man as they depict it! Since reason has proved that moral worth is the sole good, it follows that he must always be happy, and that all those titles which the ignorant are so fond of deriding do in very truth belong to him. For he will have a better claim to the title of King than Tarquin, who could not rule either himself or his subjects; a better right to the name of 'Master of the People' (for that is what a dictator is) than Sulla, who was a master of three pestilential vices, licentiousness, avarice and cruelty; a better right to be called rich than Crassus, who had he lacked nothing could never have been induced to cross the Euphrates with no pretext for war. Rightly will he be said to own all things, who alone knows how to use all things; rightly also will he be styled beautiful, for the features of the soul are fairer than those of the body; rightly the one and only free man, as subject to no man's authority, and slave of no appetite; rightly unconquerable, for though his body be thrown into fetters, no bondage can enchain his soul. 3.76. Nor need he wait for any period of time, that the decision whether he has been happy or not may be finally pronounced only when he has rounded off his life's last day in death, â the famous warning so unwisely given to Croesus by old Solon, one of the seven Wise Men; for had Croesus ever been happy, he would have carried his happiness uninterrupted to the pyre raised for him by Cyrus. If then it be true that all the good and none but the good are happy, what possession is more precious than philosophy, what more divine than virtue?" 4.74. "The same verbal legerdemain supplies you with your kingdoms and empires and riches, riches so vast that you declare that everything the world contains is the property of the Wise Man. He alone, you say, is handsome, he alone a free man and a citizen: while the foolish are the opposite of all these, and according to you insane into the bargain. The Stoics call these paradoxa, as we might say 'startling truths.' But what is there so startling about them viewed at close quarters? I will consult you as to the meaning you attach to each term; there shall be no dispute. You Stoics say that all transgressions are equal. I won't jest with you now, as I did on the same subjects when you were prosecuting and I defending Lucius Murena. On that occasion I was addressing a jury, not an audience of scholars, and I even had to play to the gallery a little; but now I must reason more closely. 4.77. "However, they press the matter, and will not give way. Every transgression, they argue, is a proof of weakness and instability of character; but all the foolish possess these vices in an equal manner; therefore all transgressions must be equal. As though it were admitted that all foolish people possess an equal degree of vice, and that Lucius Tubulus was exactly as weak and unstable as Publius Scaevola who brought in the bill for his condemnation; and as though there were no difference also between the respective circumstances in which the transgressions are committed, so that the magnitude of the transgression varies in proportion to the importance of the circumstances! |
|
7. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.48, 3.59-3.77, 4.74, 4.77 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 55, 174| 3.48. itaque consentaneum est his, quae dicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui illum bonorum finem, quod appellamus extremum, quod ultimum, crescere putent posse—isdem placere esse alium alio et et ABERV ( sequitur itemque; cf. p.188, 15 sq. et eos ... nosque), et (= etiam, ab alt. m., ut vid. ) N sapientiorem itemque alium magis alio vel peccare vel recte facere, quod nobis non licet dicere, qui crescere bonorum finem non putamus. ut enim qui demersi sunt in aqua nihilo magis respirare possunt, si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam tum essent in profundo, nec catulus ille, qui iam adpropinquat adpropinquat (appr.) edd. ut propinquat ABER apropin- quat N 2 propinquat N 1 V ut videat, plus cernit quam is, qui modo est natus, item qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis habitum habitum dett. aditum (additum R) nihilo minus in miseria est quam ille, qui nihil processit. Haec mirabilia videri intellego, sed cum certe superiora firma ac vera sint, his autem ea consentanea et consequentia, ne de horum de eorum R quidem est veritate dubitandum. sed quamquam negant nec virtutes nec vitia crescere, tamen tamen N 2 et tamen utrumque eorum fundi quodam modo et quasi dilatari putant. Divitias autem Diogenes censet eam eam non eam dett. modo vim habere, ut quasi duces sint ad voluptatem et ad valitudinem bonam; 3.59. Atque Atque dett. Atqui (At qui) perspicuum etiam illud est, in istis rebus mediis aliquid agere sapientem. iudicat igitur, cum agit, officium illud esse. quod quoniam numquam fallitur in iudicando, erit in mediis rebus officium. quod efficitur hac etiam conclusione rationis: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit autem etiam del. Lamb. inchoatum, ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito iuste fit fit Lamb. facit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. quoniamque quoniamque quandoque RV non dubium est quin in iis, iis V his quae media dicimus, dicamus A sit aliud sumendum, aliud reiciendum, quicquid ita fit aut aut autem A ut BE dicitur, omne omne Grut. omni officio continetur. ex quo intellegitur, quoniam se ipsi ipsi BE ipsos omnes natura diligant, tam insipientem quam sapientem sumpturum, quae secundum naturam sint, reiecturumque contraria. ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis, ex quo efficitur versari in iis, iis edd. his quae media dicamus. 3.60. Sed cum ab his omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes, in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem. in quo enim plura sunt quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est de vita excedere. ex quo ex quo RV e quo (equo) apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser. 3.61. nam bonum illud et malum, quod saepe iam dictum est, postea consequitur, prima autem illa naturae sive secunda sive contraria sub iudicium sapientis et dilectum cadunt, estque illa subiecta quasi materia materie BE sapientiae. itaque et manendi in vita et migrandi ratio omnis iis iis edd. in V his rebus, quas supra dixi, metienda. nam neque virtute retinetur ille in add. Se. vita, nec iis, qui qui que BER sine virtute sunt, mors est oppetenda. et et Urs. ut saepe officium est sapientis desciscere a vita, cum sit beatissimus, si id oportune facere possit, quod est convenienter naturae. sic naturae sic B naturae vivere sic ( etiam E) enim censent, oportunitatis esse beate vivere. itaque a sapientia praecipitur se ipsam, si usus sit, sapiens ut relinquat. quam ob rem cum vitiorum ista vis non sit, ut causam afferant mortis voluntariae, perspicuum est etiam stultorum, qui idem miseri sint, officium esse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte rerum earum, earum rerum BE quas secundum naturam esse dicimus. et quoniam excedens e vita et manens aeque miser est nec diuturnitas magis ei magis ei ei (et E) magis BE vitam fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur iis, qui pluribus naturalibus frui possint, esse in vita manendum. 3.62. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, possent N 2 possint ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore add. P. Man. abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, inpelli. 3.63. ex hoc nascitur ut etiam etiam ut BE communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. ut enim in membris alia sunt sunt N 2 sint tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia alia Marsus aliqua ARN aliaque BE reliqua V etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic inmanes quaedam bestiae bestie quedam BE sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque, qui enat e concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinoteres vocatur in eandemque in eandemque BE in eamque cum se recepit recepit cod. Glogav. recipit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. multo haec coniunctius homines. coniunctius homines Mdv. coniunctio est hominis itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, consilia Non. civitatis Non. RV civitates. itaque ... civitatis ( v. 18 ) Non. p. 234 3.64. mundum autem censent regi numine deorum, eumque esse quasi communem urbem et civitatem hominum et deorum, et unum quemque nostrum eius mundi esse partem; ex quo illud natura consequi, ut communem utilitatem nostrae anteponamus. ut enim leges omnium salutem singulorum saluti anteponunt, sic vir bonus et sapiens et legibus parens et civilis officii non ignarus utilitati omnium plus quam unius alicuius aut suae consulit. nec magis est vituperandus proditor patriae quam communis utilitatis aut salutis desertor propter suam utilitatem aut salutem. ex quo fit, ut laudandus is sit, qui mortem oppetat pro re publica, quod deceat deceat dett. doceat ( in A ab ead. m. corr. ex diceat) cariorem nobis esse patriam quam nosmet ipsos. quoniamque quoniamque quēque R illa vox inhumana et scelerata ducitur eorum, qui negant se recusare quo minus ipsis mortuis terrarum omnium deflagratio consequatur—quod vulgari quodam versu Graeco pronuntiari solet—, certe verum est etiam iis, qui aliquando futuri sint, esse propter ipsos consulendum. 3.65. ex hac animorum affectione testamenta commendationesque morientium natae sunt. quodque nemo in summa solitudine vitam agere velit ne cum infinita quidem voluptatum abundantia, facile intellegitur nos ad coniunctionem congregationemque hominum et ad naturalem communitatem esse natos. Inpellimur autem natura, ut prodesse velimus quam plurimis in primisque docendo rationibusque prudentiae tradendis. 3.66. itaque non facile est invenire qui quod sciat ipse non tradat alteri; ita non solum ad discendum propensi sumus, verum etiam ad docendum. Atque ut tauris natura datum est ut pro vitulis contra leones summa vi impetuque contendant, sic ii, ii edd. hi qui valent opibus atque id facere possunt, ut de Hercule et de Libero accepimus, ad servandum genus hominum natura incitantur. Atque etiam Iovem cum Optimum et Maximum dicimus cumque eundem Salutarem, Hospitalem, Statorem, hoc intellegi volumus, salutem hominum in eius esse tutela. minime autem convenit, cum ipsi inter nos viles viles NV cules A eules R civiles BE neglectique simus, postulare ut diis inmortalibus cari simus et ab iis diligamur. Quem ad modum igitur membris utimur prius, quam didicimus, cuius ea causa utilitatis habeamus, sic inter nos natura ad civilem communitatem coniuncti et consociati sumus. quod ni ita se haberet, nec iustitiae ullus esset nec bonitati locus. 3.67. Et Et Sed Mdv. quo modo hominum inter homines iuris esse vincula putant, sic homini nihil iuris esse cum bestiis. praeclare enim Chrysippus, cetera nata esse hominum causa et deorum, eos autem communitatis et societatis suae, ut bestiis homines uti ad utilitatem suam possint possint suam BE sine iniuria. Quoniamque quoniamque quēque R ea natura esset hominis, ut ei ei Lamb. et ABEN om. RV cum genere humano quasi civile ius intercederet, qui id conservaret, eum iustum, qui migraret, migraret negaret A iniustum fore. sed quem ad modum, theatrum cum cum ut E commune sit, recte tamen dici potest eius esse eum locum, quem quisque occuparit, sic in urbe mundove communi non adversatur ius, quo minus suum quidque quodque BE cuiusque sit. 3.68. Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos. ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur. arbitramur BE Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si qui qui ARN 1 V quis BEN 2 eius modi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo. 3.69. Ut vero conservetur omnis homini erga hominem societas, coniunctio, caritas, et emolumenta et detrimenta, quae w)felh/mata et bla/mmata appellant, communia esse voluerunt; quorum altera prosunt, nocent altera. neque solum ea communia, verum etiam paria esse dixerunt. incommoda autem et commoda—ita enim eu)xrhsth/mata et dusxrhsth/mata appello—communia esse voluerunt, paria noluerunt. illa enim, quae prosunt aut quae nocent, aut bona sunt aut mala, quae sint paria necesse est. commoda autem et incommoda in eo genere sunt, quae praeposita et reiecta diximus; dicimus BE ea possunt paria non esse. sed emolumenta communia emolumenta et detrimenta communia Lamb. esse dicuntur, recte autem facta et peccata non habentur communia. 3.70. Amicitiam autem adhibendam esse censent, quia sit ex eo genere, quae prosunt. quamquam autem in amicitia alii dicant aeque caram esse sapienti rationem amici ac suam, alii autem sibi cuique cariorem suam, tamen hi quoque posteriores fatentur alienum esse a iustitia, ad quam nati esse videamur, detrahere quid de aliquo, quod sibi adsumat. minime vero probatur huic disciplinae, de qua loquor, aut iustitiam aut amicitiam propter utilitates adscisci aut probari. eaedem enim utilitates poterunt eas labefactare atque pervertere. etenim nec iustitia nec amicitia iustitia nec amicitia Mdv. iusticie nec amicicie esse omnino poterunt, poterunt esse omnino BE nisi ipsae per se expetuntur. expetantur V 3.71. Ius autem, quod ita dici appellarique possit, id esse natura, natura P. Man., Lamb. naturam alienumque alienumque V et ( corr. priore u ab alt. m. ) N alienamque esse a sapiente non modo iniuriam cui facere, verum etiam nocere. nec vero rectum est cum amicis aut bene meritis consociare sociare BE aut coniungere iniuriam, gravissimeque et gravissime et BE verissime defenditur numquam aequitatem ab utilitate posse seiungi, et quicquid aequum iustumque esset, id etiam honestum vicissimque, quicquid esset honestum, id iustum etiam atque aequum fore. 3.72. Ad easque virtutes, de quibus disputatum est, dialecticam etiam adiungunt et physicam, easque ambas virtutum nomine appellant, alteram, quod habeat rationem, ne cui falso adsentiamur neve umquam captiosa probabilitate fallamur, eaque, quae de bonis et malis didicerimus, didicerimus BE didiceremus A diceremus RNV ut tenere teneri AR ne BE tuerique possimus. nam sine hac arte quemvis quamvis RBE arbitrantur a vero abduci fallique posse. recte igitur, si omnibus in rebus temeritas ignoratioque vitiosa est, ars ea, quae tollit haec, virtus nominata est. 3.73. physicae quoque quoque quidem BE non sine causa tributus idem est honos, propterea quod, qui convenienter naturae victurus sit, ei ei V et ABER ei et N proficiscendum est ab omni mundo atque ab eius procuratione. nec vero potest quisquam de bonis et malis vere iudicare nisi omni cognita ratione naturae et vitae etiam deorum, et utrum conveniat necne natura hominis cum universa. quaeque sunt vetera praecepta sapientium, qui iubent tempori parere parere pariete R et sequi sequi et deum et se BE deum et se noscere et nihil nimis, haec sine physicis quam vim habeant—et habent maximam— videre nemo potest. atque etiam ad iustitiam colendam, ad tuendas amicitias et reliquas caritates quid natura valeat haec una cognitio potest tradere. nec vero pietas adversus adversus advorsum Non. deos nec quanta iis iis Mdv. his expiatione ( explatione L 1 ut vid. Lindsay ) Non. gratia debeatur sine explicatione naturae intellegi potest. nec vero ... potest Non. p. 232 s. v. advorsum 3.74. Sed iam sentio me esse longius provectum, quam proposita ratio postularet. verum admirabilis compositio disciplinae incredibilisque rerum me rerum me R me rerum BE rerum ANV traxit ordo; quem, per deos inmortales! nonne miraris? quid enim aut in natura, qua nihil est aptius, nihil descriptius, aut in operibus manu factis tam compositum tamque compactum et coagmentatum coagmentatum ed. princ. Colon. cocicmentatum A cociom tatū R coaugmentatum BEN coagumentatum V inveniri potest? quid posterius priori non convenit? quid sequitur, quod non respondeat superiori? quid non sic aliud ex alio nectitur, ut, si ut si ' aliquis apud Bentl. ' Mdv. ut non si ABERN aut non si V ullam litteram moveris, labent omnia? nec tamen quicquam est, quod quod BE quo moveri possit. 3.75. quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis! qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus vereque omnia ista nomina possideat, quae irrideri ab inperitis solent. rectius enim appellabitur rex quam Tarquinius, qui nec se nec suos regere potuit, rectius magister populi—is enim est dictator dictator est BE —quam Sulla, qui trium pestiferorum vitiorum, luxuriae, avaritiae, crudelitatis, magister fuit, rectius dives quam Crassus, qui nisi eguisset, numquam Euphraten nulla belli causa transire voluisset. recte eius omnia dicentur, qui scit uti solus omnibus, recte etiam pulcher appellabitur— animi enim liniamenta sunt pulchriora quam corporis quam corporis NV quam corporibus ABE corporibus ( om. quam) R —, recte solus liber nec dominationi cuiusquam parens nec oboediens cupiditati, recte invictus, cuius etiamsi corpus constringatur, animo tamen vincula inici nulla possint, nec expectet ullum tempus aetatis, uti tum uti tum Se. ut tum (ut in ras., sequente ras. 2 vel 3 litt. ) N virtutum ABE ututū R ubi tum V denique iudicetur beatusne fuerit, cum extremum vitae diem morte confecerit, quod ille unus e septem sapientibus non sapienter Croesum monuit; 3.76. nam si beatus umquam fuisset, beatam vitam usque ad illum a Cyro extructum rogum pertulisset. quod si ita est, ut neque quisquam nisi bonus vir et omnes omnis ABER boni beati sint, quid philosophia magis colendum aut quid est virtute divinius? 4.74. Nam ex eisdem verborum praestrigiis praestrigiis BEN praestigiis et regna nata vobis sunt et imperia et divitiae, et tantae quidem, ut omnia, quae ubique sint, sapientis esse dicatis. solum praeterea formosum, solum liberum, solum civem, stultos omnia contraria, add. hoc loco Mdv., post contraria Morel. quos etiam insanos esse vultis. haec para/doca illi, nos admirabilia dicamus. quid autem habent admirationis, cum prope accesseris? conferam tecum, quam cuique verbo rem subicias; nulla erit controversia. Omnia peccata paria dicitis. non ego tecum iam ita iocabor, Jocabor N locabor RB locabar E letabor V ut isdem his de his de edd. is de ER ijs de V de B om. N rebus, cum L. Murenam te accusante defenderem. apud imperitos tum illa dicta sunt, aliquid etiam coronae datum; nunc agendum est subtilius. Peccata paria. 4.77. Urgent tamen et nihil remittunt. Quoniam, inquiunt, omne peccatum inbecillitatis et inconstantiae est, haec autem vitia in omnibus stultis aeque magna sunt, necesse est paria esse peccata. Quasi vero aut concedatur in omnibus stultis aeque magna esse vitia, et eadem inbecillitate et inconstantia L. Tubulum fuisse, qua qua BE quam illum, cuius is condemnatus est rogatione, P. Scaevolam, et quasi nihil inter res quoque ipsas, in quibus peccatur, intersit, ut, quo hae maiores minoresve sint, eo, quae peccentur in his rebus, aut | 3.48. So it would be consistent with the principles already stated that on the theory of those who deem the End of Goods, that which we term the extreme or ultimate Good, to be capable of degree, they should also hold that one man can be wiser than another, and similarly that one can commit a more sinful or more righteous action than another; which it is not open for us to say, who do not think that the end of Goods can vary in degree. For just as a drowning man is no more able to breathe if he be not far from the surface of the water, so that he might at any moment emerge, than if he were actually at the bottom already, and just as a puppy on the point of opening its eyes is no less blind than one just born, similarly a man that has made some progress towards the state of virtue is none the less in misery than he that has made no progress at all."I am aware that all this seems paradoxical; but as our previous conclusions are undoubtedly true and well established, and as these are the logical inferences from them, the truth of these inferences also cannot be called in question. Yet although the Stoics deny that either virtues or vices can be increased in degree, they nevertheless believe that each of them can be in a sense expanded and widened in scope. 3.59. "It is also clear that some actions are performed by the Wise Man in the sphere of these neutral things. Well then, when he does such an action he judges it to be an appropriate act. And as his judgment on this point never errs, therefore appropriate action will exist in the sphere of these neutral things. The same thing is also proved by the following argument: We observe that something exists which we call right action; but this is an appropriate act perfectly performed; therefore there will also be such a thing as an imperfect appropriate act; so that, if to restore a trust as a matter of principle is a right act, to restore a trust must be counted as an appropriate act; the addition of the qualification 'on principle' makes it a right action: the mere restitution in itself is counted an appropriate act. Again, since there can be no question but that class of things we call neutral includes some things worthy to be chosen and others to be rejected; therefore whatever is done or described in this manner is entirely included under the term appropriate action. This shows that since love of self is implanted by nature in all men, both the foolish and the wise alike will choose what is in accordance with nature and reject the contrary. Thus there is a region of appropriate action which is common to the wise and the unwise; and this proves that appropriate action deals with the things we call neutral. 3.60. But since these neutral things form the basis of all appropriate acts, there is good ground for the dictum that it is with these things that all our practical deliberations deal, including the will to live and the will to quit this life. When a man's circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life. This makes it plain that it is on occasion appropriate for the Wise Man to quit life although he is happy, and also of the Foolish Man to remain in life although he is miserable. 3.61. For with the Stoics good and evil, as has repeatedly been said already, are a subsequent outgrowth; whereas the primary things of nature, whether favourable or the reverse, fall under the judgment and choice of the Wise Man, and form so to speak the subject-matter, the given material with which wisdom deals. Therefore the reasons both for remaining in life and for departing from it are to be measured entirely by the primary things of nature aforesaid. For the virtuous man is not necessarily retained in life by virtue, and also those who are devoid of virtue need not necessarily seek death. And very often it is appropriate for the Wise Man to abandon life at a moment when he is enjoying supreme happiness, if an opportunity offers for making a timely exit. For the Stoic view is that happiness, which means life in harmony with nature, is a matter of seizing the right moment. So that Wisdom her very self upon occasion bids the Wise Man to leave her. Hence, as vice does not possess the power of furnishing a reason for suicide, it is clear that even for the foolish, who are also miserable, it is appropriate to remain alive if they possess a predomice of those things which we pronounce to be in accordance with nature. And since the fool is equally miserable when departing from life and when remaining in it, and the undesirability of his life is not increased by its prolongation, there is good ground for saying that those who are in a position to enjoy a preponderance of things that are natural ought to remain in life. 3.62. "Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. 3.63. From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the seaâpen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the seaâpen, which swims out of the seaâpen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard â these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. 3.64. "Again, they hold that the universe is governed by divine will; it is a city or state of which both men and gods are members, and each one of us is a part of this universe; from which it is a natural consequence that we should prefer the common advantage to our own. For just as the laws set the safety of all above the safety of individuals, so a good, wise and lawâabiding man, conscious of his duty to the state, studies the advantage of all more than that of himself or of any single individual. The traitor to his country does not deserve greater reprobation than the man who betrays the common advantage or security for the sake of his own advantage or security. This explains why praise is owed to one who dies for the commonwealth, because it becomes us to love our country more than ourselves. And as we feel it wicked and inhuman for men to declare (the saying is usually expressed in a familiar Greek line) that they care not if, when they themselves are dead, the universal conflagration ensues, it is undoubtedly true that we are bound to study the interest of posterity also for its own sake. 3.65. "This is the feeling that has given rise to the practice of making a will and appointing guardians for one's children when one is dying. And the fact that no one would care to pass his life alone in a desert, even though supplied with pleasures in unbounded profusion, readily shows that we are born for society and intercourse, and for a natural partnership with our fellow men. Moreover nature inspires us with the desire to benefit as many people as we can, and especially by imparting information and the principles of wisdom. 3.66. Hence it would be hard to discover anyone who will not impart to another any knowledge that he may himself possess; so strong is our propensity not only to learn but also to teach. And just as bulls have a natural instinct to fight with all their strength and force in defending their calves against lions, so men of exceptional gifts and capacity for service, like Hercules and Liber in the legends, feel a natural impulse to be the protectors of the human race. Also when we confer upon Jove the titles of Most Good and Most Great, of Saviour, Lord of Guests, Rallier of Battles, what we mean to imply is that the safety of mankind lies in his keeping. But how inconsistent it would be for us to expect the immortal gods to love and cherish us, when we ourselves despise and neglect one another! Therefore just as we actually use our limbs before we have learnt for what particular useful purpose they were bestowed upon us, so we are united and allied by nature in the common society of the state. Were this not so, there would be no room either for justice or benevolence. 3.67. "But just as they hold that man is united with man by the bonds of right, so they consider that no right exists as between man and beast. For Chrysippus well said, that all other things were created for the sake of men and gods, but that these exist for their own mutual fellowship and society, so that men can make use of beasts for their own purposes without injustice. And the nature of man, he said, is such, that as it were a code of law subsists between the individual and the human race, so that he who upholds this code will be just and he who departs from it, unjust. But just as, though the theatre is a public place, yet it is correct to say that the particular seat a man has taken belongs to him, so in the state or in the universe, though these are common to all, no principle of justice militates against the possession of private property. 3.68. Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows, it follows from this natural disposition, that the Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage. As for the principles and habits of the Cynics, some say that these befit the Wise Man, if circumstances should happen to indicate this course of action; but other Stoics reject the Cynic rule unconditionally. 3.69. "To safeguard the universal alliance, solidarity and affection that subsist between man and man, the Stoics held that both 'benefits' and 'injuries' (in their terminology, ÅphelÄmata and blammata) are common, the former doing good and the latter harm; and they pronounce them to be not only 'common' but also 'equal.' 'Disadvantages' and 'advantages' (for so I render euchrÄstÄmata and duschrÄstÄmata) they held to be 'common' but not 'equal.' For things 'beneficial' and 'injurious' are goods and evils respectively, and these must needs be equal; but 'advantages' and 'disadvantages' belong to the class we speak of as 'preferred' and 'rejected,' and these may differ in degree. But whereas 'benefits' and 'injuries' are pronounced to be 'common,' righteous and sinful acts are not considered 'common.' 3.70. "They recommend the cultivation of friendship, classing it among 'things beneficial.' In friendship some profess that the Wise Man will hold his friends' interests as dear as his own, while others say that a man's own interests must necessarily be dearer to him; at the same time the latter admit that to enrich oneself by another's loss is an action repugt to that justice towards which we seem to possess a natural propensity. But the school I am discussing emphatically rejects the view that we adopt or approve either justice or friendship for the sake of their utility. For if it were so, the same claims of utility would be able to undermine and overthrow them. In fact the very existence of both justice and friendship will be impossible if they are not desired for their own sake. 3.71. Right moreover, properly so styled and entitled, exists (they aver) by nature; and it is foreign to the nature of the Wise Man not only to wrong but even to hurt anyone. Nor again is it righteous to enter into a partnership in wrongdoing with one's friends or benefactors; and it is most truly and cogently maintained that honesty is always the best policy, and that whatever is fair and just is also honourable, and conversely whatever is honourable will also be just and fair. 3.72. "To the virtues we have discussed they also add Dialectic and Natural Philosophy. Both of these they entitle by the name of virtue; the former because it conveys a method that guards us for giving assent to any falsehood or ever being deceived by specious probability, and enables us to retain and to defend the truths that we have learned about good and evil; for without the art of Dialectic they hold that any man may be seduced from truth into error. If therefore rashness and ignorance are in all matters fraught with mischief, the art which removes them is correctly entitled a virtue. 3.73. "The same honour is also bestowed with good reason upon Natural Philosophy, because he who is to live in accordance with nature must base his principles upon the system and government of the entire world. Nor again can anyone judge truly of things good and evil, save by a knowledge of the whole plan of nature and also of the life of the gods, and of the answer to the question whether the nature of man is or is not in harmony with that of the universe. And no one without Natural Philosophy can discern the value (and their value is very great) of the ancient maxims and precepts of the Wise Men, such as to 'obey occasion,' 'follow God,' 'know thyself,' and 'moderation in all things.' Also this science alone can impart a conception of the power of nature in fostering justice and maintaining friendship and the rest of the affections; nor again without unfolding nature's secrets can we understand the sentiment of piety towards the gods or the degree of gratitude that we owe to them. 3.74. "However I begin to perceive that I have let myself be carried beyond the requirements of the plan that I set before me. The fact is that I have been led on by the marvellous structure of the Stoic system and the miraculous sequence of its topics; pray tell me seriously, does it not fill you with admiration? Nothing is more finished, more nicely ordered, than nature; but what has nature, what have the products of handicraft to show that is so well constructed, so firmly jointed and welded into one? Where do you find a conclusion inconsistent with its premise, or a discrepancy between an earlier and a later statement? Where is lacking such close interconnexion of the parts that, if you alter a single letter, you shake the whole structure? Though indeed there is nothing that it would be possible to alter. 3.75. "Then, how dignified, how lofty, how consistent is the character of the Wise Man as they depict it! Since reason has proved that moral worth is the sole good, it follows that he must always be happy, and that all those titles which the ignorant are so fond of deriding do in very truth belong to him. For he will have a better claim to the title of King than Tarquin, who could not rule either himself or his subjects; a better right to the name of 'Master of the People' (for that is what a dictator is) than Sulla, who was a master of three pestilential vices, licentiousness, avarice and cruelty; a better right to be called rich than Crassus, who had he lacked nothing could never have been induced to cross the Euphrates with no pretext for war. Rightly will he be said to own all things, who alone knows how to use all things; rightly also will he be styled beautiful, for the features of the soul are fairer than those of the body; rightly the one and only free man, as subject to no man's authority, and slave of no appetite; rightly unconquerable, for though his body be thrown into fetters, no bondage can enchain his soul. 3.76. Nor need he wait for any period of time, that the decision whether he has been happy or not may be finally pronounced only when he has rounded off his life's last day in death, â the famous warning so unwisely given to Croesus by old Solon, one of the seven Wise Men; for had Croesus ever been happy, he would have carried his happiness uninterrupted to the pyre raised for him by Cyrus. If then it be true that all the good and none but the good are happy, what possession is more precious than philosophy, what more divine than virtue?" 4.74. "The same verbal legerdemain supplies you with your kingdoms and empires and riches, riches so vast that you declare that everything the world contains is the property of the Wise Man. He alone, you say, is handsome, he alone a free man and a citizen: while the foolish are the opposite of all these, and according to you insane into the bargain. The Stoics call these paradoxa, as we might say 'startling truths.' But what is there so startling about them viewed at close quarters? I will consult you as to the meaning you attach to each term; there shall be no dispute. You Stoics say that all transgressions are equal. I won't jest with you now, as I did on the same subjects when you were prosecuting and I defending Lucius Murena. On that occasion I was addressing a jury, not an audience of scholars, and I even had to play to the gallery a little; but now I must reason more closely. 4.77. "However, they press the matter, and will not give way. Every transgression, they argue, is a proof of weakness and instability of character; but all the foolish possess these vices in an equal manner; therefore all transgressions must be equal. As though it were admitted that all foolish people possess an equal degree of vice, and that Lucius Tubulus was exactly as weak and unstable as Publius Scaevola who brought in the bill for his condemnation; and as though there were no difference also between the respective circumstances in which the transgressions are committed, so that the magnitude of the transgression varies in proportion to the importance of the circumstances! |
|
8. Cicero, On Duties, 1.6-1.7, 1.55 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 55, 174| 1.6. Quae quamquam ita sunt in promptu, ut res disputatione non egeat, tamen sunt a nobis alio loco disputata. Hae disciplinae igitur si sibi consentaneae velint esse, de officio nihil queant dicere, neque ulla officii praecepta firma, stabilia, coniuncta naturae tradi possunt nisi aut ab iis, qui solam, aut ab iis, qui maxime honestatem propter se dicant expetendam. Ita propria est ea praeceptio Stoicorum, Academicorum, Peripateticorum, quoniam Aristonis, Pyrrhonis, Erilli iam pridem explosa sententia est; qui tamen haberent ius suum disputandi de officio, si rerum aliquem dilectum reliquissent, ut ad officii inventionem aditus esset. Sequemur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo videbitur, hauriemus. 1.7. Placet igitur, quoniam omnis disputatio de officio futura est, ante definire, quid sit officium; quod a Panaetio praetermissum esse miror. Omnis enim, quae a ratione suscipitur de aliqua re institutio, debet a definitione proficisci, ut intellegatur, quid sit id, de quo disputetur Omnis de officio duplex est quaestio: unum genus est, quod pertinet ad finem bonorum, alterum, quod positum est in praeceptis, quibus in omnis partis usus vitae conformari possit. Superioris generis huius modi sunt exempla: omniane officia perfecta sint, num quod officium aliud alio maius sit, et quae sunt generis eiusdem. Quorum autem officiorum praecepta traduntur, ea quamquam pertinent ad finem bonorum, tamen minus id apparet, quia magis ad institutionem vitae communis spectare videntur; de quibus est nobis his libris explicandum. Atque etiam alia divisio est officii. 1.55. magnum est enim eadem habere monumenta maiorum, eisdem uti sacris, sepulcra habere communia. Sed omnium societatum nulla praestantior est, nulla firmior, quam cum viri boni moribus similes sunt familiaritate coniuncti; illud enim honestum quod saepe dicimus, etiam si in alio cernimus, tamen nos movet atque illi, in quo id inesse videtur, amicos facit. | 1.55. for it means much to share in common the same family traditions, the same forms of domestic worship, and the same ancestral tombs. But of all the bonds of fellowship, there is none more noble, none more powerful than when good men of congenial character are joined in intimate friendship; for really, if we discover in another that moral goodness on which I dwell so much, it attracts us and makes us friends to the one in whose character it seems to dwell. |
|
9. Septuagint, Judith, 10.5 (2nd cent. BCE - 0th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 128 | 10.5. And she gave her maid a bottle of wine and a flask of oil, and filled a bag with parched grain and a cake of dried fruit and fine bread; and she wrapped up all her vessels and gave them to her to carry. |
|
10. Philo of Alexandria, That Every Good Person Is Free, 150 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 174 | 150. unless indeed any one is so utterly destitute of reason as to fancy that it is the place itself which is the cause of their confidence and freedom of speech, and that that most god-like of all things, virtue, has nothing to do with it, though it is owing to virtue alone that sanctity attaches either to the places or to anything which is endowed with sense. |
|
11. Philo of Alexandria, On The Special Laws, 1.194-1.256 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 127 | 1.194. After the lawgiver has given these commands with reference to these subjects, he begins to distinguish between the different kinds of sacrifices, and he divides the victims into three classes. The most important of which he makes a whole burnt offering; the next an offering for preservation; the last, a sin-offering. And then he adapts suitable ceremonies and rites to each, aiming, in no inadequate manner, at what is at the same time decorous and holy. 1.195. And the distinction which he makes is one of great beauty and propriety, having a close connection and a sort of natural kindred with the things themselves; for if any one were to wish to examine minutely the causes for which it seemed good to the first men to betake themselves at the same time to sacrifices to show their gratitude, and also to supplications, he will find two most especial reasons for this conduct. Firstly, that it conduces to the honour of God, which ought to be aimed at not for the sake of any other reason, but for itself alone, as being both honourable and necessary; and, secondly, for the benefits which have been poured upon the sacrificers themselves, as has been said before. And the benefit they derive is also twofold, being both an admission to a share of good things and a deliverance from evils. 1.196. Therefore the law has assigned the whole burnt offering as a sacrifice adequate to that honour which is suited to God, and which belongs to God alone, enjoining that what is offered to the allperfect and absolute God must be itself entire and perfect, having no taint of mortal selfishness in it. But that sacrifice which is offered for the sake of men, since its appearance admits of distinction, the law has distinguished also, appointing it to be a sacrifice for the participation in blessings which mankind has enjoined, and calling it a thank-offering for their preservation. And for the deliverance from evils it has allotted the sacrifice called a sin-offering, so that these are very appropriately their sacrifices for these causes; 1.197. the whole burntoffering being sacrificed for God himself alone, who must be honoured for his own sake, and not for that of any other being or thing; and the others for our sake; the thank-offering for our preservation, for the safety and amelioration of human affairs; and the sin-offering for the cure of those offences which the soul has committed.XXXVII. 1.198. And we must now enumerate the laws which have been enacted respecting each sacrifice, making our commencement with that which is the most excellent. Now, the most excellent sacrifice is the whole burnt-offering. The law says, "In the first place the victim shall be a male, carefully selected for its excellence from all the animals which are fit for sacrifice, a calf, or a lamb, or a kid. And then let him who brings it wash his hands, and lay his hands on the head of the victim. 1.199. And after this let some one of the priests take the victim and sacrifice it, and let another hold a bowl under it, and, having caught some of the blood, let him go all around the altar and sprinkle it with the blood, and let him flay the victim and divide it into large pieces, having washed its entrails and its feet. And then let the whole victim be given to the fire of the altar of God, {26}{#le 1:3.} having become many things instead of one, and one instead of many." 1.200. These things, then, are comprehended in express words of command. But there is another meaning figuratively concealed under the enigmatical expressions. And the words employed are visible symbols of what is invisible and uncertain. Now the victim which is to be sacrificed as a whole burnt offering must be a male, because a male is both more akin to domination than a female and more nearly related to the efficient cause; for the female is imperfect, subject, seen more as the passive than as the active partner. 1.201. And since the elements of which our soul consists are two in number, the rational and the irrational part, the rational part belongs to the male sex, being the inheritance of intellect and reason; but the irrational part belongs to the sex of woman, which is the lot also of the outward senses. And the mind is in every respect superior to the outward sense, as the man is to the woman; who, when he is without blemish and purified with the proper purifications, namely, the perfect virtues, is himself the most holy sacrifice, being wholly and in all respects pleasing to God. 1.202. Again, the hands which are laid upon the head of the victim are a most manifest symbol of irreproachable actions, and of a life which does nothing which is open to accusation, but which in all respects is passed in a manner consistent with the laws and ordices of nature; 1.203. for the law, in the first place, desires that the mind of the man who is offering the sacrifice shall be made holy by being exercised in good and advantageous doctrines; and, in the second place, that his life shall consist of most virtuous actions, so that, in conjunction with the imposition of hands, the man may speak freely out of his cleanly conscience, and may say, 1.204. "These hands have never received any gift as a bribe to commit an unjust action, nor any division of what has been obtained by rapine or by covetousness, nor have they shed innocent blood. nor have they wrought mutilation, nor works of insolence, nor acts of violence, nor have they inflicted any wounds; nor, in fact, have they performed any action whatever which is liable to accusation or to reproach, but have been ministers in everything which is honourable and advantageous, and which is honoured by wisdom, or by the laws, or by honourable and virtuous men."XXXVIII. 1.205. And the blood is poured out in a circle all round the altar, because a circle is the most complete of all figures, and also in order that no part whatever may be left empty and unoccupied by the libation of life; for, to speak properly, the blood is the libation of the life. Therefore the law here symbolically teaches us that the mind, which is always performing its dances in a circle, is by every description of words, and intentions, and actions which it adopts, always showing its desire to please God. 1.206. And it is commanded that the belly and the feet shall be washed, which command is a figurative and very expressive one; for, by the belly it is figuratively meant to be signified that it is desirable that the appetites shall be purified, which are full of stains, and intoxication, and drunkenness, being thus a most pernicious evil, existing, and concocted, and exercised to the great injury of the life of mankind. 1.207. And by the command that the feet of the victim should be washed, it is figuratively shown that we must no longer walk upon the earth, but soar aloft and traverse the air. For the soul of the man who is devoted to God, being eager for truth, springs upward and mounts from earth to heaven; and, being borne on wings, traverses the expanse of the air, being eager to be classed with and to move in concert with the sun, and moon, and all the rest of the most sacred and most harmonious company of the stars, under the immediate command and government of God, who has a kingly authority without any rival, and of which he can never be deprived, in accordance with which he justly governs the universe. 1.208. And the division of the animal into limbs shows plainly that all things are but one, or that they are derived from one, and dissolved into one; which some persons have called satiety and also want, while others have called it combustion and arrangement: combustion, in accordance with the supreme power of God, who rules all other things in the world; and arrangement, according to the equality of the four elements which they all mutually allow to one another. 1.209. And when I have been investigating these matters, this has appeared to me to be a probable conjecture; the soul which honours the living God, ought for that very reason to honour him not inconsiderately nor ignorantly, but with knowledge and reason; and the reasoning which we indulge in respecting God admits of division and partition, according to each of the divine faculties and excellencies; for God is both all good, and is also the maker and creator of the universe; and he also created it having a foreknowledge of what would take place, and being its preserver and most blessed benefactor, full of every kind of happiness; all which circumstances have in themselves a most dignified and praiseworthy character, both separately and when looked at in conjunction with their kindred qualities; 1.210. and we must speak in the same way of other matters. When you wish to give thanks to God with your mind, and to assert your gratitude for the creation of the world, give him thanks for the creation of it as a whole, and of all its separate parts in their integrity, as if for the limbs of a most perfect animal; and by the parts I mean, for instance, the heaven, and the sun, and the moon, and the fixed stars; and secondly the earth, and the animals, and plants which spring from it; and next the seas and rivers, whether naturally springing from the ground or swollen by rain as winter torrents, and all the things in them: and lastly, the air and all the changes that take place in it; for winter, and summer, and spring, and autumn, being the seasons of the year, and being all of great service to mankind, are what we may call affections of the air for the preservation of all these things that are beneath the moon. 1.211. And if ever you give thanks for men and their fortunes, do not do so only for the race taken generally, but you shall give thanks also for the species and most important parts of the race, such as men and women, Greeks and barbarians, men on the continent, and those who have their habitation in the islands; and if you are giving thanks for one individual, do not divide your thankfulness in expression into gratitude for minute trifles and inconsiderable matters, but take in your view the most comprehensive circumstances, first of all, his body and his soul, of which he consists, and then his speech, and his mind, and his outward senses; for such gratitude cannot of itself be unworthy of being listened to by God, when uttered, for each of these particulars.XXXIX. 1.212. These things are enough for us to say respecting the sacrifice of the whole burntoffering. We must now proceed in due order to consider that offering which is called the sacrifice for preservation; for with respect to this one it is a matter of consequence whether the victim be male or female; and when it is slain, these three parts are especially selected for the altar, the fat, and the lobe of the liver, and the two kidneys; and all the other parts are left to make a feast for the sacrificer; 1.213. and we must consider with great accuracy the reason why these portions of the entrails are in this case looked upon as sacred, and not pass this point by carelessly. often when I have been considering this matter in my own mind, and investigating all these commandments, I have doubted why the law selected the lobe of the liver, and the kidneys, and the fat, as the first fruits of the animals thus sacrificed; and did not choose the heart or the brain, though the domit part of the man resides in one of these parts; 1.214. and I think also that many other persons who read the sacred scriptures with their mind, rather than merely with their eyes, will ask the same question. If therefore they, when they have considered the matter, can find any more probable reason, they will be benefiting both themselves and us; but if they cannot, let them consider the cause which has been discovered by us, and see whether it will stand the test; and this is it. The domit power alone of all those that exist in us is able to restrain our natural folly, and injustice, and cowardice, and our other vices, and does restrain them; and the abode of this domit power is one or other of the aforesaid portions of us, that is, it is either the brain or the heart; 1.215. therefore the sacred commandment has thought fit that one should not bring to the altar of God, by means of which a remission and complete pardon of all sins and transgressions is procured, that vessel from which the mind having at one time been abiding in it, has gone forth on the trackless road of injustice and impiety, having turned out of the way which leads to virtue and excellence; for it would be folly to suppose that sacrifices were not to procure a forgetfulness of offences, but were to act as a reminder of them. This it is which appears to me to be the reason why neither of those two parts, which are of supreme importance, namely, the brain or the heart, is brought to the altar; 1.216. and the parts which are commanded to be brought have a very suitable reason why they should be; the fat is brought because it is the richest part, and that which guards the entrails; for it envelops them and makes them to flourish, and benefits them by the softness of its touch. And the kidneys are commanded to be selected on account of the adjacent parts and the organs of generation, which they, as they dwell near them, do, like good neighbours, assist and co-operate with, in order that the seed of nature may prosper without anything in its vicinity being any obstacle to it; for they are channels resembling blood, by which that part of the purification of the superfluities of the body which is moist is separated from the body; and the testicles are near by which the seed is irrigated. And the lobe of the liver is the first fruit of the most important of the entrails, by means of which the food is digested, and being conveyed into the stomach is diffused through all the veins, and so conduces to the durability of the whole body; 1.217. for the stomach, lying close to the gullet which swallows the food, receives it as soon after it has first been chewed by the teeth and been made smooth, and so digests it; and the body again receives it from the stomach and performs the second part of the service required, to which indeed it has been destined by nature, giving forth a juice to aid in liquefying the food; and there are tow pipes like channels in the belly, which pour forth chyle into the liver, through the two channels which are originally placed in it. 1.218. And the liver has a twofold power, a secretive one, and also a power of making blood. Now the secretive power secretes everything which is hard and difficult to be digested, and removes it into the adjacent vessels of gall; and the other power turns all that portion of the food which is pure and properly strained, by the means of its own innate flame, into life-like vivifying blood; and presses it into the heart, from which, as has been already said, it is conveyed through the veins and by these channels is diffused through the whole body to which it becomes the nourishment. 1.219. We must also add to what has been here said, that the nature of the liver being a lofty character and very smooth, by reason of its smoothness is looked upon as a very transparent mirror, so that when the mind, retreating from the cares of the day (while the body is lying relaxed in sleep, and while no one of the outward senses is any hindrance or impediment 1.220. And there are two days only during which God permits the nation to make use of the sacrifice for preservation, enjoining them to carve nothing of it till the third day, on many accounts, first of all, because all the things which are ever placed on the sacred table, ought to be made use of in due season, while the users take care that they shall suffer no deterioration from the lapse of time; but the nature of meat that has been kept is very apt to become putrid, even though it may have been seasoned in the cooking; 1.221. secondly, because it is fitting that the sacrifices should not be stored up for food, but should be openly exposed, so as to afford a meal to all who are in need of it, for the sacrifice when once placed on the altar, is no longer the property of the person who has offered it, but belongs to that Being to whom the victim is sacrificed, who, being a beneficent and bounteous God, makes the whole company of those who offer the sacrifice, partakers at the altar and messmates, only admonishing them not to look upon it as their own feast, for they are but stewards of the feast, and not the entertainers; and the entertainer is the man to whom all the preparation belongs, which it is not lawful to conceal while preferring parsimony and illiberal meanness to humanity which is a noble virtue. 1.222. Lastly, this command was given because it so happens that the sacrifice for preservation is offered up for two things, the soul and the body, to each of which the lawgiver has assigned one day for feasting on the meats, for it was becoming that a number of days should be allotted for this purpose equal to the number of those parts in us which were designed to be sacred; so that in the first day we should, together with our eating of the food, receive a recollection of the salvation of our souls; and on the second day be reminded of the sound health of our bodies. 1.223. And since there is no third object which is naturally appointed as one that should receive preservation, he has, with all possible strictness, forbidden the use of those meats being reserved to the third day, commanding that if it should so happen that, out of ignorance or forgetfulness, any portion was left, it should be consumed with fire; and he declares that the man who has merely tasted of it is blameable, saying to him, "Though thinking that you were sacrificing, O foolish man, you have not sacrificed; I have not accepted the unholy, unconsecrated, profane, unclean meats which you have roasted, O gluttonous man; never, even in a dream, having a proper idea of sacrifice."XLI. 1.224. To this species of sacrifice for preservation that other sacrifice also belongs, which is called the sacrifice of praise, and which rests on the following Principle.{27}{#le 19:1.} The man who has never fallen into any unexpected disaster whatever, neither as to his body nor as to his external circumstances, but who has passed a tranquil and peaceful life, living in happiness and prosperity, being free from all calamity and all mishap, steering through the long voyage of life in calmness and serenity of circumstances, good fortune always blowing upon the stern of his vessel, is, of necessity, bound to requite God, who has been the pilot of his voyage, who has bestowed upon him untroubled salvation and unalloyed benefits, and, in short, all sorts of blessings unmingled with any evil, with hymns, and songs, an prayers, and also with sacrifices, and all other imaginable tokens of gratitude in a holy manner; all which things taken together have received the one comprehensive name of praise. 1.225. This sacrifice the lawgiver has not commanded to be spread like the one before mentioned over two days, {28}{#le 7:5.} but he has confined it to one only, in order that these men, who meet with ready benefits freely poured upon them, may offer up their requital freely and without any delay.XLII. 1.226. This is sufficient to say on these subjects. We must now proceed, in due order, to consider the third sacrifice, which is called the sinoffering. This is varied in many ways, both in respect to the persons and to the description of victims offered; in respect of persons, that is, of the high priest, and of the whole nation, and of the ruler in his turn, and of the private individual; in respect of the victim offered, whether it be a calf, or a kid, or a she-goat, or a lamb. 1.227. Also there is a distinction made, which is very necessary, as to whether they are voluntary or involuntary, with reference to those who, after they have erred, change for the better, confessing that they have sinned, and reproaching themselves for the offences that they have committed, and turning, for the future, to an irreproachable way of life. 1.228. The sins therefore of the high priest, and of the whole nation, are atoned for by animals of equal value, for the priest is commanded to offer up a calf for each. The sins of the ruler are atoned for by an inferior animal, but still a male, for a kid is the appointed victim. The sins of the private individual by a victim of an inferior species, for it is a female, not a male, a she-goat, that is sacrificed; 1.229. for it was fitting that a ruler should be ranked above a private individual, even in his performance of sacred ceremonies also: but the nation is superior to the ruler, since the whole must, at all times, be superior to the part. But the high priest is accounted worthy of the same honour as the whole nation, in respect of purification and of entreating a forgiveness of his sins from the merciful power of God. And he receives an equality of honour, not so much as it appears for his own sake, as because he is a servant of the nation, offering up a common thank-offering for them all in his most sacred prayers and most holy sacrifices. 1.230. And the commandment given respecting these matters is one of great dignity and admirable solemnity. "If," says the law, "the high priest have sinned unintentionally," and then it adds, "so that the people has sinned too," all but affirming in express words that the true high priest, not the one incorrectly called so, has no participation in sin; and if ever he stumble, this will happen to him, not for his own sake, but for the common errors of the nation, and this error is not incurable, but is one which easily admits of a remedy. 1.231. When, therefore, the calf has been sacrificed, the lawgiver commands the sacrificer to sprinkle some of the blood with his finger seven times in front of the veil which is before the holy of holies, within the former veil, in which place the sacred vessels are placed; and after that to smear and anoint the four horns of the altar, for it is square; and to pour out the rest of the blood at the foot of the altar, which is in the open air. 1.232. And to this altar they are commanded to bring three things, the fat, and the lobe of the liver, and the two kidneys, in accordance with the commandment given with reference to the sacrifice for preservation; but the skin and the flesh, and all the rest of the body of the calf, from the head to the feet, with the entrails, they are commanded to carry out and to turn in an open place, to which the sacred ashes from the altar have been conveyed. The lawgiver also gives the same command with respect to the whole nation when it has sinned. 1.233. But if any ruler has sinned he makes his purification with a kid, {29}{#le 4:22.} as I have said before; and if a private individual has sinned, he must offer a she-goat or a lamb; and for the ruler he appoints a male victim, but to the private individual a female, making all his other injunctions the same in both cases, to anoint the horns of the altar in the open air with blood, to bring the fat and the lobe of the liver, and the two kidneys, and to give the rest of the victim to the priests to eat.XLIII. 1.234. But since, of offences some are committed against men, and some against holy and sacred things; he has hitherto been speaking with reference to those which are unintentionally committed against men; but for the purification of such as have been committed against sacred things he commands a ram to be offered up, after the offender has first paid the value of the thing to which the offence related, adding one fifth to the exact value. 1.235. And after having put forth these and similar enactments with reference to sins committed unintentionally, he proceeds to lay down rules respecting intentional offences. "If any one," says the law, "shall speak falsely concerning a partnership, or about a deposit, or about a theft, or about the finding of something which another has lost, and being suspected and having had an oath proposed to him, shall swear, and when he appears to have escaped all conviction at the hands of this accusers, shall himself become his own accuser, being convicted by his own conscience residing within, and shall reproach himself for the things which he has denied, and as to which he has sworn falsely, and shall come and openly confess the sin which he has committed, and implore pardon; 1.236. then pardon shall be given to such a man, who shows the truth of his repentance, not by promises but by works, by restoring the deposit which he has received, and by giving up the things which he has stolen or found, or of which in short he has in any way deprived his neighbour, paying also in addition one fifth of the value, as an atonement for the evil which he had Done."{30}{#le 5:20.} 1.237. And then, after he has appeased the man who had been injured, the law proceeds to say, "After this let him go also into the temple, to implore remission of the sins which he has committed, taking with him an irreproachable mediator, namely, that conviction of the soul which has delivered him from his incurable calamity, curing him of the disease which would cause death, and wholly changing and bringing him to good health." And it orders that he should sacrifice a ram, and this victim is expressly mentioned, as it is in the case of the man who has offended in respect of the holy things; 1.238. for the law speaks of an unintentional offence in the matter of holy things as of equal importance with an intentional sin in respect of men; if we may not indeed say that this also is holy, since an oath is added to it, which, as having been taken for an unjust cause, it has corrected by an alteration for the better. 1.239. And we must take notice that the parts of the victim slain as a sin-offering which are placed upon the altar, are the same as those which are taken from the sacrifice for preservation, namely the lobe of the liver, and the fat, and the kidneys; for in a manner we may speak also of the man who repents as being preserved, since he is cured of a disease of the soul, which is worse than the diseases of the body; 1.240. but the other parts of the animal are assigned to be eaten in a different manner; and the difference consists in three things; in the place, and time, and in those who receive It.{31}{#le 6:9.} Now the place is the temple; the time is one day instead of two; and the persons who partake of it are the priests, and the male servants of the priests, but not the men who offer the sacrifice. 1.241. Therefore the law does not permit the sacrifice to be brought out of the temple, with the intent that, if the man who repents has committed any previous offence also, he may not now be overwhelmed by envious and malicious men, with foolish dispositions and unbridled tongues, always lying in wait for reproach and false accusation; but it must be eaten in the sacred precincts, within which the purification has taken place.XLIV. 1.242. And the law orders the priests to feast on what is offered in the sacrifice for many reasons; first of all, that by this command it may do honour to him who has offered the sacrifice, for the dignity of those who eat of the feast is an honour to those who furnish it; secondly, that they may believe the more firmly that those men who feel repentance for their sins do really have God propitious to them, for he would never have invited his servants and ministers to a participation in such a banquet, if his forgiveness of those who provided it had not been complete; and thirdly, because it is not lawful for any one of the priests to bear a part in the sacred ceremonies who is not perfect, for they are rejected for the slightest blemish. 1.243. And God comforts those who have ceased to travel by the road of wickedness, as if they now, by means of the race of the priesthood, had received a pure purpose of life for the future, and had been sent forth so as to obtain an equal share of honour with the priests. And it is for this reason that the victim sacrificed as a sin-offering is consumed in one day, because men ought to delay to sin, being always slow and reluctant to approach it, but to exert all possible haste and promptness in doing well. 1.244. But the sacrifices offered up for the sins of the high priest, or for those of the whole nation, are not prepared to be eaten at all, but are burnt to ashes, and the ashes are sacred as has been said; for there is no one who is superior to the high priest or to the whole nation, or who can as such be an intercessor for them, as to the sins which they have committed. 1.245. Very naturally, therefore, is the meat of this sacrifice ordered to be consumed by fire, in imitation of the whole burnt offerings, and this to the honour of those who offer it; not because the sacred judgments of God are given with reference to the rank of those who come before his tribunal, but because the offences committed by men of pre-eminent virtue and real holiness are accounted of a character nearly akin to the good actions of others; 1.246. for as a deep and fertile soil, even if it at times yields a bad crop, still bears more and better fruit than one which is naturally unproductive, so in the same manner it happens that the barrenness of virtuous and God-fearing men is more full of excellence than the best actions which ordinary people perform by chance; for these men cannot intentionally endure to do anything blameable.XLV. 1.247. Having given these commandments about every description of sacrifice in its turn, namely, about the burnt offering, and the sacrifice for preservation, and the sin-offering, he adds another kind of offering common to all the three, in order to show that they are friendly and connected with one another; and this combination of them all is called the great vow; 1.248. and why it received this appellation we must now proceed to say. When any persons offer first fruits from any portion of their possessions, wheat, or barley, or oil, or wine, or the best of their fruits, or the firstborn males of their flocks and herds, they do so actually dedicating those first fruits which proceed from what is clean, but paying a price as the value of what is unclean; and when they have no longer any materials left in which they can display their piety, they then consecrate and offer up themselves, displaying an unspeakable holiness, and a most superabundant excess of a God-loving disposition, on which account such a dedication is fitly called the great vow; for every man is his own greatest and most valuable possession, and this even he now gives up and abandons. 1.249. And when a man has vowed this vow the law gives him the following command; first of all, to touch no unmixed wine, nor any wine that is made of the grape, nor to drink any other strong drink whatever, to the destruction of his reason, considering that during this period his reason also is dedicated to God; for all which could tend to drunkenness is forbidden to those of the priests who are employed in the sacred ministrations, they being commanded to quench their thirst with water; 1.250. in the second place they are commanded not to show their heads, giving thus a visible sign to all who see them that they are not debasing the pure coinage of their vow; thirdly, they are commanded to keep their body pure and undefiled, so as not even to approach their parents if they are dead, nor their brothers; piety overcoming the natural good will and affection towards their relations and dearest friends, and it is both honourable and expedient that piety should at all times prevail.XLVI. 1.251. But when the appointed time for their being Released{32}{#nu 6:14.} from this vow has arrived, the law then commands the man who has dedicated himself to bring three animals to procure his release from his vow, a male lamb, and a female lamb, and a ram; the one for a burnt offering, the second for a sin-offering, and the ram as a sacrifice for preservation; 1.252. for in some sense the man who has made such a vow resembles all these things. He resembles the sacrifice of the entire burnt offering, because he is dedicating to his preserver not only a portion of the first fruits of other things, but also of his own self. And he resembles the sin-offering, inasmuch as he is a man; for there is no one born, however perfect he may be, who can wholly avoid the commission of sin. He resembles also the offering for preservation, inasmuch as he has recorded that God the saviour is the cause of his preservation, and does not ascribe it to any physician or to any power of his; for those who have been born themselves, and who are liable to infirmity, are not competent to bestow health even on themselves. Medicine does not benefit all persons, nor does it always benefit the same persons; but there are times even when it does them great injury, since its power depends on different things, both on the thing itself and also on those persons who use it. 1.253. And a great impression is made on me by the fact that of three animals offered up in these different sacrifices, there is no one of a different species from the others, but they are every one of the same kind, a ram, and a male lamb, and a female lamb; for God wishes, as I said a little while ago, by this commandment to point out that the three kinds of sacrifice are nearly connected with and akin to one another; because, both the man who repents is saved, and the man who is saved from the diseases of the soul repents, and because both of them hasten with eagerness to attain to an entire and perfect disposition, of which the sacrifice of the whole burnt-offering is a symbol. 1.254. But since the man has begun to offer himself as his first fruits, and since it is not lawful for the sacred altar to be polluted with human blood, but yet it was by all means necessary that a portion should be consecrated, he has taken care to take a portion, which, being taken, should cause neither pain nor defilement; for he has cut off{33}{#nu 6:18.} the hair of the head, the superfluities of the natural body, as if they were the superfluous branches of a tree, and he has committed them to the fire on which the meat of the sacrifice offered for preservation will be suitably prepared, {34}{#le 6:13.} in order that some portion of the man who has made the vow, which it is not lawful to place upon the altar, may still at all events be combined with the sacrifice, burning the fuel of the sacred flame.XLVII. 1.255. These sacred fires are common to all the rest of the people. But it was fitting that the priests also should offer up something on the altar as first fruits, not thinking that the services and sacred ministrations to which they have been appointed have secured them an exemption from such duties. And the first fruits suitable for the priests to offer do not come from anything containing blood, but from the purest portion of human food; 1.256. for the fine wheaten flour is their continual offering; a tenth part of a sacred measure every day; one half of which is offered up in the morning, and one half in the evening, having been soaked in oil, so that no portion of it can be left for food; for the command of God is, that all the sacrifices of the priests shall be wholly burnt, and that no portion of them shall be allotted for food. Having now, then, to the best of our ability, discussed the matters relating to the sacrifices, we will proceed in due order to speak concerning those who offer Them.{35}{yonge's translation includes a separate treatise title at this point: On Those Who offer Sacrifice. Accordingly, his next paragraph begins with roman numeral I (= XLVIII in the Loeb |
|
| 12. Anon., Sibylline Oracles, 2.96 (1st cent. BCE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 125 |
13. Philo of Alexandria, On The Sacrifices of Cain And Abel, 110 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 127 | 110. and there are some entire virtues, free from all wickedness, which it would be impious to mutilate by dividing them, and which resemble those indivisible sacrifices, the whole burnt-offerings, of which Isaac is a manifest pattern, whom his father was commanded to offer up like a victim, sharing in no destructive passion. |
|
14. Philo of Alexandria, On The Migration of Abraham, 89-93 (1st cent. BCE - missingth cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 129 | 93. But it is right to think that this class of things resembles the body, and the other class the soul; therefore, just as we take care of the body because it is the abode of the soul, so also must we take care of the laws that are enacted in plain terms: for while they are regarded, those other things also will be more clearly understood, of which these laws are the symbols, and in the same way one will escape blame and accusation from men in general. |
|
| 15. Seneca The Younger, De Otio Sapientis (Dialogorum Liber Viii), 4.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 60 |
16. New Testament, Galatians, 2.18-2.19 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 184| 2.18. εἰ γὰρ ἃ κατέλυσα ταῦτα πάλιν οἰκοδομῶ, παραβάτην ἐμαυτὸν συνιστάνω. 2.19. ἐγὼ γὰρ διὰ νόμου νόμῳ ἀπέθανον ἵνα θεῷ ζήσω· Χριστῷ συνεσταύρωμαι· | 2.18. For if I build up again those things which I destroyed, I provemyself a law-breaker. 2.19. For I, through the law, died to the law,that I might live to God. |
|
17. New Testament, Philippians, 3.20 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 60| 3.20. ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει, ἐξ οὗ καὶ σωτῆρα ἀπεκδεχόμεθα κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν, | 3.20. For our citizenship is in heaven, from where we also wait for a Savior, the Lord Jesus Christ; |
|
| 18. Persius, Saturae, 15.165-15.186 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 59 |
19. New Testament, Luke, 10.7-10.8, 10.38-10.42, 17.1, 18.8, 18.13-18.14 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety •piety, graeco-roman Found in books: Langstaff, Stuckenbruck, and Tilly, (2022), The Lord’s Prayer, 192; Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 179| 10.7. ἐν αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ οἰκίᾳ μένετε, ἔσθοντες καὶ πίνοντες τὰ παρʼ αὐτῶν, ἄξιος γὰρ ὁ ἐργάτης τοῦ μισθοῦ αὐτοῦ. μὴ μεταβαίνετε ἐξ οἰκίας εἰς οἰκίαν. 10.8. καὶ εἰς ἣν ἂν πόλιν εἰσέρχησθε καὶ δέχωνται ὑμᾶς, 10.38. Ἐν δὲ τῷ πορεύεσθαι αὐτοὺς αὐτὸς εἰσῆλθεν εἰς κώμην τινά· γυνὴ δέ τις ὀνόματι Μάρθα ὑπεδέξατο αὐτὸν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν. 10.39. καὶ τῇδε ἦν ἀδελφὴ καλουμένη Μαριάμ, [ἣ] καὶ παρακαθεσθεῖσα πρὸς τοὺς πόδας τοῦ κυρίου ἤκουεν τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ. 10.40. ἡ δὲ Μάρθα περιεσπᾶτο περὶ πολλὴν διακονίαν· ἐπιστᾶσα δὲ εἶπεν Κύριε, οὐ μέλει σοι ὅτι ἡ ἀδελφή μου μόνην με κατέλειπεν διακονεῖν; εἰπὸν οὖν αὐτῇ ἵνα μοι συναντιλάβηται. 10.41. ἀποκριθεὶς δὲ εἶπεν αὐτῇ ὁ κύριος Μάρθα Μάρθα, μεριμνᾷς καὶ θορυβάζῃ περὶ πολλά, ὀλίγων δέ ἐστιν χρεία ἢ ἑνός· 10.42. Μαριὰμ γὰρ τὴν ἀγαθὴν μερίδα ἐξελέξατο ἥτις οὐκ ἀφαιρεθήσεται αὐτῆς. 17.1. Εἶπεν δὲ πρὸς τοὺς μαθητὰς αὐτοῦ Ἀνένδεκτόν ἐστιν τοῦ τὰ σκάνδαλα μὴ ἐλθεῖν, πλὴν οὐαὶ διʼ οὗ ἔρχεται· 18.8. λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι ποιήσει τὴν ἐκδίκησιν αὐτῶν ἐν τάχει. πλὴν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐλθὼν ἆρα εὑρήσει τὴν πίστιν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς; 18.13. ὁ δὲ τελώνης μακρόθεν ἑστὼς οὐκ ἤθελεν οὐδὲ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἐπᾶραι εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, ἀλλʼ ἔτυπτε τὸ στῆθος ἑαυτοῦ λέγων Ὁ θεός, ἱλάσθητί μοι τῷ ἁμαρτωλῷ. 18.14. λέγω ὑμῖν, κατέβη οὗτος δεδικαιωμένος εἰς τὸν οἶκον αὐτοῦ παρʼ ἐκεῖνον· ὅτι πᾶς ὁ ὑψῶν ἑαυτὸν ταπεινωθήσεται, ὁ δὲ ταπεινῶν ἑαυτὸν ὑψωθήσεται. | 10.7. Remain in that same house, eating and drinking the things they give, for the laborer is worthy of his wages. Don't go from house to house. 10.8. Into whatever city you enter, and they receive you, eat the things that are set before you. 10.38. It happened as they went on their way, he entered into a certain village, and a certain woman named Martha received him into her house. 10.39. She had a sister called Mary, who also sat at Jesus' feet, and heard his word. 10.40. But Martha was distracted with much serving, and she came up to him, and said, "Lord, don't you care that my sister left me to serve alone? Ask her therefore to help me." 10.41. Jesus answered her, "Martha, Martha, you are anxious and troubled about many things, 10.42. but one thing is needed. Mary has chosen the good part, which will not be taken away from her." 17.1. He said to the disciples, "It is impossible that no occasions of stumbling should come, but woe to him through whom they come! 18.8. I tell you that he will avenge them quickly. Nevertheless, when the Son of Man comes, will he find faith on the earth?" 18.13. But the tax collector, standing far away, wouldn't even lift up his eyes to heaven, but beat his breast, saying, 'God, be merciful to me, a sinner!' 18.14. I tell you, this man went down to his house justified rather than the other; for everyone who exalts himself will be humbled, but he who humbles himself will be exalted." |
|
| 20. Persius, Satires, 15.165-15.186 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 59 |
21. New Testament, Apocalypse, 2.10, 2.14 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 125| 2.10. μὴ φοβοῦ ἃ μέλλεις πάσχειν. ἰδοὺ μέλλει βάλλειν ὁ διάβολος ἐξ ὑμῶν εἰς φυλακὴν ἵναπειρασθῆτε,καὶ ἔχητε θλίψινἡμερῶν δέκα.γίνου πιστὸς ἄχρι θανάτου, καὶ δώσω σοι τὸν στέφανον τῆς ζωῆς. 2.14. ἀλλὰ ἔχω κατὰ σοῦ ὀλίγα, ὅτι ἔχεις ἐκεῖ κρατοῦντας τὴν διδαχὴνΒαλαάμ,ὃς ἐδίδασκεν τῷ Βαλὰκ βαλεῖν σκάνδαλον ἐνώπιοντῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραήλ, φαγεῖν εἰδωλόθυτα καὶ πορνεῦσαι· | 2.10. Don't be afraid of the things which you are about to suffer. Behold, the devil is about to throw some of you into prison, that you may be tested; and you will have oppression for ten days. Be faithful to death, and I will give you the crown of life. 2.14. But I have a few things against you, because you have there some who hold the teaching of Balaam, who taught Balak to throw a stumbling block before the children of Israel , to eat things sacrificed to idols, and to commit sexual immorality. |
|
22. New Testament, Romans, 2.12 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 153| 2.12. Ὅσοι γὰρ ἀνόμως ἥμαρτον, ἀνόμως καὶ ἀπολοῦνται· καὶ ὅσοι ἐν νόμῳ ἥμαρτον, διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται· | 2.12. For as many as have sinned without law will also perish without the law. As many as have sinned under the law will be judged by the law. |
|
23. New Testament, Acts, 15.29, 21.25 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 125| 15.29. ἐξ ὧν διατηροῦντες ἑαυτοὺς εὖ πράξετε. Ἔρρωσθε. 21.25. περὶ δὲ τῶν πεπιστευκότων ἐθνῶν ἡμεῖς ἀπεστείλαμεν κρίναντες φυλάσσεσθαι αὐτοὺς τό τε εἰδωλόθυτον καὶ αἷμα καὶ πνικτὸν καὶ πορνείαν. | 15.29. that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, from blood, from things strangled, and from sexual immorality, from which if you keep yourselves, it will be well with you. Farewell." 21.25. But concerning the Gentiles who believe, we have written our decision that they should observe no such thing, except that they should keep themselves from food offered to idols, from blood, from strangled things, and from sexual immorality." |
|
| 24. Plutarch, Moralia, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •piety, graeco-roman Found in books: Langstaff, Stuckenbruck, and Tilly, (2022), The Lord’s Prayer, 192 |
25. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 1.18, 1.19, 3.16, 3.17, 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, 6.12, 6.19, 6.20, 7.32, 7.33, 7.34, 7.35, 8, 8.1-11.1, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 8.7, 8.8, 8.9, 8.10, 8.11, 8.12, 8.13, 9, 9.12, 9.14, 9.15, 9.16, 9.17, 9.18, 9.19, 9.20, 9.21, 9.22, 9.23, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 10.7, 10.8, 10.9, 10.10, 10.11, 10.12, 10.13, 10.14, 10.15, 10.16, 10.17, 10.18, 10.19, 10.20, 10.21, 10.22, 10.23, 10.23-11.1, 10.24, 10.25, 10.26, 10.27, 10.28, 10.29, 10.30, 10.31, 10.31-11.1, 10.32, 10.33, 11.1, 11.17, 11.18, 11.19, 11.20, 11.21, 11.22, 11.23, 11.24, 11.25, 11.26, 11.27, 11.28, 11.29, 11.30, 11.31, 11.32, 11.33, 11.34, 12, 12.7, 12.12, 12.13, 12.14, 12.15, 12.16, 12.17, 12.18, 12.19, 12.20, 12.21, 12.22, 12.23, 12.24, 12.25, 12.26, 12.27, 12.28, 12.29, 12.30, 12.31, 13, 13.3, 13.8, 13.9, 13.10, 14, 14.1, 14.2, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, 14.6, 14.7, 14.8, 14.9, 14.10, 14.11, 14.12, 14.13, 14.14, 14.15, 14.16, 14.17, 14.18, 14.19, 14.20, 14.21, 14.22, 14.23, 14.24, 14.25, 14.26, 14.27, 14.28, 14.29, 14.30, 14.31, 14.32, 14.33, 14.34, 14.35, 14.36, 14.37, 14.38, 14.39, 14.40, 15.18 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 180, 183| 10.17. ὅτι εἷς ἄρτος, ἓν σῶμα οἱ πολλοί ἐσμεν, οἱ γὰρ πάντες ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄρτου μετέχομεν. βλέπετε τὸν Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα· | 10.17. Because we, who are many, are one bread, one body; forwe all partake of the one bread. |
|
26. Mishnah, Avodah Zarah, 2.6 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 128| 2.6. "אֵלּוּ דְבָרִים שֶׁל גּוֹיִם אֲסוּרִין וְאֵין אִסּוּרָן אִסּוּר הֲנָאָה. חָלָב שֶׁחֲלָבוֹ גוֹי וְאֵין יִשְׂרָאֵל רוֹאֵהוּ, וְהַפַּת, וְהַשֶּׁמֶן שֶׁלָּהֶן. רַבִּי וּבֵית דִּינוֹ הִתִּירוּ בַשֶּׁמֶן. וּשְׁלָקוֹת, וּכְבָשִׁין שֶׁדַּרְכָּן לָתֵת לְתוֹכָן יַיִן וָחֹמֶץ, וְטָרִית טְרוּפָה, וְצִיר שֶׁאֵין בָּהּ דָּגָה כִלְבִּית שׁוֹטֶטֶת בּוֹ, וְהַחִלָּק, וְקֹרֶט שֶׁל חִלְתִּית, וּמֶלַח סַלְקוֹנְטִית, הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין וְאֵין אִסּוּרָן אִסּוּר הֲנָאָה: \n", | 2.6. "The following articles of non-Jews are prohibited but the prohibition does not extend to deriving benefit from them: 1. milk which a non-Jew milked without an israelite watching him, 2. their bread and oil (Rabbi and his court permitted the oil) 3. stewed and pickled things into which they are accustomed to put wine or vinegar, 4. pickled herring which had been minced, 5. brine in which there is no kalbith-fish floating, 6. helek, 7. pieces of asa foetida 8. and sal-conditum. Behold these are prohibited but the prohibition does not extend to deriving benefit from them.", |
|
| 27. Josephus Flavius, Life, 74-76 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 128 |
28. Josephus Flavius, Jewish War, 2.591-2.592 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 128 | 2.591. He after that contrived a very shrewd trick, and pretending that the Jews who dwelt in Syria were obliged to make use of oil that was made by others than those of their own nation, he desired leave of Josephus to send oil to their borders; 2.592. o he bought four amphorae with such Tyrian money as was of the value of four Attic drachmae, and sold every half-amphora at the same price. And as Galilee was very fruitful in oil, and was peculiarly so at that time, by sending away great quantities, and having the sole privilege so to do, he gathered an immense sum of money together, which money he immediately used to the disadvantage of him who gave him that privilege; |
|
29. Josephus Flavius, Jewish Antiquities, 12.119-12.120 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 128 | 12.119. 1. The Jews also obtained honors from the kings of Asia when they became their auxiliaries; for Seleucus Nicator made them citizens in those cities which he built in Asia, and in the lower Syria, and in the metropolis itself, Antioch; and gave them privileges equal to those of the Macedonians and Greeks, who were the inhabitants, insomuch that these privileges continue to this very day: 12.120. an argument for which you have in this, that whereas the Jews do not make use of oil prepared by foreigners, they receive a certain sum of money from the proper officers belonging to their exercises as the value of that oil; which money, when the people of Antioch would have deprived them of, in the last war, Mucianus, who was then president of Syria, preserved it to them. |
|
| 30. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.7.3, 1.7.29, 1.9.1, 1.9.5, 1.18.1-1.18.3, 2.19.13-2.19.15, 2.19.27-2.19.28, 2.20.6-2.20.8, 2.20.20, 2.22.9, 2.22.14, 2.22.25, 2.22.31, 3.24.24-3.24.37, 3.24.93, 3.24.95-3.24.118, 4.6.31, 4.10.24 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 55, 60, 174, 175, 179 |
| 31. Cornutus, De Natura Deorum, 10, 14, 16, 20-22, 9, 24 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 59 |
32. New Testament, 2 Corinthians, 2.15, 4.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 153| 2.15. ὅτι Χριστοῦ εὐωδία ἐσμὲν τῷ θεῷ ἐν τοῖς σωζομένοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις, 4.3. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔστιν κεκαλυμμένον τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἡμῶν, ἐν τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις ἐστὶν κεκαλυμμένον, | |
|
| 33. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 10.24, 12.26 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 174 |
34. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 6.63, 7.89, 7.94-7.95, 7.118-7.131, 7.135-7.136 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 55, 59, 60, 153, 173, 174 | 6.63. On being asked what he had gained from philosophy, he replied, This at least, if nothing else – to be prepared for every fortune. Asked where he came from, he said, I am a citizen of the world. Certain parents were sacrificing to the gods, that a son might be born to them. But, said he, do you not sacrifice to ensure what manner of man he shall turn out to be? When asked for a subscription towards a club, he said to the president:Despoil the rest; off Hector keep thy hands.The mistresses of kings he designated queens; for, said he, they make the kings do their bidding. When the Athenians gave Alexander the title of Dionysus, he said, Me too you might make Sarapis. Some one having reproached him for going into dirty places, his reply was that the sun too visits cesspools without being defiled. 7.89. By the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chrysippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of man, whereas Cleanthes takes the nature of the universe alone as that which should be followed, without adding the nature of the individual.And virtue, he holds, is a harmonious disposition, choice-worthy for its own sake and not from hope or fear or any external motive. Moreover, it is in virtue that happiness consists; for virtue is the state of mind which tends to make the whole of life harmonious. When a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness of external pursuits or sometimes to the influence of associates. For the starting-points of nature are never perverse. 7.94. Good in general is that from which some advantage comes, and more particularly what is either identical with or not distinct from benefit. Whence it follows that virtue itself and whatever partakes of virtue is called good in these three senses – viz. as being (1) the source from which benefit results; or (2) that in respect of which benefit results, e.g. the virtuous act; or (3) that by the agency of which benefit results, e.g. the good man who partakes in virtue.Another particular definition of good which they give is the natural perfection of a rational being qua rational. To this answers virtue and, as being partakers in virtue, virtuous acts and good men; as also its supervening accessories, joy and gladness and the like. 7.95. So with evils: either they are vices, folly, cowardice, injustice, and the like; or things which partake of vice, including vicious acts and wicked persons as well as their accompaniments, despair, moroseness, and the like.Again, some goods are goods of the mind and others external, while some are neither mental nor external. The former include the virtues and virtuous acts; external goods are such as having a good country or a good friend, and the prosperity of such. Whereas to be good and happy oneself is of the class of goods neither mental nor external. 7.118. Again, the good are genuinely in earnest and vigilant for their own improvement, using a manner of life which banishes evil out of sight and makes what good there is in things appear. At the same time they are free from pretence; for they have stripped off all pretence or make-up whether in voice or in look. Free too are they from all business cares, declining to do anything which conflicts with duty. They will take wine, but not get drunk. Nay more, they will not be liable to madness either; not but what there will at times occur to the good man strange impressions due to melancholy or delirium, ideas not determined by the principle of what is choiceworthy but contrary to nature. Nor indeed will the wise man ever feel grief; seeing that grief is irrational contraction of the soul, as Apollodorus says in his Ethics. 7.119. They are also, it is declared, godlike; for they have a something divine within them; whereas the bad man is godless. And yet of this word – godless or ungodly – there are two senses, one in which it is the opposite of the term godly, the other denoting the man who ignores the divine altogether: in this latter sense, as they note, the term does not apply to every bad man. The good, it is added, are also worshippers of God; for they have acquaintance with the rites of the gods, and piety is the knowledge of how to serve the gods. Further, they will sacrifice to the gods and they keep themselves pure; for they avoid all acts that are offences against the gods, and the gods think highly of them: for they are holy and just in what concerns the gods. The wise too are the only priests; for they have made sacrifices their study, as also establishing holy places, purifications, and all the other matters appertaining to the gods. 7.120. The Stoics approve also of honouring parents and brothers in the second place next after the gods. They further maintain that parental affection for children is natural to the good, but not to the bad. It is one of their tenets that sins are all equal: so Chrysippus in the fourth book of his Ethical Questions, as well as Persaeus and Zeno. For if one truth is not more true than another, neither is one falsehood more false than another, and in the same way one deceit is not more so than another, nor sin than sin. For he who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus and he who is only one furlong away are equally not in Canopus, and so too he who commits the greater sin and he who commits the less are equally not in the path of right conduct. 7.121. But Heraclides of Tarsus, who was the disciple of Antipater of Tarsus, and Athenodorus both assert that sins are not equal.Again, the Stoics say that the wise man will take part in politics, if nothing hinders him – so, for instance, Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Various Types of Life – since thus he will restrain vice and promote virtue. Also (they maintain) he will marry, as Zeno says in his Republic, and beget children. Moreover, they say that the wise man will never form mere opinions, that is to say, he will never give assent to anything that is false; that he will also play the Cynic, Cynicism being a short cut to virtue, as Apollodorus calls it in his Ethics; that he will even turn cannibal under stress of circumstances. They declare that he alone is free and bad men are slaves, freedom being power of independent action, whereas slavery is privation of the same; 7.122. though indeed there is also a second form of slavery consisting in subordination, and a third which implies possession of the slave as well as his subordination; the correlative of such servitude being lordship; and this too is evil. Moreover, according to them not only are the wise free, they are also kings; kingship being irresponsible rule, which none but the wise can maintain: so Chrysippus in his treatise vindicating Zeno's use of terminology. For he holds that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary attribute of the ruler, and that no bad man is acquainted with this science. Similarly the wise and good alone are fit to be magistrates, judges, or orators, whereas among the bad there is not one so qualified. 7.123. Furthermore, the wise are infallible, not being liable to error. They are also without offence; for they do no hurt to others or to themselves. At the same time they are not pitiful and make no allowance for anyone; they never relax the penalties fixed by the laws, since indulgence and pity and even equitable consideration are marks of a weak mind, which affects kindness in place of chastizing. Nor do they deem punishments too severe. Again, they say that the wise man never wonders at any of the things which appear extraordinary, such as Charon's mephitic caverns, ebbings of the tide, hot springs or fiery eruptions. Nor yet, they go on to say, will the wise man live in solitude; for he is naturally made for society and action. 7.124. He will, however, submit to training to augment his powers of bodily endurance.And the wise man, they say, will offer prayers, and ask for good things from the gods: so Posidonius in the first book of his treatise On Duties, and Hecato in his third book On Paradoxes. Friendship, they declare, exists only between the wise and good, by reason of their likeness to one another. And by friendship they mean a common use of all that has to do with life, wherein we treat our friends as we should ourselves. They argue that a friend is worth having for his own sake and that it is a good thing to have many friends. But among the bad there is, they hold, no such thing as friendship, and thus no bad man has a friend. Another of their tenets is that the unwise are all mad, inasmuch as they are not wise but do what they do from that madness which is the equivalent of their folly. 7.125. Furthermore, the wise man does all things well, just as we say that Ismenias plays all airs on the flute well. Also everything belongs to the wise. For the law, they say, has conferred upon them a perfect right to all things. It is true that certain things are said to belong to the bad, just as what has been dishonestly acquired may be said, in one sense, to belong to the state, in another sense to those who are enjoying it.They hold that the virtues involve one another, and that the possessor of one is the possessor of all, inasmuch as they have common principles, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his work On Virtues, Apollodorus in his Physics according to the Early School, and Hecato in the third book of his treatise On Virtues. 7.126. For if a man be possessed of virtue, he is at once able to discover and to put into practice what he ought to do. Now such rules of conduct comprise rules for choosing, enduring, staying, and distributing; so that if a man does some things by intelligent choice, some things with fortitude, some things by way of just distribution, and some steadily, he is at once wise, courageous, just, and temperate. And each of the virtues has a particular subject with which it deals, as, for instance, courage is concerned with things that must be endured, practical wisdom with acts to be done, acts from which one must abstain, and those which fall under neither head. Similarly each of the other virtues is concerned with its own proper sphere. To wisdom are subordinate good counsel and understanding; to temperance, good discipline and orderliness; to justice, equality and fair-mindedness; to courage, constancy and vigour. 7.127. It is a tenet of theirs that between virtue and vice there is nothing intermediate, whereas according to the Peripatetics there is, namely, the state of moral improvement. For, say the Stoics, just as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust. Nor again are there degrees of justice and injustice; and the same rule applies to the other virtues. Further, while Chrysippus holds that virtue can be lost, Cleanthes maintains that it cannot. According to the former it may be lost in consequence of drunkenness or melancholy; the latter takes it to be inalienable owing to the certainty of our mental apprehension. And virtue in itself they hold to be worthy of choice for its own sake. At all events we are ashamed of bad conduct as if we knew that nothing is really good but the morally beautiful. Moreover, they hold that it is in itself sufficient to ensure well-being: thus Zeno, and Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Virtues, and Hecato in the second book of his treatise On Goods: 7.128. For if magimity by itself alone can raise us far above everything, and if magimity is but a part of virtue, then too virtue as a whole will be sufficient in itself for well-being – despising all things that seem troublesome. Panaetius, however, and Posidonius deny that virtue is self-sufficing: on the contrary, health is necessary, and some means of living and strength.Another tenet of theirs is the perpetual exercise of virtue, as held by Cleanthes and his followers. For virtue can never be lost, and the good man is always exercising his mind, which is perfect. Again, they say that justice, as well as law and right reason, exists by nature and not by convention: so Chrysippus in his work On the Morally Beautiful. 7.129. Neither do they think that the divergence of opinion between philosophers is any reason for abandoning the study of philosophy, since at that rate we should have to give up life altogether: so Posidonius in his Exhortations. Chrysippus allows that the ordinary Greek education is serviceable.It is their doctrine that there can be no question of right as between man and the lower animals, because of their unlikeness. Thus Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Justice, and Posidonius in the first book of his De officio. Further, they say that the wise man will feel affection for the youths who by their countece show a natural endowment for virtue. So Zeno in his Republic, Chrysippus in book i. of his work On Modes of Life, and Apollodorus in his Ethics. 7.130. Their definition of love is an effort toward friendliness due to visible beauty appearing, its sole end being friendship, not bodily enjoyment. At all events, they allege that Thrasonides, although he had his mistress in his power, abstained from her because she hated him. By which it is shown, they think, that love depends upon regard, as Chrysippus says in his treatise of Love, and is not sent by the gods. And beauty they describe as the bloom or flower of virtue.of the three kinds of life, the contemplative, the practical, and the rational, they declare that we ought to choose the last, for that a rational being is expressly produced by nature for contemplation and for action. They tell us that the wise man will for reasonable cause make his own exit from life, on his country's behalf or for the sake of his friends, or if he suffer intolerable pain, mutilation, or incurable disease. 7.131. It is also their doctrine that amongst the wise there should be a community of wives with free choice of partners, as Zeno says in his Republic and Chrysippus in his treatise On Government [and not only they, but also Diogenes the Cynic and Plato]. Under such circumstances we shall feel paternal affection for all the children alike, and there will be an end of the jealousies arising from adultery. The best form of government they hold to be a mixture of democracy, kingship, and aristocracy (or the rule of the best).Such, then, are the statements they make in their ethical doctrines, with much more besides, together with their proper proofs: let this, however, suffice for a statement of them in a summary and elementary form. 7.135. Body is defined by Apollodorus in his Physics as that which is extended in three dimensions, length, breadth, and depth. This is also called solid body. But surface is the extremity of a solid body, or that which has length and breadth only without depth. That surface exists not only in our thought but also in reality is maintained by Posidonius in the third book of his Celestial Phenomena. A line is the extremity of a surface or length without breadth, or that which has length alone. A point is the extremity of a line, the smallest possible mark or dot.God is one and the same with Reason, Fate, and Zeus; he is also called by many other names. 7.136. In the beginning he was by himself; he transformed the whole of substance through air into water, and just as in animal generation the seed has a moist vehicle, so in cosmic moisture God, who is the seminal reason of the universe, remains behind in the moisture as such an agent, adapting matter to himself with a view to the next stage of creation. Thereupon he created first of all the four elements, fire, water, air, earth. They are discussed by Zeno in his treatise On the Whole, by Chrysippus in the first book of his Physics, and by Archedemus in a work On Elements. An element is defined as that from which particular things first come to be at their birth and into which they are finally resolved. |
|
| 35. Stobaeus, Anthology, 4.671.7-673.1 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 58 |
| 36. Philo of Alexandria, On The Account of The Worlds Creation, 1 Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 60 |
37. Septuagint, 4 Maccabees, 5.2 Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 125 | 5.2. ordered the guards to seize each and every Hebrew and to compel them to eat pork and food sacrificed to idols. |
|
38. Babylonian Talmud, Avodah Zarah, None Tagged with subjects: •graeco-roman piety Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 128| 36b. (מלאכי ג, ט) במארה אתם נארים ואותי אתם קובעים הגוי כולו אי איכא גוי כולו אין אי לא לא,גופא אמר באלי אמר אבימי נותאה משמיה דרב פיתן ושמנן יינן ובנותיהן כולן משמונה עשר דבר הן בנותיהן מאי היא אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק גזרו על בנותיהן נידות מעריסותן,וגניבא משמיה דרב אמר כולן משום עבודת כוכבים גזרו בהן דכי אתא רב אחא בר אדא א"ר יצחק גזרו על פיתן משום שמנן מאי אולמיה דשמן מפת,אלא על פיתן ושמנן משום יינן ועל יינן משום בנותיהן ועל בנותיהן משום דבר אחר ועל דבר אחר משום ד"א,בנותיהן דאורייתא היא דכתיב (דברים ז, ג) לא תתחתן בם דאורייתא ז' אומות אבל שאר עובדי כוכבים לא ואתו אינהו וגזור אפילו דשאר עובדי כוכבים,ולר"ש בן יוחי דאמר (דברים ז, ד) כי יסיר את בנך מאחרי לרבות כל המסירות מאי איכא למימר אלא דאורייתא אישות דרך חתנות ואתו אינהו גזור אפילו דרך זנות,זנות נמי בבית דינו של שם גזרו דכתיב (בראשית לח, כד) ויאמר יהודה הוציאוה ותשרף,אלא דאורייתא עובד כוכבים הבא על בת ישראל דמשכה בתריה אבל ישראל הבא על העובדת כוכבים לא ואתו אינהו גזור אפי' ישראל הבא על העובדת כוכבים,ישראל הבא על העובדת כוכבים הלכה למשה מסיני היא דאמר מר הבועל ארמית קנאין פוגעין בו,א"ל דאורייתא בפרהסיא וכמעשה שהיה ואתו אינהו גזור אפילו בצינעא בצינעא נמי בית דינו של חשמונאי גזרו,[דכי אתא רב דימי אמר ב"ד של חשמונאי גזרו] ישראל הבא על העובדת כוכבים חייב משום נשג"א,כי אתא רבין אמר משום נשג"ז,כי גזרו בית דינו של חשמונאי ביאה אבל ייחוד לא ואתו אינהו גזור אפי' ייחוד ייחוד נמי בית דינו של דוד גזרו,דאמר רב יהודה באותה שעה גזרו על ייחוד אמרי התם ייחוד דבת ישראל אבל ייחוד דעובדת כוכבים לא ואתו אינהו גזרו אפי' אייחוד דעובדת כוכבים,ייחוד דבת ישראל דאורייתא היא דאמר ר' יוחנן משום ר"ש בן יהוצדק רמז לייחוד מן התורה מנין שנאמר (דברים יג, ז) כי יסיתך אחיך בן אמך וכי בן אם מסית בן אב אינו מסית,אלא בן מתייחד עם אמו ואין אחר מתייחד עם כל עריות שבתורה,ייחוד דאורייתא דאשת איש ואתא דוד וגזר אפי' אייחוד דפנויה ואתו תלמידי בית שמאי ובית הלל גזור אפי' אייחוד דעובדת כוכבים,מאי על ד"א משום ד"א אמר רב נחמן בר יצחק גזרו על תינוק עובד כוכבים שיטמא בזיבה שלא יהא תינוק ישראל רגיל אצלו במשכב זכור,דא"ר זירא צער גדול היה לי אצל ר' אסי ור' אסי אצל ר' יוחנן ור' יוחנן אצל ר' ינאי ור' ינאי אצל רבי נתן בן עמרם ור"נ בן עמרם אצל רבי תינוק עובד כוכבים מאימתי מטמא בזיבה ואמר לי בן יומו וכשבאתי אצל ר' חייא אמר לי בן ט' שנים ויום אחד,וכשבאתי והרציתי דברי לפני רבי אמר לי הנח דברי ואחוז דברי רבי חייא דאמר תינוק עובד כוכבים אימתי מטמא בזיבה בן תשע שנים ויום אחד | 36b. It is the verse: b “You are cursed with the curse, yet you rob Me, even this whole nation” /b (Malachi 3:9). This teaches that b if there is /b the acceptance of b the whole nation, yes, /b an ordice may be instituted, but b if not, no, /b the ordice may not be instituted.,§ The Gemara discusses b the /b matter b itself: Balei says /b that b Avimi of Nota says in the name of Rav: /b The prohibitions with regard to gentiles’ b bread and their oil, their wine and their daughters, are all from the eighteen matters /b issued in a single day in the time of the students of Shammai and Hillel. The Gemara asks: With regard to b their daughters, what is /b the decree? b Rabbi Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: They decreed upon their daughters /b that they should be classified as b menstruating women from /b the time they are in b their cradle, /b i.e., they decreed that from when they are young, gentile women are always considered to be menstruating.,The Gemara presents another opinion. b And Geneiva says in the name of Rav: /b Gentiles’ bread, oil, wine, and daughters were b all decreed upon due to /b the concern that Jews might participate in b idol worship /b with gentiles as a result of intermingling with them. b As, when Rav Aḥa bar Adda came /b from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia he said that b Rabbi Yitzḥak says: They decreed /b a prohibition b upon their bread due to their oil. /b The Gemara asks: In b what /b way b is the /b prohibition with regard to b oil stronger than /b the prohibition with regard to b bread? /b That is, why does the primary concern relate to the oil of gentiles rather than their bread?,The Gemara offers a different interpretation: b Rather, /b they issued a decree prohibiting b their bread and their oil due to their wine. And /b they issued the decree prohibiting b their wine due to /b the fact that this leads to familiarity, and Jews will come to marry b their daughters. And /b they issued a decree prohibiting b their daughters due to something else, /b idolatry. b And /b they further issued a decree b on something else due to something else, /b which will be explained by the Gemara.,It was stated that the prohibition against marrying the daughters of gentiles was decreed on account of idolatry. The Gemara raises an objection: But the prohibition against marrying b their daughters is /b prescribed b by Torah law, as it is written: “Neither shall you make marriages with them” /b (Deuteronomy 7:3). The Gemara explains: b By Torah law /b intermarriage is prohibited only with the b seven /b Canaanite b nations, but /b intermarriage with b the other nations /b of the world is b not /b prohibited, b and /b the students of Shammai and Hillel b came and decreed /b that intermarriage is prohibited b even /b with b the other nations. /b ,The Gemara asks: b And according to /b the opinion of b Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, who says /b that the subsequent verse: b “For he will turn away your son from following Me” /b (Deuteronomy 7:4) serves b to include all who turn away /b one’s son from God, i.e., all gentiles, b what is there to say? Rather, by Torah law /b only b sexual relations by way of marriage /b are prohibited, b and they came /b and b decreed /b that sexual relations are prohibited b even by way of licentiousness. /b ,The Gemara raises an objection: b Licentious /b sexual intercourse was b also /b prohibited earlier, as b they decreed /b a prohibition in this regard b in the court of Shem, as it is written: /b “It was told to Judah, saying: Tamar your daughter-in-law has played the harlot; and moreover, behold, she is with child by harlotry. b And Judah said: Bring her forth, and let her be burned” /b (Genesis 38:24). This proves that the prohibition against licentious intercourse with a gentile was in force long before the time of the students of Shammai and Hillel.,The Gemara explains: b Rather, /b the prohibition prescribed b by Torah law /b applies to the case of b a gentile who engaged in intercourse with a Jewish woman, as she is drawn after him /b toward idolatry, b but /b the case of b a Jew who engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman /b is b not /b included in the prohibition by Torah law. b And /b the students of Shammai and Hillel b came /b and b decreed /b that the prohibition applies b even /b to b a Jew who engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman. /b ,The Gemara rejects this: The prohibition concerning b a Jew who engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman is a i halakha /i /b transmitted b to Moses from Sinai, /b not a rabbinic ordice. b As the Master said: /b With regard to b one who engages in intercourse with an Aramean woman, zealots may attack him, /b as Pinehas did to Zimri in the wilderness (see Numbers 25:6–8)., b He said to him: By Torah law /b intercourse with a gentile is prohibited b in public, and /b only in situations b like the incident that occurred, /b as described in Numbers, chapter 25. b And /b the students of Shammai and Hillel b came /b and b decreed /b that the prohibition applies b even in private. /b The Gemara raises another difficulty: This was b also /b prohibited b in private, /b as b the court of the Hasmoneans decreed /b that it is prohibited., b As when Rav Dimi came /b from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he b said: The court of the Hasmoneans decreed /b that b a Jew who engaged in intercourse with a gentile woman bears /b liability b for /b transgressing four prohibitions, represented by the mnemonic: b i Nun /i , i shin /i , i gimmel /i , i alef /i . /b These letters stands for: Menstruating woman [ i nidda /i ], maidservant [ i shifḥa /i ], gentile [ i goya /i ], and married woman [ i eshet ish /i ]. By rabbinic law, a man who engages in intercourse with a gentile woman is considered to have violated the prohibitions involved in having intercourse with all four of these women.,And b when Ravin came /b from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he b said: /b He bears liability b for /b four prohibitions represented by the mnemonic: b i Nun /i , i shin /i , i gimmel /i , i zayin /i , /b which stands for: Menstruating woman [ i nidda /i ], maidservant [ i shifḥa /i ], gentile [ i goya /i ], and prostitute [ i zona /i ]. In any case, it is apparent that this decree was in force before the time of the students of Shammai and Hillel.,The Gemara answers: b When the court of the Hasmoneans decreed, /b they prohibited only b sexual intercourse, but /b with regard to b seclusion /b with a gentile woman, b no, /b they did not prohibit that. b And /b the students of Shammai and Hillel b came /b and b decreed /b that b even seclusion /b with a gentile woman is prohibited. The Gemara raises an objection: b Seclusion /b was b also /b prohibited earlier, as b the court of /b King b David decreed /b that with regard to this matter., b As Rav Yehuda says: At that time, /b after the incident involving Amnon and Tamar (see II Samuel 13:1–19), b they decreed with regard to seclusion. /b The Sages b said /b in response to the objection: b There, /b in David’s court, b seclusion with a Jewish woman /b was prohibited, b but seclusion with a gentile woman /b was b not /b prohibited. b And /b the students of Shammai and Hillel b came /b and b decreed /b a prohibition b even with regard to seclusion with a gentile woman. /b ,The Gemara raises yet another difficulty: b Seclusion with a Jewish woman is /b prohibited b by Torah law, as Rabbi Yoḥa says in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: Where is there an allusion in the Torah to /b the prohibition against b seclusion? As it is stated: “If your brother, the son of your mother, entices you” /b (Deuteronomy 13:7). b And does only /b a half brother who is b the son of a mother entice /b one to sin, whereas b the son of a father does not entice? /b , b Rather, /b there is a greater concern that a maternal half brother might entice one to sin, as b a son secludes himself with his mother, and no other may seclude himself with any /b of b those with whom relations are forbidden by the Torah. /b Since an individual and his maternal half brother both seclude themselves with their shared mother, they are frequently together in private, and this facilitates enticement. In any case, it is clear that the prohibition against seclusion with a Jewish woman preceded King David.,The Gemara explains: The prohibition against b seclusion /b prescribed b by Torah law /b applies specifically to b a married woman, and David came and decreed /b a prohibition b even with regard to seclusion with an unmarried woman. And /b later b the students of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel came /b and b decreed even with regard to seclusion with a gentile woman. /b ,§ It was stated above that they issued a decree prohibiting the daughters of gentiles due to something else, idolatry. And they further issued a decree on something else due to something else. The Gemara asks: b What /b is the meaning of: And they further issued a decree b on something else due to something else? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: They decreed upon /b a male b gentile child that he imparts ritual impurity as /b though he were a Jew who experienced a gonorrhea-like b discharge [ i ziva /i ], /b so b that a Jewish child will not become familiar with him, /b leading b to homosexual intercourse. /b The Sages employed a euphemism when referring to this decree., b As Rabbi Zeira says: I had great trouble with Rabbi Asi /b when I asked him the following question, b and /b likewise b Rabbi Asi /b experienced trouble b with Rabbi Yoḥa /b when he posed it to him. b And Rabbi Yoḥa /b had trouble b with Rabbi Yannai, and Rabbi Yannai /b had trouble b with Rabbi Natan ben Amram, and Rabbi Natan ben Amram /b had trouble b with Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi. The inquiry was as follows: With regard to a male b gentile child, from when, /b i.e., from what age, does he b impart ritual impurity as /b one who experiences b i ziva /i ? And /b Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi b said to me: /b From when he is b one day old. And when I came to Rabbi Ḥiyya, he said to me: /b From when he is b nine years and one day old. /b , b And when I came /b back b and relayed /b Rabbi Ḥiyya’s b statement before Rabbi /b Yehuda HaNasi, b he said to me: Discard my statement, and grasp the statement of Rabbi Ḥiyya, who says: /b From b when /b does b a gentile child impart ritual impurity as /b one who experiences b i ziva /i ? /b From when he is b nine years and one day old. /b |
|
| 39. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Wilson (2022), Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency, 174 |
