1. Hebrew Bible, Isaiah, 1.20 (8th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 299 | 1.20. But if ye refuse and rebel, Ye shall be devoured with the sword; For the mouth of the LORD hath spoken. |
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2. Plato, Apology of Socrates, 23c, 283e-285c, 30b, 32d (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 299 32d. οὐ λόγῳ ἀλλʼ ἔργῳ αὖ ἐνεδειξάμην ὅτι ἐμοὶ θανάτου μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ ἀγροικότερον ἦν εἰπεῖν, οὐδʼ ὁτιοῦν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδʼ ἀνόσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἐξέπληξεν, οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὖσα, ὥστε ἄδικόν τι ἐργάσασθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἐξήλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέτταρες ᾤχοντο εἰς Σαλαμῖνα καὶ ἤγαγον Λέοντα, ἐγὼ δὲ ᾠχόμην ἀπιὼν οἴκαδε. καὶ ἴσως ἂν διὰ ταῦτα ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη. καὶ | 32d. howed again, by action, not in word only, that I did not care a whit for death if that be not too rude an expression, but that I did care with all my might not to do anything unjust or unholy. For that government, with all its power, did not frighten me into doing anything unjust, but when we came out of the rotunda, the other four went to Salamis and arrested Leon, but I simply went home; and perhaps I should have been put to death for it, if the government had not |
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3. Euripides, Medea, 1079 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 186 1079. θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων, | 1079. the soft young cheek, the fragrant breath! my children! Go, leave me; I cannot bear to longer look upon ye; my sorrow wins the day. At last I understand the awful deed I am to do; but passion, that cause of direst woes to mortal man, |
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4. Plato, Gorgias, 467c-486a (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 93, 121 |
5. Plato, Laws, 4.716b-c, 1.631b-d, 4.715e (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 104 |
6. Plato, Phaedo, 82a, 82b, 114E (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201 |
7. Plato, Phaedrus, 248a, 250a, 250b, 250c, 253a, 254b5-8 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Ebrey and Kraut, The Cambridge Companion to Plato, 2nd ed (2022) 221 |
8. Plato, Philebus, 24a9, 24b, 24b4-5, 24b7-8, 24c, 24d, 24d4, 24e7-25a4, 45d, 45e, 62E 9 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201 |
9. Plato, Statesman, 283e-285c, 269d (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 204 269d. ζῷον ὂν καὶ φρόνησιν εἰληχὸς ἐκ τοῦ συναρμόσαντος αὐτὸ κατʼ ἀρχάς. τοῦτο δὲ αὐτῷ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν ἰέναι διὰ τόδʼ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔμφυτον γέγονε. ΝΕ. ΣΩ. διὰ τὸ ποῖον δή; ΞΕ. τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν ἀεὶ καὶ ταὐτὸν εἶναι τοῖς πάντων θειοτάτοις προσήκει μόνοις, σώματος δὲ φύσις οὐ ταύτης τῆς τάξεως. ὃν δὲ οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον ἐπωνομάκαμεν, πολλῶν μὲν καὶ μακαρίων παρὰ τοῦ γεννήσαντος μετείληφεν, ἀτὰρ οὖν δὴ κεκοινώνηκέ γε | 269d. and of its own accord it turns backward in the opposite direction, since it is a living creature and is endowed with intelligence by him who fashioned it in the beginning. Now this reversal of its motion is an inevitable part of its nature for the following reason. Y. Soc. What reason? Str. Absolute and perpetual immutability is a property of only the most divine things of all, and body does not belong to this class. Now that which we call heaven and the universe has received from its creator many blessed qualities, but then, too, it partakes also of a bodily nature; |
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10. Plato, Protagoras, 352c, 352b (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 186 352b. καὶ τόδε τῆς διανοίας ἀποκάλυψον· πῶς ἔχεις πρὸς ἐπιστήμην; πότερον καὶ τοῦτό σοι δοκεῖ ὥσπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἄλλως; δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς πολλοῖς περὶ ἐπιστήμης τοιοῦτόν τι, οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδʼ ἡγεμονικὸν οὐδʼ ἀρχικὸν εἶναι· οὐδὲ ὡς περὶ τοιούτου αὐτοῦ ὄντος διανοοῦνται, ἀλλʼ ἐνούσης πολλάκις ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπιστήμης οὐ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλʼ ἄλλο τι, τοτὲ μὲν θυμόν, τοτὲ δὲ ἡδονήν, τοτὲ δὲ λύπην, ἐνίοτε δὲ ἔρωτα, πολλάκις δὲ φόβον, ἀτεχνῶς | 352b. how are you in regard to knowledge? Do you share the view that most people take of this, or have you some other? The opinion generally held of knowledge is something of this sort—that it is no strong or guiding or governing thing; it is not regarded as anything of that kind, but people think that, while a man often has knowledge in him, he is not governed by it, but by something else—now by passion, now by pleasure, now by pain, at times by love, and often by fear; their feeling about knowledge |
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11. Plato, Republic, 586E-587A, 571B, 558D -559C, 485D, 441D-E, 440A-D, 606A-B, 4.435c, 4.439a-441c, 4.442b, 2.357b-d, 6.500c-d, 6.500d, 10.613a-b, 10.613b, 4.444d, 10.613a (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201 |
12. Plato, Symposium, 205a, 210e2-6, 211a1-2, 211b, 211c, 211d, 211d1-3, 211e (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 204 211e. αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ἰδεῖν εἰλικρινές, καθαρόν, ἄμεικτον, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀνάπλεων σαρκῶν τε ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ χρωμάτων καὶ ἄλλης πολλῆς φλυαρίας θνητῆς, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον καλὸν δύναιτο μονοειδὲς κατιδεῖν; ἆρʼ οἴει, ἔφη, φαῦλον βίον | 211e. But tell me, what would happen if one of you had the fortune to look upon essential beauty entire, pure and unalloyed; not infected with the flesh and color of humanity, and ever so much more of mortal trash? What if he could behold the divine beauty itself, in its unique form? |
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13. Plato, Theaetetus, 176a, 176b (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44, 104, 108, 125, 148, 447 176b. ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅτι τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέσθαι. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ πάνυ τι ῥᾴδιον πεῖσαι ὡς ἄρα οὐχ ὧν ἕνεκα οἱ πολλοί φασι δεῖν πονηρίαν μὲν φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπιτηδευτέον, τὸ δʼ οὔ, ἵνα δὴ μὴ κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἶναι· ταῦτα μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται· τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὧδε λέγωμεν. θεὸς οὐδαμῇ | |
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14. Hebrew Bible, Ecclesiastes, 17.24 (5th cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 204 |
15. Plato, Timaeus, 90c, 90d, 45c (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 326 45c. τῶν ὀμμάτων, ὥστε τὸ μὲν ἄλλο ὅσον παχύτερον στέγειν πᾶν, τὸ τοιοῦτον δὲ μόνον αὐτὸ καθαρὸν διηθεῖν. ὅταν οὖν μεθημερινὸν ᾖ φῶς περὶ τὸ τῆς ὄψεως ῥεῦμα, τότε ἐκπῖπτον ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον, συμπαγὲς γενόμενον, ἓν σῶμα οἰκειωθὲν συνέστη κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὀμμάτων εὐθυωρίαν, ὅπῃπερ ἂν ἀντερείδῃ τὸ προσπῖπτον ἔνδοθεν πρὸς ὃ τῶν ἔξω συνέπεσεν. ὁμοιοπαθὲς δὴ διʼ ὁμοιότητα πᾶν γενόμενον, ὅτου τε ἂν αὐτό | 45c. and they compressed the whole substance, and especially the center, of the eyes, so that they occluded all other fire that was coarser and allowed only this pure kind of fire to filter through. So whenever the stream of vision is surrounded by midday light, it flows out like unto like, and coalescing therewith it forms one kindred substance along the path of the eyes’ vision, wheresoever the fire which streams from within collides with an obstructing object without. And this substance, having all become similar in its properties because of its similar nature, |
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16. Demosthenes, On The Crown, 259 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 204 | 259. On arriving at manhood you assisted your mother in her initiations, reading the service-book while she performed the ritual, and helping generally with the paraphernalia. At night it was your duty to mix the libations, to clothe the catechumens in fawn-skins, to wash their bodies, to scour them with the loam and the bran, and, when their lustration was duly performed, to set them on their legs, and give out the hymn: Here I leave my sins behind, Here the better way I find; and it was your pride that no one ever emitted that holy ululation so powerfully as yourself. I can well believe it! When you hear the stentorian tones of the orator, can you doubt that the ejaculations of the acolyte were simply magnificent? |
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17. Aristotle, Soul, 404b (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 326 |
18. Crates, Letters, 34.4 (4th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 208 |
19. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1225a30-32, 1223a (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 361 |
20. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 3.10, 1095a, 1103a, 1106b8-1107a8, 1108a31-36, 1109a20-24, 1113b6-7, 1114b30-1115a3, 1118b8, 1133a, 1138b18-20, 1145a25-27, 1151b32, 1178b7-22 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201 |
21. Chrysippus, Fragments, 3.139 (3rd cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 204 |
22. Cicero, On Fate, 10, 28-29, 42-43, 9, 30 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428 |
23. Philodemus of Gadara, De Ira \ , 42, 44, 47-49, 32 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32 |
24. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.22, 3.25-3.30, 3.33, 3.58, 4.11-4.14, 4.29, 4.34, 5.81-5.82, 5.96 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32, 44, 183, 207, 208, 212, 360, 361, 393, 501; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 3.22. Haec sic sic R c? V c si X dicuntur a Stoicis concludunturque contortius. sed latius aliquando aliquando cf. 323,22 aliquanto s male, cf. de orat. 1, 133 opt. gen. 23 dicenda sunt et diffusius; sententiis tamen utendum eorum potissimum, qui qui ex quā ut v. G 2 maxime forti et, ut ita dicam, virili utuntur ratione atque sententia. nam Peripatetici, familiares nostri, quibus nihil est uberius, nihil eruditius, nihil gravius, mediocritates vel perturbationum vel morborum animi mihi non sane probant. omne enim malum, etiam mediocre, mediocre iocre in r. G 2 malum malum Bouh. magnum alt. id om. H est; nos autem id agimus, ut id in sapiente nullum sit omnino. nam ut corpus, etiamsi mediocriter aegrum est, sanum non est, sic in animo ista mediocritas caret sanitate. itaque praeclare nostri, ut alia multa, molestiam sollicitudinem angorem propter similitudinem corporum aegrorum aegritudinem aegritudinem cf. Aug. civ. 14,17 ext. nominaverunt. 3.25. —ergo haec duo genera, voluptas gestiens et libido, bonorum opinione turbantur, ut ut in at corr. V 2 duo reliqua, metus et et om. H s aegritudo, malorum. nam et metus est post metus add. V c s non male. opinio magni mali inpendentis inpendentes G 1 R 1 V 1 ( corr. G 2 R 1 V 1 ) et aegritudo est opinio magni mali praesentis, et quidem recens opinio talis mali, ut in eo rectum recte H videatur esse angi, id autem est, ut ut om. G 1 dolore V is qui doleat oportere opinetur se dolere. his autem perturbationibus, quas in quas in quasi in GKH quas in R vitam vitam Lb. vita ( cf. off. 3,34 ) homini H hominum stultitia quasi quasdam Furias inmittit atque incitat,, 3 omne ... 330, 4 incitat H omnibus viribus atque opibus repugdum est, si volumus hoc, quod datum est vitae, tranquille placideque traducere. Sed cetera alias; nunc aegritudinem, si possumus, depellamus. id enim sit sit (si V 1 )] est Bouh. sed cf. fin. 4,25 propositum, quandoquidem eam tu videri tibi in sapientem cadere dixisti, quod ego nullo modo existimo; taetra enim res est, misera, detestabilis, omni omne GRV ( corr. R 1 V 1 ) contentione, velis, ut ita dicam, remisque fugienda. 3.26. qualis enim tibi ille videtur Ta/ntalo progna/tus, Pelope na/tus, qui quondam a/ Enn. Thy. sc. 357 socru socru Bentl. coll. Non. 223, 30 al. socero Oe/nomao rege Hi/ppodameam hippodamiam R 2 ra/ptis ctus nactus KR c nactust Bentl. sed haec ab ipso Thyeste proferri videri Va. monet nu/ptiis—? Iovis iste quidem pronepos. Iovis ... pronepos poe- tae trib. Bentl. tamne ergo abiectus tamque fractus? Noli/te inquit hospite/s ad me adi/re, ilico illic oG 1 KV 1 (l exp. 2 ) i/stic, Enn. Thy.349 istic istinc vel isti s sed cf. Plaut. Mere. 912 Ne co/ntagio/ mea boni/s umbrave o/bsit. Tanta ante tanta ins. meo Bentl. stetis La. vis sce/leris in co/rpore hae/ret. tu te, tu te tune R 2 Thyesta, damnabis orbabisque luce propter vim sceleris alieni? quid? illum filium Solis nonne patris ipsius luce indignum putas? Refu/gere oculi, co/rpus macie exta/buit, Trag. inc. 189 extabunt R 1 V 1 G 2 extabant G 1 Lacrimae/ peredere u/more umorem RV 1 K c humo-rem GV 2 K 2 utmorem K 1 exangui/s genas, Situm i/nter oris situm inter oris La. ad Lucr. 2,118 situ nitoris GKRV 1 situ nitoris corr. V 2? praeterea nidoris V rec ut v. situ nigroris Va. op. ac. 1, 56 al. alii bárba paedore pedore hic X ( cf.p. 348, 25 ) hórrida atque atque (adque G 1 ) del. Bothe sed cf. La. ad Lucr. 2,118 Intónsa infuscat péctus inluvié inluviae GK (ill.) R 1 scabrum. haec mala, o stultissime Aeeta, aeota G eota KRV 1 (aeota V 2 ) ipse tibi addidisti; non inerant in is quae tibi casus invexerat, et quidem inveterato malo, cum tumor animi resedisset—est autem aegritudo, ut docebo, in opinione mali recentis est etiam aegr.... 6 recentis H recenti Ba. sed cf. 5 inveterate, p. 355, 8, Rabbow, Antike Schr. über Seelenheilung S. 153 —; sed maeres videlicet regni desiderio, non filiae. illam enim oderas, et iure fortasse; regno non aequo animo carebas. est autem inpudens impud. GKR e corr. luctus maerore se sed G conficientis, quod imperare non liceat liberis. 3.28. Atque hoc quidem perspicuum est, tum tum add. G 2 aegritudinem existere, cum quid ita visum sit, ut magnum quoddam malum adesse et urgere videatur. Epicuro autem placet opinionem mali aegritudinem esse ea ante esse add. V 2 natura, esse, ea natura Usen. Ep. fr. 444 ( sed cf. 334,14 necesse esse eqs.) ex opinione pro opinionem Sey. efficere pro esse Bai. cf. quae dixi Herm. XLI 323 ut, quicumque intueatur in aliquod maius malum, si id sibi accidisse opinetur, sit continuo in aegritudine. aegritudinem X Cyrenaici non omni malo malo modo R 1 aegritudinem aegritudine GK 1 effici censent, sed insperato et necopinato malo. est id quidem non mediocre ad aegritudinem augendam: videntur enim omnia repentina graviora. ex hoc et illa iure laudantur: E/go cum genui, tu/m morituros moriturum et huic rei Sen. ad Pol. 11, 2 sci/vi et ei rei Enn. Telam. sc. 312. cf. Hier. epist. 60, 5 su/stuli. Prae/terea praeterea ae in r. V c ad Troia/m cum misi ob de/fendendam Grae/ciam, Sci/bam scibam Fronto p. 217 sciebam me in morti/ferum bellum, no/n in epulas mi/ttere. 3.29. haec igitur praemeditatio futurorum malorum lenit eorum adventum, quae venientia longe ante videris. itaque apud Euripiden a Theseo dicta laudantur; licet Eurip. fr. 964 euripidĕ K thesseo GKR 1 enim, ut saepe facimus, in Latinum illa convertere: Nam qui hae/c audita a do/cto meminisse/m viro, Futu/ras mecum co/mmentabar mi/serias: Aut mo/rtem acerbam aut alt. aut add. G 2 exilii X e/xili maesta/m fugam Aut se/mper aliquam mo/lem meditaba/r mali, Ut, si/ qua invecta di/ritas casu/ foret, Ne me i/nparatum cu/ra lacerare/t repens. lacerare trepens G 1 R 1 3.30. quod autem Theseus a docto se audisse dicit, id de se ipso de ipso K 1 ( ex dese ipse) V 1 (se add. 1 ) Anax. A 33 loquitur Euripides. fuerat enim auditor Anaxagorae, quem ferunt nuntiata morte filii dixisse: sciebam me genuisse mortalem. quae vox declarat is esse haec acerba, quibus non fuerint cogitata. ergo id quidem non dubium, quin omnia, quae mala putentur, sint inprovisa graviora. itaque quamquam non haec una res efficit maximam aegritudinem, tamen, quoniam multum potest provisio animi et praeparatio ad minuendum dolorem, sint semper omnia homini humana meditata. et et ex e V c nimirum haec est illa praestans et divina sapientia, et perceptas penitus et pertractatas res humanas habere, nihil admirari, ammirari GR 1 V cum acciderit, nihil, ante quam evenerit, non evenire posse arbitrari. Quam ob rem o/mnis, cum secu/ndae res sunt ma/xume, tum ma/xume tum maxume add. K c maxime alt. loco GRV bis H Medita/ri secum opo/rtet, quo pacto a/dversam adversum KRH aerumna/m ferant. fuerant H ferat K 1 Peri/cla, pericula X damna pe/regre rediens se/mper secum co/gitet, pericla damna exilia peregre rediens semper cogitet Ter. codd. Aut fi/li filii p. X peccatum au/t uxoris mo/rtem aut morbum fi/liae, Commu/nia esse haec, ne/ quid horum umquam a/ccidat animo/ novum; c. e. haec, fieri posse, ut ne quid animo sit novom Ter. Quicqui/d praeter praeter propter K spem eve/niat, omne id de/putare esse i/n lucro. ergo .. 22 lucro H ... 22 Ter. Phormio 241–6 ergo hoc hoc ex haec G 2 Terentius a philosophia sumptum cum tam commode dixerit, nos, e quorum fontibus id haustum est, non et dicemus hoc melius et constantius sentiemus? 3.33. Levationem autem aegritudinis in duabus rebus ponit, avocatione a cogitanda molestia et revocatione revocationem GKV 1 ad contemplandas voluptates. parere pareri GR 1 ( corr. 1 ) V 1 ( corr. 2 ) enim censet animum rationi posse et, quo illa ducat, sequi. vetat igitur ratio intueri molestias, abstrahit ab acerbis cogitationibus, hebetem habetem V 1 aciem ad miserias contemplandas facit; facit add. V c ( ante aciem We. ft. rectius cf. docere 220,13 sed cf. off. 1, 12 extr. al. ) om. cett. a quibus cum cecinit cecidit X corr. 2 receptui, inpellit receptuimpellit VHK c (receptaimp. K 1 )G 2 (receptum pellit 1 ) receptū impellit R rursum et incitat ad conspiciendas totaque mente contrectandas contractandas K ( ex -tes 1 ) H varias voluptates, vetat... 335, 4 voluptates H quibus ille et praeteritarum memoria et spe consequentium sapientis vitam refertam putat. refert amputat G 1 R 1 V 1 Haec nostro more nos diximus, Epicurii epicurei R c K 2 dicunt suo; sed quae quae ex qui V 2 dicant, videamus, quo modo, neglegamus. 3.58. similiter commemorandis exemplis orbitates quoque liberum liberorum V c praedicantur, eorumque, eorum quoque K 1 qui gravius ferunt, luctus aliorum exemplis leniuntur. sic perpessio ceterorum facit, ut ea quae acciderint multo minora maiora ex minora V c quam quanta sint existimata, videantur. ita fit, sensim cogitantibus ut, quantum sit ementita opinio, appareat. atque hoc idem et Telamo ille declarat: ego cum genui et Theseus: futuras mecum commentabar miserias tum morituros scivi et ei rei sustuli add. R 2, moriturum scivi V 3 et Anaxagoras: sciebam me genuisse mortalem. cf. p. 332, 9 sqq. hi enim omnes diu cogitantes de rebus humanis intellegebant eas nequaquam pro opinione volgi esse extimescendas. extimescendas KR 1 existimescendas R c G existimiscendas G 1 e corr. V et mihi quidem videtur idem fere accidere is qui ante meditantur, quod is quibus medetur dies, nisi quod ratio ratio V ratione GKR ( unde in hoc quae- dam 2? ) quaedam sanat illos, hos ipsa natura intellecto eo quod rem continet, illud illud continet X trp. B malum, quod opinatum sit esse maxumum, nequaquam esse tantum, ut vitam beatam possit evertere. 4.11. sit igitur hic hic K 1 fons; utamur tamen in his perturbationibus describendis discrib. Mue. sed cf. Th. l. l. 5, 663 Stoicorum definitionibus et partitionibus, parti cipationibus R 1 particionibus GVH qui mihi videntur in hac quaestione versari acutissime. Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, ut perturbatio Zeno fr. 205 sit, quod pa/qos pat OC K patos R ( p ex ) PL T w C H ille dicit, aversa a a om. V 1 ( add. c ) recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. quidam brevius perturbationem esse adpetitum vehementiorem, sed vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discesserit a naturae constantia. partes autem perturbationum volunt ex duobus opinatis bonis nasci et ex duobus opinatis malis; ita esse quattuor, ex bonis libidinem et laetitiam, ut sit laetitia praesentium bonorum, libido futurorum, ex malis metum et aegritudinem nasci censent, metum futuris, aegritudinem praesentibus; quae enim venientia metuuntur, eadem adficiunt aegritudine aegritudinem K ( corr. 2 ) RH instantia. 4.12. laetitia autem et libido in bonorum opinione versantur, cum libido ad id, quod videtur bonum, inlecta inlecta s iniecta X et sqq. cf. Barlaami eth. sec. Stoicos 2, 11 qui hinc haud pauca adsumpsit. inflammata rapiatur, laetitia ut adepta iam aliquid concupitum ecferatur et gestiat. natura natura s V rec naturae X (-re K) enim omnes ea, Stoic. fr. 3, 438 quae bona videntur, secuntur fugiuntque contraria; quam ob rem simul obiecta species est speciei est H speci est KR ( add. c ) speciest GV cuiuspiam, quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura. id cum constanter prudenterque fit, eius modi adpetitionem Stoici bou/lhsin BO gL AHClN KR bo gL HC in G bo ga HCin V appellant, nos appellemus appellemus We. appellamus X (apell G) cf. v. 26, fin. 3, 20 voluntatem, eam eam iam V illi putant in solo esse sapiente; quam sic definiunt: voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat. quae autem ratione adversante adversante Po. ( cf. p.368, 6; 326, 3; St. fr. 3, 462 a)peiqw=s tw=| lo/gw| w)qou/menon e)pi\ plei=on adversa X (d del. H 1 ) a ratione aversa Or. incitata est vehementius, ea libido est vel cupiditas effrenata, quae in omnibus stultis invenitur. 4.13. itemque cum ita ita om. H movemur, ut in bono simus aliquo, dupliciter id contingit. nam cum ratione curatione K 1 (ũ 2 ) animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur; cum autem iiter et effuse animus exultat, tum illa laetitia gestiens vel nimia dici potest, quam ita definiunt: sine ratione animi elationem. quoniamque, quoniam quae X praeter K 1 (quae del. V rec ) ut bona natura adpetimus, app. KR 2? (H 367, 24) sic a malis natura declinamus, quae declinatio si cum del. Bentl. ratione fiet, cautio appelletur, appellatur K 1 V rec s eaque intellegatur in solo esse sapiente; quae autem sine ratione et cum exanimatione humili atque fracta, nominetur metus; est igitur metus a a Gr.(?) s om. X ratione aversa cautio. cautio Cic. dicere debebat: declinatio 4.14. praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum stultorum Dav. stulta autem aegritudo est, eaque eaque Ba. ea qua X (ea qu e M 1 ) adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. itaque haec prima definitio difin. V est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. itaque ... 6 contractio Non. 93, 1 sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam cf. Aug. civ. 14, 8 aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur. Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et St. fr. 3, 380 et 393 opinione. itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, vitiose GKR sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate. est ergo ergo igitur H s aegritudo aegritudo om. G 1 add. 1 et 2 opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri ecferri haec ferri VK c (eff. K 2 ) rectum esse videatur, laetitia...15 videatur om. G 1, add. G 2 in mg. inf. ( lemmata laetitia metus adscr. 1 cf. praef. ) metus opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile intollerabile V esse videatur, libido lubido K, in lib. corr. G 1 (libido etiam in mg. ) R 1 opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse. 4.29. itaque illa duo, morbus et aegrotatio, ex totius valetudinis corporis conquassatione et perturbatione gignuntur, vitium autem integra valetudine ipsum ex se cernitur. sed in animo tantum modo cogitatione possumus morbum ab aegrotatione seiungere, vitiositas autem est habitus aut adfectio in tota vita inconstans et a se ipsa dissentiens. ita fit, ut in altera corruptione opinionum morbus efficiatur et aegrotatio, in altera inconstantia et repugtia. non enim omne vitium paris habet dissensiones, paris h. dissensiones Bentl. partis h. dissentientis X (-ent V c, ent in r. ). ceterum totus locus negle- genter a Cic. scriptus ut eorum, qui non longe a sapientia absunt, adfectio est illa quidem discrepans sibi ipsa, dum est insipiens, sed non distorta nec prava. morbi autem et aegrotationes aegrotationis X ( corr. K 2 ) partes sunt vitiositatis, sed perturbationes sintne eiusdem partes, quaestio est. 4.34. Quando, ut ut Man. et aliis locis de virtute et diximus et saepe dicendum erit—pleraeque enim quaestiones, quae ad vitam moresque pertinent, a virtutis fonte forte V 1 ducuntur d icuntur K 1 —, quando igitur virtus est adfectio animi constans St. fr. 3, 198 conveniensque, laudabiles efficiens eos, in quibus est, et ipsa per se sua sponte separata etiam utilitate laudabilis, ex ea proficiscuntur honestae voluntates sententiae actiones omnisque recta ratio (quamquam ipsa virtus brevissume brevissumme G 1 V recta ratio dici potest). huius igitur virtutis virtus KR contraria est vitiositas—sic enim malo quam malitiam appellare eam quam Graeci kaki/an kakian X appellant; nam malitia certi cuiusdam vitii nomen est, vitiositas omnium—; ex qua concitantur concitantur Camerar. cogitantur perturbationes, quae sunt, ut paulo ante paulo ante cf. § 22 diximus, turbidi animorum concitatique motus, aversi a ratione et inimicissimi mentis vitaeque tranquillae. inportant enim aegritudines anxias atque acerbas animosque adfligunt et debilitant metu; idem item K 2 inflammant adpetitione nimia, quam tum cupiditatem quantum c. GK 1 V 1 tum libidinem dicimus, inpotentiam quandam animi a animi a s V 3 anima X temperantia et moderatione plurimum dissidentem. 5.81. itaque eam tergiversari non sinent sinent s V rec Non. sinenti secumque rapient, itaque...6 rapienti Non.41,26 ad quemcumque ipsae ipse X dolorem cruciatumque ducentur. sapientis est enim proprium nihil quod paenitere possit possit add. G 2 facere, nihil invitum, splendide constanter graviter graviter c nstanter R honeste omnia, nihil ita expectare exspectare GRH ( alt.loco ) quasi certo incerto H (inc. alt.loco futurum, nihil, cum acciderit, admirari, ut inopinatum opinatum R 1 ac novum accidisse videatur, omnia ad suum arbitrium referre, suis stare iudiciis. quo quod G ( exp. 2 ) quid sit beatius, mihi certe in mentem venire non potest. numquam...441, 7 sapientis ( om. 441, 12 omnia...14 potest) H 5.82. Stoicorum quidem facilis conclusio est; qui cum finem bonorum esse esse om. H senserint congruere congruę G 1 naturae cumque ea convenienter vivere, cum id sit in sapientis sapientis Lb. sapiente situm non officio solum, verum etiam etiam om. H potestate, sequatur necesse est, ut, cuius in potestate summum bonum, in eiusdem vita beata ita ista V 1 sit. ita fit semper vita beata sapientis. Habes, quae fortissime de beata vita dici putem et, quo modo nunc est, nisi quid tu melius attuleris, etiam verissime. Melius equidem adferre nihil possum, sed a te impetrarim lubenter, ut, nisi molestum sit, sit est Ha. quoniam te nulla vincula impediunt ullius ullius V 3 B Corr s illius X certae disciplinae libasque ex omnibus, quodcumque te maxime specie veritatis movet,—quod paulo ante paulo ante 438,22 Peripateticos veteremque Academiam hortari videbare, ut sine retractatione libere dicere dicerent G ( corr. 1 ) RV ( corr. rec ) auderent audirent K sapientis esse semper beatissimos, id velim audire, quem ad modum his putes consentaneum esse id dicere. multa multi K 1 enim a te contra istam sententiam dicta sunt et Stoicorum ratione conclusa. 5.96. quocirca corpus gaudere tam diu, dum praesentem sentiret voluptatem, animum et praesentem percipere pariter cum corpore et prospicere venientem nec praeteritam praeterfluere sinere. ita perpetuas et contextas contestas ex contentas K c voluptates in sapiente fore semper, cum expectatio expectatione G 1 speratarum voluptatum cum cum add. Lb. perceptarum memoria iungeretur. | |
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25. Cicero, On Duties, 2.43-2.44, 3.16-3.76, 5.26 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 7, 44, 207, 268, 456, 552 2.43. Quamquam praeclare Socrates hanc viam ad gloriam proximam et quasi compendiariam dicebat esse, si quis id ageret, ut, qualis haberi vellet, talis esset. Quodsi qui simulatione et ii ostentatione et ficto non modo sermone, sed etiam voltu stabilem se gloriam consequi posse rentur, vehementer errant. Vera gloria radices agit atque etiam propagatur, ficta omnia celeriter tamquam flosculi decidunt, nee simulatum potest quicquam esse diuturnum. Testes sunt permulti in utramque partem, sed brevitatis causa familia contenti erimus una. Ti. enim Gracchus P. f. tam diu laudabitur, dum memoria rerum Romanarum manebit; at eius filii nec vivi probabantur bonis et mortui numerum optinent iure caesorum. Qui igitur adipisci veram gloriam volet, iustitiae fungatur officiis. Ea quae essent, dictum est in libro superiore. 2.44. Sed ut facillime, quales simus, tales esse videamur, etsi in eo ipso vis maxima est, ut simus ii, qui haberi velimus, tamen quaedam praecepta danda sunt. Nam si quis ab ineunte aetate habet causam celebritatis et nominis aut a patre acceptam, quod tibi, mi Cicero, arbitror contigisse, aut aliquo casu atque fortuna, in hunc oculi omnium coniciuntur atque in eum, quid agat, quem ad modum vivat, inquiritur et, tamquam in clarissima luce versetur, ita nullum obscurum potest nec dictum eius esse nec factum. 3.16. Itaque iis omnes, in quibus est virtutis indoles, commoventur. Nec vero, cum duo Decii aut duo Scipiones fortes viri commemorantur, aut cum Fabricius aut Aristides iustus nominatur, aut ab illis fortitudinis aut ab hoc iustitiae tamquam a sapiente petitur exemplum; nemo enim horum sic sapiens, ut sapientem volumus intellegi, nec ii, qui sapientes habiti et nominati, M. Cato et C. Laelius, sapientes fuerunt, ne illi quidem septem, sed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant speciemque sapientium. 3.17. Quocirca nec id, quod vere honestum est, fas est cum utilitatis repugtia comparari, nec id, quod communiter appellamus honestum, quod colitur ab iis, qui bonos se viros haberi volunt, cum emolumentis umquam est comparandum, tamque id honestum, quod in nostram intellegentiam cadit, tuendum conservandumque nobis est quam illud, quod proprie dicitur vereque est honestum, sapientibus; aliter enim teneri non potest, si qua ad virtutem est facta progressio. Sed haec quidem de iis, qui conservatione officiorum existimantur boni. 3.18. Qui autem omnia metiuntur emolumentis et commodis neque ea volunt praeponderari honestate, ii solent in deliberando honestum cum eo, quod utile putant, comparare, boni viri non solent. Itaque existimo Panaetium, cum dixerit homines solere in hac comparatione dubitare, hoc ipsum sensisse, quod dixerit, solere modo, non etiam oportere. Etenim non modo pluris putare, quod utile videatur, quam quod honestum sit, sed etiam haec inter se comparare et in his addubitare turpissimum est. Quid ergo est, quod non numquam dubitationem afferre soleat considerandumque videatur? Credo, si quando dubitatio accidit, quale sit id, de quo consideretur. 3.19. Saepe enim tempore fit, ut, quod turpe plerumque haberi soleat, inveniatur non esse turpe; exempli causa ponatur aliquid, quod pateat latius: Quod potest maius esse scelus quam non modo hominem, sed etiam familiarem hominem occidere? Num igitur se astrinxit scelere, si qui tyrannum occidit quamvis familiarem? Populo quidem Romano non videtur, qui ex omnibus praeclaris factis illud pulcherrimum existimat. Vicit ergo utilitas honestatem? Immo vero honestas utilitatem secuta est. Itaque, ut sine ullo errore diiudicare possimus, si quando cum illo, quod honestum intellegimus, pugnare id videbitur, quod appellamus utile, formula quaedam constituenda est; quam si sequemur in comparatione rerum, ab officio numquam recedemus. 3.20. Erit autem haec formula Stoicorum rationi disciplinaeque maxime consentanea; quam quidem his libris propterea sequimur, quod, quamquam et a veteribus Academicis et a Peripateticis vestris, qui quondam idem erant, qui Academici, quae honesta sunt, anteponuntur iis, quae videntur utilia, tamen splendidius haec ab eis disseruntur, quibus, quicquid honestum est, idem utile videtur nec utile quicquam, quod non honestum, quam ab iis, quibus et honestum aliquid non utile et utile non honestum. Nobis autem nostra Academia magnam licentiam dat, ut, quodcumque maxime probabile occurrat, id nostro iure liceat defendere. Sed redeo ad formulam. 3.21. Detrahere igitur alteri aliquid et hominem hominis incommodo suum commodum augere magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam dolor, quam cetera, quae possunt aut corpori accidere aut rebus externis. Nam principio tollit convictum humanum et societatem. Si enim sic erimus affecti, ut propter suum quisque emolumentum spoliet aut violet alterum, disrumpi necesse est, eam quae maxime est secundum naturam, humani generis societatem. 3.22. Ut, si unum quodque membrum sensum hunc haberet, ut posse putaret se valere, si proximi membri valetudinem ad se traduxisset, debilitari et interire totum corpus necesse esset, sic, si unus quisque nostrum ad se rapiat commoda aliorum detrahatque, quod cuique possit, emolumenti sui gratia, societas hominum et communitas evertatur necesse est. Nam sibi ut quisque malit, quod ad usum vitae pertineat, quam alteri acquirere, concessum est non repugte natura, illud natura non patitur, ut aliorum spoliis nostras facultates, copias, opes augeamus. 3.23. Neque vero hoc solum natura, id est iure gentium, sed etiam legibus populorum, quibus in singulis civitatibus res publica continetur, eodem modo constitutum est, ut non liceat sui commodi causa nocere alteri; hoc enim spectant leges, hoc volunt, incolumem esse civium coniunctionem; quam qui dirimunt, eos morte, exsilio, vinclis, damno coërcent. Atque hoc multo magis efficit ipsa naturae ratio, quae est lex divina et humana; cui parere qui velit (omnes autem parebunt, qui secundum naturam volent vivere), numquam committet, ut alienum appetat et id, quod alteri detraxerit, sibi adsumat. 3.24. Etenim multo magis est secundum naturam excelsitas animi et magnitudo itemque comitas, iustitia, liberalitas quam voluptas, quam vita, quam divitiae; quae quidem contemnere et pro nihilo ducere comparantem cum utilitate communi magni animi et excelsi est. Detrahere autem de altero sui commodi causa magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam dolor, quam cetera generis eiusdem. 3.25. Itemque magis est secundum naturam pro omnibus gentibus, si fieri possit, conservandis aut iuvandis maximos labores molestiasque suscipere imitantem Herculem illum, quem hominum fama beneficiorum memor in concilio caelestium collocavit, quam vivere in solitudine non modo sine ullis molestiis, sed etiam in maximis voluptatibus abundantem omnibus copiis, ut excellas etiam pulchritudine et viribus. Quocirca optimo quisque et splendidissimo ingenio longe illam vitam huic anteponit. Ex quo efficitur hominem naturae oboedientem homini nocere non posse. 3.26. Deinde, qui alterum violat, ut ipse aliquid commodi consequatur, aut nihil existimat se facere contra naturam aut magis fugiendam censet mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, amissionem etiam liberorum, propinquorum, amicorum quam facere cuiquam iniuriam. Si nihil existimat contra naturam fieri hominibus violandis, quid cum eo disseras, qui omnino hominem ex homine tollat? sin fugiendum id quidem censet, sed multo illa peiora, mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, errat in eo, quod ullum aut corporis aut fortunae vitium vitiis animi gravius existimat. Ergo unum debet esse omnibus propositum, ut eadem sit utilitas unius cuiusque et universorum; quam si ad se quisque rapiet, dissolvetur omnis humana consortio. 3.27. Atque etiam, si hoc natura praescribit, ut homo homini, quicumque sit, ob eam ipsam causam, quod is homo sit, consultum velit, necesse est secundum eandem naturam omnium utilitatem esse communem. Quod si ita est, una continemur omnes et eadem lege naturae, idque ipsum si ita est, certe violare alterum naturae lege prohibemur. Verum autem primum; verum igitur extremum. 3.28. Nam illud quidem absurdum est, quod quidam dicunt, parenti se aut fratri nihil detracturos sui commodi causa, aliam rationem esse civium reliquorum. Hi sibi nihil iuris, nullam societatem communis utilitatis causa statuunt esse cum civibus, quae sententia omnem societatem distrahit civitatis. Qui autem civium rationem dicunt habendam, externorum negant, ii dirimunt communem humani generis societatem; qua sublata beneficentia, liberalitas, bonitas, iustitia funditus tollitur; quae qui tollunt, etiam adversus deos immortales impii iudicandi sunt. Ab iis enim constitutam inter homines societatem evertunt, cuius societatis artissimum vinculum est magis arbitrari esse contra naturam hominem homini detrahere sui commodi causa quam omnia incommoda subire vel externa vel corporis vel etiam ipsius animi, quae vacent iustitia; haec enim una virtus omnium est domina et regina virtutum. 3.29. Forsitan quispiam dixerit: Nonne igitur sapiens, si fame ipse conficiatur, abstulerit cibum alteri homini ad nullam rem utili? Minime vero; non enim mihi est vita mea utilior quam animi talis affectio, neminem ut violem commodi mei gratia. Quid? si Phalarim, crudelem tyrannum et immanem, vir bonus, ne ipse frigore conficiatur, vestitu spoliare possit, nonne faciat? 3.30. Haec ad iudicandum sunt facillima. Nam, si quid ab homine ad nullam partem utili utilitatis tuae causa detraxeris, inhumane feceris contraque naturae legem; sin autem is tu sis, qui multam utilitatem rei publicae atque hominum societati, si in vita remaneas, afferre possis, si quid ob eam causam alteri detraxeris, non sit reprehendendum. Sin autem id non sit eius modi, suum cuique incommodum ferendum est potius quam de alterius commodis detrahendum. Non igitur magis est contra naturam morbus aut egestas aut quid eius modi quam detractio atque appetitio alieni, sed communis utilitatis derelictio contra naturam est; est enim iniusta. 3.31. Itaque lex ipsa naturae, quae utilitatem hominum conservat et continet, decernet profecto, ut ab homine inerti atque inutili ad sapientem, bonum, fortem virum transferantur res ad vivendum necessariae, qui si occiderit, multum de communi utilitate detraxerit, modo hoc ita faciat, ut ne ipse de se bene existimans seseque diligens hanc causam habeat ad iniuriam. Ita semper officio fungetur utilitati consulens hominum et ei, quam saepe commemoro, humanae societati. 3.32. Nam quod ad Phalarim attinet, perfacile iudicium est. Nulla est enim societas nobis cum tyrannis, et potius summa distractio est, neque est contra naturam spoliare eum, si possis, quem est honestum necare, atque hoc omne genus pestiferum atque impium ex hominum communitate extermidum est. Etenim, ut membra quaedam amputantur, si et ipsa sanguine et tamquam spiritu carere coeperunt et nocent reliquis partibus corporis, sic ista in figura hominis feritas et immanitas beluae a communi tamquam humanitatis corpore segreganda est. Huius generis quaestiones sunt omnes eae, in quibus ex tempore officium exquiritur. 3.33. Eius modi igitur credo res Panaetium persecuturum fuisse, nisi aliqui casus aut occupatio eius consilium peremisset. Ad quas ipsas consultationes superioribus libris satis multa praecepta sunt, ex quibus perspici possit, quid sit propter turpitudinen fugiendum, quid sit, quod idcirco fugiendum non sit, quod omnino turpe non sit. Sed quoniam operi inchoato, prope tamen absoluto tamquam fastigium imponimus, ut geometrae solent non omnia docere, sed postulare, ut quaedam sibi concedantur, quo facilius, quae volunt, explicent, sic ego a te postulo, mi Cicero, ut mihi concedas, si potes, nihil praeter id, quod honestum sit, propter se esse expetendum. Sin hoc non licet per Cratippum, at illud certe dabis, quod honestum sit, id esse maxime propter se expetendum. Mihi utrumvis satis est et tum hoc, tum illud probabilius videtur nec praeterea quicquam probabile. 3.34. Ac primum in hoc Panaetius defendendus est, quod non utilia cum honestis pugnare aliquando posse dixerit (neque enim ei fas erat), sed ea, quae viderentur utilia. Nihil vero utile, quod non idem honestum, nihil honestum, quod non idem utile sit, saepe testatur negatque ullam pestem maiorem in vitam hominum invasisse quam eorum opinionem, qui ista distraxerint. Itaque, non ut aliquando anteponeremus utilia honestis, sed ut ea sine errore diiudicaremus, si quando incidissent, induxit earn, quae videretur esse, non quae esset, repugtiam. Hanc igitur partem relictam explebimus nullis adminiculis, sed, ut dicitur, Marte nostro. Neque enim quicquam est de hac parte post Panaetium explicatum, quod quidem mihi probaretur, de iis, quae in manus meas venerunt. 3.35. Cum igitur aliqua species utilitatis obiecta est, commoveri necesse est; sed si, cum animum attenderis, turpitudinem videas adiunctam ei rei, quae speciem utilitatis attulerit, tum non utilitas relinquenda est, sed intellegendum, ubi turpitude sit, ibi utilitatem esse non posse. Quodsi nihil est tam contra naturam quam turpitudo (recta enim et convenientia et constantia natura desiderat aspernaturque contraria) nihilque tam secundum naturam quam utilitas, certe in eadem re utilitas et turpitudo esse non potest. Itemque, si ad honestatem nati sumus eaque aut sola expetenda est, ut Zenoni visum est, aut certe omni pondere gravior habenda quam reliqua omnia, quod Aristoteli placet, necesse est, quod honestum sit, id esse aut solum aut summum bonum; quod autem bonum, id certe utile; ita, quicquid honestum, id utile. 3.36. Quare error hominum non proborum, cum aliquid, quod utile visum est, arripuit, id continuo secernit ab honesto. Hinc sicae, hinc venena, hinc falsa testamenta nascuntur, hinc furta, peculatus, expilationes dir-ptionesque sociorum et civium, hinc opum nimiarum, potentiae non ferendae, postremo etiam in liberis civitatibus regdi exsistunt cupiditates, quibus nihil nec taetrius nec foedius excogitari potest. Emolumenta enim rerum fallacibus iudiciis vident, poenam non dico legum, quam saepe perrumpunt, sed ipsius turpitudinis, quae acerbissima est, non vident. 3.37. Quam ob rem hoc quidem deliberantium genus pellatur e medio (est enim totum sceleratum et impium), qui deliberant, utrum id sequantur, quod honestum esse videant, an se scientes scelere contaminent; in ipsa enim dubitatione facinus inest, etiamsi ad id non pervenerint. Ergo ea deliberanda omnlino non sunt, in quibus est turpis ipsa deliberatio. Atque etiam ex omni deliberatione celandi et occultandi spes opinioque removenda est. Satis enim nobis, si modo in philosophia aliquid profecimus, persuasum esse debet, si omnes deos hominesque celare possimus, nihil tamen avare, nihil iniuste, nihil libidinose, nihil incontinenter esse faciendum. 3.38. Hinc ille Gyges inducitur a Platone, qui, cum terra discessisset magnis quibusdam imbribus, descendit in illum hiatum aeneumque equum, ut ferunt fabulae, animadvertit, cuius in lateribus fores essent; quibus apertis corpus hominis mortui vidit magnitudine invisitata anulumque aureum in digito; quem ut detraxit, ipse induit (erat autem regius pastor), tum in concilium se pastorum recepit. Ibi cum palam eius anuli ad palmam converterat, a nullo videbatur, ipse autem omnia videbat; idem rursus videbatur, cum in locum anulum inverterat. Itaque hac opportunitate anuli usus reginae stuprum intulit eaque adiutrice regem dominum interemit, sustulit, quos obstare arbitrabatur, nec in his eum facinoribus quisquam potuit videre. Sic repente anuli beneficio rex exortus est Lydiae. Hunc igitur ipsum anulum si habeat sapiens, nihilo plus sibi licere putet peccare, quam si non haberet; honesta enim bonis viris, non occulta quaeruntur. 3.39. Atque hoc loco philosoplis quidam, minime mali illi quidem, sed non satis acuti, fictam et commenticiam fabulam prolatam dicunt a Platone; quasi vero ille aut factum id esse aut fieri potuisse defendat! Ilaec est vis huius anuli et huius exempli: si nemo sciturus, nemo ne suspicaturus quidemn sit, cum aliquid divitiarum, potentiae, dominationis, libidinis causa feceris, si id dis hominibusque futurum sit semper ignotuml, sisne facturus. Negant id fieri posse. Nequaquam potest id quidem; sed quaero, quod negant posse, id si posset, quidnam facerent. Urguent rustice sane; negant enim posse et in eo perstant; hoc verbum quid valeat, non vident. Cum enim quaerimus, si celare possint, quid facturi sint, non quaerimus, possintne celare, sed tamquam tormenta quaedam adhibemus, ut, si responderint se impunitate proposita facturos, quod expediat, facinorosos se esse fateantur, si negent, omnia turpia per se ipsa fugienda esse concedant. Sed iam ad propositum revertamur. 3.40. Incidunt multae saepe causae, quae conturbent animos utilitatis specie, non cum hoc deliberetur, relinquendane sit honestas propter utilitatis magnitudinem (nam id quidem improbum est), sed illud, possitne id, quod utile videatur, fieri non turpiter. Cum Collatino collegae Brutus imperium abrogabat, poterat videri facere id iniuste; fuerat enim in regibus expellendis socius Bruti consiliorum et adiutor. Cum autem consilium hoc principes cepissent, cognationem Superbi nomenque Tarquiniorum et memoriam regni esse tollendam, quod erat utile, patriae consulere, id erat ita honestum, ut etiam ipsi Collatino placere deberet. Itaque utilitas valuit propter honestatem, sine qua ne utilitas quidem esse potuisset. At in eo rege, qui urbem condidit, non item; species enim utilitatis animum pepulit eius; 3.41. cui cum visum esset utilius solum quam cum altero regnare, fratrem interemit. Omisit hic et pietatem et humanitatem, ut id, quod utile videbatur neque erat, assequi posset, et tamen muri causamopposuit, speciem honestatis nec probabilem nec sane idoneam. Peccavit igitur, pace vel Quirini vel Romuli dixerim. 3.42. Nec tamen nostrae nobis utilitates omittendae sunt aliisque tradendae, cum iis ipsi egeamus, sed suae cuique utilitati, quod sine alterius iniuria fiat, serviendum est. Scite Chrysippus, ut multa: Qui stadium, inquit, currit, eniti et contendere debet, quam maxime possit, ut vincat, supplantare eum, quicum certet, aut manu depellere nullo modo debet; sic in vita sibi quemque petere, quod pertineat ad usum, non iniquum est, alteri deripere ius non est. 3.43. Maxime autem perturbantur officia in amicitiis, quibus et non tribuere, quod recte possis, et tribuere, quod non sit aequum, contra officium est. Sed huius generis totius breve et non difficile praeceptum est. Quae enim videntur utilia, honores, divitiae, voluptates, cetera generis eiusdem, haec amicitiae numquam anteponenda sunt. At neque contra rem publicam neque contra ius iurandum ac fidem amici causa vir bonus faciet, ne si iudex quidem erit de ipso amico; ponit enim personam amici, cum induit iudicis. Tantum dabit amicitiae, ut veram amici causam esse malit, ut orandae litis tempus, quoad per leges liceat, accommodet. 3.44. Cum vero iurato sententia dicenda erit, meminerit deum se adhibere testem, id est, ut ego arbitror, mentem suam, qua nihil homini dedit deus ipse divinius. Itaque praeclarum a maioribus accepimus morem rogandi iudicis, si eum teneremus, quae salva fide facere possit. Haec rogatio ad ea pertinet, quae paulo ante dixi honeste amico a iudice posse concedi; nam si omnia facienda sint, quae amici velint, non amicitiae tales, sed coniurationes putandae sint. 3.45. Loquor autem de communibus amicitiis; nam in sapientibus viris perfectisque nihil potest esse tale. Damonem et Phintiam Pythagoreos ferunt hoc animo inter se fuisse, ut, cum eorum alteri Dionysius tyrannus diem necis destinavisset et is, qui morti addictus esset, paucos sibi dies commendandorum suorum causa postulavisset, vas factus sit alter eius sistendi, ut, si ille non revertisset, moriendum esset ipsi. Qui cum ad diem se recepisset, admiratus eorum fidem tyrannus petivit, ut se ad amicitiam tertium ascriberent. 3.46. Cum igitur id, quod utile videtur in amicitia, cum eo, quod honestum est, comparatur, iaceat utilitatis species, valeat honestas; cum autem in amicitia, quae honesta non sunt, postulabuntur, religio et fides anteponatur amicitiae. Sic habebitur is, quem exquirimus, dilectus officii. Sed utilitatis specie in re publica saepissime peccatur, ut in Corinthi disturbatione nostri; durius etiam Athenienses, qui sciverunt, ut Aeginetis, qui classe valebant, pollices praeciderentur. Hoc visum est utile; nimis enim imminebat propter propinquitatem Aegina Piraeo. Sed nihil, quod crudele, utile; est enim hominum naturae, quam sequi debemus, maxime inimica crudelitas. 3.47. Male etiam, qui peregrinos urbibus uti prohibent eosque extermit, ut Pennus apud patres nostros, Papius nuper. Nam esse pro cive, qui civis non sit, rectum est non licere; quam legem tulerunt sapientissimi consules Crassus et Scaevola; usu vero urbis prohibere peregrinos sane inhumanum est. Illa praeclara, in quibus publicae utilitatis species prae honestate contemnitur. Plena exemplorum est nostra res publica cum saepe, tum maxime bello Punico secundo; quae Cannensi calamitate accepta maiores animos habuit quam umquam rebus secundis; nulla timoris significatio, nulla mentio pacis. Tanta vis est honesti, ut speciem utilitatis obscuret. 3.48. Athenienses cum Persarum impetum nullo modo possent sustinere statuerentque, ut urbe relicta coniugibus et liberis Troezene depositis naves conscenderent libertatemque Graeciae classe defenderent, Cyrsilum quendam suadentem ut in urbe manerent Xerxemque reciperent, lapidibus obruerunt. Atqui ille utilitatem sequi videbatur; sed ea nulla erat repugte honestate. 3.49. Themistocles post victoriam eius belli, quod cum Persis fuit, dixit in contione se habere consilium rei publicae salutare, sed id sciri non opus ese; postulavit, ut aliquem populus daret, quicum communicaret; datus est Aristides; huic ille, classem Lacedaemoniorum, quae subducta esset ad Gytheum, clam incendi posse, quo facto frangi Lacedaemoniorum opes necesse esset. Quod Aristides cum audisset, in contionem magna exspectatione venit dixitque perutile esse consilium, quod Themistocles afferret, sed minime honestum. Itaque Athenienses, quod honestum non esset, id ne utile quidem putaverunt totamque ear rem, quam ne audierant quidem, auctore Aristide repudiaverunt. Melius hi quam nos, qui piratas immunes, socios vectigales habemus. Maneat ergo, quod turpe sit, id numquam esse utile, ne tur quidem, cum id, quod esse utile putes, adipiscare; hoc enim ipsum, utile putare, quod turpe sit, calamitosum est. 3.50. Sed incidunt, ut supra dixi, saepe causae, cum repugnare utilitas honestati videatur, ut animadvertendum sit, repugnetne plane an possit cum honestate coniungi. Eius generis hae sunt quaestiones: si exempli gratia vir bonus Alexandrea Rhodum magnum frumenti nurerum advexerit in Rhodiorum inopia et fame summaque annonae caritate, si idem sciat complures mercatores Alexandrea solvisse navesque in cursu frumento onustas petentes Rhodum viderit, dicturusne sit id Rhodiis an silentio suum quam plurimo venditurus. Sapientem et bonum virum fingimus; de eius deliberatione et consultatione quaerimus, qui celaturus Rhodios non sit, si id turpe iudicet, sed dubitet, an turpe non sit. 3.51. In huius modi causis aliud Diogeni Babylonio videri solet, magno et gravi Stoico, aliud Antipatro, discipulo eius, homini acutissimo. Antipatro omnia patefacienda, ut ne quid om-nino, quod venditor norit, emptor ignoret, Diogeni venditorem, quatenus iure civili constitutum sit, dicere vitia oportere, cetera sine insidiis agere et, quoniam vendat, velle quam optime vendere. Advexi, exposui, vendo meum non pluris quain ceteri, fortasse etiam minoris, cum maior est copia. Cui fit iniuria? 3.52. Exoritur Antipatri ratio ex altera parte: Quid ais? tu cum horninibus consulere debeas et servire humanae societati eaque lege natus sis et ea habeas principia naturae, quibus parere et quae sequi debeas, ut utilitas tua communis sit utilitas vicissimque communis utilitas tua sit, celabis homines, quid iis adsit commoditatis et copiae? Respondebit Diogenes fortasse sic: Aliud est celare, aliud tacere; neque ego nune te celo, si tibi non dico, quae natura deorum sit, qui sit finis bonorum, quae tibi plus prodessent cognita quam tritici vilitas; sed non, quicquid tibi audire utile est, idem mihi dicere necesse est. 3.53. Immo vero, inquiet ille, necesse est, siquidem meministi esse inter homines natura coniunctam societatem. Memini, inquiet ille; sed num ista societas talis est, ut nihil suum cuiusque sit? Quod si ila est, ne vendendum quidem quicquam est, sed dodum. Vides in hac tota disceptatione non illud dici: Quamvis hoc turpe sit, tamen, quoniam expedit, faciam, sed ita expedire, ut turpe non sit, ex altera autem parte, ea re, quia turpe sit, non esse faciendum. 3.54. Vendat aedes vir bonus propter aliqua vitia, quae ipse norit, ceteri ignorent, pestilentes sint et habeantur salubres, ignoretur in omnibus cubiculis apparere serpentes, male materiatae sint, ruinosae, sed hoc praeter dominum nemo sciat; quaero, si haec emptoribus venditor non dixerit aedesque vendiderit pluris multo, quam se venditurun putarit, num id iniuste aut improbe fecerit. 3.55. Ille vero, inquit Antipater; quid est enim aliud erranti viam non monstrare, quod Athenis exsecrationibus publicis sanctum est, si hoc non est, emptorem pati ruere et per errorem in maximam fraudem incurrere? Plus etiam est quam viam non monstrare; nam est scientem in errorem alterum inducere. Diogenes contra: Num te emere coegit, qui ne hortatus quidem est? Ille, quod non placebat, proscripsit, tu, quod placebat, emisti. Quodsi, qui proscribunt villain bonam beneque aedificatam, non existimantur fefellisse, etiamsi illa nec bona est nec aedificata ratione, multo minus, qui domum non laudarunt. Ubi enim iudicium emptoris est, ibi fraus venditoris quae potest esse? Sin autem dictum non omne praestandum est, quod dictum non est, id praestandum putas? Quid vero est stultius quam venditorem eius rei, quam vendat, vitia narrare? quid autem tam absurdum, quam si domini iussu ita praeco praedicet: 'Domum pestilentem vendo'? 3.56. Sic ergo in quibusdam causis dubiis ex altera parte defenditur honestas, ex altera ita de utilitate dicitur, ut id, quod utile videatur, non modo facere honestum sit, sed etiam non facere turpe. Haec est illa, quae videtur utilium fieri cum honestis saepe dissensio. Quae diiudicanda sunt; non enim, ut quaereremus, exposuimus, sed ut explicaremus. 3.57. Non igitur videtur nec frumentarius ille Rhodios nec hic aedium venditor celare emptores debuisse. Neque enim id est celare, quicquid reticeas, sed cum, quod tu scias, id ignorare emolumenti tui causa velis eos, quorum intersit id scire. Hoc autem celandi genus quale sit et cuius hominis, quis non videt? Certe non aperti, non simplicis, non ingenui, non iusti, non viri boni, versuti potius, obscuri, astuti, fallacis, malitiosi, callidi, veteratoris, vafri. Haec tot et alia plura nonne inutile est vitiorum subire nomina? 3.58. Quodsi vituperandi, qui reticuerunt, quid de iis existimandum est, qui orationis vanitatem adhibuerunt? C. Canius, eques Romanus, nec infacetus et satis litteratus, cum se Syracusas otiandi, ut ipse dicere solebat, non negotiandi causa contulisset, dictitabat se hortulos aliquos emere velle, quo invitare amicos et ubi se oblectare sine interpellatoribus posset. Quod cum percrebruisset, Pythius ei quidam, qui argentariam faceret Syracusis, venales quidem se hortos non habere, sed licere uti Canio, si vellet, ut suis, et simul ad cenam hominem in hortos invitavit in posterum diem. Cum ille promisisset, tum Pythius, qui esset ut argentarius apud omnes ordines gratiosus, piscatores ad se convocavit et ab iis petivit, ut ante suos hortulos postridie piscarentur, dixitque, quid eos facere vellet. Ad cenam tempori venit Canius; opipare a Pythio apparatum convivium, cumbarum ante oculos multitudo; pro se quisque, quod ceperat, afferebat, ante pedes Pythi pisces abiciebantur. 3.59. Tum Canius: Quaeso, inquit, quid est hoc, Pythi? tantumne piscium? tantumne cumbarum? Et ille: Quid mirum? inquit, hoc loco est Syracusis quicquid est piscium, hic aquatio, hac villa isti carere non possunt. Incensus Canius cupiditate contendit a Pythio, ut venderet; gravate ille primo; quid multa? impetrat. Emit homo cupidus et locuples tanti, quanti Pythius voluit, et emit instructos; nomina facit, negotium conficit. Invitat Canius postridie familiares suos, venit ipse mature; scalmum nullum videt, quaerit ex proximo vicino, num feriae quaedam piscatorum essent, quod eos nullos videret. Nullae, quod sciam, inquit; sed hic piscari nulli solent; itaque heri mirabar, quid accidisset. 3.60. Stomachari Canius; sed quid faceret? nondum enim C. Aquilius, collega et familiaris meus, protulerat de dolo malo formulas; in quibus ipsis, cum ex eo quaereretur, quid esset dolus malus, respondebat: cum esset aliud simulatum, aliud actum. Hoc quidem sane luculente ut ab homine perito definiendi. Ergo et Pythius et omnes aliud agentes, aliud simulantes perfidi, improbi, malitiosi. Nullum igitur eorum factum potest utile esse, cum sit tot vitiis inquinatum. 3.61. Quodsi Aquiliana definitio vera est, ex omni vita simulatio dissimulatioque tollenda est. Ita, nec ut emat melius nec ut vendat, quicquam simulabit aut dissimulabit vir bonus. Atque iste dolus malus et legibus erat vindicatus, ut tutela duodecim tabulis, circumscriptio adulescentium lege Plaetoria, et sine lege iudiciis, in quibus additur EX FIDE BONA . Reliquorum autem iudiciorum haec verba maxime excellunt: in arbitrio rei uxoriae MELIUS AEQUIUS, in fiducia UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER. Quid ergo? aut in eo, QUOD MELIUS AEQUIUS, potest ulla pars inesse fraudis? aut, cum dicitur INTER BONOS BENE AGIER, quicquam agi dolose aut malitiose potest? Dolus autem malus in simulatione, ut ait Aquilius, continetur. Tollendum est igitur ex rebus contrahendis omne mendacium; non illicitatorem venditor, non, qui contra se liceatur, emptor apponet; uterque, si ad eloquendum venerit, non plus quam semel eloquetur. 3.62. Q. quidem Scaevola P. f., cum postulasset, ut sibi fundus, cuius emptor erat, semel indicaretur idque venditor ita fecisset, dixit se pluris aestimare; addidit centum milia. Nemo est, qui hoc viri boni fuisse neget, sapientis negant, ut si minoris, quam potuisset, vendidisset. Haec igitur est illa pernicies, quod alios bonos, alios sapientes existimant. Ex quo Ennius nequiquam sapere sapientem, qui ipse sibi prodesse non quiret. Vere id quidem, si, quid esset prodesse, mihi cum Ennio conveniret. 3.63. Hecatonem quidem Rhodium, discipulum Panaeti, video in iis libris, quos de officio scripsit Q. Tuberoni, dicere sapientis esse nihil contra mores, leges, instituta facientem habere rationem rei familiaris. Neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis, propinquis, amicis maximeque rei publicae. Singulorum enim facultates et copiae divitiae sunt civitatis. Huic Scaevolae factum, de quo paulo ante dixi, placere nullo modo potest; etenim omnino tantum se negat facturum compendii sui causa, quod non liceat. Huic nec laus magna tribuenda nec gratia est. 3.64. Sed, sive et simulatio et dissimulatio dolus malus est, perpaucae res sunt, in quibus non dolus malus iste versetur, sive vir bonus est is, qui prodest, quibus potest, nocet nemini, certe istum virum bonum non facile reperimus. Numquam igitur est utile peccare, quia semper est turpe, et, quia semper est honestum virum bonum esse, semper est utile. 3.65. Ac de iure quidem praediorum sanctum apud nos est iure civili, ut in iis vendendis vitia dicerentur, quae nota essent venditori. Nam, cum ex duodecim tabulis satis esset ea praestari, quae essent lingua nuncupata, quae qui infitiatus esset, dupli poenam subiret, a iuris consultis etiam reticentiae poena est constituta; quicquid enim esset in praedio vitii, id statuerunt, si venditor sciret, nisi nominatim dictum esset, praestari oportere. 3.66. Ut, cum in arce augurium augures acturi essent iussissentque Ti. Claudium Centumalum, qui aedes in Caelio monte habebat, demoliri ea, quorum altitudo officeret auspiciis, Claudius proscripsit insulam vendidit, emit P. Calpurnius Lanarius. Huic ab auguribus illud idem denuntiatum est. Itaque Calpurnius cum demolitus esset cognossetque Claudium aedes postea proscripsisse, quam esset ab auguribus demoliri iussus, arbitrum ilium adegit, QUICQUID SIBI DARE FACERE OPORTERET EX FIDE BONA. M. Cato sententiam dixit, huius nostri Catonis pater (ut enim ceteri ex patribus, sic hic, qui illud lumen progenuit, ex filio est nomidus)—is igitur iudex ita pronuntiavit: cum in vendendo rem eam scisset et non pronuntiasset, emptori damnum praestari oportere. 3.67. Ergo ad fidem bonam statuit pertinere notum esse emptori vitium, quod nosset venditor. Quod si recte iudicavit, non recte frumentarius ille, non recte aedium pestilentium venditor tacuit. Sed huius modi reticentiae iure civili conlprehendi non possunt; quae autem possunt, diligenter tenentur. M. Marius Gratidianus, propinquus noster, C. Sergio Oratae vendiderat aedes eas, quas ab eodem ipse paucis ante annis emerat. Eae serviebant, sed hoc in mancipio Marius non dixerat. Adducta res in iudicium est. Oratam Crassus, Gratidianum defendebat Antonius. Ius Crassus urguebat, quod vitii venditor non dixisset sciens, id oportere praestari, aequitatem Antonius, quoniam id vitium ignotum Sergio non fuisset, qui illas aedes vendidisset, nihil fuisse necesse dici, nec eum esse deceptum, qui, id, quod emerat, quo iure esset, teneret. 3.68. Quorsus haec? Ut illud intellegas, non placuisse maioribus nostris astutos. Sed aliter leges, aliter philosophi tollunt astutias, leges, quatenus manu tenere possunt, philosophi, quatenus ratione et intellegentia. Ratio ergo hoc postulat, ne quid insidiose, ne quid simulate, ne quid fallaciter. Suntne igitur insidiae tendere plagas, etiarnsi excitaturus non sis nec agitaturus? ipsae enim ferae nullo insequente saepe incidunt. Sic tu aedes proscribas, tabulam tamquam plagam ponas, domum propter vitia vendas, in ear aliquis incurrat imprudens? 3.69. Hoc quamquam video propter depravationem consuetudinis neque more turpe haberi neque aut lege sanciri aut iure civili, tamen naturae lege sanctum est. Societas est enim (quod etsi saepe dictum est, dicendum est tamen saepius), latissime quidem quae pateat, omnium inter omnes, interior eorum, qui eiusdem gentis sint, propior eorum, qui eiusdem civitatis. Itaque maiores aliud ius gentium, aliud ius civile esse voluerunt; quod civile, non idem continuo gentium, quod autem gentium, idem civile esse debet. Sed nos veri iuris germanaeque iustitiae solidam et expressam effigiem nullam tenemus, umbra et imaginibus utimur. Eas ipsas utinam sequeremur! feruntur enim ex optimis naturae et veritatis exemplis. 3.70. Nam quanti verba illa: UTI NE PROPTER TE FIDEMVE TUAM CAPTUS FRAUDATUSVE SIM! quam illa aurea: UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER OPORTET ET SINE FRAUDATIONE! Sed, qui sint boni, et quid sit bene agi, magna quaestio est. Q. quidem Scaevola, pontifex maximus, summam vim esse dicebat in omnibus iis arbitriis, in quibus adderetur EX FIDE BONA, fideique bonae nomen existimabat manare latissime, idque versari in tutelis societatibus, fiduciis mandatis, rebus emptis venditis, conductis locatis, quibus vitae societas contineretur; in iis magni esse iudicis statuere, praesertim cum in plerisque essent iudicia contraria, quid quemque cuique praestare oporteret. 3.71. Quocirca astutiae tollendae sunt eaque malitia, quae volt illa quidem videri se esse prudentiam, sed abest ab ea distatque plurimum. Prudentia est enim locata in dilectu bonorum et malorum, malitia, si omnia, quae turpia sunt, mala sunt, mala bonis ponit ante. Nec vero in praediis solum ius civile ductum a natura malitiam fraudemque vindicat, sed etiam in mancipiorum venditione venditoris fraus omnis excluditur. Qui enim scire debuit de sanitate, de fuga, de furtis, praestat edicto aedilium. Heredum alia causa est. 3.72. Ex quo intellegitur, quoniam iuris natura fons sit, hoc secundum naturam esse, neminem id agere, ut ex alterius praedetur inscitia. Nec ulla pernicies vitae maior inveniri potest quam in malitia simulatio intellegentiae; ex quo ista innumerabilia nascuntur, ut utilia cum honestis pugnare videantur. Quotus enim quisque reperietur, qui impunitate et ignoratione omnium proposita abstinere possit iniuria? 3.73. Periclitemur, si placet, et in iis quidem exemplis, in quibus peccari volgus hominum fortasse non putet. Neque enim de sicariis, veneficis, testamentariis, furibus, peculatoribus hoc loco disserendum est, qui non verbis sunt et disputatione philosophorum, sed vinclis et carcere fatigandi, sed haec consideremus, quae faciunt ii, qui habentur boni. L. Minuci Basili, locupletis hominis, falsum testamentum quidam e Graecia Romamn attulerunt. Quod quo facilius optinerent, scripserunt heredes secum M. Crassum et Q. Hortensium, homines eiusdem aetatis potentissimos; qui cum illud falsum esse suspicarentur, sibi autem nullius essent conscii culpae, alieni facinoris munusculum non repudiaverunt. Quid ergo? satin est hoc, ut non deliquisse videantur? Mihi quidem non videtur, quamquam alterum vivum amavi, alterum non odi mortuum; 3.74. sed, cum Basilus M. Satrium, sororis filium, nomen suum ferre voluisset eumque fecisset heredem (hunc dico patronum agri Piceni et Sabini; o turpem notam temporum nomen illorum !), non erat aequum principes civis rem habere, ad Satrium nihil praeter nomen pervenire. Etenim, si is, qui non defendit iniuriam neque propulsat, cum potest, iniuste facit, ut in primo libro disserui, qualis habendus est is, qui non modo non repellit, set etiam adiuvat iniuriam? Mihi quidem etiam verae hereditates non honestae videntur, si sunt malitiosis blanditiis, officiorum non veritate, sed simulatione quaesitae. Atqui in talibus rebus aliud utile interdum, aliud honestum videri solet. 3.75. Falso; nam eadem utilitatis, quae honestatis, est regula. Qui hoc non perviderit, ab hoc nulla fraus aberit, nullum facinus. Sic enim cogitans: Est istuc quidem honestum, verum hoc expedit, res a natura copulatas audebit errore divellere, qui fons est fraudium, maleficiorum, scelerum omnium. Itaque, si vir bonus habeat hanc vim, ut, si digitis concrepuerit, possit in locupletium testamenta nomen eius inrepere, hac vi non utatur, ne si exploratum quidem habeat id omnino neminem umquam suspicaturum. At dares hanc vim M. Crasso, ut digitorum percussione heres posset scriptus esse, qui re vera non esset heres, in foro, mihi crede, saltaret. Homo autem iustus isque, quem sentimus virum bonum, nihil cuiquam, quod in se transferat, detrahet. Hoc qui admiratur, is se, quid sit vir bonus, nescire fateatur. 3.76. At vero, si qui voluerit animi sui complicatam notionem evolvere, iam se ipse doceat cum virum bonum esse, qui prosit, quibus possit, noceat nemini nisi lacessitus iniuria. Quid ergo? hic non noceat, qui quodam quasi veneno perficiat, ut veros heredes moveat, in eorum locum ipse succedat? Non igitur faciat, dixerit quis, quod utile sit, quod expediat? Immo intellegat nihil nec expedire nec utile esse, quod sit iniustum; hoc qui non didicerit, bonus vir esse non poterit. | 2.43. "the nearest way to glory â a short cut, as it were â is to strive to be what you wish to be thought to be." For if anyone thinks that he can win lasting glory by pretence, by empty show, by hypocritical talk and looks, he is very much mistaken. True glory strikes deep root and spreads its branches wide; but all pretences soon fall to the ground like fragile flowers, and nothing counterfeit can be lasting. There are very many witnesses to both facts; but, for brevity's sake: I shall confine myself to one family: Tiberius Gracchus, Publius's son, will be held in honour as long as the memory of Rome shall endure; but his sons were not approved by patriots while they lived, and since they are dead they are numbered among those whose murder was justifiable. If, therefore, anyone wishes to win true glory, let him discharge the duties required by justice. And what they are has been set forth in the course of the preceding book. 2.44. But, although the very essence of the problem is that we actually be what we wish to be thought to be, still some rules may be laid down to enable us most easily to secure the reputation of being what we are. For, if anyone in his early youth has the responsibility of living up to a distinguished name acquired either by inheritance from his father (as, I think, my dear Cicero, is your good fortune) or by some chance or happy combination of circumstances, the eyes of the world are turned upon him; his life and character are scrutinized; and, as if he moved in a blaze of light, not a word and not a deed of his can be kept a secret. < 3.16. Accordingly, such duties appeal to all men who have a natural disposition to virtue. And when the two Decii or the two Scipios are mentioned as "brave men" or Fabricius is called "the just," it is not at all that the former are quoted as perfect models of courage or the latter as a perfect model of justice, as if we had in one of them the ideal "wise man." For no one of them was wise in the sense in which we wish to have "wise" understood; neither were Marcus Cato and Gaius Laelius wise, though they were so considered and were surnamed "the wise." Not even the famous Seven were "wise." But because of their constant observance of "mean" duties they bore a certain semblance and likeness to wise men. < 3.17. For these reasons it is unlawful either to weigh true morality against conflicting expediency, or common morality, which is cultivated by those who wish to be considered good men, against what is profitable; but we every-day people must observe and live up to that moral right which comes within the range of our comprehension as jealously as the truly wise men have to observe and live up to that which is morally right in the technical and true sense of the word. For otherwise we cannot maintain such progress as we have made in the direction of virtue. So much for those who have won a reputation for being good men by their careful observance of duty. < 3.18. Those, on the other hand, who measure everything by a standard of profits and personal advantage and refuse to have these outweighed by considerations of moral rectitude are accustomed, in considering any question, to weigh the morally right against what they think the expedient; good men are not. And so I believe that when Panaetius stated that people were accustomed to hesitate to do such weighing, he meant precisely what he said â merely that "such was their custom," not that such was their duty. And he gave it no approval; for it is most immoral to think more highly of the apparently expedient than of the morally right, or even to set these over against each other and to hesitate to choose between them. What, then, is it that may sometimes give room for a doubt and seem to call for consideration? It is, I believe, when a question arises as to the character of an action under consideration. < 3.19. For it often happens, owing to exceptional circumstances, that what is accustomed under ordinary circumstances to be considered morally wrong is found not to be morally wrong. For the sake of illustration, let us assume some particular case that admits of wider application â what more atrocious crime can there be than to kill a fellow-man, and especially an intimate friend? But if anyone kills a tyrant â be he never so intimate a friend â he has not laden his soul with guilt, has he? The Roman People, at all events, are not of that opinion; for of all glorious deeds they hold such an one to be the most noble. Has expediency, then, prevailed over moral rectitude? Not at all; moral rectitude has gone hand in hand with expediency. Some general rule, therefore, should be laid down to enable us to decide without error, whenever what we call the expedient seems to clash with what we feel to be morally right; and, if we follow that rule in comparing courses of conduct, we shall never swerve from the path of duty. < 3.20. That rule, moreover, shall be in perfect harmony with the Stoics' system and doctrines. It is their teachings that I am following in these books, and for this reason: the older Academicians and your Peripatetics (who were once the same as the Academicians) give what is morally right the preference over what seems expedient; and yet the discussion of these problems, if conducted by those who consider whatever is morally right also expedient and nothing expedient that is not at the same time morally right, will be more illuminating than if conducted by those who think that something not expedient may be morally right and that something not morally right may be expedient. But our New Academy allows us wide liberty, so that it is within my right to defend any theory that presents itself to me as most probable. But to return to my rule. < 3.21. Well then, for a man to take something from his neighbour and to profit by his neighbour's loss is more contrary to Nature than is death or poverty or pain or anything else that can affect either our person or our property. For, in the first place, injustice is fatal to social life and fellowship between man and man. For, if we are so disposed that each, to gain some personal profit, will defraud or injure his neighbour, then those bonds of human society, which are most in accord with Nature's laws, must of necessity be broken. < 3.22. Suppose, by way of comparison, that each one of our bodily members should conceive this idea and imagine that it could be strong and well if it should draw off to itself the health and strength of its neighbouring member, the whole body would necessarily be enfeebled and die; so, if each one of us should seize upon the property of his neighbours and take from each whatever he could appropriate to his own use, the bonds of human society must inevitably be annihilated. For, without any conflict with Nature's laws, it is granted that everybody may prefer to secure for himself rather than for his neighbour what is essential for the conduct of life; but Nature's laws do forbid us to increase our means, wealth, and resources by despoiling others. < 3.23. But this principle is established not by Nature's laws alone (that is, by the common rules of equity), but also by the statutes of particular communities, in accordance with which in individual states the public interests are maintained. In all these it is with one accord ordained that no man shall be allowed for the sake of his own advantage to injure his neighbour. For it is to this that the laws have regard; this is their intent, that the bonds of union between citizens should not be impaired; and any attempt to destroy these bonds is repressed by the penalty of death, exile, imprisonment, or fine. Again, this principle follows much more effectually directly from the Reason which is in Nature, which is the law of gods and men. If anyone will hearken to that voice (and all will hearken to it who wish to live in accord with Nature's laws), he will never be guilty of coveting anything that is his neighbour's or of appropriating to himself what he has taken from his neighbour. < 3.24. Then, too, loftiness and greatness of spirit, and courtesy, justice, and generosity are much more in harmony with Nature than are selfish pleasure, riches, and life itself; but it requires a great and lofty spirit to despise these latter and count them as naught, when one weighs them over against the common weal. [But for anyone to rob his neighbour for his own profit is more contrary to Nature than death, pain, and the like.] < 3.25. In like manner it is more in accord with Nature to emulate the great Hercules and undergo the greatest toil and trouble for the sake of aiding or saving the world, if possible, than to live in seclusion, not only free from all care, but revelling in pleasures and abounding in wealth, while excelling others also in beauty and strength. Thus Hercules denied himself and underwent toil and tribulation for the world, and, out of gratitude for his services, popular belief has given him a place in the council of the gods. The better and more noble, therefore, the character with which a man is endowed, the more does he prefer the life of service to the life of pleasure. Whence it follows that man, if he is obedient to Nature, cannot do harm to his fellow-man. < 3.26. Finally, if a man wrongs his neighbour to gain some advantage for himself he must either imagine that he is not acting in defiance of Nature or he must believe that death, poverty, pain, or even the loss of children, kinsmen, or friends, is more to be shunned than an act of injustice against another. If he thinks he is not violating the laws of Nature, when he wrongs his fellow-men, how is one to argue with the individual who takes away from man all that makes him man? But if he believes that, while such a course should be avoided, the other alternatives are much worse â namely, death, poverty, pain â he is mistaken in thinking that any ills affecting either his person or his property are more serious than those affecting his soul. This, then, ought to be the chief end of all men, to make the interest of each individual and of the whole body politic identical. For, if the individual appropriates to selfish ends what should be devoted to the common good, all human fellowship will be destroyed. < 3.27. And further, if Nature ordains that one man shall desire to promote the interests of a fellow-man, whoever he may be, just because he is a fellow-man, then it follows, in accordance with that same Nature, that there are interests that all men have in common. And, if this is true, we are all subject to one and the same law of Nature; and, if this also is true, we are certainly forbidden by Nature's law to wrong our neighbour. Now the first assumption is true; therefore the conclusion is likewise true. < 3.28. For that is an absurd position which is taken by some people, who say that they will not rob a parent or a brother for their own gain, but that their relation to the rest of their fellow-citizens is quite another thing. Such people contend in essence that they are bound to their fellow-citizens by no mutual obligations, social ties, or common interests. This attitude demolishes the whole structure of civil society. Others again who say that regard should be had for the rights of fellow-citizens, but not of foreigners, would destroy the universal brotherhood of mankind; and, when this is annihilated, kindness, generosity, goodness, and justice must utterly perish; and those who work all this destruction must be considered as wickedly rebelling against the immortal gods. For they uproot the fellowship which the gods have established between human beings, and the closest bond of this fellowship is the conviction that it is more repugt to Nature for man to rob a fellow-man for his own gain than to endure all possible loss, whether to his property or to his person . . . or even to his very soul â so far as these losses are not concerned with justice; for this virtue is the sovereign mistress and queen of all the virtues. < 3.29. But, perhaps, someone may say: "Well, then, suppose a wise man were starving to death, might he not take the bread of some perfectly useless member of society?" [Not at all; for my life is not more precious to me than that temper of soul which would keep me from doing wrong to anybody for my own advantage.] "Or again; supposing a righteous man were in a position to rob the cruel and inhuman tyrant Phalaris of clothing, might he not do it to keep himself from freezing to death?" < 3.30. These cases are very easy to decide. For, if merely for one's own benefit one were to take something away from a man, though he were a perfectly worthless fellow, it would be an act of meanness and contrary to Nature's law. But suppose one would be able, by remaining alive, to render signal service to the state and to human society â if from that motive one should take something from another, it would not be a matter for censure. But, if such is not the case, each one must bear his own burden of distress rather than rob a neighbour of his rights. We are not to say, therefore, that sickness or want or any evil of that sort is more repugt to Nature than to covet and to appropriate what is one's neighbour's; but we do maintain that disregard of the common interests is repugt to Nature; for it is unjust. < 3.31. And therefore Nature's law itself, which protects and conserves human interests, will surely determine that a man who is wise, good, and brave, should in emergency have the necessaries of life transferred to him from a person who is idle and worthless; for the good man's death would be a heavy loss to the common weal; only let him beware that self-esteem and self-love do not find in such a transfer of possessions a pretext for wrong-doing. But, thus guided in his decision, the good man will always perform his duty, promoting the general interests of human society on which I am so fond of dwelling. < 3.32. As for the case of Phalaris, a decision is quite simple: we have no ties of fellowship with a tyrant, but rather the bitterest feud; and it is not opposed to Nature to rob, if one can, a man whom it is morally right to kill; â nay, all that pestilent and abominable race should be exterminated from human society. And this may be done by proper measures; for, as certain members are amputated, if they show signs themselves of being bloodless and virtually lifeless and thus jeopardize the health of the other parts of the body, so those fierce and savage monsters in human form should be cut off from what may be called the common body of humanity. of this sort are all those problems in which we have to determine what moral duty is, as it varies with varying circumstances. < 3.33. It is subjects of this sort that I believe Panaetius would have followed up, had not some accident or business interfered with his design. For the elucidation of these very questions there are in his former books rules in plenty, from which one can learn what should be avoided because of its immorality and what does not have to be avoided for the reason that it is not immoral at all. We are now putting the capstone, as it were, upon our structure, which is unfinished, to be sure, but still almost completed; and, as mathematicians make a practice of not demonstrating every proposition, but require that certain axioms be assumed as true, in order more easily to explain their meaning, so, my dear Cicero, I ask you to assume with me, if you can, that nothing is worth the seeking for its own sake except what is morally right. But if Cratippus does not permit this assumption, you will still grant this at least â that what is morally right is the object most worth the seeking for its own sake. Either alternative is sufficient for my purposes; first the one and then the other seems to me the more probable, and, besides these, there is no other alternative that seems probable at all. < 3.34. In the first place, I must undertake the defence of Panaetius on this point; for he has said, not that the truly expedient could under certain circumstances clash with the morally right (for he could not have said that conscientiously), but only that what seemed expedient could do so. For he often bears witness to the fact that nothing is really expedient that is not at the same time morally right, and nothing morally right that is not at the same time expedient; and he says that no greater curse has ever assailed human life than the doctrine of those who have separated these two conceptions. And so he introduced an apparent, not a real, conflict between them, not to the end that we should under certain circumstances give the expedient preference over the moral, but that, in case they ever should get in each other's way, we might decide between them without uncertainty. This part, therefore, which was passed over by Panaetius, I will carry to completion without any auxiliaries, but fighting my own battle, as the saying is. For, of all that has been worked out on this line since the time of Panaetius, nothing that has come into my hands is at all satisfactory to me. 3.35. Now when we meet with expediency in some specious form or other, we cannot help being influenced by it. But if upon closer inspection one sees that there is some immorality connected with what presents the appearance of expediency, then one is not necessarily to sacrifice expediency but to recognize that there can be no expediency where there is immorality. But if there is nothing so repugt to Nature as immorality (for Nature demands right and harmony and consistency and abhors their opposites), and if nothing is so thoroughly in accord with Nature as expediency, then surely expediency and immorality cannot coexist in one and the same object. Again: if we are born for moral rectitude and if that is either the only thing worth seeking, as Zeno thought, or at least to be esteemed as infinitely outweighing everything else, as Aristotle holds, then it necessarily follows that the morally right is either the sole good or the supreme good. Now, that which is good is certainly expedient; consequently, that which is morally right is also expedient. < 3.36. Thus it is the error of men who are not strictly upright to seize upon something that seems to be expedient and straightway to dissociate that from the question of moral right. To this error the assassin's dagger, the poisoned cup, the forged wills owe their origin; this gives rise to theft, embezzlement of public funds, exploitation and plundering of provincials and citizens; this engenders also the lust for excessive wealth, for despotic power, and finally for making oneself king even in the midst of a free people; and anything more atrocious or repulsive than such a passion cannot be conceived. For with a false perspective they see the material rewards but not the punishment â I do not mean the penalty of the law, which they often escape, but the heaviest penalty of all, their own demoralization. < 3.37. Away, then, with questioners of this sort (for their whole tribe is wicked and ungodly), who stop to consider whether to pursue the course which they see is morally right or to stain their hands with what they know is crime. For there is guilt in their very deliberation, even though they never reach the performance of the deed itself. Those actions, therefore, should not be considered at all, the mere consideration of which is itself morally wrong. Furthermore, in any such consideration we must banish any vain hope and thought that our action may be covered up and kept secret. For if we have only made some real progress in the study of philosophy, we ought to be quite convinced that, even though we may escape the eyes of gods and men, we must still do nothing that savours of greed or of injustice, of lust or of intemperance. < 3.38. By way of illustrating this truth Plato introduces the familiar story of Gyges: Once upon a time the earth opened in consequence of heavy rains; Gyges went down into the chasm and saw, so the story goes, a horse of bronze; in its side was a door. On opening this door he saw the body of a dead man of enormous size with a gold ring upon his finger. He removed this and put it on his own hand and then repaired to an assembly of the shepherds, for he was a shepherd of the king. As often as he turned the bezel of the ring inwards toward the palm of his hand, he became invisible to everyone, while he himself saw everything; but as often as he turned it back to its proper position, he became visible again. And so, with the advantage which the ring gave him, he debauched the queen, and with her assistance he murdered his royal master and removed all those who he thought stood in his way, without anyone's being able to detect him in his crimes. Thus, by virtue of the ring, he shortly rose to be king of Lydia. Now, suppose a wise man had just such a ring, he would not imagine that he was free to do wrongly any more than if he did not have it; for good men aim to secure not secrecy but the right. < 3.39. And yet on this point certain philosophers, who are not at all vicious but who are not very discerning, declare that the story related by Plato is fictitious and imaginary. As if he affirmed that it was actually true or even possible! But the force of the illustration of the ring is this: if nobody were to know or even to suspect the truth, when you do anything to gain riches or power or sovereignty or sensual gratification â if your act should be hidden for ever from the knowledge of gods and men, would you do it? The condition, they say, is impossible. of course it is. But my question is, if that were possible which they declare to be impossible, what, pray, would one do? They press their point with right boorish obstinacy, they assert that it is impossible and insist upon it; they refuse to see the meaning of my words, "if possible." For when we ask what they would do, if they could escape detection, we are not asking whether they can escape detection; but we put them as it were upon the rack: should they answer that, if impunity were assured, they would do what was most to their selfish interest, that would be a confession that they are criminally minded; should they say that they would not do so they would be granting that all things in and of themselves immoral should be avoided. But let us now return to our theme. < 3.40. Many cases oftentimes arise to perplex our minds with a specious appearance of expediency: the question raised in these cases is not whether moral rectitude is to be sacrificed to some considerable advantage (for that would of course be wrong), but whether the apparent advantage can be secured without moral wrong. When Brutus deposed his colleague Collatinus from the consular office, his treatment of him might have been thought unjust; for Collatinus had been his associate, and had helped him with word and deed in driving out the royal family. But when the leading men of the state had determined that all the kindred of Superbus and the very name of the Tarquins and every reminder of the monarchy should be obliterated, then the course that was expedient â namely, to serve the country's interests â was so pre-eminently right, that it was even Collatinus's own duty to acquiesce in its justice. And so expediency gained the day because of its moral rightness; for without moral rectitude there could have been no possible expediency. Not so in the case of the king who founded the city: < 3.41. it was the specious appearance of expediency that actuated him; and when he decided that it was more expedient for him to reign alone than to share the throne with another, he slew his brother. He threw to the winds his brotherly affection and his human feelings, to secure what seemed to him â but was not â expedient; and yet in defence of his deed he offered the excuse about his wall â a specious show of moral rectitude, neither reasonable nor adequate at all. He committed a crime, therefore, with due respect to him let me say so, be he Quirinus or Romulus. < 3.42. And yet we are not required to sacrifice our own interest and surrender to others what we need for ourselves, but each one should consider his own interests, as far as he may without injury to his neighbour's. "When a man enters the foot-race," says Chrysippus with his usual aptness, "it is his duty to put forth all his strength and strive with all his might to win; but he ought never with his foot to trip, or with his hand to foul a competitor. Thus in the stadium of life, it is not unfair for anyone to seek to obtain what is needful for his own advantage, but he has no right to wrest it from his neighbour." < 3.43. It is in the case of friendships, however, that men's conceptions of duty are most confused; for it is a breach of duty either to fail to do for a friend what one rightly can do, or to do for him what is not right. But for our guidance in all such cases we have a rule that is short and easy to master: apparent advantages â political preferment, riches, sensual pleasures, and the like â should never be preferred to the obligations of friendship. But an upright man will never for a friend's sake do anything in violation of his country's interests or his oath or his sacred honour, not even if he sits as judge in a friend's case; for he lays aside the rôle of friend when he assumes that of judge. Only so far will he make concessions to friendship, that he will prefer his friend's side to be the juster one and that he will set the time for presenting his case, as far as the laws will allow, to suit his friend's convenience. < 3.44. But when he comes to pronounce the verdict under oath, he should remember that he has God as his witness â that is, as I understand it, his own conscience, than which God himself has bestowed upon man nothing more divine. From this point of view it is a fine custom that we have inherited from our forefathers (if we were only true to it now), to appeal to the juror with this formula â "to do what he can consistently with his sacred honour." This form of appeal is in keeping with what I said a moment ago would be morally right for a judge to concede to a friend. For supposing that we were bound to everything that our friends desired, such relations would have to be accounted not friendships but conspiracies. < 3.45. But I am speaking here of ordinary friendships; for among men who are ideally wise and perfect such situations cannot arise. They say that Damon and Phintias, of the Pythagorean school, enjoyed such ideally perfect friendship, that when the tyrant Dionysius had appointed a day for the executing of one of them, and the one who had been condemned to death requested a few days' respite for the purpose of putting his loved ones in the care of friends, the other became surety for his appearance, with the understanding that his friend did not return, he himself should be put to death. And when the friend returned on the day appointed, the tyrant in admiration for their faithfulness begged that they would enrol him as a third partner in their friendship. < 3.46. Well then, when we are weighing what seems to be expedient in friendship against what is morally right, let apparent expediency be disregarded and moral rectitude prevail; and when in friendship requests are submitted that are not morally right, let conscience and scrupulous regard for the right take precedence of the obligations of friendship. In this way we shall arrive at a proper choice between conflicting duties â the subject of this part of our investigation. Through a specious appearance of expediency wrong is very often committed in transactions between state and state, as by our own country in the destruction of Corinth. A more cruel wrong was perpetrated by the Athenians in decreeing that the Aeginetans, whose strength lay in their navy, should have their thumbs cut off. This seemed to be expedient; for Aegina was too grave a menace, as it was close to the Piraeus. But no cruelty can be expedient; for cruelty is most abhorrent to human nature, whose lead we ought to follow. < 3.47. They, too, do wrong who would debar foreigners from enjoying the advantages of their city and would exclude them from its borders, as was done by Pennus in the time of our fathers, and in recent times by Papius. It may not be right, of course, for one who is not a citizen to exercise the rights and privileges of citizenship; and the law on this point was secured by two of our wisest consuls, Crassus and Scaevola. Still, to debar foreigners from enjoying the advantages of the city is altogether contrary to the laws of humanity. There are splendid examples in history where the apparent expediency of the state has been set at naught out of regard for moral rectitude. Our own country has many instances to offer throughout her history, and especially in the Second Punic War, when news came of the disaster at Cannae, Rome displayed a loftier courage than ever she did in success; never a trace of faint-heartedness, never a mention of making terms. The influence of moral right is so potent, at it eclipses the specious appearance of expediency. < 3.48. When the Athenians could in no way stem the tide of the Persian invasion and determined to abandon their city, bestow their wives and children in safety at Troezen, embark upon their ships, and fight on the sea for the freedom of Greece, a man named Cyrsilus proposed that they should stay at home and open the gates of their city to Xerxes. They stoned him to death for it. And yet he was working for what he thought was expediency; but it was not â not at all, for it clashed with moral rectitude. < 3.49. After the victorious close of that war with Persia, Themistocles announced in the Assembly that he had a plan for the welfare of the state, but that it was not politic to let it be generally known. He requested the people to appoint someone with whom he might discuss it. They appointed Aristides. Themistocles confided to him that the Spartan fleet, which had been hauled up on shore at Gytheum, could be secretly set on fire; this done, the Spartan power would inevitably be crushed. When Aristides heard the plan, he came into the Assembly amid the eager expectation of all and reported that the plan proposed by Themistocles was in the highest degree expedient, but anything but morally right. The result was that the Athenians concluded that what was not morally right was likewise not expedient, and at the instance of Aristides they rejected the whole proposition without even listening to it. Their attitude was better than ours; for we let pirates go scot free, while we make our allies pay tribute. Let it be set down as an established principle, then, that what is morally wrong can never be expedient â not even when one secures by means of it that which one thinks expedient; for the mere act of thinking a course expedient, when it is morally wrong, is demoralizing. < 3.50. But, as I said above, cases often arise in which expediency may seem to clash with moral rectitude; and so we should examine carefully and see whether their conflict is inevitable or whether they may be reconciled. The following are problems of this sort: suppose, for example, a time of dearth and famine at Rhodes, with provisions at fabulous prices; and suppose that an honest man has imported a large cargo of grain from Alexandria and that to his certain knowledge also several other importers have set sail from Alexandria, and that on the voyage he has sighted their vessels laden with grain and bound for Rhodes; is he to report the fact to the Rhodians or is he to keep his own counsel and sell his own stock at the highest market price? I am assuming the case of a virtuous, upright man, and I am raising the question how a man would think and reason who would not conceal the facts from the Rhodians if he thought that it was immoral to do so, but who might be in doubt whether such silence would really be immoral. < 3.51. In deciding cases of this kind Diogenes of Babylonia, a great and highly esteemed Stoic, consistently holds one view; his pupil Antipater, a most profound scholar, holds another. According to Antipater all the facts should be disclosed, that the buyer may not be uninformed of any detail that the seller knows; according to Diogenes the seller should declare any defects in his wares, in so far as such a course is prescribed by the common law of the land; but for the rest, since he has goods to sell, he may try to sell them to the best possible advantage, provided he is guilty of no misrepresentation. "I have imported my stock," Diogenes's merchant will say; "I have offered it for sale; I sell at a price no higher than my competitors â perhaps even lower, when the market is overstocked. Who is wronged?" < 3.52. "What say you?" comes Antipater's argument on the other side; "it is your duty to consider the interests of your fellow-men and to serve society; you were brought into the world under these conditions and have these inborn principles which you are in duty bound to obey and follow, that your interest shall be the interest of the community and conversely that the interest of the community shall be your interest as well; will you, in view of all these facts, conceal from your fellow-men what relief in plenteous supplies is close at hand for them?" "It is one thing to conceal," Diogenes will perhaps reply; not to reveal is quite a different thing. At this present moment I am not concealing from you, even if I am not revealing to you, the nature of gods or the highest good; and to know these secrets would be of more advantage to you than to know that the price of wheat was down. But I am under no obligation to tell you everything that it may be to your interest to be told." < 3.53. "Yea," Antipater will say, "but you are, as you must admit, if you will only bethink you of the bonds of fellowship forged by Nature and existing between man and man." "I do not forget them," the other will reply: but do you mean to say that those bonds of fellowship are such that there is no such thing as private property? If that is the case, we should not sell anything at all, but freely give everything away." In this whole discussion, you see, no one says, "However wrong morally this or that may be, still, since it is expedient, I will do it"; but the one side asserts that a given act is expedient, without being morally wrong, while the other insists that the act should not be done, because it is morally wrong. < 3.54. Suppose again that an honest man is offering a house for sale on account of certain undesirable features of which he himself is aware but which nobody else knows; suppose it is unsanitary, but has the reputation of being healthful; suppose it is not generally known that vermin are to be found in all the bedrooms; suppose, finally, that it is built of unsound timber and likely to collapse, but that no one knows about it except the owner; if the vendor does not tell the purchaser these facts but sells him the house for far more than he could reasonably have expected to get for it, I ask whether his transaction is unjust or dishonourable. < 3.55. "Yes," says Antipater, "it is; for to allow a purchaser to be hasty in closing a deal and through mistaken judgment to incur a very serious loss, if this is not refusing 'to set a man right when he has lost his way' (a crime which at Athens is prohibited on pain of public execration), what is? It is even worse than refusing to set a man on his way: it is deliberately leading a man astray." "Can you say," answers Diogenes, "that he compelled you to purchase, when he did not even advise it? He advertised for sale what he did not like; you bought what you did like. If people are not considered guilty of swindling when they place upon their placards For Sale: A Fine Villa, Well Built, even when it is neither good nor properly built, still less guilty are they who say nothing in praise of their house. For there the purchaser may exercise his own judgment, what fraud can there be on the part of the vendor? But if, again, not all that is expressly stated has to be made good, do you think a man is bound to make good what has not been said? What, pray, would be more stupid than for a vendor to recount all the faults in the article he is offering for sale? And what would be so absurd as for an auctioneer to cry, at the owner's bidding, 'Here is an unsanitary house for sale'?" < 3.56. In this way, then, in certain doubtful cases moral rectitude is defended on the one side, while on the other side the case of expediency is so presented as to make it appear not only morally right to do what seems expedient, but even morally wrong not to do it. This is the contradiction that seems often to arise between the expedient and the morally right. But I must give my decision in these two cases; for I did not propound them merely to raise the questions, but to offer a solution. < 3.57. I think, then, that it was the duty of that grain-dealer not to keep back the facts from the Rhodians, and of this vendor of the house to deal in the same way with his purchaser. The fact is that merely holding one's peace about a thing does not constitute concealment, but concealment consists in trying for your own profit to keep others from finding out something that you know, when it is for their interest to know it. And who fails to discern what manner of concealment that is and what sort of person would be guilty of it? At all events he would be no candid or sincere or straightforward or upright or honest man, but rather one who is shifty, sly, artful, shrewd, underhand, cunning, one grown old in fraud and subtlety. Is it not inexpedient to subject oneself to all these terms of reproach and many more besides? < 3.58. If, then, they are to be blamed who suppress the truth, what are we to think of those who actually state what is false? Gaius Canius, a Roman knight, a man of considerable wit and literary culture, once went to Syracuse for a vacation, as he himself used to say, and not for business. He gave out that he had a mind to purchase a little country seat, where he could invite his friends and enjoy himself, uninterrupted by troublesome visitors. When this fact was spread abroad, one Pythius, a banker of Syracuse, informed him that he had such an estate; that it was not for sale, however, but Canius might make himself at home there, if he pleased; and at the same time he invited him to the estate to dinner next day. Canius accepted. Then Pythius, who, as might be expected of a moneylender, could command favours of all classes, called the fishermen together and asked them to do their fishing the next day out in front of his villa, and told them what he wished them to do. Canius came to dinner at the appointed hour; Pythius had a sumptuous banquet prepared; there was a whole fleet of boats before their eyes; each fisherman brought in in turn the catch that he had made; and the fishes were deposited at the feet of Pythius. < 3.59. "Pray, Pythius," said Canius thereupon, "what does this mean? â all these fish? â all these boats?" "No wonder," answered Pythius; "this is where all the fish in Syracuse are; here is where the fresh water comes from; the fishermen cannot get along without this estate." Inflamed with desire for it, Canius insisted upon Pythius's selling it to him. At first he demurred. To make a long story short, Canius gained his point. The man was rich, and, in his desire to own the country seat, he paid for it all that Pythius asked; and he bought the entire equipment, too. Pythius entered the amount upon his ledger and completed the transfer. The next day Canius invited his friends; he came early himself. Not so much as a thole-pin was in sight. He asked his next-door neighbour whether it was a fishermen's holiday, for not a sign of them did he see. "Not so far as I know," said he; "but none are in the habit of fishing here. And so I could not make out what was the matter yesterday." < 3.60. Canius was furious; but what could he do? For not yet had my colleague and friend, Gaius Aquilius, introduced the established form to apply to criminal fraud. When asked what he meant by "criminal fraud," as specified in these forms, he could reply: "Pretending one thing and practising another" â a very felicitous definition, as one might expect from an expert in making them. Pythius, therefore, and all others who do one thing while they pretend another are faithless, dishonest, and unprincipled scoundrels. No act of theirs can be expedient, when what they do is tainted with so many vices. < 3.61. But if Aquilius's definition is correct, pretence and concealment should be done away with in all departments of our daily life. Then an honest man will not be guilty of either pretence or concealment in order to buy or to sell to better advantage. Besides, your "criminal fraud" had previously been prohibited by the statutes: the penalty in the matter of trusteeships, for example, is fixed by the Twelve Tables; for the defrauding of minors, by the Plaetorian law. The same prohibition is effective, without statutory enactment, in equity cases, in which it is added that the decision shall be "as good faith requires." In all other cases in equity, moreover, the following phrases are most noteworthy: in a case calling for arbitration in the matter of a wife's dowry: what is "the fairer is the better"; in a suit for the restoration of a trust: "honest dealing, as between honest parties." Pray, then, can there be any element of fraud in what is adjusted for the "better and fairer"? Or can anything fraudulent or unprincipled be done, when "honest dealing between honest parties" is stipulated? But "criminal fraud," as Aquilius says, consists in false pretence. We must, therefore, keep misrepresentation entirely out of business transactions: the seller will not engage a bogus bidder to run prices up nor the buyer one to bid low against himself to keep them down; and each, if they come to naming a price, will state once for all what he will give or take. < 3.62. Why, when Quintus Scaevola, the son of Publius Scaevola, asked that the price of a farm that he desired to purchase be definitely named and the vendor named it, he replied that he considered it worth more, and paid him 100,000 sesterces over and above what he asked. No one could say that this was not the act of an honest man; but people do say that it was not the act of a worldly-wise man, any more than if he had sold for a smaller amount than he could have commanded. Here, then, is that mischievous idea â the world accounting some men upright, others wise; and it is this fact that gives Ennius occasion to say: "In vain is the wise man wise, who cannot benefit himself." And Ennius is quite right, if only he and I were agreed upon the meaning of "benefit." < 3.63. Now I observe that Hecaton of Rhodes, a pupil of Panaetius, says in his books on "Moral Duty" dedicated to Quintus Tubero that "it is a wise man's duty to take care of his private interests, at the same time doing nothing contrary to the civil customs, laws, and institutions. But that depends on our purpose in seeking prosperity; for we do not aim to be rich for ourselves alone but for our children, relatives, friends, and, above all, for our country. For the private fortunes of individuals are the wealth of the state." Hecaton could not for a moment approve of Scaevola's act, which I cited a moment ago; for he openly avows that he will abstain from doing for his own profit only what the law expressly forbids. Such a man deserves no great praise nor gratitude. < 3.64. Be that as it may, if both pretence and concealment constitute "criminal fraud," there are very few transactions into which "criminal fraud" does not enter; or, if he only is a good man who helps all he can, and harms no one, it will certainly be no easy matter for us to find the good man as thus defined. To conclude, then, it is never expedient to do wrong, because wrong is always immoral; and it is always expedient to be good, because goodness is always moral. < 3.65. In the laws pertaining to the sale of real property it is stipulated in our civil code that when a transfer of any real estate is made, all its defects shall be declared as far as they are known to the vendor. According to the laws of the Twelve Tables it used to be sufficient that such faults as had been expressly declared should be made good and that for any flaws which the vendor expressly denied, when questioned, he should be assessed double damages. A like penalty for failure to make such declaration also has now been secured by our jurisconsults: they have decided that any defect in a piece of real estate, if known to the vendor but not expressly stated, must be made good by him. < 3.66. For example, the augurs were proposing to take observations from the citadel and they ordered Tiberius Claudius Centumalus, who owned a house upon the Caelian Hill, to pull down such parts of the building as obstructed the augurs' view by reason of their height. Claudius at once advertised his block for sale, and Publius Calpurnius Lanarius bought it. The same notice was served also upon him. And so, when Calpurnius had pulled down those parts of the building and discovered that Claudius had advertised it for sale only after the augurs had ordered them to be pulled down, he summoned the former owner before a court of equity to decide "what indemnity the owner was under obligation 'in good faith' to pay and deliver to him." The verdict was pronounced by Marcus Cato, the father of our Cato (for as other men receive a distinguishing name from their fathers, so he who bestowed upon the world so bright a luminary must have his distinguishing name from his son); he, as I was saying, was presiding judge and pronounced the verdict that "since the augurs' mandate was known to the vendor at the time of making the transfer and since he had not made it known, he was bound to make good the purchaser's loss." < 3.67. With this verdict he established the principle that it was essential to good faith that any defect known to the vendor must be made known to the purchaser. If his decision was right, our grain-dealer and the vendor of the unsanitary house did not do right to suppress the facts in those cases. But the civil code cannot be made to include all cases where facts are thus suppressed; but those cases which it does include are summarily dealt with. Marcus Marius Gratidianus, a kinsman of ours, sold back to Gaius Sergius Orata the house which he himself had bought a few years before from that same Orata. It was subject to an encumbrance, but Marius had said nothing about this fact in stating the terms of sale. The case was carried to the courts. Crassus was counsel for Orata; Antonius was retained by Gratidianus. Crassus pleaded the letter of the law that "the vendor was bound to make good the defect, for he had not declared it, although he was aware of it "; Antonius laid stress upon the equity of the case, leading that, "inasmuch as the defect in question had not been unknown to Sergius (for it was the same house that he had sold to Marius), no declaration of it was needed, and in purchasing it back he had not been imposed upon, for he knew to what legal liability his purchase was subject. < 3.68. What is the purpose of these illustrations? To let you see that our forefathers did not countece sharp practice. Now the law disposes of sharp practices in one way, philosophers in another: the law deals with them as far as it can lay its strong arm upon them; philosophers, as far as they can be apprehended by reason and conscience. Now reason demands that nothing be done with unfairness, with false pretence, or with misrepresentation. Is it not deception, then, to set snares, even if one does not mean to start the game or to drive it into them? Why, wild creatures often fall into snares undriven and unpursued. Could one in the same way advertise a house for sale, post up a notice "To be sold," like a snare, and have somebody run into it unsuspecting? < 3.69. Owing to the low ebb of public sentiment, such a method of procedure, I find, is neither by custom accounted morally wrong nor forbidden either by statute or by civil law; nevertheless it is forbidden by the moral law. For there is a bond of fellowship â although I have often made this statement, I must still repeat it again and again â which has the very widest application, uniting all men together and each to each. This bond of union is closer between those who belong to the same nation, and more intimate still between those who are citizens of the same city-state. It is for this reason that our forefathers chose to understand one thing by the universal law and another by the civil law. The civil law is not necessarily also the universal law; but the universal law ought to be also the civil law. But we possess no substantial, life-like image of true Law and genuine Justice; a mere outline sketch is all that we enjoy. I only wish that we were true even to this; for, even as it is, it is drawn from the excellent models which Nature and Truth afford. < 3.70. For how weighty are the words: "That I be not deceived and defrauded through you and my confidence in you"! How precious are these "As between honest people there ought to be honest dealing, and no deception"! But who are "honest people," and what is "honest dealing" â these are serious questions. It was Quintus Scaevola, the pontifex maximus, who used to attach the greatest importance to all questions of arbitration to which the formula was appended "as good faith requires"; and he held that the expression "good faith" had a very extensive application, for it was employed in trusteeships and partnerships, in trusts and commissions, in buying and selling, in hiring and letting â in a word, in all the transactions on which the social relations of daily life depend; in these, he said, it required a judge of great ability to decide the extent of each individual's obligation to the other, especially when the counter-claims were admissible in most cases. < 3.71. Away, then, with sharp practice and trickery, which desires, of course, to pass for wisdom, but is far from it and totally unlike it. For the function of wisdom is to discriminate between good and evil; whereas, inasmuch as all things morally wrong are evil, trickery prefers the evil to the good. It is not only in the case of real estate transfers that the civil law, based upon a natural feeling for the right, punishes trickery and deception, but also in the sale of slaves every form of deception on the vendor's part is disallowed. For by the aediles' ruling the vendor is answerable for any deficiency in the slave he sells, for he is supposed to know if his slave is sound, or if he is a runaway, or a thief. The case of those who have just come into the possession of slaves by inheritance is different. < 3.72. From this we come to realize that since Nature is the source of right, it is not in accord with Nature that anyone should take advantage of his neighbour's ignorance. And no greater curse in life can be found than knavery that wears the mask of wisdom. Thence come those countless cases in which the expedient seems to conflict with the right. For how few will be found who can refrain from wrong-doing, if assured of the power to keep it an absolute secret and to run no risk of punishment! < 3.73. Let us put our principle to the test, if you please, and see if it holds good in those instances in which, perhaps, the world in general finds no wrong; for in this connection we do not need to discuss cut-throats, poisoners, forgers of wills, thieves, and embezzlers of public moneys, who should be repressed not by lectures and discussions of philosophers, but by chains and prison walls; but let us study here the conduct of those who have the reputation of being honest men. Certain individuals brought from Greece to Rome a forged will, purporting to be that of the wealthy Lucius Minucius Basilus. The more easily to procure validity for it, they made joint-heirs with themselves two of the most influential men of the day, Marcus Crassus and Quintus Hortensius. Although these men suspected that the will was a forgery, still, as they were conscious of no personal guilt in the matter, they did not spurn the miserable boon procured through the crime of others. What shall we say, then? Is this excuse competent to acquit them of guilt? I cannot think so, although I loved the one while he lived, and do not hate the other now that he is dead. < 3.74. Be that as it may, Basilus had in fact desired that his nephew Marcus Satrius should bear his name and inherit his property, (I refer to the Satrius who is the present patron of Picenum and the Sabine country â and oh, what a shameful stigma it is upon the times!) And therefore it was not right that two of the leading citizens of Rome should take the estate and Satrius succeed to nothing except his uncle's name. For if he does wrong who does not ward off and repel injury when he can â as I explained in the course of the First Book â what is to be thought of the man who not only does not try to prevent wrong, but actually aids and abets it? For my part, I do not believe that even genuine legacies are moral, if they are sought after by designing flatteries and by attentions hypocritical rather than sincere. And yet in such cases there are times when one course is likely to appear expedient and another morally right. < 3.75. The appearance is deceptive; for our standard is the same for expediency and for moral rectitude. And the man who does not accept the truth of this will be capable of any sort of dishonesty, any sort of crime. For if he reasons, "That is, to be sure, the right course, but this course brings advantage," he will not hesitate in his mistaken judgment to divorce two conceptions that Nature has made one; and that spirit opens the door to all sorts of dishonesty, wrong-doing, and crime. Suppose, then, that a good man had such power that at a snap of his fingers his name could steal into rich men's wills, he would not avail himself of that power â no, not even though he could be perfectly sure that no one would ever suspect it. Suppose, on the other hand, that one were to offer a Marcus Crassus the power, by the mere snapping, of his fingers, to get himself named as heir, when he was not really an heir, he would, I warrant you, dance in the forum. But the righteous man, the one whom we feel to be a good man, would never rob anyone of anything to enrich himself. If anybody is astonished at this doctrine, let him confess that he does not know what a good man is. < 3.76. If, on the other hand, anyone should desire to unfold the idea of a good man which lies wrapped up in his own mind, he would then at once make it clear to himself that a good man is one who helps all whom he can and harms nobody, unless provoked by wrong. What shall we say, then? Would he not be doing harm who by a kind of magic spell should succeed in displacing the real heirs to an estate and pushing himself into their place? "Well," someone may say, "is he not to do what is expedient, what is advantageous to himself?" Nay, verily; he should rather be brought to realize that nothing that is unjust is either advantageous or expedient; if he does not learn this lesson, it will never be possible for him to be a "good man." < |
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26. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.60(SVF 3.763), 3.22(SVF 3.18), 5.20(SVF 3.44), 3.50, 3.51, 3.52, 3.53, 3.31(SVF 3.190), 1.18.60, 1.37, 1.32, 1.31, 1.30, 1.29, 1.38, 1.39, 2.10, 2.9, 1.45, 1.41, 1.40, 4.14, 3.64, 3.17, 3.16, 3.18, 3.29, 3.28, 3.27, 3.26, 3.25, 3.24, 3.23, 3.22, 3.21, 3.20, 3.19, 3.76, 3.75, 3.74, 3.65, 3.66, 3.67, 3.68, 3.70, 3.71, 3.72, 3.73, 3.69, 5.26, 2.43, 2.44, 3.30, 3.49, 3.58, 3.59, 3.60, 3.61, 3.57, 3.56, 3.54, 3.55, 3.41, 3.46, 3.44, 3.43, 3.42, 3.47, 3.38, 3.39, 3.40, 3.48, 3.35, 3.37, 3.36, 3.34, 3.33, 3.31, 3.62, 3.63, 3.32, 3.45 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 171 |
27. Cicero, De Finibus, 5.20(SVF 3.44), 3.60(SVF 3.763), 3.22(SVF 3.18), 3.51, 3.52, 3.53, 3.50, 3.31(SVF 3.190), 1.18.60, 1.37, 1.32, 1.31, 1.38, 1.30, 1.29, 1.39, 2.9, 1.40, 1.45, 2.10, 1.41, 4.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 171 |
28. Cicero, On Laws, 1.25, 1.58-1.59 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 442 | 1.25. From whence we conclude that every man must recognize a Deity, who considers the origin of his nature and the progress of his life. Now the law of virtue is the same in God and man, and cannot possibly be diverse. This virtue is nothing else than a nature perfect in itself, and developed in all its excellence. There exists therefore a similitude between God and man; nor can any knowledge be more appropriate and sterling than what relates to this divine similitude. Nature, attentive to our wants, offers us her treasures with the most graceful profusion. And it is easy to perceive that the benefits which flow from her are true and veritable gifts, which Providence has provided on purpose for human enjoyment, and not the fortuitous productions of her exuberant fecundity. Her liberality appears, not only in the fruits and vegetables which gush from the bosom of the earth, but likewise in cattle and the beasts of the field. It is clear that some of these are intended for the advantage of mankind, a part for propagation, and a part for food. Innumerable arts have likewise been discovered by the teaching of nature; for her doth reason imitate, and skilfully discover all things necessary to the happiness of life. With respect to man this same bountiful nature hath not merely allotted him a subtle and active spirit, but moreover favoured him with physical senses, like so many guardians and messengers. Thus has she improved our understanding in relation to many obscure principles, and laid the foundation of practical knowledge; and in all respects moulded our corporeal faculties to the service of our intellectual genius. For while she has debased the forms of other animals, who live to eat rather than eat to live, she has bestowed on man an erect stature, and an open countece, and thus prompted him to the contemplation of heaven, the ancient home of his kindred immortals. So exquisitely, too, hath she fashioned the features of the human face, as to make them symbolic of the most recondite thoughts and sentiments. 1.58. MARCUS: I would to heaven, my Quintus, that what you desire were so commensurate to my ability, that it might gracefully harmonize with the subjects I discuss. But you must allow me, that since it was necessary there should be a Law, which by censuring vice and advocating virtue, becomes the source of the precepts we most need to direct us in our conduct; it is also necessary that there should be a wisdom from the love of which, the Greeks have composed the word Philosophy, which is the parent of all the fine arts; for it is beyond contradiction the richest, the brightest, and the loveliest of the gifts the gods have bestowed on us. She has taught us, among other things, the most difficult of all lessons, namely, a precept so forcible and so comprehensive, that it has been attributed not to a man, but to the God of Delphi himself, and that not without reason. 1.59. For he who knows himself must be conscious that he is inspired by a divine principle. He will look upon his rational part as a resemblance to some divinity consecrated within him, and will always be careful that his sentiments, as well as his external behaviour, be worthy of this inestimable gift of God. A serious and thorough examination of all his powers, will inform him what signal advantages he has received from nature, and with what infinite help he is furnished for the attainment of wisdom. For, from his first entrance into the world, he has, as it were, the intelligible principles of things delineated on his mind, by the enlightening assistance of which, and the guidance of wisdom, he may become a good, and, consequently, a happy man. |
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29. Septuagint, 4 Maccabees, 1.1-1.8, 1.22-1.23 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44, 186 | 1.1. The subject that I am about to discuss is most philosophical, that is, whether devout reason is sovereign over the emotions. So it is right for me to advise you to pay earnest attention to philosophy. 1.2. For the subject is essential to everyone who is seeking knowledge, and in addition it includes the praise of the highest virtue -- I mean, of course, rational judgment. 1.3. If, then, it is evident that reason rules over those emotions that hinder self-control, namely, gluttony and lust, 1.4. it is also clear that it masters the emotions that hinder one from justice, such as malice, and those that stand in the way of courage, namely anger, fear, and pain. 1.5. Some might perhaps ask, "If reason rules the emotions, why is it not sovereign over forgetfulness and ignorance?" Their attempt at argument is ridiculous! 1.6. For reason does not rule its own emotions, but those that are opposed to justice, courage, and self-control; and it is not for the purpose of destroying them, but so that one may not give way to them. 1.7. I could prove to you from many and various examples that reason is domit over the emotions, 1.8. but I can demonstrate it best from the noble bravery of those who died for the sake of virtue, Eleazar and the seven brothers and their mother. 1.22. Thus desire precedes pleasure and delight follows it. 1.23. Fear precedes pain and sorrow comes after. |
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30. Septuagint, Wisdom of Solomon, 7 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 326 | 7. Make not Thy dwelling afar from us, O God; Lest they assail us that hate us without cause., For Thou hast rejected them, O God; Let not their foot trample upon Thy holy inheritance., Chasten us Thyself in Thy good pleasure; But give (us) not up to the nations;, For, if Thou sendest pestilence, Thou Thyself givest it charge concerning us; For Thou art merciful, And wilt not be angry to the point of consuming us., While Thy name dwelleth in our midst, we shall find mercy;, And the nations shall not prevail against us. For Thou art our shield,, And when we call upon Thee, Thou hearkenest to us;, For Thou wilt pity the seed of Israel for ever And Thou wilt not reject (them): But we (shall be) under Thy yoke for ever, And (under) the rod of Thy chastening., Thou wilt establish us in the time that Thou helpest us, Showing mercy to the house of Jacob on the day wherein Thou didst promise (to help them). 7. I also am mortal, like all men,a descendant of the first-formed child of earth;and in the womb of a mother I was molded into flesh,, within the period of ten months, compacted with blood,from the seed of a man and the pleasure of marriage., And when I was born, I began to breathe the common air,and fell upon the kindred earth,and my first sound was a cry, like that of all., I was nursed with care in swaddling cloths.", For no king has had a different beginning of existence;", there is for all mankind one entrance into life, and a common departure., Therefore I prayed, and understanding was given me;I called upon God, and the spirit of wisdom came to me., I preferred her to scepters and thrones,and I accounted wealth as nothing in comparison with her., Neither did I liken to her any priceless gem,because all gold is but a little sand in her sight,and silver will be accounted as clay before her., I loved her more than health and beauty,and I chose to have her rather than light,because her radiance never ceases., All good things came to me along with her,and in her hands uncounted wealth., I rejoiced in them all, because wisdom leads them;but I did not know that she was their mother., I learned without guile and I impart without grudging;I do not hide her wealth,, for it is an unfailing treasure for men;those who get it obtain friendship with God,commended for the gifts that come from instruction., May God grant that I speak with judgment and have thought worthy of what I have received,for he is the guide even of wisdom and the corrector of the wise., For both we and our words are in his hand,as are all understanding and skill in crafts., For it is he who gave me unerring knowledge of what exists,to know the structure of the world and the activity of the elements;, the beginning and end and middle of times,the alternations of the solstices and the changes of the seasons,, the cycles of the year and the constellations of the stars,, the natures of animals and the tempers of wild beasts,the powers of spirits and the reasonings of men,the varieties of plants and the virtues of roots;, I learned both what is secret and what is manifest,, for wisdom, the fashioner of all things, taught me. For in her there is a spirit that is intelligent, holy,unique, manifold, subtle,mobile, clear, unpolluted,distinct, invulnerable, loving the good, keen,irresistible,, beneficent, humane, steadfast, sure, free from anxiety,all-powerful, overseeing all,and penetrating through all spirits that are intelligent and pure and most subtle., For wisdom is more mobile than any motion;because of her pureness she pervades and penetrates all things.", For she is a breath of the power of God,and a pure emanation of the glory of the Almighty;therefore nothing defiled gains entrance into her., For she is a reflection of eternal light,a spotless mirror of the working of God,and an image of his goodness., Though she is but one, she can do all things,and while remaining in herself, she renews all things;in every generation she passes into holy souls and makes them friends of God, and prophets;, for God loves nothing so much as the man who lives with wisdom.", For she is more beautiful than the sun,and excels every constellation of the stars. Compared with the light she is found to be superior,, for it is succeeded by the night,but against wisdom evil does not prevail. |
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31. Septuagint, Ecclesiasticus (Siracides), 29.9-29.13 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 298 | 29.9. Help a poor man for the commandments sake,and because of his need do not send him away empty. 29.11. Lay up your treasure according to the commandments of the Most High,and it will profit you more than gold. 29.12. Store up almsgiving in your treasury,and it will rescue you from all affliction; 29.13. more than a mighty shield and more than a heavy spear,it will fight on your behalf against your enemy. |
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32. Philo of Alexandria, On Flight And Finding, 101, 63 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 326 | 63. This, too, one of the most eminent among the men who have been admired for their wisdom has asserted, speaking in a magnificent strain in the Theaetetus, where he says, "But it is impossible for evils to come to and end. For it is indispensable that there should always be something in opposition to God. And it is equally impossible that it should have a place in the divine regions; but it must of necessity hover around mortal nature and this place where we live; on which account we ought to endeavor to flee from this place as speedily as possible. And our flight will be a likening of ourselves to God, to the best of our power. And such a likening consists of being just and holy in conjunction with Prudence." |
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33. Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation, 3.18 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 360 |
34. Philo of Alexandria, Who Is The Heir, 235, 299 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 204 | 299. for the first number is that into which it is not possible to receive any idea of either good or evil, since the soul is as yet destitute of all impressions; and the second is that in which we indulge in a rapid course of the passions; and the third is that in which we are healed, repelling the infections of disease, and at last ceasing to feel the evil vigour of the passions; the fourth is that in which we acquire complete and perfect health and vigour, when rejecting what is bad we appear to endeavor to apply to what is good, which previously was not in our power. LX. |
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35. Philo of Alexandria, That The Worse Attacks The Better, 63 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 204 | 63. And it has not fallen to the lot of all the suppliants to become guardians of the holy things, but to those only who have arrived at the number fifty, which proclaims remission of offences and perfect liberty and a return to their ancient possessions. "For this," says the Scripture, "is the law concerning the Levites: from twenty-five years old and upwards, they shall go in to wait upon the service of the tabernacle of the congregation: and from the age of fifty years they shall cease waiting upon the service thereof, and shall serve no more; but shall minister with their brethren in the tabernacle of the congregation, and they shall keep what is to be kept, and shall do no Service." |
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36. Philo of Alexandria, That God Is Unchangeable, 143 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 326 | 143. And know that this way is wisdom. For the mind being guided by wisdom, while the road is straight and level and easy, proceeds along it to the end; and the end of this road is the knowledge and understanding of God. But every companion of the flesh hates and repudiates, and endeavours to corrupt this way; for there is no one thing so much at variance with another, as knowledge is at variance with the pleasure of the flesh. Accordingly, the earthly Edom is always fighting with those who wish to proceed by this road, |
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37. Philo of Alexandria, That Every Good Person Is Free, 22.160(SVF 1.179) (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), posidonius Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 97 |
38. Cicero, Academica Posteriora, 1.40 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 361 |
39. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 3.152-3.160, 3.947-3.949, 5.45-5.50 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 3.152. verum ubi vementi magis est commota metu mens, 3.153. consentire animam totam per membra videmus 3.154. sudoresque ita palloremque existere toto 3.155. corpore et infringi linguam vocemque aboriri, 3.156. caligare oculos, sonere auris, succidere artus, 3.157. denique concidere ex animi terrore videmus 3.158. saepe homines; facile ut quivis hinc noscere possit 3.159. esse animam cum animo coniunctam, quae cum animi vi 3.160. percussa est, exim corpus propellit et icit. 3.947. confecti languent, eadem tamen omnia restant, 3.948. omnia si perges vivendo vincere saecla, 3.949. atque etiam potius, si numquam sis moriturus', 5.45. quantae tum scindunt hominem cuppedinis acres 5.46. sollicitum curae quantique perinde timores! 5.47. quidve superbia spurcitia ac petulantia? quantas 5.48. efficiunt clades! quid luxus desidiaeque? 5.49. haec igitur qui cuncta subegerit ex animoque 5.50. expulerit dictis, non armis, nonne decebit | |
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40. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Abraham, 236-244, 76 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 326 | 76. For he has not chosen to be beheld by the eyes of the body, perhaps because it was not consistent with holiness for what is mortal to touch what is everlasting, or perhaps because of the weakness of our sight; for it would never have been able to stand the rays which are poured forth from the living God, since it cannot even look straight at the rays of the sun. XVII. |
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41. Philo of Alexandria, On Rewards And Punishments, 163, 46 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 326 |
42. Philo of Alexandria, On The Contemplative Life, 2 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 186 | 2. but the deliberate intention of the philosopher is at once displayed from the appellation given to them; for with strict regard to etymology, they are called therapeutae and therapeutrides, either because they process an art of medicine more excellent than that in general use in cities (for that only heals bodies, but the other heals souls which are under the mastery of terrible and almost incurable diseases, which pleasures and appetites, fears and griefs, and covetousness, and follies, and injustice, and all the rest of the innumerable multitude of other passions and vices, have inflicted upon them), or else because they have been instructed by nature and the sacred laws to serve the living God, who is superior to the good, and more simple than the one, and more ancient than the unit; |
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43. Philo of Alexandria, On The Special Laws, 1.43 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 326 | 1.43. But God replied, "I receive, indeed, your eagerness, inasmuch as it is praiseworthy; but the request which you make is not fitting to be granted to any created being. And I only bestow such gifts as are appropriate to him who receives them; for it is not possible for a man to receive all that it is easy for me to give. On which account I give to him who is deserving of my favour all the gifts which he is able to receive. |
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44. New Testament, John, 1.12, 1.14, 12.45, 14.9 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 326 1.12. ὅσοι δὲ ἔλαβον αὐτόν, ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα θεοῦ γενέσθαι, τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, 1.14. Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ ἐθεασάμεθα τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός, πλήρης χάριτος καὶ ἀληθείας·?̔ 12.45. καὶ ὁ θεωρῶν ἐμὲ θεωρεῖ τὸν πέμψαντά με. 14.9. λέγει αὐτῷ [ὁ] Ἰησοῦς Τοσοῦτον χρόνον μεθʼ ὑμῶν εἰμὶ καὶ οὐκ ἔγνωκάς με, Φίλιππε; ὁ ἑωρακὼς ἐμὲ ἑωρακεν τὸν πατέρα· πῶς σὺ λέγεις Δεῖξον ἡμῖν τὸν πατέρα; | 1.12. But as many as received him, to them he gave the right to become God's children, to those who believe in his name: 1.14. The Word became flesh, and lived among us. We saw his glory, such glory as of the one and only Son of the Father, full of grace and truth. 12.45. He who sees me sees him who sent me. 14.9. Jesus said to him, "Have I been with you such a long time, and do you not know me, Philip? He who has seen me has seen the Father. How do you say, 'Show us the Father?' |
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45. New Testament, 1 John, 3.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 326 3.2. Ἀγαπητοί, νῦν τέκνα θεοῦ ἐσμέν, καὶ οὔπω ἐφανερώθη τί ἐσόμεθα. οἴδαμεν ὅτι ἐὰν φανερωθῇ ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ ἐσόμεθα, ὅτι ὀψόμεθα αὐτὸν καθώς ἐστιν. | 3.2. Beloved, now we are children of God, and it is not yet revealed what we will be. But we know that, when he is revealed, we will be like him; for we will see him just as he is. |
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46. New Testament, Hebrews, 1.3, 12.14 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 326 1.3. ὃς ὢν ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ, φέρων τε τὰ πάντα τῷ ῥήματι τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ, καθαρισμὸν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ποιησάμενοςἐκάθισεν ἐν δεξιᾷτῆς μεγαλωσύνης ἐν ὑψηλοῖς, 12.14. Εἰρήνην διώκετεμετὰ πάντων, καὶ τὸν ἁγιασμόν, οὗ χωρὶς οὐδεὶς ὄψεται τὸν κύριον, | 1.3. His Son is the radiance of his glory, the very image of his substance, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he had by himself made purification for our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high; 12.14. Follow after peace with all men, and the sanctification without which no man will see the Lord, |
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47. New Testament, 2 Peter, 3.18 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 81 3.18. αὐξάνετε δὲ ἐν χάριτι καὶ γνώσει τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν καὶ σωτῆρος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ. αὐτῷ ἡ δόξα καὶ νῦν καὶ εἰς ἡμέραν αἰῶνος. | 3.18. But grow in the grace and knowledge of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. To him be the glory both now and forever. Amen. |
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48. New Testament, 2 Corinthians, 9.10, 10.15 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 81 9.10. ὁ δὲ ἐπιχορηγῶνσπέρμα τῷ σπείροντι καὶ ἄρτον εἰς βρῶσινχορηγήσει καὶ πληθυνεῖ τὸν σπόρον ὑμῶν καὶ αὐξήσειτὰ γενήματα τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὑμῶν·?̓ 10.15. οὐκ εἰς τὰ ἄμετρα καυχώμενοι ἐν ἀλλοτρίοις κόποις, ἐλπίδα δὲ ἔχοντες αὐξανομένης τῆς πίστεως ὑμῶν ἐν ὑμῖν μεγαλυνθῆναι κατὰ τὸν κανόνα ἡμῶν εἰς περισσείαν, | |
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49. New Testament, Acts, 6.7, 7.17, 12.24, 17.18, 19.20 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 7, 81 6.7. Καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ηὔξανεν, καὶ ἐπληθύνετο ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν μαθητῶν ἐν Ἰερουσαλὴμ σφόδρα, πολύς τε ὄχλος τῶν ἱερέων ὑπήκουον τῇ πίστει. 7.17. Καθὼς δὲ ἤγγιζεν ὁ χρόνος τῆς ἐπαγγελίας ἧς ὡμολόγησεν ὁ θεὸς τῷ Ἀβραάμ, ηὔξησεν ὁ λαὸς καὶ ἐπληθύνθη ἐν Ἀἰγύπτῳ, 12.24. Ὁ δὲ λόγος τοῦ κυρίου ηὔξανεν καὶ ἐπληθύνετο. 17.18. τινὲς δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἐπικουρίων καὶ Στωικῶν φιλοσόφων συνέβαλλον αὐτῷ, καί τινες ἔλεγον Τί ἂν θέλοι ὁ σπερμολόγος οὗτος λέγειν; οἱ δέ Ξένων δαιμονίων δοκεῖ καταγγελεὺς εἶναι· 19.20. Οὕτως κατὰ κράτος τοῦ κυρίου ὁ λόγος ηὔξανεν καὶ ἴσχυεν. | 6.7. The word of God increased and the number of the disciples multiplied in Jerusalem exceedingly. A great company of the priests were obedient to the faith. 7.17. "But as the time of the promise came close which God swore to Abraham, the people grew and multiplied in Egypt, 12.24. But the word of God grew and multiplied. 17.18. Some of the Epicurean and Stoic philosophers also encountered him. Some said, "What does this babbler want to say?"Others said, "He seems to be advocating foreign demons," because he preached Jesus and the resurrection. 19.20. So the word of the Lord was growing and becoming mighty. |
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50. New Testament, Apocalypse, 22.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 326 22.4. καὶὄψονται τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ,καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ὰὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν μετώπων αὐτῶν. | 22.4. They will see his face, and his name will be on their foreheads. |
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51. New Testament, Colossians, 1.10, 2.19 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 81 1.10. περιπατῆσαι ἀξίως τοῦ κυρίου εἰς πᾶσαν ἀρεσκίαν ἐν παντὶ ἔργῳ ἀγαθῷ καρποφοροῦντες καὶ αὐξανόμενοι τῇ ἐπιγνώσει τοῦ θεοῦ, 2.19. καὶ οὐ κρατῶν τὴν κεφαλήν, ἐξ οὗ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα διὰ τῶν ἁφῶν καὶ συνδέσμων ἐπιχορηγούμενον καὶ συνβιβαζόμενον αὔξει τὴν αὔξησιν τοῦ θεοῦ. | 1.10. that you may walk worthily of the Lord, to please him in all respects, bearing fruit in every good work, and increasing in the knowledge of God; 2.19. and not holding firmly to the Head, from whom all the body, being supplied and knit together through the joints and ligaments, grows with God's growth. |
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52. New Testament, Ephesians, 2.21, 4.15 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 81 2.21. ἐν ᾧ πᾶσα οἰκοδομὴ συναρμολογουμένη αὔξει εἰς ναὸν ἅγιον ἐν κυρίῳ, 4.15. ἀληθεύοντες δὲ ἐν ἀγάπῃ αὐξήσωμεν εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα, ὅς ἐστιν ἡ κεφαλή, Χριστός, | 2.21. in whom the whole building, fitted together, grows into a holy temple in the Lord; 4.15. but speaking truth in love, we may grow up in all things into him, who is the head, Christ; |
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53. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 3.6-3.7, 13.12 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 326; Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 81 3.6. ἐγὼ ἐφύτευσα, Ἀπολλὼς ἐπότισεν, ἀλλὰ ὁ θεὸς ηὔξανεν· 3.7. ὥστε οὔτε ὁ φυτεύων ἐστίν τι οὔτε ὁ ποτίζων, ἀλλʼ ὁ αὐξάνων θεός. 13.12. βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι διʼ ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον· ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους, τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην. | 3.6. I planted. Apollos watered. But Godgave the increase. 3.7. So then neither he who plants is anything, norhe who waters, but God who gives the increase. 13.12. For now we see in a mirror, dimly, butthen face to face. Now I know in part, but then I will know fully, evenas I was also fully known. |
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54. New Testament, 1 Peter, 2.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 81 2.2. ὡς ἀρτιγέννητα βρέφη τὸ λογικὸν ἄδολον γάλα ἐπιποθήσατε, ἵνα ἐν αὐτῷ αὐξηθῆτε εἰς σωτηρίαν, | 2.2. as newborn babes, long for the pure milk of the Word, that you may grow thereby, |
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55. Seneca The Younger, De Beneficiis, 5.5.4-5.5.5, 7.2.4-7.2.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 361; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 |
56. New Testament, Mark, 4.8 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 81 4.8. καὶ ἄλλα ἔπεσεν εἰς τὴν γῆν τὴν καλήν, καὶ ἐδίδου καρπὸν ἀναβαίνοντα καὶ αὐξανόμενα, καὶ ἔφερεν εἰς τριάκοντα καὶ ἐν ἑξήκοντα καὶ ἐν ἑκατόν. | 4.8. Others fell into the good ground, and yielded fruit, growing up and increasing. Some brought forth thirty times, some sixty times, and some one hundred times as much." |
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57. New Testament, Matthew, 4.17, 5.3-5.12, 6.1-6.34, 13.32 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life •goal (telos) Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 279, 284, 298, 299, 326; Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 81 4.17. ΑΠΟ ΤΟΤΕ ἤρξατο ὁ Ἰησοῦς κηρύσσειν καὶ λέγειν Μετανοεῖτε, ἤγγικεν γὰρ ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν. 5.3. ΜΑΚΑΡΙΟΙ οἱ πτωχοὶ τῷ πνεύματι, ὅτι αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν. 5.4. μακάριοι οἱ πενθοῦντες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ παρακληθήσονται. 5.5. μακάριοι οἱ πραεῖς, ὅτι αὐτοὶ κληρονομήσουσι τὴν γῆν. 5.6. μακάριοι οἱ πεινῶντες καὶ διψῶντες τὴν δικαιοσύνην, ὅτι αὐτοὶ χορτασθήσονται. 5.7. μακάριοι οἱ ἐλεήμονες, ὅτι αὐτοὶ ἐλεηθήσονται. 5.8. μακάριοι οἱ καθαροὶ τῇ καρδίᾳ, ὅτι αὐτοὶ τὸν θεὸν ὄψονται. 5.9. μακάριοι οἱ εἰρηνοποιοί, ὅτι [αὐτοὶ] υἱοὶ θεοῦ κληθήσονται. 5.10. μακάριοι οἱ δεδιωγμένοι ἕνεκεν δικαιοσύνης, ὅτι αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν. 5.11. μακάριοί ἐστε ὅταν ὀνειδίσωσιν ὑμᾶς καὶ διώξωσιν καὶ εἴπωσιν πᾶν πονηρὸν καθʼ ὑμῶν ψευδόμενοι ἕνεκεν ἐμοῦ· 5.12. χαίρετε καὶ ἀγαλλιᾶσθε, ὅτι ὁ μισθὸς ὑμῶν πολὺς ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς· οὕτως γὰρ ἐδίωξαν τοὺς προφήτας τοὺς πρὸ ὑμῶν. 6.1. Προσέχετε [δὲ] τὴν δικαιοσύνην ὑμῶν μὴ ποιεῖν ἔμπροσθεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τὸ θεαθῆναι αὐτοῖς· εἰ δὲ μήγε, μισθὸν οὐκ ἔχετε παρὰ τῷ πατρὶ ὑμῶν τῷ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς. 6.2. Ὅταν οὖν ποιῇς ἐλεημοσύνην, μὴ σαλπίσῃς ἔμπροσθέν σου, ὥσπερ οἱ ὑποκριταὶ ποιοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς συναγωγαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς ῥύμαις, ὅπως δοξασθῶσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀπέχουσιν τὸν μισθὸν αὐτῶν. 6.3. σοῦ δὲ ποιοῦντος ἐλεημοσύνην μὴ γνώτω ἡ ἀριστερά σου τί ποιεῖ ἡ δεξιά σου, 6.4. ὅπως ᾖ σου ἡ ἐλεημοσύνη ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ· καὶ ὁ πατήρ σου ὁ βλέπων ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ ἀποδώσει σοι. 6.5. Καὶ ὅταν προσεύχησθε, οὐκ ἔσεσθε ὡς οἱ ὑποκριταί· ὅτι φιλοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς συναγωγαῖς καὶ ἐν ταῖς γωνίαις τῶν πλατειῶν ἑστῶτες προσεύχεσθαι, ὅπως φανῶσιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀπέχουσι τὸν μισθὸν αὐτῶν. 6.6. σὺ δὲ ὅταν προσεύχῃ, εἴσελθε εἰς τὸ ταμεῖόν σου καὶ κλείσας τὴν θύραν σου πρόσευξαι τῷ πατρί σου τῷ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ· καὶ ὁ πατήρ σου ὁ βλέπων ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ ἀποδώσει σοι. 6.7. Προσευχόμενοι δὲ μὴ βατταλογήσητε ὥσπερ οἱ ἐθνικοί, δοκοῦσιν γὰρ ὅτι ἐν τῇ πολυλογίᾳ αὐτῶν εἰσακουσθήσονται· 6.8. μὴ οὖν ὁμοιωθῆτε αὐτοῖς, οἶδεν γὰρ [ὁ θεὸς] ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὧν χρείαν ἔχετε πρὸ τοῦ ὑμᾶς αἰτῆσαι αὐτόν. 6.9. Οὕτως οὖν προσεύχεσθε ὑμεῖς Πάτερ ἡμῶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς· Ἁγιασθήτω τὸ ὄνομά σου, 6.10. ἐλθάτω ἡ βασιλεία σου, γενηθήτω τὸ θέλημά σου, ὡς ἐν οὐρανῷ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς· 6.11. Τὸν ἄρτον ἡμῶν τὸν ἐπιούσιον δὸς ἡμῖν σήμερον· 6.12. καὶ ἄφες ἡμῖν τὰ ὀφειλήματα ἡμῶν, ὡς καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀφήκαμεν τοῖς ὀφειλέταις ἡμῶν· 6.13. καὶ μὴ εἰσενέγκῃς ἡμᾶς εἰς πειρασμόν, ἀλλὰ ῥῦσαι ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ πονηροῦ. 6.14. Ἐὰν γὰρ ἀφῆτε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὰ παραπτώματα αὐτῶν, ἀφήσει καὶ ὑμῖν ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος· 6.15. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀφῆτε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις [τὰ παραπτώματα αὐτῶν], οὐδὲ ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ἀφήσει τὰ παραπτώματα ὑμῶν. 6.16. Ὅταν δὲ νηστεύητε, μὴ γίνεσθε ὡς οἱ ὑποκριταὶ σκυθρωποί, ἀφανίζουσιν γὰρ τὰ πρόσωπα αὐτῶν ὅπως φανῶσιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις νηστεύοντες· ἀμὴν λέγω ὑμῖν, ἀπέχουσιν τὸν μισθὸν αὐτῶν. 6.17. σὺ δὲ νηστεύων ἄλειψαί σου τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ τὸ πρόσωπόν σου νίψαι, 6.18. ὅπως μὴ φανῇς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις νηστεύων ἀλλὰ τῷ πατρί σου τῷ ἐν τῷ κρυφαίῳ· καὶ ὁ πατήρ σου ὁ βλέπων ἐν τῷ κρυφαίῳ ἀποδώσει σοι. 6.19. Μὴ θησαυρίζετε ὑμῖν θησαυροὺς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, ὅπου σὴς καὶ βρῶσις ἀφανίζει, καὶ ὅπου κλέπται διορύσσουσιν καὶ κλέπτουσιν· 6.20. θησαυρίζετε δὲ ὑμῖν θησαυροὺς ἐν οὐρανῷ, ὅπου οὔτε σὴς οὔτε βρῶσις ἀφανίζει, καὶ ὅπου κλέπται οὐ διορύσσουσιν οὐδὲ κλέπτουσιν· 6.21. ὅπου γάρ ἐστιν ὁ θησαυρός σου, ἐκεῖ ἔσται [καὶ] ἡ καρδία σου. 6.22. Ὁ λύχνος τοῦ σώματός ἐστιν ὁ ὀφθαλμός. ἐὰν οὖν ᾖ ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου ἁπλοῦς, ὅλον τὸ σῶμά σου φωτινὸν ἔσται· 6.23. ἐὰν δὲ ὁ ὀφθαλμός σου πονηρὸς ᾖ, ὅλον τὸ σῶμά σου σκοτινὸν ἔσται. εἰ οὖν τὸ φῶς τὸ ἐν σοὶ σκότος ἐστίν, τὸ σκότος πόσον. 6.24. Οὐδεὶς δύναται δυσὶ κυρίοις δουλεύειν· ἢ γὰρ τὸν ἕνα μισήσει καὶ τὸν ἕτερον ἀγαπήσει, ἢ ἑνὸς ἀνθέξεται καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου καταφρονήσει· οὐ δύνασθε θεῷ δουλεύειν καὶ μαμωνᾷ. 6.25. Διὰ τοῦτο λέγω ὑμῖν, μὴ μεριμνᾶτε τῇ ψυχῇ ὑμῶν τί φάγητε [ἢ τί πίητε], μηδὲ τῷ σώματι ὑμῶν τί ἐνδύσησθε· οὐχὶ ἡ ψυχὴ πλεῖόν ἐστι τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ἐνδύματος; 6.26. ἐμβλέψατε εἰς τὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὅτι οὐ σπείρουσιν οὐδὲ θερίζουσιν οὐδὲ συνάγουσιν εἰς ἀποθήκας, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος τρέφει αὐτά· οὐχ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον διαφέρετε αὐτῶν; 6.27. τίς δὲ ἐξ ὑμῶν μεριμνῶν δύναται προσθεῖναι ἐπὶ τὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτοῦ πῆχυν ἕνα; 6.28. καὶ περὶ ἐνδύματος τί μεριμνᾶτε; καταμάθετε τὰ κρίνα τοῦ ἀγροῦ πῶς αὐξάνουσιν· οὐ κοπιῶσιν οὐδὲ νήθουσιν· 6.29. λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν ὅτι οὐδὲ Σολομὼν ἐν πάσῃ τῇ δόξῃ αὐτοῦ περιεβάλετο ὡς ἓν τούτων. 6.30. εἰ δὲ τὸν χόρτον τοῦ ἀγροῦ σήμερον ὄντα καὶ αὔριον εἰς κλίβανον βαλλόμενον ὁ θεὸς οὕτως ἀμφιέννυσιν, οὐ πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὑμᾶς, ὀλιγόπιστοι; 6.31. μὴ οὖν μεριμνήσητε λέγοντες Τί φάγωμεν; ἤ Τί πίωμεν; ἤ Τί περιβαλώμεθα; 6.32. πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τὰ ἔθνη ἐπιζητοῦσιν· οἶδεν γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν ὁ οὐράνιος ὅτι χρῄζετε τούτων ἁπάντων. 6.33. ζητεῖτε δὲ πρῶτον τὴν βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην αὐτοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα προστεθήσεται ὑμῖν. 6.34. μὴ οὖν μεριμνήσητε εἰς τὴν αὔριον, ἡ γὰρ αὔριον μεριμνήσει αὑτῆς· ἀρκετὸν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἡ κακία αὐτῆς. 13.32. ὃ μικρότερον μέν ἐστιν πάντων τῶν σπερμάτων, ὅταν δὲ αὐξηθῇ μεῖζον τῶν λαχάνων ἐστὶν καὶ γίνεται δένδρον, ὥστε ἐλθεῖν τὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ κατασκηνοῖν ἐν τοῖς κλάδοις αὐτοῦ. | 4.17. From that time, Jesus began to preach, and to say, "Repent! For the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand." 5.3. "Blessed are the poor in spirit, For theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven. 5.4. Blessed are those who mourn, For they shall be comforted. 5.5. Blessed are the gentle, For they shall inherit the earth. 5.6. Blessed are those who hunger and thirst after righteousness, For they shall be filled. 5.7. Blessed are the merciful, For they shall obtain mercy. 5.8. Blessed are the pure in heart, For they shall see God. 5.9. Blessed are the peacemakers, For they shall be called sons of God. 5.10. Blessed are those who have been persecuted for righteousness' sake, For theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven. 5.11. "Blessed are you when people reproach you, persecute you, and say all kinds of evil against you falsely, for my sake. 5.12. Rejoice, and be exceedingly glad, for great is your reward in heaven. For that is how they persecuted the prophets who were before you. 6.1. "Be careful that you don't do your charitable giving before men, to be seen by them, or else you have no reward from your Father who is in heaven. 6.2. Therefore when you do merciful deeds, don't sound a trumpet before yourself, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they may get glory from men. Most assuredly I tell you, they have received their reward. 6.3. But when you do merciful deeds, don't let your left hand know what your right hand does, 6.4. so that your merciful deeds may be in secret, then your Father who sees in secret will reward you openly. 6.5. "When you pray, you shall not be as the hypocrites, for they love to stand and pray in the synagogues and in the corners of the streets, that they may be seen by men. Most assuredly, I tell you, they have received their reward. 6.6. But you, when you pray, enter into your inner chamber, and having shut your door, pray to your Father who is in secret, and your Father who sees in secret will reward you openly. 6.7. In praying, don't use vain repetitions, as the Gentiles do; for they think that they will be heard for their much speaking. 6.8. Therefore don't be like them, for your Father knows what things you need, before you ask him. 6.9. Pray like this: 'Our Father in heaven, may your name be kept holy. 6.10. Let your kingdom come. Let your will be done, as in heaven, so on earth. 6.11. Give us today our daily bread. 6.12. Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors. 6.13. Bring us not into temptation, but deliver us from the evil one. For yours is the kingdom, the power, and the glory forever. Amen.' 6.14. "For if you forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you. 6.15. But if you don't forgive men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses. 6.16. "Moreover when you fast, don't be like the hypocrites, with sad faces. For they disfigure their faces, that they may be seen by men to be fasting. Most assuredly I tell you, they have received their reward. 6.17. But you, when you fast, anoint your head, and wash your face; 6.18. so that you are not seen by men to be fasting, but by your Father who is in secret, and your Father, who sees in secret, will reward you. 6.19. "Don't lay up treasures for yourselves on the earth, where moth and rust consume, and where thieves break through and steal; 6.20. but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust consume, and where thieves don't break through and steal; 6.21. for where your treasure is, there your heart will be also. 6.22. "The lamp of the body is the eye. If therefore your eye is sound, your whole body will be full of light. 6.23. But if your eye is evil, your whole body will be full of darkness. If therefore the light that is in you is darkness, how great is the darkness! 6.24. "No one can serve two masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other; or else he will be devoted to one and despise the other. You can't serve both God and Mammon. 6.25. Therefore, I tell you, don't be anxious for your life: what you will eat, or what you will drink; nor yet for your body, what you will wear. Isn't life more than food, and the body more than clothing? 6.26. See the birds of the sky, that they don't sow, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns. Your heavenly Father feeds them. Aren't you of much more value than they? 6.27. "Which of you, by being anxious, can add one cubit to the measure of his life? 6.28. Why are you anxious about clothing? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow. They don't toil, neither do they spin, 6.29. yet I tell you that even Solomon in all his glory was not dressed like one of these. 6.30. But if God so clothes the grass of the field, which today exists, and tomorrow is thrown into the oven, won't he much more clothe you, you of little faith? 6.31. "Therefore don't be anxious, saying, 'What will we eat?', 'What will we drink?' or, 'With what will we be clothed?' 6.32. For the Gentiles seek after all these things, for your heavenly Father knows that you need all these things. 6.33. But seek first God's Kingdom, and his righteousness; and all these things will be given to you as well. 6.34. Therefore don't be anxious for tomorrow, for tomorrow will be anxious for itself. Each day's own evil is sufficient. 13.32. which indeed is smaller than all seeds. But when it is grown, it is greater than the herbs, and becomes a tree, so that the birds of the air come and lodge in its branches." |
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58. Plutarch, To An Uneducated Ruler, 780e-781a (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 447 |
59. Plutarch, Agesilaus, 36.2-36.3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 67 36.3. οὐ μὴν ἐφρόντιζε τούτων ὁ Ἀγησίλαος, οὐδὲ ᾤετο παρʼ ἀξίαν εἶναι λειτούργημα δημόσιον οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀνάξιον ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ζῆν ἄπρακτον ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ καθῆσθαι περιμένοντα τὸν θάνατον, ὅθεν ἀθροίσας ἀθροισας with Coraës and S: ἤθροισε . μισθοφόρους ἀφʼ ὧν ὁ Τάχως αὐτῷ χρημάτων ἔπεμψε, καὶ πλοῖα πληρώσας, ἀνήχθη, τριάκοντα συμβούλους ἔχων μεθʼ ἑαυτοῦ Σπαρτιάτας, ὡς πρότερον. | 36.3. Agesilaüs, however, paid no heed to these considerations, nor did he think any public service beneath his dignity; it was more unworthy of him, in his opinion, to live an idle life in the city, and to sit down and wait for death. Therefore he collected mercenaries with the money which Tachos sent him, embarked them on transports, and put to sea, accompanied by thirty Spartan counsellors, as formerly. |
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60. Plutarch, Letter of Condolence To Apollonius, 102c, 102d, 118D-E, 112D (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 |
61. Plutarch, On The Control of Anger, 463D (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 |
62. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, 1069E (SVF 3.491), 1070F-1071E (SVF 3.195), 1071C, 1071B, 1071A (SVF 3.195), 1072E-F (SVF 3Antipater 59) (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 171 |
63. Plutarch, On Being A Busybody, 515d (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 204 |
64. Plutarch, On Talkativeness, 515a (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 81 |
65. Plutarch, On Hearing, 37d (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 104 |
66. Plutarch, On The Delays of Divine Vengeance, 550e, 550d (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44, 139, 148, 447 |
67. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, 1034c, 1034d, 1034e, 1042c, 1042d, 1046e-, 1040d (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 121 |
68. Plutarch, On Tranquility of Mind, 474D (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 |
69. New Testament, Luke, 1.80, 2.40, 12.27, 13.19 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 81 1.80. Τὸ δὲ παιδίον ηὔξανε καὶ ἐκραταιοῦτο πνεύματι, καὶ ἦν ἐν ταῖς ἐρήμοις ἕως ὴμέρας ἀναδείξεως αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸν Ἰσραήλ. 2.40. Τὸ δὲ παιδίον ηὔξανεν καὶ ἐκραταιοῦτο πληρούμενον σοφίᾳ, καὶ χάρις θεοῦ ἦν ἐπʼ αὐτό. 12.27. οὐ κοπιᾷ οὐδὲ νήθει. λέγω δὲ ὑμῖν, οὐδὲ Σολομὼν ἐν πάσῃ τῇ δόξῃ αὐτοῦ περιεβάλετο ὡς ἓν τούτων. 13.19. ὁμοία ἐστὶν κόκκῳ σινάπεως, ὃν λαβὼν ἄνθρωπος ἔβαλεν εἰς κῆπον ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ ηὔξησεν καὶ ἐγένετο εἰς δένδρον, καὶ τὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κατεσκήνωσεν ἐν τοῖς κλάδοις αὐτοῦ. | 1.80. The child was growing, and becoming strong in spirit, and was in the desert until the day of his public appearance to Israel. 2.40. The child was growing, and was becoming strong in spirit, being filled with wisdom, and the grace of God was upon him. 12.27. Consider the lilies, how they grow. They don't toil, neither do they spin; yet I tell you, even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these. 13.19. It is like a grain of mustard seed, which a man took, and put in his own garden. It grew, and became a large tree, and the birds of the sky lodged in its branches." |
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70. Musonius Rufus, Fragments, 19, 2, 38, 5, 17 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 360, 502 |
71. Plutarch, Table Talk, 718d (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 204 |
72. Plutarch, Marius, 440e-441c, 441b, 441c, 442b, 444b, 445-446c, 446-447a, 446a, 448d, 451d, 452b, 442a (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32 |
73. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 6.1-6.2, 6.5, 9.2, 11.9-11.10, 12.8-12.9, 16.5-16.6, 18.5-18.13, 23.5, 61.1-61.2, 70.22-70.23, 78.16, 85.10-85.14, 93.6, 96.2, 101.10, 107.11-107.12 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 207, 360, 361, 368, 428, 432, 442; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 171, 235 | 6.1. I feel, my dear Lucilius, that I am being not only reformed, but transformed. I do not yet, however, assure myself, or indulge the hope, that there are no elements left in me which need to be changed. of course there are many that should be made more compact, or made thinner, or be brought into greater prominence. And indeed this very fact is proof that my spirit is altered into something better, – that it can see its own faults, of which it was previously ignorant. In certain cases sick men are congratulated because they themselves have perceived that they are sick. 6.2. I therefore wish to impart to you this sudden change in myself; I should then begin to place a surer trust in our friendship, – the true friendship which hope and fear and self-interest cannot sever, the friendship in which and for the sake of which men meet death. 6.5. I shall therefore send to you the actual books; and in order that you may not waste time in searching here and there for profitable topics, I shall mark certain passages, so that you can turn at once to those which I approve and admire. of course, however, the living voice and the intimacy of a common life will help you more than the written word. You must go to the scene of action, first, because men put more faith in their eyes than in their ears,[1] and second, because the way is long if one follows precepts, but short and helpful, if one follows patterns. 11.9. Such, my dear Lucilius, is the counsel of Epicurus;[2] he has quite properly given us a guardian and an attendant. We can get rid of most sins, if we have a witness who stands near us when we are likely to go wrong. The soul should have someone whom it can respect, – one by whose authority it may make even its inner shrine more hallowed.[3] Happy is the man who can make others better, not merely when he is in their company, but even when he is in their thoughts! And happy also is he who can so revere a man as to calm and regulate himself by calling him to mind! One who can so revere another, will soon be himself worthy of reverence. 11.10. Choose therefore a Cato; or, if Cato seems too severe a model, choose some Laelius, a gentler spirit. Choose a master whose life, conversation, and soul-expressing face have satisfied you; picture him always to yourself as your protector or your pattern. For we must indeed have someone according to whom we may regulate our characters; you can never straighten that which is crooked unless you use a ruler. Farewell. 12.8. Hence, every day ought to be regulated as if it closed the series, as if it rounded out and completed our existence. Pacuvius, who by long occupancy made Syria his own,[8] used to hold a regular burial sacrifice in his own honour, with wine and the usual funeral feasting, and then would have himself carried from the dining-room to his chamber, while eunuchs applauded and sang in Greek to a musical accompaniment: "He has lived his life, he has lived his life!" 12.9. Thus Pacuvius had himself carried out to burial every day. Let us, however, do from a good motive what he used to do from a debased motive; let us go to our sleep with joy and gladness; let us say: I have lived; the course which Fortune set for me Is finished.[9] And if God is pleased to add another day, we should welcome it with glad hearts. That man is happiest, and is secure in his own possession of himself, who can await the morrow without apprehension. When a man has said: "I have lived!", every morning he arises he receives a bonus. 16.5. Whether the truth, Lucilius, lies in one or in all of these views, we must be philosophers; whether Fate binds us down by an inexorable law, or whether God as arbiter of the universe has arranged everything, or whether Chance drives and tosses human affairs without method, philosophy ought to be our defence. She will encourage us to obey God cheerfully, but Fortune defiantly; she will teach us to follow God and endure Chance. 18.5. I am so firmly determined, however, to test the constancy of your mind that, drawing from the teachings of great men, I shall give you also a lesson: Set aside a certain number of days, during which you shall be content with the scantiest and cheapest fare, with coarse and rough dress, saying to yourself the while: "Is this the condition that I feared?" 18.6. It is precisely in times of immunity from care that the soul should toughen itself beforehand for occasions of greater stress, and it is while Fortune is kind that it should fortify itself against her violence. In days of peace the soldier performs manœuvres, throws up earthworks with no enemy in sight, and wearies himself by gratuitous toil, in order that he may be equal to unavoidable toil. If you would not have a man flinch when the crisis comes, train him before it comes. Such is the course which those men[4] have followed who, in their imitation of poverty, have every month come almost to want, that they might never recoil from what they had so often rehearsed. 18.7. You need not suppose that I mean meals like Timon's, or "paupers' huts,"[5] or any other device which luxurious millionaires use to beguile the tedium of their lives. Let the pallet be a real one, and the coarse cloak; let the bread be hard and grimy. Endure all this for three or four days at a time, sometimes for more, so that it may be a test of yourself instead of a mere hobby. Then, I assure you, my dear Lucilius, you will leap for joy when filled with a pennyworth of food, and you will understand that a man's peace of mind does not depend upon Fortune; for, even when angry she grants enough for our needs. 18.8. There is no reason, however, why you should think that you are doing anything great; for you will merely be doing what many thousands of slaves and many thousands of poor men are doing every day. But you may credit yourself with this item, – that you will not be doing it under compulsion, and that it will be as easy for you to endure it permanently as to make the experiment from time to time. Let us practise our strokes on the "dummy";[6] let us become intimate with poverty, so that Fortune may not catch us off our guard. We shall be rich with all the more comfort, if we once learn how far poverty is from being a burden. 18.9. Even Epicurus, the teacher of pleasure, used to observe stated intervals, during which he satisfied his hunger in niggardly fashion; he wished to see whether he thereby fell short of full and complete happiness, and, if so, by what amount he fell short, and whether this amount was worth purchasing at the price of great effort. At any rate, he makes such a statement in the well known letter written to Polyaenus in the archonship of Charinus.[7] Indeed, he boasts that he himself lived on less than a penny, but that Metrodorus, whose progress was not yet so great, needed a whole penny. 18.10. Do you think that there can be fulness on such fare? Yes, and there is pleasure also, – not that shifty and fleeting pleasure which needs a fillip now and then, but a pleasure that is steadfast and sure. For though water, barley-meal, and crusts of barley-bread, are not a cheerful diet, yet it is the highest kind of pleasure to be able to derive pleasure from this sort of food, and to have reduced one's needs to that modicum which no unfairness of Fortune can snatch away. 18.11. Even prison fare is more generous; and those who have been set apart for capital punishment are not so meanly fed by the man who is to execute them. Therefore, what a noble soul must one have, to descend of one's own free will to a diet which even those who have been sentenced to death have not to fear! This is indeed forestalling the spear-thrusts of Fortune. 18.12. So begin, my dear Lucilius, to follow the custom of these men, and set apart certain days on which you shall withdraw from your business and make yourself at home with the scantiest fare. Establish business relations with poverty. Dare, O my friend, to scorn the sight of wealth, And mould thyself to kinship with thy God.[8] 18.13. For he alone is in kinship with God who has scorned wealth. of course I do not forbid you to possess it, but I would have you reach the point at which you possess it dauntlessly; this can be accomplished only by persuading yourself that you can live happily without it as well as with it, and by regarding riches always as likely to elude you. 23.5. The yield of poor mines is on the surface; those are really rich whose veins lurk deep, and they will make more bountiful returns to him who delves unceasingly. So too those baubles which delight the common crowd afford but a thin pleasure, laid on as a coating, and every joy that is only plated lacks a real basis. But the joy of which I speak, that to which I am endeavouring to lead you, is something solid, disclosing itself the more fully as you penetrate into it. 70.22. Inasmuch as I began with an illustration taken from humble life I shall keep on with that sort. For men will make greater demands upon themselves, if they see that death can be despised even by the most despised class of men. The Catos, the Scipios, and the others whose names we are wont to hear with admiration, we regard as beyond the sphere of imitation; but I shall now prove to you that the virtue of which I speak is found as frequently in the gladiators' training-school as among the leaders in a civil war. 70.22. Inasmuch as I began with an illustration taken from humble life, I shall keep on with that sort. For men will make greater demands upon themselves, if they see that death can be despised even by the most despised class of men. The Catos, the Scipios, and the others whose names we are wont to hear with admiration, we regard as beyond the sphere of imitation; but I shall now prove to you that the virtue of which I speak is found as frequently in the gladiators' training-school as among the leaders in a civil war. 70.23. Lately a gladiator, who had been sent forth to the morning exhibition, was being conveyed in a cart along with the other prisoners; nodding as if he were heavy with sleep, he let his head fall over so far that it was caught in the spokes; then he kept his body in position long enough to break his neck by the revolution of the wheel. So he made his escape by means of the very wagon which was carrying him to his punishment. 70.23. Lately a gladiator, who had been sent forth to the morning exhibition, was being conveyed in a cart along with the other prisoners;[11] nodding as if he were heavy with sleep, he let his head fall over so far that it was caught in the spokes; then he kept his body in position long enough to break his neck by the revolution of the wheel. So he made his escape by means of the very wagon which was carrying him to his punishment. 78.16. What blows do athletes receive on their faces and all over their bodies! Nevertheless, through their desire for fame they endure every torture, and they undergo these things not only because they are fighting but in order to be able to fight. Their very training means torture. So let us also win the way to victory in all our struggles, – for the reward is not a garland or a palm or a trumpeter who calls for silence at the proclamation of our names, but rather virtue, steadfastness of soul, and a peace that is won for all time, if fortune has once been utterly vanquished in any combat. You say, "I feel severe pain." 85.10. Virtue alone possesses moderation; the evils that afflict the mind do not admit of moderation. You can more easily remove than control them. Can one doubt that the vices of the human mind, when they have become chronic and callous ("diseases" we call them), are beyond control, as, for example, greed, cruelty, and wantonness? Therefore the passions also are beyond control; for it is from the passions that we pass over to the vices. 85.11. Again, if you grant any privileges to sadness, fear, desire, and all the other wrong impulses, they will cease to lie within our jurisdiction. And why? Simply because the means of arousing them lie outside our own power. They will accordingly increase in proportion as the causes by which they are stirred up are greater or less. Fear will grow to greater proportions, if that which causes the terror is seen to be of greater magnitude or in closer proximity; and desire will grow keener in proportion as the hope of a greater gain has summoned it to action. 85.12. If the existence of the passions is not in our own control, neither is the extent of their power; for if you once permit them to get a start, they will increase along with their causes, and they will be of whatever extent they shall grow to be. Moreover, no matter how small these vices are, they grow greater. That which is harmful never keeps within bounds. No matter how trifling diseases are at the beginning, they creep on apace; and sometimes the slightest augmentation of disease lays low the enfeebled body! 85.13. But what folly it is, when the beginnings of certain things are situated outside our control, to believe that their endings are within our control! How have I the power to bring something to a close, when I have not had the power to check it at the beginning? For it is easier to keep a thing out than to keep it under after you have let it in. 96.2. Such affairs come by order, and not by accident. If you will believe me, it is my inmost emotions that I am just now disclosing to you: when everything seems to go hard and uphill, I have trained myself not merely to obey God, but to agree with His decisions. I follow Him because my soul wills it, and not because I must. Nothing will ever happen to me that I shall receive with ill humour or with a wry face. I shall pay up all my taxes willingly. Now all the things which cause us to groan or recoil, are part of the tax of life – things, my dear Lucilius, which you should never hope and never seek to escape. 101.10. Therefore, my dear Lucilius, begin at once to live, and count each separate day as a separate life. He who has thus prepared himself, he whose daily life has been a rounded whole, is easy in his mind; but those who live for hope alone find that the immediate future always slips from their grasp and that greed steals along in its place, and the fear of death, a curse which lays a curse upon everything else. Thence came that most debased of prayers, in which Maecenas does not refuse to suffer weakness, deformity, and as a climax the pain of crucifixion provided only that he may prolong the breath of life amid these sufferings: 107.11. Lead me, O Master of the lofty heavens, My Father, whithersoever thou shalt wish. I shall not falter, but obey with speed. And though I would not, I shall go, and suffer, In sin and sorrow what I might have done In noble virtue. Aye, the willing soul Fate leads, but the unwilling drags along.[2] 107.12. Let us live thus, and speak thus; let Fate find us ready and alert. Here is your great soul – the man who has given himself over to Fate; on the other hand, that man is a weakling and a degenerate who struggles and maligns the order of the universe and would rather reform the gods than reform himself. Farewell. |
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74. Seneca The Younger, De Vita Beata (Dialogorum Liber Vii), 3.3-3.4, 5.5-5.6, 11.1-11.2, 16.3, 22.4, 23.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) •end or goal of life (telos), antipater, end of aiming well distinguished from target •end or goal of life (telos), diogenes of babylon Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 360, 442; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 170, 171 |
75. Epictetus, Discourses, 3.3, 2.6.9(SVF 3.191), 3.26, 4.4.6, 4.4.7, 3.24.86, 3.24.87, 3.24.88, 4.5.27, 2.23.40, 3.7.7, 3.7.6, 3.7.5, 3.5.3, 3.5.2, 3.5.1, 3.3.19, 3.3.18, 3.3.17, 3.3.16, 3.3.15, 3.3.14, 2.23.43, 2.23.42, 2.23.41, 4.1.80, 4.1.100, 4.1.101, 4.1.102, 4.1.111, 4.1.112, 4.1.129, 4.1.159, 4.1.160, 4.1.161, 4.1.162, 4.1.163, 4.1.164, 4.1.165, 4.1.166, 4.1.167, 4.1.168, 4.1.169, 4.1.79, 4.1.78, 4.1.76, 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3, 1.1.4, 1.1.5, 1.1.6, 1.1.7, 1.1.8, 1.1.9, 1.1.10, 1.1.11, 1.1.12, 1.1.13, 3.22.105, 3.22.106, 4.1.72, 4.1.73, 4.1.74, 4.1.75, 4.1.77, 3.7.8, 3.7.9, 3.7.11, 1.6.20, 4.10.30, 4.7.40, 4.4.34, 4.1.132, 4.1.131, 3.22.96, 3.22.95, 3.7.12, 3.7.10, 1.28.7, 4.12.15, 4.12.16, 4.12.17, 4.12.18, 4.12.19, 4.12.20, 4.12.21, 2.14.11, 2.14.12, 2.14.13, 1.16.17, 1.16.18, 1.16.19, 1.16.20, 1.16.21, 1.20.14, 1.20.15, 1.20.16, 3.26.28, 3.26.29, 3.26.30, 3.26.31, 4.10.14, 4.10.15, 2.16.47, 4.12.8, 4.12.1, 4.12.2, 4.12.3, 4.12.7, 4.12.6, 4.12.5, 4.12.4, 3.13.11, 2.18.32, 2.18.31, 2.18.30, 2.18.29, 2.18.28, 2.18.27, 1.18.19, 2.19.20, 2.19.21, 2.19.22, 2.19.23, 1.17.26, 1.17.25, 1.17.24, 1.17.23, 1.17.22, 1.17.21, 3.2.4, 2.17.31, 1.17.27, 1.17.28, 1.17.29, 2.8.23, 3.15.12, 3.21.9, 1.4.29, 1.4.3, 4.1.21, 2.19.28, 2.19.27, 2.19.26, 2.19.25, 2.19.24, 1.4.2, 1.4.1, 1.4.28, 4.1.23, 4.1.22, 3.24.24, 4.3.7, 4.10.13, 4.10.22, 4.10.26, 4.8.27, 3.26.13, 4.6.34, 4.4.36, 4.4.9 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 170 |
76. Diogenes of Oenoanda, Fragments, 54.3.10-54.3.15 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 423 |
77. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 1.1-1.5, 12.2, 29.7, 48.2-48.3, 53.1 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 207, 360, 361, 362, 428, 432 |
78. Seneca The Younger, On Leisure, 9.1-9.6, 11.6, 11.10 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 360 |
79. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 1.8.1, 1.17.1-1.17.2, 2.2.6, 2.4.1, 3.36.1-3.36.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32, 212, 362, 437 |
80. Seneca The Younger, De Constantia Sapientis, 15.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 |
81. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Marciam, 1.7, 9.2, 9.5, 10.3, 21.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 360 |
82. Valerius Maximus, Memorable Deeds And Sayings, 5.10, ext.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 |
83. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Supplement To On The Soul (Mantissa), 163.4(SVF 3.192), 163.32, 163-4(SVF 3.192), 164.7(SVF 3.193), 164.32(SVF 3.194) (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 170 |
84. Alcinous, Handbook of Platonism, 2.1-2.3, 3.1, 9.1-9.2, 10.5, 27.2-27.5, 28.1-28.4, 30.4-30.5 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44, 67, 104, 125, 127, 138, 210, 447, 448 |
85. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 1.9.9, 2.1-2.2, 2.5, 2.5.2, 3.13, 4.3, 4.24, 5.1, 5.11, 5.16, 5.26, 6.15, 6.32, 6.41, 7.27, 7.31, 7.55, 7.64, 7.69, 8.2, 8.7, 8.36, 9.40, 10.13, 10.34, 11.2, 11.18.10, 11.34, 11.37, 12.31 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 207, 360, 361, 362, 363, 442; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 |
86. Aelian, Varia Historia, 3.2 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 |
87. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 2.7.17, 2.8.40-2.8.51, 3.1.25, 3.3.13-3.3.22, 4.2.10-4.2.18, 4.3.1-4.3.5, 4.3.8, 4.5.26-4.5.44, 4.6.2-4.6.5, 4.7.6-4.7.11, 4.7.19, 4.7.24-4.7.41, 5.1.292, 5.2.3-5.2.7, 5.5.3-5.5.26, 5.5.36-5.5.38, 5.6.1, 5.6.9-5.6.12, 5.6.14, 5.6.17-5.6.18, 5.6.20-5.6.32, 5.6.34-5.6.37, 5.6.39-5.6.46, 5.7.1-5.7.88, 8.4.26, 8.9.15-8.9.17 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) •end or goal of life (telos), posidonius •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32, 67, 183, 186, 212, 220, 276, 508; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 97, 98, 235 |
88. Achilles Tatius, The Adventures of Leucippe And Cleitophon, 5.13 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 326 |
89. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 2.21 (129) (SVF 3 Diogenes 46; Antipater 58; Posidonius F 186 Edelstein and Kidd) (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), antipater, end of aiming well distinguished from target •end or goal of life (telos), diogenes of babylon •end or goal of life (telos), posidonius Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 98, 171 |
90. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.17, 1.22-1.28, 1.231, 1.235, 3.173-3.177, 3.235-3.236 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32, 502 |
91. Apuleius, The Golden Ass, 11.23 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 326 | 11.23. At once I set about acquiring those things myself or procuring them zealously through friends, while sparing no expense. Then the high-priest escorted by a band of devotees led me to the nearest baths, saying the occasion required it. When I had bathed according to the custom, he asked favour of the gods, and purified me by a ritual cleansing, sprinkling me with water. Then in the early afternoon he led me to the shrine again, and placed me at the Goddess' feet. He gave me certain orders too sacred for open utterance then, with all the company as witnesses, commanded me to curb my desire for food for the ten days following, to eat of no creature, and drink no wine. I duly observed all this with reverence and restraint, and now came the evening destined for my appearance before the Goddess. The sun was setting, bringing twilight on, when suddenly a crowd flowed towards me, to honour me with sundry gifts, in accord with the ancient and sacred rite. All the uninitiated were ordered to depart, I was dressed in a new-made robe of linen and the high-priest, taking me by the arm, led me into the sanctuary's innermost recess. And now, diligent reader, you are no doubt keen to know what was said next, and what was done. I'd tell you, if to tell you, were allowed; if you were allowed to hear then you might know, but ears and tongue would sin equally, the latter for its profane indiscretion, the former for their unbridled curiosity. Oh, I shall speak, since your desire to hear may be a matter of deep religious longing, and I would not torment you with further anguish, but I shall speak only of what can be revealed to the minds of the uninitiated without need for subsequent atonement, things which though you have heard them, you may well not understand. So listen, and believe in what is true. I reached the very gates of death and, treading Proserpine's threshold, yet passed through all the elements and returned. I have seen the sun at midnight shining brightly. I have entered the presence of the gods below and the presence of the gods above, and I have paid due reverence before them. 11.23. This done, I gave charge to certain of my companions to buy liberally whatever was necessary and appropriate. Then the priest brought me to the baths nearby, accompanied with all the religious sort. He, demanding pardon of the goddess, washed me and purified my body according to custom. After this, when no one approached, he brought me back again to the temple and presented me before the face of the goddess. He told me of certain secret things that it was unlawful to utter, and he commanded me, and generally all the rest, to fast for the space of ten continual days. I was not allowed to eat any beast or drink any wine. These strictures I observed with marvelous continence. Then behold, the day approached when the sacrifice was to be made. And when night came there arrived on every coast a great multitude of priests who, according to their order, offered me many presents and gifts. Then all the laity and profane people were commanded to depart. When they had put on my back a linen robe, they brought me to the most secret and sacred place of all the temple. You will perhaps ask (o studious reader) what was said and done there. Verily I would tell you if it were lawful for me to tell. You would know if it were appropriate for you to hear. But both your ears and my tongue shall incur similar punishment for rash curiosity. However, I will content your mind for this present time, since it is perhaps somewhat religious and given to devotion. Listen therefore and believe it to be true. You shall understand that I approached near to Hell, and even to the gates of Proserpina. After I was brought through all the elements, I returned to my proper place. About midnight I saw the sun shine, and I saw likewise the celestial and infernal gods. Before them I presented myself and worshipped them. Behold, now have I told you something which, although you have heard it, it is necessary for you to conceal. This much have I declared without offence for the understanding of the profane. |
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92. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 11.64-7(SVF 1.361), 11.62(SVF 3.122), 11.63, 11.62, 11.61, 11.22(SVF 3.75), 7.206, 7.207, 7.208, 7.209, 7.210, 11.118, 11.141, 11.158, 11.159 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 170 |
93. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 6.8.25-6.8.38 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428 |
94. Plotinus, Enneads, 1.2.2.18-3.10 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 121 |
95. Lactantius, Divine Institutes, 3.7-3.8, 6.15.2 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), posidonius •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 210; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 97 |
96. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.105, 7.104, 7.160(SVF 1.351), 7.101-3(SVF 3.195), 7.101, 7.102, 7.103, 10.120, 10.119, 10.118, 10.136, 10.117, 7.87, 7.88(SVF 3 Diogenes 45), 10.144 (Epicurus, 10.139 (Epicurus, Kyriai Doxai), 10.127 (Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus), 10.131-2 (Epicurus, 10.2, 7.179, 7.125, 7.88, 7.89, 7.116, 7.126, 10.128, 10.127, 7.106, 7.107, 7.108, 7.109, 7.110, 7.111, 7.112, 7.113, 7.114, 7.115, 7.117, 7.118, 7.95, 7.96, 7.97, 7.98, 7.99, 7.100, 7.131, 7.130, 7.129, 7.128, 7.127, 7.119, 7.120, 7.121, 7.122, 7.123, 7.124, 7.84, 7.85, 7.86, 7.90, 7.91, 7.92, 7.93, 7.94, 7.135 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 432, 552; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 170 | 7.105. they being quite capable of exciting inclination or aversion. Hence of these latter some are taken by preference, others are rejected, whereas indifference in the other sense affords no ground for either choosing or avoiding.of things indifferent, as they express it, some are preferred, others rejected. Such as have value, they say, are preferred, while such as have negative, instead of positive, value are rejected. Value they define as, first, any contribution to harmonious living, such as attaches to every good; secondly, some faculty or use which indirectly contributes to the life according to nature: which is as much as to say any assistance brought by wealth or health towards living a natural life; thirdly, value is the full equivalent of an appraiser, as fixed by an expert acquainted with the facts – as when it is said that wheat exchanges for so much barley with a mule thrown in. |
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97. Lactantius, Epitome Divinarum Institutionum, 6.15.2 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 210 |
98. Origen, Against Celsus, 2.20 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428 | 2.20. Let us see how he continues after this: These events, he says, he predicted as being a God, and the prediction must by all means come to pass. God, therefore, who above all others ought to do good to men, and especially to those of his own household, led on his own disciples and prophets, with whom he was in the habit of eating and drinking, to such a degree of wickedness, that they became impious and unholy men. Now, of a truth, he who shared a man's table would not be guilty of conspiring against him; but after banqueting with God, he became a conspirator. And, what is still more absurd, God himself plotted against the members of his own table, by converting them into traitors and villains! Now, since you wish me to answer even those charges of Celsus which seem to me frivolous, the following is our reply to such statements. Celsus imagines that an event, predicted through foreknowledge, comes to pass because it was predicted; but we do not grant this, maintaining that he who foretold it was not the cause of its happening, because he foretold it would happen; but the future event itself, which would have taken place though not predicted, afforded the occasion to him, who was endowed with foreknowledge, of foretelling its occurrence. Now, certainly this result is present to the foreknowledge of him who predicts an event, when it is possible that it may or may not happen, viz., that one or other of these things will take place. For we do not assert that he who foreknows an event, by secretly taking away the possibility of its happening or not, makes any such declaration as this: This shall infallibly happen, and it is impossible that it can be otherwise. And this remark applies to all the foreknowledge of events dependent upon ourselves, whether contained in the sacred Scriptures or in the histories of the Greeks. Now, what is called by logicians an idle argument, which is a sophism, will be no sophism as far as Celsus can help, but according to sound reasoning it is a sophism. And that this may be seen, I shall take from the Scriptures the predictions regarding Judas, or the foreknowledge of our Saviour regarding him as the traitor; and from the Greek histories the oracle that was given to Laius, conceding for the present its truth, since it does not affect the argument. Now, in Ps. cviii., Judas is spoken of by the mouth of the Saviour, in words beginning thus: Hold not Your peace, O God of my praise; for the mouth of the wicked and the mouth of the deceitful are opened against me. Now, if you carefully observe the contents of the psalm, you will find that, as it was foreknown that he would betray the Saviour, so also was he considered to be himself the cause of the betrayal, and deserving, on account of his wickedness, of the imprecations contained in the prophecy. For let him suffer these things, because, says the psalmist, he remembered not to show mercy, but persecuted the poor and needy man. Wherefore it was possible for him to show mercy, and not to persecute him whom he did persecute. But although he might have done these things, he did not do them, but carried out the act of treason, so as to merit the curses pronounced against him in the prophecy. And in answer to the Greeks we shall quote the following oracular response to Laius, as recorded by the tragic poet, either in the exact words of the oracle or in equivalent terms. Future events are thus made known to him by the oracle: Do not try to beget children against the will of the gods. For if you beget a son, your son shall murder you; and all your household shall wade in blood. Now from this it is clear that it was within the power of Laius not to try to beget children, for the oracle would not have commanded an impossibility; and it was also in his power to do the opposite, so that neither of these courses was compulsory. And the consequence of his not guarding against the begetting of children was, that he suffered from so doing the calamities described in the tragedies relating to Œdipus and Jocasta and their sons. Now that which is called the idle argument, being a quibble, is such as might be applied, say in the case of a sick man, with the view of sophistically preventing him from employing a physician to promote his recovery; and it is something like this: If it is decreed that you should recover from your disease, you will recover whether you call in a physician or not; but if it is decreed that you should not recover, you will not recover whether you call in a physician or no. But it is certainly decreed either that you should recover, or that you should not recover; and therefore it is in vain that you call in a physician. Now with this argument the following may be wittily compared: If it is decreed that you should beget children, you will beget them, whether you have intercourse with a woman or not. But if it is decreed that you should not beget children, you will not do so, whether you have intercourse with a woman or no. Now, certainly, it is decreed either that you should beget children or not; therefore it is in vain that you have intercourse with a woman. For, as in the latter instance, intercourse with a woman is not employed in vain, seeing it is an utter impossibility for him who does not use it to beget children; so, in the former, if recovery from disease is to be accomplished by means of the healing art, of necessity the physician is summoned, and it is therefore false to say that in vain do you call in a physician. We have brought forward all these illustrations on account of the assertion of this learned Celsus, that being a God He predicted these things, and the predictions must by all means come to pass. Now, if by by all means he means necessarily, we cannot admit this. For it was quite possible, also, that they might not come to pass. But if he uses by all means in the sense of simple futurity, which nothing hinders from being true (although it was possible that they might not happen), he does not at all touch my argument; nor did it follow, from Jesus having predicted the acts of the traitor or the perjurer, that it was the same thing with His being the cause of such impious and unholy proceedings. For He who was among us, and knew what was in man, seeing his evil disposition, and foreseeing what he would attempt from his spirit of covetousness, and from his want of stable ideas of duty towards his Master, along with many other declarations, gave utterance to this also: He that dips his hand with Me in the dish, the same shall betray Me. |
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99. Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras, 31.196 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 |
100. Augustine, Confessions, 4.6.12, 4.8.13 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 |
101. Augustine, De Sermone Domini In Monte Secundum Matthaeum, 1.3 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 284 |
102. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 6, 269 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 |
103. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 6, 269 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 |
104. Jerome, Letters, 60.5.1 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 |
105. Jerome, Letters, 60.5.1 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 |
106. Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.38-2.39, 2.57-2.85, 2.60.7-2.60.8, 2.63.6-2.63.25, 2.67.5-2.67.12, 2.79.12-2.79.17, 2.88.10, 2.89.3, 2.111.18-2.111.20 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 393 |
107. Jerome, Letters, 60.5.1 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE) Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 |
108. Arius Didymus, Fragments, 10, 11m, 5b1, 5b11, 5b4, 5b5, 6 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 432 |
109. Cleanthes, Hymn To Zeus, 15-19, 21, 20 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428, 432 |
110. Stobaeus, Eclogues, 2.79.16, 2.80(SVF 3.136), 2.80.22-81.1, 2.82, 2.83, 2.82.11(SVF 1.192; 3.128), 2.83-4(SVF 3.124), 2.83.2, 2.83.10-84.2(SVF 3.124), 2.85.1, 2.85.2, 2.85.3, 2.85.4, 2.79.15, 2.80, 2.79, 2.75, 2.76.6, 2.76.5, 2.76.4, 2.76.3, 2.76.2, 2.76.9-15(SVF 3 Diogenes 44; Antipater 57) Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 170 |
111. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 1, 18, 25, 3, 30, 29 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201 |
112. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.102, 1.205, 1.527, 1.563, 2.974, 3.39, 3.178, 3.278, 3.280, 3.299, 3.389, 3.459, 3.757, 3.760, 3.763 Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 183, 186, 220, 231, 268, 276, 393, 411, 423, 428, 432, 438 |
113. Epicurus, Letter To Herodotus, 82 Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 44 |
114. Epicurus, Vatican Sayings, 14 Tagged with subjects: •end or goal of life (telos), epicurus Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 |
115. Marican, Life of Aristotle, 4 Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 219 |
116. Protagoras, Phaedrus, 320d, 320c Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 299 |
117. Aristotle, Protrepticus, 22, 79, 3 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 275 |
118. Protagoras, Republic, 514a, 515c-516a, 515d, 516a, 516b, 516c, 518c, 518d, 519d, 525c, 532b Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 204 |
119. Philodemus, On Choices And Avoidances, 2 Tsouna‐McKirahan and Indelli, col.6 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201 |
121. Antiphon, On Emotions, fr.5 DK, fr.3 DK Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 235 |
122. Various, Long And Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 21e, 41g, 46b, 55s, 59j, 61, 61a, 61b, 61c, 61d, 62a-k, 62c, 63c, 65a, 65g, 65h-k, 62b Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 428, 432 |
123. Galen, Aff. Dig., 2.5.2-2.5.13, 3.8.6-3.8.17, 5.18.10-5.18.25, 5.19.10-5.19.20, 6.26.14-6.26.20, 7.27.22-7.27.25, 8.33.1, 10.41.5-10.41.11, 10.42.9, 10.43.9-10.43.10 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 160 |
124. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 122, 127-129, 131-132, 136 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 201 |
125. Plutarch, Virt. Prof., 84d, 84c Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 161 |
126. Plutarch, Fr.Erot., 134 Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32 |
127. Galen, Ind., 68, 71, 72, 74, 75, 79b, 81, 76 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 93 |
128. Plutarch, Adul. Amic., 49, 51a, 51c, 51d, 52a, 54, 54d, 54e, 55a, 55d, 55e-60b, 56a, 70e, 73c, 73d, 74d, 93, 93d, 95b, 96-97a, 51b Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 159 |
129. Diogenes of Sinope, Ep., 12, 21, 47, 11 Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 208 |
130. Epicurus, Vs, 59 Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32 |
131. Theophrastus, Usener, 247 Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32 |
132. Seneca The Younger, Otio, 1.4-3.1 Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 368 |
133. Seneca The Younger, Polyb., 17.1-17.2 Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 368 |
134. Plutarch, Inv. Od., 538e Tagged with subjects: •goal (telos) Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 159 |
135. Plutarch, An. Procr., 1025d, 1025c Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 32 |
136. Various, Corpus Hermeticum, 13.3.39-13.3.41 Tagged with subjects: •goal/telos of philosophical life Found in books: Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 326 |