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24 results for "freedom"
1. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •freedom, and swerve of atoms Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 333
2. Plato, Charmides, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •freedom, and swerve of atoms Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320
3. Aristotle, Soul, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320
4. Aristotle, Movement of Animals, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320
5. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320
6. Aristotle, Politics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320
7. Aristotle, Topics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320
8. Cicero, On Fate, 9.20 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •freedom, and swerve of atoms Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320, 333
9. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 2.251-2.293, 4.886-4.887 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •freedom, and swerve of atoms Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320, 333, 334
2.251. Denique si semper motu conectitur omnis 2.252. et vetere exoritur motus novus ordine certo 2.253. nec declido faciunt primordia motus 2.254. principium quoddam, quod fati foedera rumpat, 2.255. ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur, 2.256. libera per terras unde haec animantibus exstat, 2.257. unde est haec, inquam, fatis avolsa voluntas, 2.258. per quam progredimur quo ducit quemque voluptas, 2.259. declinamus item motus nec tempore certo 2.260. nec regione loci certa, sed ubi ipsa tulit mens? 2.261. nam dubio procul his rebus sua cuique voluntas 2.262. principium dat et hinc motus per membra rigantur. 2.263. nonne vides etiam patefactis tempore puncto 2.264. carceribus non posse tamen prorumpere equorum 2.265. vim cupidam tam de subito quam mens avet ipsa? 2.266. omnis enim totum per corpus materiai 2.267. copia conciri debet, concita per artus 2.268. omnis ut studium mentis conixa sequatur; 2.269. ut videas initum motus a corde creari 2.270. ex animique voluntate id procedere primum, 2.271. inde dari porro per totum corpus et artus. 2.272. nec similest ut cum inpulsi procedimus ictu 2.273. viribus alterius magnis magnoque coactu; 2.274. nam tum materiem totius corporis omnem 2.275. perspicuumst nobis invitis ire rapique, 2.276. donec eam refrenavit per membra voluntas. 2.277. iamne vides igitur, quamquam vis extera multos 2.278. pellat et invitos cogat procedere saepe 2.279. praecipitesque rapi, tamen esse in pectore nostro 2.280. quiddam quod contra pugnare obstareque possit? 2.281. cuius ad arbitrium quoque copia materiai 2.282. cogitur inter dum flecti per membra per artus 2.283. et proiecta refrenatur retroque residit. 2.284. quare in seminibus quoque idem fateare necessest, 2.285. esse aliam praeter plagas et pondera causam 2.286. motibus, unde haec est nobis innata potestas, 2.287. de nihilo quoniam fieri nihil posse videmus. 2.288. pondus enim prohibet ne plagis omnia fiant 2.289. externa quasi vi; sed ne res ipsa necessum 2.290. intestinum habeat cunctis in rebus agendis 2.291. et devicta quasi cogatur ferre patique, 2.292. id facit exiguum clinamen principiorum 2.293. nec regione loci certa nec tempore certo. 4.886. ergo animus cum sese ita commovet ut velit ire 4.887. inque gredi, ferit extemplo quae in corpore toto
10. New Testament, Mark, 14.36 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •freedom, and swerve of atoms Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320
14.36. καὶ ἔλεγεν Ἀββά ὁ πατήρ, πάντα δυνατά σοι· παρένεγκε τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο ἀπʼ ἐμοῦ· ἀλλʼ οὐ τί ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλὰ τί σύ. 14.36. He said, "Abba, Father, all things are possible to you. Please remove this cup from me. However, not what I desire, but what you desire."
11. New Testament, Matthew, 26.39 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •freedom, and swerve of atoms Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320
26.39. καὶ προελθὼν μικρὸν ἔπεσεν ἐπὶ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ προσευχόμενος καὶ λέγων Πάτερ μου, εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν, παρελθάτω ἀπʼ ἐμοῦ τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο· πλὴν οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλʼ ὡς σύ. 26.39. He went forward a little, fell on his face, and prayed, saying, "My Father, if it is possible, let this cup pass away from me; nevertheless, not what I desire, but what you desire."
12. New Testament, Luke, 22.42 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •freedom, and swerve of atoms Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320
22.42. εἰ βούλει παρένεγκε τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον ἀπʼ ἐμοῦ· πλὴν μὴ τὸ θέλημά μου ἀλλὰ τὸ σὸν γινέσθω. 22.42. saying, "Father, if you are willing, remove this cup from me. Nevertheless, not my will, but yours, be done."
13. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.12.34, 4.4.44 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •freedom, and swerve of atoms Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 333
14. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Fate, 13, 182.8-20 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 333
15. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.2.2, 1.29.4 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •freedom, and swerve of atoms Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 334
16. Plotinus, Enneads, 3.7.11(15-16), 3.8.8(32-6), 5.1.1(1-22), 5.1.1, 6.8 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 334
17. Origen, On First Principles, 3.1.8, 3.1.18, 3.1.20 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •freedom, and swerve of atoms Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320
3.1.8. Let us begin, then, with those words which were spoken to Pharaoh, who is said to have been hardened by God, in order that he might not let the people go; and, along with his case, the language of the apostle also will be considered, where he says, Therefore He has mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardens. For it is on these passages chiefly that the heretics rely, asserting that salvation is not in our own power, but that souls are of such a nature as must by all means be either lost or saved; and that in no way can a soul which is of an evil nature become good, or one which is of a virtuous nature be made bad. And hence they maintain that Pharaoh, too, being of a ruined nature, was on that account hardened by God, who hardens those that are of an earthly nature, but has compassion on those who are of a spiritual nature. Let us see, then, what is the meaning of their assertion; and let us, in the first place, request them to tell us whether they maintain that the soul of Pharaoh was of an earthly nature, such as they term lost. They will undoubtedly answer that it was of an earthly nature. If so, then to believe God, or to obey Him, when his nature opposed his so doing, was an impossibility. And if this were his condition by nature, what further need was there for his heart to be hardened, and this not once, but several times, unless indeed because it was possible for him to yield to persuasion? Nor could any one be said to be hardened by another, save him who of himself was not obdurate. And if he were not obdurate of himself, it follows that neither was he of an earthly nature, but such an one as might give way when overpowered by signs and wonders. But he was necessary for God's purpose, in order that, for the saving of the multitude, He might manifest in him His power by his offering resistance to numerous miracles, and struggling against the will of God, and his heart being by this means said to be hardened. Such are our answers, in the first place, to these persons; and by these their assertion may be overturned, according to which they think that Pharaoh was destroyed in consequence of his evil nature. And with regard to the language of the Apostle Paul, we must answer them in a similar way. For who are they whom God hardens, according to your view? Those, namely, whom you term of a ruined nature, and who, I am to suppose, would have done something else had they not been hardened. If, indeed, they come to destruction in consequence of being hardened, they no longer perish naturally, but in virtue of what befalls them. Then, in the next place, upon whom does God show mercy? On those, namely, who are to be saved. And in what respect do those persons stand in need of a second compassion, who are to be saved once by their nature, and so come naturally to blessedness, except that it is shown even from their case, that, because it was possible for them to perish, they therefore obtain mercy, that so they may not perish, but come to salvation, and possess the kingdom of the good. And let this be our answer to those who devise and invent the fable of good or bad natures, i.e., of earthly or spiritual souls, in consequence of which, as they say, each one is either saved or lost. 3.1.8. Let us begin, then, with what is said about Pharaoh— that he was hardened by God, that he might not send away the people; along with which will be examined also the statement of the apostle, Therefore has He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardens. And certain of those who hold different opinions misuse these passages, themselves also almost destroying free-will by introducing ruined natures incapable of salvation, and others saved which it is impossible can be lost; and Pharaoh, they say, as being of a ruined nature, is therefore hardened by God, who has mercy upon the spiritual, but hardens the earthly. Let us see now what they mean. For we shall ask them if Pharaoh was of an earthy nature; and when they answer, we shall say that he who is of an earthy nature is altogether disobedient to God: but if disobedient, what need is there of his heart being hardened, and that not once, but frequently? Unless perhaps, since it was possible for him to obey (in which case he would certainly have obeyed, as not being earthy, when hard pressed by the signs and wonders), God needs him to be disobedient to a greater degree, in order that He may manifest His mighty deeds for the salvation of the multitude, and therefore hardens his heart. This will be our answer to them in the first place, in order to overturn their supposition that Pharaoh was of a ruined nature. And the same reply must be given to them with respect to the statement of the apostle. For whom does God harden? Those who perish, as if they would obey unless they were hardened, or manifestly those who would be saved because they are not of a ruined nature. And on whom has He mercy? Is it on those who are to be saved? And how is there need of a second mercy for those who have been prepared once for salvation, and who will by all means become blessed on account of their nature? Unless perhaps, since they are capable of incurring destruction, if they did not receive mercy, they will obtain mercy, in order that they may not incur that destruction of which they are capable, but may be in the condition of those who are saved. And this is our answer to such persons. 3.1.18. Let us now look to the expression, It is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. For our opponents assert, that if it does not depend upon him that wills, nor on him that runs, but on God that shows mercy, that a man be saved, our salvation is not in our own power. For our nature is such as to admit of our either being saved or not, or else our salvation rests solely on the will of Him who, if He wills it, shows mercy, and confers salvation. Now let us inquire, in the first place, of such persons, whether to desire blessings be a good or evil act; and whether to hasten after good as a final aim be worthy of praise. If they were to answer that such a procedure was deserving of censure, they would evidently be mad; for all holy men both desire blessings and run after them, and certainly are not blameworthy. How, then, is it that he who is not saved, if he be of an evil nature, desires blessing, and runs after them, but does not find them? For they say that a bad tree does not bring forth good fruits, whereas it is a good fruit to desire blessings. And how is the fruit of a bad tree good? And if they assert that to desire blessings, and to run after them, is an act of indifference, i.e., neither good nor bad, we shall reply, that if it be an indifferent act to desire blessings, and to run after them, then the opposite of that will also be an indifferent act, viz., to desire evils, and to run after them; whereas it is certain that it is not an indifferent act to desire evils, and to run after them, but one that is manifestly wicked. It is established, then, that to desire and follow after blessings is not an indifferent, but a virtuous proceeding. 3.1.18. Let us look next at the passage: So, then, it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. For they who find fault say: If it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy, salvation does not depend upon ourselves, but upon the arrangement made by Him who has formed us such as we are, or on the purpose of Him who shows mercy when he pleases. Now we must ask these persons the following questions: Whether to desire what is good is virtuous or vicious; and whether the desire to run in order to reach the goal in the pursuit of what is good be worthy of praise or censure? And if they shall say that it is worthy of censure, they will return an absurd answer; since the saints desire and run, and manifestly in so acting do nothing that is blameworthy. But if they shall say that it is virtuous to desire what is good, and to run after what is good, we shall ask them how a perishing nature desires better things; for it is like an evil tree producing good fruit, since it is a virtuous act to desire better things. They will give (perhaps) a third answer, that to desire and run after what is good is one of those things that are indifferent, and neither beautiful nor wicked. Now to this we must say, that if to desire and to run after what is good be a thing of indifference, then the opposite also is a thing of indifference, viz., to desire what is evil, and to run after it. But it is not a thing of indifference to desire what is evil, and to run after it. And therefore also, to desire what is good, and to run after it, is not a thing of indifference. Such, then, is the defense which I think we can offer to the statement, that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. Solomon says in the book of Psalms (for the Song of Degrees is his, from which we shall quote the words): Unless the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it; except the Lord keep the city, the watchman wakes in vain: not dissuading us from building, nor teaching us not to keep watch in order to guard the city in our soul, but showing that what is built without God, and does not receive a guard from Him, is built in vain and watched to no purpose, because God might reasonably be entitled the Lord of the building; and the Governor of all things, the Ruler of the guard of the city. As, then, if we were to say that such a building is not the work of the builder, but of God, and that it was not owing to the successful effort of the watcher, but of the God who is over all, that such a city suffered no injury from its enemies, we should not be wrong, it being understood that something also had been done by human means, but the benefit being gratefully referred to God who brought it to pass; so, seeing that the (mere) human desire is not sufficient to attain the end, and that the running of those who are, as it were, athletes, does not enable them to gain the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus — for these things are accomplished with the assistance of God — it is well said that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. As if also it were said with regard to husbandry what also is actually recorded: I planted, Apollos watered; and God gave the increase. So then neither is he that plants anything, neither he that waters; but God that gives the increase. Now we could not piously assert that the production of full crops was the work of the husbandman, or of him that watered, but the work of God. So also our own perfection is brought about, not as if we ourselves did nothing; for it is not completed by us, but God produces the greater part of it. And that this assertion may be more clearly believed, we shall take an illustration from the art of navigation. For in comparison with the effect of the winds, and the mildness of the air, and the light of the stars, all co-operating in the preservation of the crew, what proportion could the art of navigation be said to bear in the bringing of the ship into harbour? — since even the sailors themselves, from piety, do not venture to assert often that they had saved the ship, but refer all to God; not as if they had done nothing, but because what had been done by Providence was infinitely greater than what had been effected by their art. And in the matter of our salvation, what is done by God is infinitely greater than what is done by ourselves; and therefore, I think, is it said that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy. For if in the manner which they imagine we must explain the statement, that it is not of him that wills, nor of him that runs, but of God that shows mercy, the commandments are superfluous; and it is in vain that Paul himself blames some for having fallen away, and approves of others as having remained upright, and enacts laws for the Churches: it is in vain also that we give ourselves up to desire better things, and in vain also (to attempt) to run. But it is not in vain that Paul gives such advice, censuring some and approving of others; nor in vain that we give ourselves up to the desire of better things, and to the chase after things that are pre-eminent. They have accordingly not well explained the meaning of the passage. 3.1.20. Still the declaration of the apostle will appear to drag us to the conclusion that we are not possessed of freedom of will, in which, objecting against himself, he says, Therefore has He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardens. You will say then unto me, Why does He yet find fault? For who has resisted His will? Nay but, O man, who are you that replies against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why have you made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? For it will be said: If the potter of the same lump make some vessels to honour and others to dishonour, and God thus form some men for salvation and others for ruin, then salvation or ruin does not depend upon ourselves, nor are we possessed of free-will. Now we must ask him who deals so with these passages, whether it is possible to conceive of the apostle as contradicting himself. I presume, however, that no one will venture to say so. If, then, the apostle does not utter contradictions, how can he, according to him who so understands him, reasonably find fault, censuring the individual at Corinth who had committed fornication, or those who had fallen away, and had not repented of the licentiousness and impurity of which they had been guilty? And how can he bless those whom he praises as having done well, as he does the house of Onesiphorus in these words: The Lord give mercy to the house of Onesiphorus; for he oft refreshed me, and was not ashamed of my chain: but, when he was in Rome, he sought me out very diligently, and found me. The Lord grant to him that he may find mercy of the Lord in that day. It is not consistent for the same apostle to blame the sinner as worthy of censure, and to praise him who had done well as deserving of approval; and again, on the other hand, to say, as if nothing depended on ourselves, that the cause was in the Creator why the one vessel was formed to honour, and the other to dishonour. And how is this statement correct: For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he has done, whether it be good or bad, since they who have done evil have advanced to this pitch of wickedness because they were created vessels unto dishonour, while they that have lived virtuously have done good because they were created from the beginning for this purpose, and became vessels unto honour? And again, how does not the statement made elsewhere conflict with the view which these persons draw from the words which we have quoted (that it is the fault of the Creator that one vessel is in honour and another in dishonour), viz., that in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some to honour, and some to dishonour. If a man therefore purge himself, he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified, and meet for the Master's use, and prepared unto every good work; for if he who purges himself becomes a vessel unto honour, and he who allows himself to remain unpurged becomes a vessel unto dishonour, then, so far as these words are concerned, the Creator is not at all to blame. For the Creator makes vessels of honour and vessels of dishonour, not from the beginning according to His foreknowledge, since He does not condemn or justify beforehand according to it; but (He makes) those into vessels of honour who purged themselves, and those into vessels of dishonour who allowed themselves to remain unpurged: so that it results from older causes (which operated) in the formation of the vessels unto honour and dishonour, that one was created for the former condition, and another for the latter. But if we once admit that there were certain older causes (at work) in the forming of a vessel unto honour, and of one unto dishonour, what absurdity is there in going back to the subject of the soul, and (in supposing) that a more ancient cause for Jacob being loved and for Esau being hated existed with respect to Jacob before his assumption of a body, and with regard to Esau before he was conceived in the womb of Rebecca?
18. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, None (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 333
19. Augustine, The City of God, 10.23 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •freedom, and swerve of atoms Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 334
10.23. Even Porphyry asserts that it was revealed by divine oracles that we are not purified by any sacrifices to sun or moon, meaning it to be inferred that we are not purified by sacrificing to any gods. For what mysteries can purify, if those of the sun and moon, which are esteemed the chief of the celestial gods, do not purify? He says, too, in the same place, that principles can purify, lest it should be supposed, from his saying that sacrificing to the sun and moon cannot purify, that sacrificing to some other of the host of gods might do so. And what he as a Platonist means by principles, we know. For he speaks of God the Father and God the Son, whom he calls (writing in Greek) the intellect or mind of the Father; but of the Holy Spirit he says either nothing, or nothing plainly, for I do not understand what other he speaks of as holding the middle place between these two. For if, like Plotinus in his discussion regarding the three principal substances, he wished us to understand by this third the soul of nature, he would certainly not have given it the middle place between these two, that is, between the Father and the Son. For Plotinus places the soul of nature after the intellect of the Father, while Porphyry, making it the mean, does not place it after, but between the others. No doubt he spoke according to his light, or as he thought expedient; but we assert that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit not of the Father only, nor of the Son only, but of both. For philosophers speak as they have a mind to, and in the most difficult matters do not scruple to offend religious ears; but we are bound to speak according to a certain rule, lest freedom of speech beget impiety of opinion about the matters themselves of which we speak.
20. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None  Tagged with subjects: •freedom, and swerve of atoms Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320
21. Pseudo‐Iamblichus (Nicomachus of Gerasa), Theologoumena Arithmeticae, Ed.De Falco, None  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 334
22. Porphyry, On What Is Up To Us, None  Tagged with subjects: •freedom, and swerve of atoms Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 320
23. Nemesius, On The Nature of Man, 35  Tagged with subjects: •freedom, and swerve of atoms Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 333
24. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 133  Tagged with subjects: •freedom, and swerve of atoms Found in books: Sorabji (2000) 333