Home About Network of subjects Linked subjects heatmap Book indices included Search by subject Search by reference Browse subjects Browse texts

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

validated results only / all results

and or

Filtering options: (leave empty for all results)
By author:     
By work:        
By subject:
By additional keyword:       

Results for
Please note: the results are produced through a computerized process which may frequently lead to errors, both in incorrect tagging and in other issues. Please use with caution.
Due to load times, full text fetching is currently attempted for validated results only.
Full texts for Hebrew Bible and rabbinic texts is kindly supplied by Sefaria; for Greek and Latin texts, by Perseus Scaife, for the Quran, by Tanzil.net

For a list of book indices included, see here.

4 results for "figures"
1. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 9.20 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •figures of speech, paradox Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013) 230
9.20. "And Noah, the man of the land, began and planted a vineyard.",
2. Hebrew Bible, Leviticus, 11.4, 11.7 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •figures of speech, paradox Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013) 230
11.4. "אַךְ אֶת־זֶה לֹא תֹאכְלוּ מִמַּעֲלֵי הַגֵּרָה וּמִמַּפְרִיסֵי הַפַּרְסָה אֶת־הַגָּמָל כִּי־מַעֲלֵה גֵרָה הוּא וּפַרְסָה אֵינֶנּוּ מַפְרִיס טָמֵא הוּא לָכֶם׃", 11.4. "וְהָאֹכֵל מִנִּבְלָתָהּ יְכַבֵּס בְּגָדָיו וְטָמֵא עַד־הָעָרֶב וְהַנֹּשֵׂא אֶת־נִבְלָתָהּ יְכַבֵּס בְּגָדָיו וְטָמֵא עַד־הָעָרֶב׃", 11.7. "וְאֶת־הַחֲזִיר כִּי־מַפְרִיס פַּרְסָה הוּא וְשֹׁסַע שֶׁסַע פַּרְסָה וְהוּא גֵּרָה לֹא־יִגָּר טָמֵא הוּא לָכֶם׃", 11.4. "Nevertheless these shall ye not eat of them that only chew the cud, or of them that only part the hoof: the camel, because he cheweth the cud but parteth not the hoof, he is unclean unto you.", 11.7. "And the swine, because he parteth the hoof, and is cloven-footed, but cheweth not the cud, he is unclean unto you.",
3. Aristotle, Topics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)  Tagged with subjects: •nan Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013) 230
4. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.63-7.64, 7.75, 7.82 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)  Tagged with subjects: •figures of speech, paradox Found in books: Geljon and Runia (2013) 230
7.63. To the department dealing with things as such and things signified is assigned the doctrine of expressions, including those which are complete in themselves, as well as judgements and syllogisms and that of defective expressions comprising predicates both direct and reversed.By verbal expression they mean that of which the content corresponds to some rational presentation. of such expressions the Stoics say that some are complete in themselves and others defective. Those are defective the enunciation of which is unfinished, as e.g. writes, for we inquire Who? Whereas in those that are complete in themselves the enunciation is finished, as Socrates writes. And so under the head of defective expressions are ranged all predicates, while under those complete in themselves fall judgements, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries. 7.64. A predicate is, according to the followers of Apollodorus, what is said of something; in other words, a thing associated with one or more subjects; or, again, it may be defined as a defective expression which has to be joined on to a nominative case in order to yield a judgement. of predicates some are adjectival, as e.g. to sail through rocks. Again, some predicates are direct, some reversed, some neither. Now direct predicates are those that are constructed with one of the oblique cases, as hears, sees, converses; while reversed are those constructed with the passive voice, as I am heard, I am seen. Neutral are such as correspond to neither of these, as thinks, walks. Reflexive predicates are those among the passive, which, although in form passive, are yet active operations, as he gets his hair cut: 7.75. A probable judgement is one which induces to assent, e.g. Whoever gave birth to anything, is that thing's mother. This, however, is not necessarily true; for the hen is not mother of an egg.Again, some things are possible, others impossible; and some things are necessary, others are not necessary. A proposition is possible which admits of being true, there being nothing in external circumstances to prevent it being true, e.g. Diocles is alive. Impossible is one which does not admit of being true, as e.g. The earth flies. That is necessary which besides being true does not admit of being false or, while it may admit of being false, is prevented from being false by circumstances external to itself, as Virtue is beneficial. Not necessary is that which, while true, yet is capable of being false if there are no external conditions to prevent, e.g. Dion is walking. 7.82. There are also certain insoluble arguments: the Veiled Men, the Concealed, Sorites, Horned Folk, the Nobodies. The Veiled is as follows: . . . It cannot be that if two is few, three is not so likewise, nor that if two or three are few, four is not so; and so on up to ten. But two is few, therefore so also is ten. . . . The Nobody argument is an argument whose major premiss consists of an indefinite and a definite clause, followed by a minor premiss and conclusion; for example, If anyone is here, he is not in Rhodes; but there is some one here, therefore there is not anyone in Rhodes. . . .