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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 130

Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

11 results
1. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

558d. would have a son bred in his father’s ways. Why not? And he, too, would control by force all his appetites for pleasure that are wasters and not winners of wealth, those which are denominated unnecessary. Obviously. And in order not to argue in the dark, shall we first define our distinction between necessary and unnecessary appetites? Let us do so. Well, then, desires that we cannot divert or suppress may be properly called necessary
2. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

3. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

4. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.66-1.70 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.66. Tribus igitur igitur ergo BE modis video esse a nostris a nostris esse BE de amicitia disputatum. alii cum eas voluptates, quae ad amicos pertinerent, negarent esse per se ipsas tam expetendas, quam nostras expeteremus, quo loco videtur quibusdam stabilitas amicitiae vacillare, tuentur tamen eum locum seque facile, ut mihi videtur, expediunt. ut enim virtutes, de quibus ante dictum est, sic amicitiam negant posse a voluptate discedere. nam cum solitudo et vita sine amicis insidiarum et metus plena sit, ratio ipsa monet amicitias comparare, quibus partis confirmatur confirmetur ABE animus et a spe et a spe ad spem et ABE pariendarum voluptatum seiungi non potest. 1.67. atque ut odia, odiā BE invidiae, invidiae A 2 invidie (e ab alt. m. in ras. scr. ) N invidiā B invidia A 1 EV, R ( sequente una litt. erasa, quae vi-detur fuisse e) despicationes adversantur voluptatibus, sic amicitiae non modo fautrices fidelissimae, sed etiam effectrices sunt voluptatum tam amicis quam sibi, quibus non solum praesentibus fruuntur, sed etiam spe eriguntur consequentis ac posteri temporis. quod quia nullo modo sine amicitia firmam et perpetuam iucunditatem vitae tenere possumus possumus etiam B neque vero ipsam amicitiam tueri, nisi nisi ipsi ARV aeque amicos et nosmet ipsos diligamus, idcirco et hoc ipsum efficitur in amicitia, et amicitia et amicitia om. R, A 1 (ab alt. m. in mg. exteriore sinistro ita add. amicitia, ut a ligatore et desectum esse possit) cōnect. BE cum voluptate conectitur. nam et laetamur amicorum laetitia aeque atque ut RNV atque nostra et pariter dolemus angoribus. 1.68. quocirca eodem modo sapiens erit affectus erga amicum, quo in se ipsum, quosque labores propter suam voluptatem susciperet, susciperet susceperit R (suam susceperit voluptatem), NV eosdem suscipiet suscipiet susciperet BE propter amici voluptatem. quaeque de virtutibus dicta sunt, quem ad modum eae eae A hc B hec E hee RV ea N semper voluptatibus inhaererent, eadem de amicitia dicenda sunt. praeclare enim Epicurus his paene verbis: 'Eadem', his paene verbis eadem eadem hys pene verbis BE hiis pene eadem verbis V inquit, scientia scientia sententia BE confirmavit animum, ne quod aut sempiternum aut diuturnum timeret malum, quae perspexit in hoc ipso vitae spatio amicitiae praesidium esse firmissimum. 1.69. Sunt autem quidam Epicurei timidiores paulo contra vestra convicia, nostra convitia V convicia nostra BE sed tamen satis acuti, qui verentur ne, si amicitiam propter nostram voluptatem expetendam putemus, tota amicitia quasi claudicare videatur. itaque primos congressus copulationesque et consuetudinum instituendarum voluntates fieri propter voluptatem; voluntates A voluptates R voluptatum NV om. BE voluptatem voluptates R cum autem usus progrediens familiaritatem effecerit, tum amorem efflorescere tantum, ut, etiamsi nulla sit utilitas ex amicitia, tamen ipsi amici propter se ipsos amentur. etenim si loca, si fana, si urbes, si gymnasia, si campum, si canes, si equos, si ludicra si ludicras A 2 si ludicrica R exercendi aut vedi consuetudine consuetudines A consuetudinēs R adamare solemus, quanto id in hominum consuetudine facilius fieri poterit poterit edd. potuerit et iustius? 1.70. Sunt autem, qui dicant foedus esse quoddam sapientium, sapientum V sap ia (= sapientia, pro sap iu = sapientiū) R ut ne minus amicos quam minus amicos quam P. Man. minus quidem amicos quam ARNV minus quam amicos BE se ipsos diligant. quod et posse fieri fieri posse BE intellegimus et saepe etiam etiam Dav. enim videmus, et perspicuum est nihil ad iucunde vivendum reperiri posse, quod coniunctione tali sit aptius. Quibus ex omnibus iudicari potest non modo non impediri rationem amicitiae, si summum bonum in voluptate ponatur, sed sine hoc institutionem omnino amicitiae non posse reperiri. et 26 repp. A
5. Philodemus of Gadara, De Morte \ , 3.32-3.39 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

6. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 2.1-2.36 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

7. Plutarch, Against Colotes, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

8. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.85-7.86, 10.22, 10.136 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.85. An animal's first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are, The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it. 7.86. As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal's existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically. 10.22. And when near his end he wrote the following letter to Idomeneus:On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My continual sufferings from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing could augment them; but over against them all I set gladness of mind at the remembrance of our past conversations. But I would have you, as becomes your life-long attitude to me and to philosophy, watch over the children of Metrodorus.Such were the terms of his will.Among his disciples, of whom there were many, the following were eminent: Metrodorus, the son of Athenaeus (or of Timocrates) and of Sande, a citizen of Lampsacus, who from his first acquaintance with Epicurus never left him except once for six months spent on a visit to his native place, from which he returned to him again. 10.136. He differs from the Cyrenaics with regard to pleasure. They do not include under the term the pleasure which is a state of rest, but only that which consists in motion. Epicurus admits both; also pleasure of mind as well as of body, as he states in his work On Choice and Avoidance and in that On the Ethical End, and in the first book of his work On Human Life and in the epistle to his philosopher friends in Mytilene. So also Diogenes in the seventeenth book of his Epilecta, and Metrodorus in his Timocrates, whose actual words are: Thus pleasure being conceived both as that species which consists in motion and that which is a state of rest. The words of Epicurus in his work On Choice are: Peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity.
9. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 127-129, 131-132, 135, 124

10. Epicurus, Vatican Sayings, 33

11. Epicurus, Kuriai Doxai, 29, 3, 18

Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
action-tendency Hockey (2019) 74
altruism Long (2006) 200
apollo Williams and Vol (2022) 64
appraisal Hockey (2019) 74
aristippus of cyrene,and hedonism Wolfsdorf (2020) 404
aristippus of cyrene,post-classical reception Wolfsdorf (2020) 404
aristippus of cyrene Wolfsdorf (2020) 404
aristotle,on desire Huffman (2019) 198
art of life Long (2006) 30
assent Hockey (2019) 74
assimilation,to god/gods Allison (2020) 71, 72
ataraxia Long (2006) 30
character,excellence of Long (2006) 30
cognition,and emotion Hockey (2019) 74
cynicism Allison (2020) 42
cyrenaic school Wolfsdorf (2020) 404
desire Huffman (2019) 198, 415; Long (2006) 179
distress Hockey (2019) 74
emotion,ancient philosophical theory of Hockey (2019) 74
epicurean garden Long (2006) 179
epicureanism,ethics of Long (2006) 179, 200
epicureans Wolfsdorf (2020) 404
epicurus,as model Allison (2020) 71, 72
epicurus,on nature and the self Long (2006) 179, 200
epicurus/epicureanism,hedonic calculus Williams and Vol (2022) 64
epicurus/epicureanism Williams and Vol (2022) 64
epicurus Huffman (2019) 198
ethics,modern compared with ancient Long (2006) 30
filling and emptying Huffman (2019) 415
friendship,divine-human Allison (2020) 71
friendship Long (2006) 30, 200
frugality Long (2006) 179
goal of life Long (2006) 179, 200
goals,personal Hockey (2019) 74
gods (epicurean),human friendship with Allison (2020) 71
gods (epicurean),involvement in moral formation Allison (2020) 71, 72
goodness,good life Long (2006) 30
goods,benefit Hockey (2019) 74
hairesis Long (2006) 30
happiness Long (2006) 30, 179, 200
harm Hockey (2019) 74
hedonism Long (2006) 200; Wolfsdorf (2020) 404
hellenistic philosophy,ethics of Long (2006) 30
horace,epicureanism as main thread of life Williams and Vol (2022) 64
horace Williams and Vol (2022) 64
impression Hockey (2019) 74
impulse Hockey (2019) 74
interdependence,economic Allison (2020) 42
katastematic pleasure Wolfsdorf (2020) 404
kinetic pleasure Wolfsdorf (2020) 404
knowledge,epicurean Allison (2020) 71, 72
knowledge,lucretius Allison (2020) 72
lucretius Williams and Vol (2022) 64
maturity Allison (2020) 71, 72
mitsis,p. Long (2006) 200
moral formation,involvement of god/gods within Allison (2020) 71, 72
moral formation,via imitation Allison (2020) 71, 72
nature,of human beings Long (2006) 30
nature and convention' Huffman (2019) 415
ovid,and epicurus Williams and Vol (2022) 64
ovid,hedonic calculus in Williams and Vol (2022) 64
pain Wolfsdorf (2020) 404
pathē Wolfsdorf (2020) 404
perfection Long (2006) 30
philodemus,socio-economic location Allison (2020) 42
plato,on desire Huffman (2019) 198
pleasure Hockey (2019) 74; Long (2006) 30, 179, 200
pleasure (ἡδονή\u200e),in epicureanism Wolfsdorf (2020) 404
poverty Allison (2020) 42
reason Long (2006) 30
self-sufficency Long (2006) 200
social philosophy Long (2006) 179
stoicism,stoics Long (2006) 200
telos Long (2006) 30, 200
tsouna,voula Williams and Vol (2022) 64
value system Hockey (2019) 74
virtue Hockey (2019) 74
wealth Long (2006) 179
wise man Long (2006) 200
yona,sergio Williams and Vol (2022) 64