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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

Diogenes Of Apollonia, Fragments, b2

Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

8 results
1. Anaxagoras, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)

2. Aristophanes, The Women Celebrating The Thesmophoria, 620-630, 619 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

619. τίς ἔστ' ἀνήρ σοι; τὸν ἐμὸν ἄνδρα πυνθάνει;
3. Aristophanes, Wasps, 555 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

555. ἱκετεύουσίν θ' ὑποκύπτοντες τὴν φωνὴν οἰκτροχοοῦντες:
4. Diogenes of Apollonia, Fragments, None (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)

5. Xenophon, Memoirs, 1.4.2-1.4.9, 1.4.17 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

1.4.2. I will first state what I once heard him say about the godhead in conversation with Aristodemus the dwarf, as he was called. On learning that he was not known to sacrifice or pray or use divination, and actually made a mock of those who did so, he said: Tell me, Aristodemus, do you admire any human beings for wisdom? I do, he answered. 1.4.3. Tell us their names. In epic poetry Homer comes first, in my opinion; in dithyramb, Melanippides; in tragedy, Sophocles; in sculpture, Polycleitus; in painting, Zeuxis. 1.4.4. Which, think you, deserve the greater admiration, the creators of phantoms without sense and motion, or the creators of living, intelligent, and active beings? Oh, of living beings, by far, provided only they are created by design and not mere chance. Suppose that it is impossible to guess the purpose of one creature’s existence, and obvious that another’s serves a useful end, which, in your judgment, is the work of chance, and which of design? Presumably the creature that serves some useful end is the work of design. 1.4.5. Do you not think then that he who created man from the beginning had some useful end in view when he endowed him with his several senses, giving eyes to see visible objects, ears to hear sounds? Would odours again be of any use to us had we not been endowed with nostrils? What perception should we have of sweet and bitter and all things pleasant to the palate had we no tongue in our mouth to discriminate between them? 1.4.6. Besides these, are there not other contrivances that look like the results of forethought? Thus the eyeballs, being weak, are set behind eyelids, that open like doors when we want to see, and close when we sleep: on the lids grow lashes through which the very winds filter harmlessly: above the eyes is a coping of brows that lets no drop of sweat from the head hurt them. The ears catch all sounds, but are never choked with them. Again, the incisors of all creatures are adapted for cutting, the molars for receiving food from them and grinding it. And again, the mouth, through which the food they want goes in, is set near the eyes and nostrils; but since what goes out is unpleasant, the ducts through which it passes are turned away and removed as far as possible from the organs of sense. With such signs of forethought in these arrangements, can you doubt whether they are the works of chance or design? No, of course not. 1.4.7. When I regard them in this light they do look very like the handiwork of a wise and loving creator. What of the natural desire to beget children, the mother’s desire to rear her babe, the child’s strong will to live and strong fear of death? Undoubtedly these, too, look like the contrivances of one who deliberately willed the existence of living creatures. 1.4.8. Do you think you have any wisdom yourself? Oh! Ask me a question and judge from my answer. And do you suppose that wisdom is nowhere else to be found, although you know that you have a mere speck of all the earth in your body and a mere drop of all the water, and that of all the other mighty elements you received, I suppose, just a scrap towards the fashioning of your body? But as for mind, which alone, it seems, is without mass, do you think that you snapped it up by a lucky accident, and that the orderly ranks of all these huge masses, infinite in number, are due, forsooth, to a sort of absurdity? 1.4.9. Yes; for I don’t see the master hand, whereas I see the makers of things in this world. Neither do you see your own soul, Cyropaedia VIII. Vii. 17. which has the mastery of the body; so that, as far as that goes, you may say that you do nothing by design, but everything by chance. Here Aristodemus exclaimed: 1.4.17. Be well assured, my good friend, that the mind within you directs your body according to its will; and equally you must think that Thought indwelling in the Universal disposes all things according to its pleasure. For think not that your eye can travel over many furlongs and yet god’s eye cannot see the the whole world at once; that your soul can ponder on things in Egypt and in Sicily, and god’s thought is not sufficient to pay heed to the whole world at once.
6. Aristotle, Physics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

7. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.26 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.26. Next, Anaximenes held that air is god, and that it has a beginning in time, and is immeasurable and infinite in extent, and is always in motion; just as if formless air could be god, especially seeing that it is proper to god to possess not merely some shape but the most beautiful shape; or as if anything that has had a beginning must not necessarily be mortal. Then there is Anaxagoras, the successor of Anaximenes; he was the first thinker to hold that the orderly disposition of the universe is designed and perfected by the rational power of an infinite mind. But in saying this he failed to see that there can be no such thing as sentient and continuous activity in that which is infinite, and that sensation in general can only occur when the subject itself becomes sentient by the impact of a sensation. Further, if he intended his infinite mind to be a definite living creature, it must have some inner principle of life to justify the name. But mind is itself the innermost principle. Mind therefore will have an outer integument of body.
8. Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.6.1 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
analogy Horkey (2019) 271
anaxagoras of clazomenae Horkey (2019) 271
anaximander of miletus Wolfsdorf (2020) 56
anaximenes Wolfsdorf (2020) 56
anthropogony Horkey (2019) 271
aristophanes of athens Horkey (2019) 177
aēr Wolfsdorf (2020) 56
breath,as pneuma Horkey (2019) 271
breath,as spiritus/spirit Horkey (2019) 271
breath Horkey (2019) 271
community Horkey (2019) 271
cosmogony Horkey (2019) 177, 271
cosmology,pneumatic/spiritual Horkey (2019) 271
cosmology Horkey (2019) 177, 271
democracy Horkey (2019) 177
diogenes of apollonia Wolfsdorf (2020) 56
empedocles Wolfsdorf (2020) 56
heaven,christian Horkey (2019) 271
law (nomos) Horkey (2019) 177
love (empedoclean cosmic force) Wolfsdorf (2020) 56
natural philosophy,socrates and prior tradition Wolfsdorf (2020) 56
parts' Horkey (2019) 271
paul,saint Horkey (2019) 271
philo of alexandria Horkey (2019) 271
platonists,ix,x Horkey (2019) 271
posidonius of apamea Horkey (2019) 271
principle (arche),of causal difference Carter (2019) 49
principle (arche),of causal likeness Carter (2019) 49
principle (arche) Carter (2019) 49
psychē (soul),in anaximenes Wolfsdorf (2020) 56
pythagoreans Horkey (2019) 271
socrates,and natural philosophical tradition Wolfsdorf (2020) 56
socrates of athens Horkey (2019) 177
stoics Horkey (2019) 271
xenophon,on socrates and natural philosophy Wolfsdorf (2020) 56
zeus Horkey (2019) 177