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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



11242
Xenophon, Memoirs, 4.8.11


τῶν δὲ Σωκράτην γιγνωσκόντων, οἷος ἦν, οἱ ἀρετῆς ἐφιέμενοι πάντες ἔτι καὶ νῦν διατελοῦσι πάντων μάλιστα ποθοῦντες ἐκεῖνον, ὡς ὠφελιμώτατον ὄντα πρὸς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐμοὶ μὲν δή, τοιοῦτος ὢν οἷον ἐγὼ διήγημαι, εὐσεβὴς μὲν οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲν ἄνευ τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ποιεῖν, δίκαιος δὲ ὥστε βλάπτειν μὲν μηδὲ μικρὸν μηδένα, ὠφελεῖν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τοὺς χρωμένους αὐτῷ, ἐγκρατὴς δὲ ὥστε μηδέποτε προαιρεῖσθαι τὸ ἥδιον ἀντὶ τοῦ βελτίονος, φρόνιμος δὲ ὥστε μὴ διαμαρτάνειν κρίνων τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ χείρω μηδὲ ἄλλου προσδεῖσθαι, ἀλλʼ αὐτάρκης εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ λόγῳ εἰπεῖν τε καὶ διορίσασθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἄλλως δοκιμάσαι τε καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντα ἐλέγξαι καὶ προτρέψασθαι ἐπʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ καλοκαγαθίαν, ἐδόκει τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος ἂν εἴη ἄριστός τε ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος. εἰ δέ τῳ μὴ ἀρέσκει ταῦτα, παραβάλλων τὸ ἄλλων ἦθος πρὸς ταῦτα οὕτω κρινέτω.This was the tenor of his conversation with Hermogenes and with the others. All who knew what manner of man Socrates was and who seek after virtue continue to this day to miss him beyond all others, as the chief of helpers in the quest of virtue. For myself, I have described him as he was: so religious that he did nothing without counsel from the gods; so just that he did no injury, however small, to any man, but conferred the greatest benefits on all who dealt with him; so self-controlled that he never chose the pleasanter rather than the better course; so wise that he was unerring in his judgment of the better and the worse, and needed no counsellor, but relied on himself for his knowledge of them; masterly in expounding and defining such things; no less masterly in putting others to the test, and convincing them of error and exhorting them to follow virtue and gentleness. To me then he seemed to be all that a truly good and happy man must be. But if there is any doubter, let him set the character of other men beside these things; then let him judge.


τῶν δὲ Σωκράτην γιγνωσκόντων, οἷος ἦν, οἱ ἀρετῆς ἐφιέμενοι πάντες ἔτι καὶ νῦν διατελοῦσι πάντων μάλιστα ποθοῦντες ἐκεῖνον, ὡς ὠφελιμώτατον ὄντα πρὸς ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν. ἐμοὶ μὲν δή, τοιοῦτος ὢν οἷον ἐγὼ διήγημαι, εὐσεβὴς μὲν οὕτως ὥστε μηδὲν ἄνευ τῆς τῶν θεῶν γνώμης ποιεῖν, δίκαιος δὲ ὥστε βλάπτειν μὲν μηδὲ μικρὸν μηδένα, ὠφελεῖν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τοὺς χρωμένους αὐτῷ, ἐγκρατὴς δὲ ὥστε μηδέποτε προαιρεῖσθαι τὸ ἥδιον ἀντὶ τοῦ βελτίονος, φρόνιμος δὲ ὥστε μὴ διαμαρτάνειν κρίνων τὰ βελτίω καὶ τὰ χείρω μηδὲ ἄλλου προσδεῖσθαι, ἀλλʼ αὐτάρκης εἶναι πρὸς τὴν τούτων γνῶσιν, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ λόγῳ εἰπεῖν τε καὶ διορίσασθαι τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἱκανὸς δὲ καὶ ἄλλως δοκιμάσαι τε καὶ ἁμαρτάνοντα ἐλέγξαι καὶ προτρέψασθαι ἐπʼ ἀρετὴν καὶ καλοκαγαθίαν, ἐδόκει τοιοῦτος εἶναι οἷος ἂν εἴη ἄριστός τε ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος. εἰ δέ τῳ μὴ ἀρέσκει ταῦτα, παραβάλλων τὸ ἄλλων ἦθος πρὸς ταῦτα οὕτω κρινέτω.This was the tenor of his conversation with Hermogenes and with the others. All who knew what manner of man Socrates was and who seek after virtue continue to this day to miss him beyond all others, as the chief of helpers in the quest of virtue. For myself, I have described him as he was: so religious that he did nothing without counsel from the gods; so just that he did no injury, however small, to any man, but conferred the greatest benefits on all who dealt with him; so self-controlled that he never chose the pleasanter rather than the better course; so wise that he was unerring in his judgment of the better and the worse, and needed no counsellor, but relied on himself for his knowledge of them; masterly in expounding and defining such things; no less masterly in putting others to the test, and convincing them of error and exhorting them to follow virtue and gentleness. To me then he seemed to be all that a truly good and happy man must be. But if there is any doubter, let him set the character of other men beside these things; then let him judge.END


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

14 results
1. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 4.6-4.7 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

4.6. וַיֹּאמֶר יְהוָה לוֹ עוֹד הָבֵא־נָא יָדְךָ בְּחֵיקֶךָ וַיָּבֵא יָדוֹ בְּחֵיקוֹ וַיּוֹצִאָהּ וְהִנֵּה יָדוֹ מְצֹרַעַת כַּשָּׁלֶג׃ 4.7. וַיֹּאמֶר הָשֵׁב יָדְךָ אֶל־חֵיקֶךָ וַיָּשֶׁב יָדוֹ אֶל־חֵיקוֹ וַיּוֹצִאָהּ מֵחֵיקוֹ וְהִנֵּה־שָׁבָה כִּבְשָׂרוֹ׃ 4.6. And the LORD said furthermore unto him: ‘Put now thy hand into thy bosom.’ And he put his hand into his bosom; and when he took it out, behold, his hand was leprous, as white as snow." 4.7. And He said: ‘Put thy hand back into thy bosom.—And he put his hand back into his bosom; and when he took it out of his bosom, behold, it was turned again as his other flesh.—"
2. Plato, Apology of Socrates, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

3. Plato, Euthyphro, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

4. Plato, Gorgias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

5. Xenophon, Apology, 14, 10 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

6. Xenophon, The Cavalry General, 9.8-9.9 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

7. Xenophon, The Education of Cyrus, 1.2.1, 1.4.3, 1.6.46, 8.1.24-8.1.25, 8.1.33, 8.7.6, 8.7.10, 8.7.13-8.7.24, 8.7.28, 8.8.2 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

1.2.1. The father of Cyrus is said to have been His parentage Cambyses, king of the Persians: this Cambyses belonged to the stock of the Persidae, and the Persidae derive their name from Perseus. His mother, it is generally agreed, was Mandane; and this Mandane was the daughter of Astyages, sometime king of the Medes. And even to this day the barbarians tell in story and in song that Cyrus was most handsome in person, most generous of heart, most devoted to learning, and most ambitious, so that he endured all sorts of labour and faced all sorts of danger for the sake of praise. 8.7.13. As for you, Cambyses, you must also know His words of counsel—(1) to Cambyses; that it is not this golden sceptre that maintains your empire; but faithful friends are a monarch’s truest and surest sceptre. But do not think that man is naturally faithful; else all men would find the same persons faithful, just as all find the other properties of nature the same. But every one must create for himself faithfulness in his friends; and the winning of such friends comes in no wise by compulsion, but by kindness. 8.7.16. Therefore, Tanaoxares, let no one more (2) to Tanaoxares readily than yourself yield obedience to your brother or more zealously support him. For his fortunes, good or ill, will touch no one more closely than yourself. And bear this also in mind: whom could you favour in the hope of getting more from him than from your brother? Where could you lend help and get in return a surer ally than you would find in him? Whom would it be a more shameful thing for you not to love than your own brother? And who is there in all the world whom it would be a more noble thing to prefer in honour than your brother? It is only a brother, you know, Cambyses, whom, if he holds the first place of love in his brother’s heart, the envy of others cannot reach. 8.7.17. Nay by our fathers’ gods I implore you, my sons, honour one another, if you care at all to give me pleasure. For assuredly, this one thing, so it Cyrus on the immortality of the soul seems to me, you do not know clearly, that I shall have no further being when I have finished this earthly life; for not even in this life have you seen my soul, but you have detected its existence by what it accomplished. 8.7.21. Consider again, he continued, that there is nothing in the world more nearly akin to death than is sleep; and the soul of man at just such times is revealed in its most divine aspect and at such times, too, it looks forward into the future; for then, it seems, it is most untrammelled by the bonds of the flesh. 8.7.28. Remember also this last word of mine, he said: if you do good to your friends, you will also be able to punish your enemies. And now farewell, my children, and say farewell to your mother as from me. And to all my friends, both present and absent, I bid farewell. After these words, he shook hands with them all, covered himself over, and so died. delSpan spanTo= 8.8.2. I know, for example, that in early times the kings and their officers, in their dealings with even the worst offenders, would abide by an oath that they might have given, and be true to any pledge they might have made.
8. Xenophon, Memoirs, 1.1.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.14, 1.3.5-1.3.6, 1.5.4-1.5.5, 1.6.10, 2.1.17-2.1.18, 2.1.30-2.1.33, 3.9.4-3.9.5, 4.4.1-4.4.4, 4.4.11, 4.5.11, 4.6.11, 4.8.6 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

1.1.2. First then, that he rejected the gods acknowledged by the state — what evidence did they produce of that? He offered sacrifices constantly, and made no secret of it, now in his home, now at the altars of the state temples, and he made use of divination with as little secrecy. Indeed it had become notorious that Socrates claimed to be guided by the deity: That immanent divine something, as Cicero terms it, which Socrates claimed as his peculiar possession. it was out of this claim, I think, that the charge of bringing in strange deities arose. 1.2.1. No less wonderful is it to me that some believed the charge brought against Socrates of corrupting the youth. In the first place, apart from what I have said, in control of his own passions and appetites he was the strictest of men; further, in endurance of cold and heat and every kind of toil he was most resolute; and besides, his needs were so schooled to moderation that having very little he was yet very content. 1.2.3. To be sure he never professed to teach this; but, by letting his own light shine, he led his disciples to hope that they through imitation of him would attain to such excellence. 1.2.14. Ambition was the very life-blood of both: no Athenian was ever like them. They were eager to get control of everything and to outstrip every rival in notoriety. They knew that Socrates was living on very little, and yet was wholly independent; that he was strictly moderate in all his pleasures; and that in argument he could do what he liked with any disputant. 1.3.5. He schooled his body and soul by following, a system which, in all human calculation, would give him a life of confidence and security, and would make it easy to meet his expenses. For he was so frugal that it is hardly possible to imagine a man doing so little work as not to earn enough to satisfy the needs of Socrates . He ate just sufficient food to make eating a pleasure, and he was so ready for his food that he found appetite the best sauce Cyropaedia I. v. 12. : and any kind of drink he found pleasant, because he drank only when he was thirsty. 1.3.6. Whenever he accepted an invitation to dinner, he resisted without difficulty the common temptation to exceed the limit of satiety; and he advised those who could not do likewise to avoid appetizers that encouraged them to eat and drink what they did not want: for such trash was the ruin of stomach and brain and soul. 1.5.4. In social intercourse what pleasure could you find in such a man, knowing that he prefers your sauces and your wines to your friends, and likes the women Employed to entertain the guests at the banquet. better than the company? Should not every man hold self-control to be the foundation of all virtue, and first lay this foundation firmly in his soul? 1.5.5. For who without this can learn any good or practise it worthily? Or what man that is the slave of his pleasures is not in an evil plight body and soul alike? From my heart I declare that every free man should pray not to have such a man among his slaves; and every man who is a slave to such pleasures should entreat the gods to give him good masters: thus, and only thus, may he find salvation. 1.6.10. You seem, Antiphon, to imagine that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance. But my belief is that to have no wants is divine; Cyropaedia VIII. iii. 40. to have as few as possible comes next to the divine; and as that which is divine is supreme, so that which approaches nearest to its nature is nearest to the supreme. 2.1.17. I make their lives a burden to them until I reduce them to submission. But how about those who are trained in the art of kingship, Socrates, which you appear to identify with happiness? How are they better off than those whose sufferings are compulsory, if they must bear hunger, thirst, cold, sleeplessness, and endure all these tortures willingly? For if the same back gets the flogging whether its owner kicks or consents, or, in short, if the same body, consenting or objecting, is besieged by all these torments, I see no difference, apart from the folly of voluntary suffering. 2.1.18. What, Aristippus, exclaimed Socrates, don’t you think that there is just this difference between these voluntary and involuntary sufferings, that if you bear hunger or thirst willingly, you can eat, drink, or what not, when you choose, whereas compulsory suffering is not to be ended at will? Besides, he who endures willingly enjoys his work because he is comforted by hope; hunters, for instance, toil gladly in hope of game. 2.1.30. What good thing is thine, poor wretch, or what pleasant thing dost thou know, if thou wilt do nought to win them? Thou dost not even tarry for the desire of pleasant things, but fillest thyself with all things before thou desirest them, eating before thou art hungry, drinking before thou art thirsty, getting thee cooks, to give zest to eating, buying thee costly wines and running to and fro in search of snow in summer, to give zest to drinking; to soothe thy slumbers it is not enough for thee to buy soft coverlets, but thou must have frames for thy beds. For not toil, but the tedium of having nothing to do, makes thee long for sleep. Thou dost rouse lust by many a trick, when there is no need, using men as women: thus thou trainest thy friends, waxing wanton by night, consuming in sleep the best hours of day. 2.1.31. Immortal art thou, yet the outcast of the gods, the scorn of good men. Praise, sweetest of all things to hear, thou hearest not: the sweetest of all sights thou beholdest not, for never yet hast thou beheld a good work wrought by thyself. Who will believe what thou dost say? who will grant what thou dost ask? Or what sane man will dare join thy throng? While thy votaries are young their bodies are weak, when they wax old, their souls are without sense; idle and sleek they thrive in youth, withered and weary they journey through old age, and their past deeds bring them shame, their present deeds distress. Pleasure they ran through in their youth: hardship they laid up for their old age. 2.1.32. But I company with gods and good men, and no fair deed of god or man is done without my aid. I am first in honour among the gods and among men that are akin to me: to craftsmen a beloved fellow-worker, to masters a faithful guardian of the house, to servants a kindly protector: good helpmate in the toils of peace, staunch ally in the deeds of war, best partner in friendship. 2.1.33. To my friends meat and drink bring sweet and simple enjoyment: for they wait till they crave them. And a sweeter sleep falls on them than on idle folk: they are not vexed at awaking from it, nor for its sake do they neglect to do their duties. The young rejoice to win the praise of the old; the elders are glad to be honoured by the young; with joy they recall their deeds past, and their present well-doing is joy to them, for through me they are dear to the gods, lovely to friends, precious to their native land. And when comes the appointed end, they lie not forgotten and dishonoured, but live on, sung and remembered for all time. O Heracles, thou son of goodly parents, if thou wilt labour earnestly on this wise, thou mayest have for thine own the most blessed happiness. 3.9.4. Between Wisdom and Prudence he drew no distinction; but if a man knows and practises what is beautiful and good, knows and avoids what is base, The Greek text is corrupt, but the sense is clear. that man he judged to be both wise and prudent. When asked further whether he thought that those who know what they ought to do and yet do the opposite are at once wise and vicious, he answered: No; not so much that, as both unwise and vicious. For I think that all men have a choice between various courses, and choose and follow the one which they think conduces most to their advantage. Therefore I hold that those who follow the wrong course are neither wise nor prudent. 3.9.5. He said that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom. For just actions and all forms of virtuous activity are beautiful and good. He who knows the beautiful and good will never choose anything else, he who is ignorant of them cannot do them, and even if he tries, will fail. Hence the wise do what is beautiful and good, the unwise cannot and fail if they try. Therefore since just actions and all other forms of beautiful and good activity are virtuous actions, it is clear that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom. 4.4.1. Again, concerning Justice he did not hide his opinion, but proclaimed it by his actions. All his private conduct was lawful and helpful: to public authority he rendered such scrupulous obedience in all that the laws required, both in civil life and in military service, that he was a pattern of good discipline to all. 4.4.2. When chairman in the Assemblies he would not permit the people to record an illegal vote, but, upholding the laws, resisted a popular impulse that might even have overborne any but himself. 4.4.3. And when the Thirty laid a command on him that was illegal, he refused to obey. Thus he disregarded their repeated injunction not to talk with young men; and when they commanded him and certain other citizens to arrest a man on a capital charge, he alone refused, because the command laid on him was illegal. Alluding to the famous case of Leon. 4.4.4. Again, when he was tried on the charge brought by Meletus, whereas it is the custom of defendants to curry favour with the jury and to indulge in flattery and illegal appeals, and many by such means have been known to gain a verdict of acquittal, he rejected utterly the familiar chicanery of the courts; and though he might easily have gained a favourable verdict by even a moderate indulgence in such stratagems, he chose to die through his loyalty to the laws rather than to live through violating them. 4.4.11. Then have you ever found me dealing in perjury or calumny, or stirring up strife between friends or fellow-citizens, or doing any other unjust act? I have not. To abstain from what is unjust is just, don’t you think? Even now, Socrates, you are clearly endeavouring to avoid stating what you think Justice to be. You are saying not what the just do, but what they don’t do. 4.5.11. Socrates, said Euthydemus, I think you mean that he who is at the mercy of the bodily pleasures has no concern whatever with virtue in any form. Yes, Euthydemus; for how can an incontinent man be any better than the dullest beast? How can he who fails to consider the things that matter most, and strives by every means to do the things that are most pleasant, be better than the stupidest of creatures? No, only the self-controlled have power to consider the things that matter most, and, sorting them out after their kind, by word and deed alike to prefer the good and reject the evil. 4.6.11. And do you think that any are good in the presence of such things, except those who can deal with them well? None but these. And bad, except such as deal badly with them? These and none others. Then do both classes behave as they think they must? How can they behave otherwise? Then do those who cannot behave well know how they must behave? Surely not. So those who know how they must behave are just those who can? Yes, only they. Well now, do those who are not utterly mistaken deal badly with such things? I think not. So those who behave badly are utterly mistaken? Presumably. It follows that those who know how to deal well with terrors and dangers are courageous, and those who utterly mistake the way are cowards? That is my opinion. 4.8.6. Strange words, said I; and he, Do you think it strange, if it seems better to God that I should die now? Don’t you see that to this day I never would acknowledge that any man had lived a better or a pleasanter life than I? For they live best, I think, who strive best to become as good as possible: and the pleasantest life is theirs who are conscious that they are growing in goodness.
9. Xenophon, On Household Management, 1.22 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

1.22. Yes, they too are slaves, and hard indeed are their masters: some are in bondage to gluttony, some to lechery, some to drink, and some to foolish and costly ambitions. And so hard is the rule of these passions over every man who falls into their clutches, that so long as they see that he is strong and capable of work, they force him to pay over all the profits of his toil, and to spend it on their own desires; but no sooner do they find that he is too old to work, than they leave him to an old age of misery, and try to fasten the yoke on other shoulders.
10. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

11. New Testament, John, 20.30-20.31 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

20.30. Therefore Jesus did many other signs in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book; 20.31. but these are written, that you may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing you may have life in his name.
12. Hermogenes, Rhetorical Exercises, 7 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

13. Aphthonius, Progymnasmata, 8 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

14. Gregory of Nyssa, Life of Makrina, 18 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
agesilaus ii Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 416, 417, 429
aphthonius Gray, Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers (2021) 236
aretē/-a (virtue, excellence), and enkrateia in xenophon Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418
aretē/-a (virtue, excellence), identified with knowledge Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418
brickhouse, t. Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
charmides Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
cleanthes, by socrates Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 160
cleanthes, by the stoics Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 160
courage Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
courage (andreia) Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 416
cyrus the elder Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 416, 417, 429
daimones, daimonion of socrates Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 114
death, of xenophons heroes Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 429
demes Mikalson, New Aspects of Religion in Ancient Athens: Honors, Authorities, Esthetics, and Society (2016) 46
devereux, d. Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
dikaiosune Mikalson, New Aspects of Religion in Ancient Athens: Honors, Authorities, Esthetics, and Society (2016) 46
divination, and socrates Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 114
divination Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 114
divinity, freedom from wants Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418
encomium, instructions for Gray, Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers (2021) 235, 236
endurance (karteria) Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 417, 418
eusebeia Mikalson, New Aspects of Religion in Ancient Athens: Honors, Authorities, Esthetics, and Society (2016) 46
euthyphro Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
ferejohn, m. Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
freedom (ἐλευθερία\u200e) Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 419
gera, deborah Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 429
good (agathos, to agathon) Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 429
gospel Gray, Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers (2021) 236
hermogenes Gray, Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers (2021) 235
hippias Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 419
ignorance Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
imitation (see also mimesis), of christ Gray, Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers (2021) 235
jesus christ Gray, Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers (2021) 235
job Gray, Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers (2021) 235
justice Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
justice (dikē), in xenophon Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418, 419
kraut, r. Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
laches Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
lack of respect for gods', and introducing new gods" Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 114
lack of respect for gods', and socrates" Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 114
lake Gray, Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers (2021) 235
luxury Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 419
miracles, biblical Gray, Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers (2021) 235
miracles, of thaumaturgus Gray, Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers (2021) 235
moral psychology Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
panhellenism, of xenophon Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 416
penner, t. Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
philanthropia Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 416, 417
philotimia Mikalson, New Aspects of Religion in Ancient Athens: Honors, Authorities, Esthetics, and Society (2016) 46
phronēsis (wisdom, intelligence) Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 416, 417
phryne Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 114
piety Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
plato Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 160
pleasure (ἡδονή\u200e), encratic Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 419
pleasure (ἡδονή\u200e), in xenophon Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 429
practice (askēsis, meletē), in socratic thought Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418
preference Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
progress Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 160
proper respect for gods, and divination Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 114
proper respect for gods, and introducing new gods Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 114
proper respect for gods, and socrates Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 114
rational (and nonrational) Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
reason Gray, Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers (2021) 235
recognizing the gods, and socrates Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 114
red sea Gray, Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers (2021) 235
rhetoric, handbooks (progymnasmata) Gray, Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers (2021) 235, 236
rowe, c. Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
sacrifices, and divination Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 114
searching for wisdom, stoics as followers of' Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 160
self-improvement Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 429
self-mastery/self-restraint (enkrateia), in xenophon Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 416, 417, 418, 419
self-sufficiency (autarkeia) Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418
slavery Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 419
smith, n. Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
socrates, death of Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 429
socrates, prosecution of Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 417, 429
socrates, xenophons portrayal of Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 416, 417
socrates Gray, Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers (2021) 236
socratic literature, of xenophon Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 417, 418, 419, 429
soteria Mikalson, New Aspects of Religion in Ancient Athens: Honors, Authorities, Esthetics, and Society (2016) 46
sparta, xenophon and Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 416
synkrisis, biblical Gray, Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers (2021) 235
synkrisis, instructions for Gray, Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers (2021) 235
teachability of aretē Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418
temperance Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
thucydides Gray, Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers (2021) 235, 236
tribes Mikalson, New Aspects of Religion in Ancient Athens: Honors, Authorities, Esthetics, and Society (2016) 46
typhon, stoic interpretation of Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 160
virtue Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
vlastos, g. Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
wisdom Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
woodruff, p. Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88
xenophon, and death Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 429
xenophon, life Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 416
xenophon, on self-mastery Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 417, 418, 419
xenophon, on the good Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 429
xenophon, traits of role models Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 416, 417
xenophon Gray, Gregory of Nyssa as Biographer: Weaving Lives for Virtuous Readers (2021) 235, 236; Smith, Socrates on Self-Improvement: Knowledge, Virtue, and Happiness (2021) 88; Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 416, 417, 418, 419, 429