3. Xenophon, Memoirs, 1.2.41-1.2.46, 3.9.4-3.9.5, 3.14.2, 4.4.19-4.4.23, 4.4.25, 4.5.11 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
| 1.2.41. Tell me, Pericles, he said, can you teach me what a law is? Certainly, he replied. Then pray teach me. For whenever I hear men praised for keeping the laws, it occurs to me that no one can really deserve that praise who does not know what a law is. 1.2.42. Well, Alcibiades, there is no great difficulty about what you desire. You wish to know what a law is. Laws are all the rules approved and enacted by the majority in assembly, whereby they declare what ought and what ought not to be done. Do they suppose it is right to do good or evil? Good, of course, young man, — not evil. 1.2.43. But if, as happens under an oligarchy, not the majority, but a minority meet and enact rules of conduct, what are these? Whatsoever the sovereign power in the State, after deliberation, enacts and directs to be done is known as a law. If, then, a despot, being the sovereign power, enacts what the citizens are to do, are his orders also a law? Yes, whatever a despot as ruler enacts is also known as a law. 1.2.44. But force, the negation of law, what is that, Pericles? Is it not the action of the stronger when he constrains the weaker to do whatever he chooses, not by persuasion, but by force? That is my opinion. Then whatever a despot by enactment constrains the citizens to do without persuasion, is the negation of law? I think so: and I withdraw my answer that whatever a despot enacts without persuasion is a law. 1.2.45. And when the minority passes enactments, not by persuading the majority, but through using its power, are we to call that force or not? Everything, I think, that men constrain others to do without persuasion, whether by enactment or not, is not law, but force. It follows then, that whatever the assembled majority, through using its power over the owners of property, enacts without persuasion is not law, but force? 1.2.46. Alcibiades, said Pericles, at your age, I may tell you, we, too, were very clever at this sort of thing. For the puzzles we thought about and exercised our wits on were just such as you seem to think about now. Ah, Pericles, cried Alcibiades, if only I had known you intimately when you were at your cleverest in these things! 3.9.4. Between Wisdom and Prudence he drew no distinction; but if a man knows and practises what is beautiful and good, knows and avoids what is base, The Greek text is corrupt, but the sense is clear. that man he judged to be both wise and prudent. When asked further whether he thought that those who know what they ought to do and yet do the opposite are at once wise and vicious, he answered: No; not so much that, as both unwise and vicious. For I think that all men have a choice between various courses, and choose and follow the one which they think conduces most to their advantage. Therefore I hold that those who follow the wrong course are neither wise nor prudent. 3.9.5. He said that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom. For just actions and all forms of virtuous activity are beautiful and good. He who knows the beautiful and good will never choose anything else, he who is ignorant of them cannot do them, and even if he tries, will fail. Hence the wise do what is beautiful and good, the unwise cannot and fail if they try. Therefore since just actions and all other forms of beautiful and good activity are virtuous actions, it is clear that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom. 3.14.2. He observed on one occasion that one of the company at dinner had ceased to take bread, and ate the meat by itself. Now the talk was of names and the actions to which they are properly applied. Can we say, my friends, said Socrates, what is the nature of the action for which a man is called greedy? For all, I presume, eat meat with their bread when they get the chance: but I don’t think there is so far any reason for calling them greedy? No, certainly not, said one of the company. 4.4.19. Do you know what is meant by unwritten laws, Hippias? Yes, those that are uniformly observed in every country. Could you say that men made them? Nay, how could that be, seeing that they cannot all meet together and do not speak the same language? Then by whom have these laws been made, do you suppose? I think that the gods made these laws for men. For among all men the first law is to fear the gods. 4.4.20. Is not the duty of honouring parents another universal law? Yes, that is another. And that parents shall not have sexual intercourse with their children nor children with their parents? Cyropaedia V. i. 10. No, I don’t think that is a law of God. Why so? Because I notice that some transgress it. 4.4.21. Yes, and they do many other things contrary to the laws. But surely the transgressors of the laws ordained by the gods pay a penalty that a man can in no wise escape, as some, when they transgress the laws ordained by man, escape punishment, either by concealment or by violence. 4.4.22. And pray what sort of penalty is it, Socrates, that may not be avoided by parents and children who have intercourse with one another? The greatest, of course. For what greater penalty can men incur when they beget children than begetting them badly? 4.4.23. How do they beget children badly then, if, as may well happen, the fathers are good men and the mothers good women? Surely because it is not enough that the two parents should be good. They must also be in full bodily vigour: unless you suppose that those who are in full vigour are no more efficient as parents than those who have not yet reached that condition or have passed it. of course that is unlikely. Which are the better then? Those who are in full vigour, clearly. Consequently those who are not in full vigour are not competent to become parents? It is improbable, of course. In that case then, they ought not to have children? Certainly not. Therefore those who produce children in such circumstances produce them wrongly? I think so. Who then will be bad fathers and mothers, if not they? I agree with you there too. 4.4.25. Then, Hippias, do you think that the gods ordain what is just or what is otherwise? Not what is otherwise — of course not; for if a god ordains not that which is just, surely no other legislator can do so. Consequently, Hippias, the gods too accept the identification of just and lawful. By such words and actions he encouraged Justice in those who resorted to his company. 4.5.11. Socrates, said Euthydemus, I think you mean that he who is at the mercy of the bodily pleasures has no concern whatever with virtue in any form. Yes, Euthydemus; for how can an incontinent man be any better than the dullest beast? How can he who fails to consider the things that matter most, and strives by every means to do the things that are most pleasant, be better than the stupidest of creatures? No, only the self-controlled have power to consider the things that matter most, and, sorting them out after their kind, by word and deed alike to prefer the good and reject the evil. |
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