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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



11242
Xenophon, Memoirs, 1.6.10


ἔοικας, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι· ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δʼ ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον κράτιστον, τὸ δʼ ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ κρατίστου.You seem, Antiphon, to imagine that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance. But my belief is that to have no wants is divine; Cyropaedia VIII. iii. 40. to have as few as possible comes next to the divine; and as that which is divine is supreme, so that which approaches nearest to its nature is nearest to the supreme.


ἔοικας, ὦ Ἀντιφῶν, τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰομένῳ τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν εἶναι· ἐγὼ δὲ νομίζω τὸ μὲν μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι θεῖον εἶναι, τὸ δʼ ὡς ἐλαχίστων ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου, καὶ τὸ μὲν θεῖον κράτιστον, τὸ δʼ ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ θείου ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ κρατίστου.You seem, Antiphon, to imagine that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance. But my belief is that to have no wants is divine; to have as few as possible comes next to the divine; and as that which is divine is supreme, so that which approaches nearest to its nature is nearest to the supreme.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

16 results
1. Herodotus, Histories, 1.32.8 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)

1.32.8. It is impossible for one who is only human to obtain all these things at the same time, just as no land is self-sufficient in what it produces. Each country has one thing but lacks another; whichever has the most is the best. Just so no human being is self-sufficient; each person has one thing but lacks another.
2. Plato, Alcibiades I, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

134d. Soc. For you and the state, if you act justly and temperately, will act so as to please God. Alc. Naturally. Soc. And, as we were saying in what went before, you will act with your eyes turned on what is divine and bright. Alc. Apparently. Soc. Well, and looking thereon you will behold and know both yourselves and your good. Alc. Yes. Soc. And so you will act aright and well? Alc. Yes.
3. Plato, Euthydemus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

280b. in the end that the truth in general was this: when wisdom is present, he with whom it is present has no need of good fortune as well; and as we had agreed on this I began to inquire of him over again what we should think, in this case, of our previous agreements. For we agreed, said I, that if many goods were present to us we should be happy and prosper.
4. Plato, Gorgias, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

507c. Callicles, that the temperate man, as shown in our exposition, being just and brave and pious, is the perfection of a good man; and that the good man does well and fairly whatever he does and that he who does well is blessed and happy, while the wicked man or evil-doer is wretched. And this must be the man who is in an opposite case to the temperate,—the licentious man whom you were commending.
5. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

6. Plato, Symposium, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

7. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

68e. Tim. Wherefore one ought to distinguish two kinds of causes, the necessary and the divine, and in all things to seek after the divine for the sake of gaining a life of blessedness, so far as our nature admits thereof
8. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 2.36.3, 2.41.1 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2.36.3. Lastly, there are few parts of our dominions that have not been augmented by those of us here, who are still more or less in the vigor of life; while the mother country has been furnished by us with everything that can enable her to depend on her own resources whether for war or for peace. 2.41.1. In short, I say that as a city we are the school of Hellas ; while I doubt if the world can produce a man, who where he has only himself to depend upon, is equal to so many emergencies, and graced by so happy a versatility as the Athenian.
9. Xenophon, Memoirs, 1.2.1, 1.2.3, 1.2.14, 1.5.4, 1.6.2, 3.5.7, 3.9.4-3.9.5, 4.5.11, 4.8.3, 4.8.11 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

1.2.1. No less wonderful is it to me that some believed the charge brought against Socrates of corrupting the youth. In the first place, apart from what I have said, in control of his own passions and appetites he was the strictest of men; further, in endurance of cold and heat and every kind of toil he was most resolute; and besides, his needs were so schooled to moderation that having very little he was yet very content. 1.2.3. To be sure he never professed to teach this; but, by letting his own light shine, he led his disciples to hope that they through imitation of him would attain to such excellence. 1.2.14. Ambition was the very life-blood of both: no Athenian was ever like them. They were eager to get control of everything and to outstrip every rival in notoriety. They knew that Socrates was living on very little, and yet was wholly independent; that he was strictly moderate in all his pleasures; and that in argument he could do what he liked with any disputant. 1.5.4. In social intercourse what pleasure could you find in such a man, knowing that he prefers your sauces and your wines to your friends, and likes the women Employed to entertain the guests at the banquet. better than the company? Should not every man hold self-control to be the foundation of all virtue, and first lay this foundation firmly in his soul? 1.6.2. Socrates, I supposed that philosophy must add to one’s store of happiness. But the fruits you have reaped from philosophy are apparently very different. For example, you are living a life that would drive even a slave to desert his master. Your meat and drink are of the poorest: the cloak you wear is not only a poor thing, but is never changed summer or winter; and you never wear shoes or tunic. 3.5.7. Well, exclaimed Pericles, if they are now in the mood for obedience, it seems time to say how we can revive in them a longing for the old virtue and fame and happiness. 3.9.4. Between Wisdom and Prudence he drew no distinction; but if a man knows and practises what is beautiful and good, knows and avoids what is base, The Greek text is corrupt, but the sense is clear. that man he judged to be both wise and prudent. When asked further whether he thought that those who know what they ought to do and yet do the opposite are at once wise and vicious, he answered: No; not so much that, as both unwise and vicious. For I think that all men have a choice between various courses, and choose and follow the one which they think conduces most to their advantage. Therefore I hold that those who follow the wrong course are neither wise nor prudent. 3.9.5. He said that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom. For just actions and all forms of virtuous activity are beautiful and good. He who knows the beautiful and good will never choose anything else, he who is ignorant of them cannot do them, and even if he tries, will fail. Hence the wise do what is beautiful and good, the unwise cannot and fail if they try. Therefore since just actions and all other forms of beautiful and good activity are virtuous actions, it is clear that Justice and every other form of Virtue is Wisdom. 4.5.11. Socrates, said Euthydemus, I think you mean that he who is at the mercy of the bodily pleasures has no concern whatever with virtue in any form. Yes, Euthydemus; for how can an incontinent man be any better than the dullest beast? How can he who fails to consider the things that matter most, and strives by every means to do the things that are most pleasant, be better than the stupidest of creatures? No, only the self-controlled have power to consider the things that matter most, and, sorting them out after their kind, by word and deed alike to prefer the good and reject the evil. 4.8.3. How, then, could man die more nobly? Or what death could be nobler than the death most nobly faced? What death more blessed than the noblest? Or what dearer to the gods than the most blessed? 4.8.11. This was the tenor of his conversation with Hermogenes and with the others. All who knew what manner of man Socrates was and who seek after virtue continue to this day to miss him beyond all others, as the chief of helpers in the quest of virtue. For myself, I have described him as he was: so religious that he did nothing without counsel from the gods; so just that he did no injury, however small, to any man, but conferred the greatest benefits on all who dealt with him; so self-controlled that he never chose the pleasanter rather than the better course; so wise that he was unerring in his judgment of the better and the worse, and needed no counsellor, but relied on himself for his knowledge of them; masterly in expounding and defining such things; no less masterly in putting others to the test, and convincing them of error and exhorting them to follow virtue and gentleness. To me then he seemed to be all that a truly good and happy man must be. But if there is any doubter, let him set the character of other men beside these things; then let him judge.
10. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

11. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

12. Philo of Alexandria, On The Cherubim, 46 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

46. And he teaches the same lesson more plainly in the case of Leah, where he says that "God opened her Womb." But to open the womb is the especial business of the husband. And she having conceived, brought forth, not to God, for he alone is sufficient and all-abundant for himself, but to him who underwent labour for the sake of that which is good, namely, for Jacob; so that in this instance virtue received the divine seed from the great Cause of all things, but brought forth her offspring to one of her lovers, who deserved to be preferred to all her other Suitors. 46. And a voice sounded forth from out of the midst of the fire which had flowed from heaven, a most marvellous and awful voice, the flame being endowed with articulate speech in a language familiar to the hearers, which expressed its words with such clearness and distinctness that the people seemed rather to be seeing than hearing it.
13. Philo of Alexandria, On The Special Laws, 1.277 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

1.277. And this command is a symbol of nothing else but of the fact that in the eyes of God it is not the number of things sacrificed that is accounted valuable, but the purity of the rational spirit of the sacrificer. Unless, indeed, one can suppose that a judge who is anxious to pronounce a holy judgment will never receive gifts from any of those whose conduct comes before his tribunal, or that, if he does receive such presents, he will be liable to an accusation of corruption; and that a good man will not receive gifts from a wicked person, not even though he may be poor and the other rich, and he himself perhaps in actual want of what he would so receive; and yet that God can be corrupted by bribes, who is most all-sufficient for himself and who has no need of any thing created; who, being himself the first and most perfect good thing, the everlasting fountain of wisdom, and justice, and of every virtue, rejects the gifts of the wicked.
14. Philo of Alexandria, On The Life of Moses, 1.154-1.155 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

1.154. and these things are, temperance, and fortitude, and continence, and presence of mind, and acuteness, and knowledge, and industry, and patience under evil, and contempt of pleasure, and justice, and exhortations to virtue and blame, and lawful punishment of offenders, and, on the contrary, praise and honour to those who did well in accordance with law. 1.155. Therefore, as he had utterly discarded all desire of gain and of those riches which are held in the highest repute among men, God honoured him, and gave him instead the greatest and most perfect wealth; and this is the Wealth{2}{the text here is very corrupt.} of all the earth and sea, and of all the rivers, and of all the other elements, and all combinations whatever; for having judged him deserving of being made a partaker with himself in the portion which he had reserved for himself, he gave him the whole world as a possession suitable for his heir:
15. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 6.23, 6.34, 6.38, 6.63, 6.71-6.72, 6.85-6.86, 6.98, 6.104 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

6.23. He did not lean upon a staff until he grew infirm; but afterwards he would carry it everywhere, not indeed in the city, but when walking along the road with it and with his wallet; so say Olympiodorus, once a magistrate at Athens, Polyeuctus the orator, and Lysanias the son of Aeschrio. He had written to some one to try and procure a cottage for him. When this man was a long time about it, he took for his abode the tub in the Metroon, as he himself explains in his letters. And in summer he used to roll in it over hot sand, while in winter he used to embrace statues covered with snow, using every means of inuring himself to hardship. 6.34. To those who said to him, You are an old man; take a rest, What? he replied, if I were running in the stadium, ought I to slacken my pace when approaching the goal? ought I not rather to put on speed? Having been invited to a dinner, he declared that he wouldn't go; for, the last time he went, his host had not expressed a proper gratitude. He would walk upon snow barefoot and do the other things mentioned above. Not only so; he even attempted to eat meat raw, but could not manage to digest it. He once found Demosthenes the orator lunching at an inn, and, when he retired within, Diogenes said, All the more you will be inside the tavern. When some strangers expressed a wish to see Demosthenes, he stretched out his middle finger and said, There goes the demagogue of Athens. 6.38. He dedicated to Asclepius a bruiser who, whenever people fell on their faces, used to run up to them and bruise them.All the curses of tragedy, he used to say, had lighted upon him. At all events he wasA homeless exile, to his country dead. A wanderer who begs his daily bread.But he claimed that to fortune he could oppose courage, to convention nature, to passion reason. When he was sunning himself in the Craneum, Alexander came and stood over him and said, Ask of me any boon you like. To which he replied, Stand out of my light. Some one had been reading aloud for a very long time, and when he was near the end of the roll pointed to a space with no writing on it. Cheer up, my men, cried Diogenes; there's land in sight. 6.63. On being asked what he had gained from philosophy, he replied, This at least, if nothing else – to be prepared for every fortune. Asked where he came from, he said, I am a citizen of the world. Certain parents were sacrificing to the gods, that a son might be born to them. But, said he, do you not sacrifice to ensure what manner of man he shall turn out to be? When asked for a subscription towards a club, he said to the president:Despoil the rest; off Hector keep thy hands.The mistresses of kings he designated queens; for, said he, they make the kings do their bidding. When the Athenians gave Alexander the title of Dionysus, he said, Me too you might make Sarapis. Some one having reproached him for going into dirty places, his reply was that the sun too visits cesspools without being defiled. 6.71. Nothing in life, however, he maintained, has any chance of succeeding without strenuous practice; and this is capable of overcoming anything. Accordingly, instead of useless toils men should choose such as nature recommends, whereby they might have lived happily. Yet such is their madness that they choose to be miserable. For even the despising of pleasure is itself most pleasurable, when we are habituated to it; and just as those accustomed to a life of pleasure feel disgust when they pass over to the opposite experience, so those whose training has been of the opposite kind derive more pleasure from despising pleasure than from the pleasures themselves. This was the gist of his conversation; and it was plain that he acted accordingly, adulterating currency in very truth, allowing convention no such authority as he allowed to natural right, and asserting that the manner of life he lived was the same as that of Heracles when he preferred liberty to everything. 6.72. He maintained that all things are the property of the wise, and employed such arguments as those cited above. All things belong to the gods. The gods are friends to the wise, and friends share all property in common; therefore all things are the property of the wise. Again as to law: that it is impossible for society to exist without law; for without a city no benefit can be derived from that which is civilized. But the city is civilized, and there is no advantage in law without a city; therefore law is something civilized. He would ridicule good birth and fame and all such distinctions, calling them showy ornaments of vice. The only true commonwealth was, he said, that which is as wide as the universe. He advocated community of wives, recognizing no other marriage than a union of the man who persuades with the woman who consents. And for this reason he thought sons too should be held in common. 6.85. 5. CRATESCrates, son of Ascondas, was a Theban. He too was amongst the Cynic's famous pupils. Hippobotus, however, alleges that he was a pupil not of Diogenes, but of Bryson the Achaean. The following playful lines are attributed to him:There is a city Pera in the midst of wine-dark vapour,Fair, fruitful, passing squalid, owning nought,Into which sails nor fool nor parasiteNor glutton, slave of sensual appetite,But thyme it bears, garlic, and figs and loaves,For which things' sake men fight not each with other,Nor stand to arms for money or for fame. 6.86. There is also his widely circulated day-book, which runs as follows:Set down for the chef ten minas, for the doctorOne drachma, for a flatterer talents five,For counsel smoke, for mercenary beautyA talent, for a philosopher three obols.He was known as the Door-opener – the caller to whom all doors fly open – from his habit of entering every house and admonishing those within. Here is another specimen of his composition:That much I have which I have learnt and thought,The noble lessons taught me by the Muses:But wealth amassed is prey to vanity.And again he says that what he has gained from philosophy isA quart of lupins and to care for no one.This too is quoted as his:Hunger stops love, or, if not hunger, Time,Or, failing both these means of help, – a halter. 6.98. And when he said to her:Is this sheWho quitting woof and warp and comb and loom?she replied, It is I, Theodorus, – but do you suppose that I have been ill advised about myself, if instead of wasting further time upon the loom I spent it in education? These tales and countless others are told of the female philosopher.There is current a work of Crates entitled Epistles, containing excellent philosophy in a style which sometimes resembles that of Plato. He has also written tragedies, stamped with a very lofty kind of philosophy; as, for example, the following passage:Not one tower hath my country nor one roof,But wide as the whole earth its citadelAnd home prepared for us to dwell therein.He died in old age, and was buried in Boeotia. 6.104. So they get rid of geometry and music and all such studies. Anyhow, when somebody showed Diogenes a clock, he pronounced it a serviceable instrument to save one from being late for dinner. Again, to a man who gave a musical recital before him he said:By men's minds states are ordered well, and households,Not by the lyre's twanged strings or flute's trilled notes.They hold further that Life according to Virtue is the End to be sought, as Antisthenes says in his Heracles: exactly like the Stoics. For indeed there is a certain close relationship between the two schools. Hence it has been said that Cynicism is a short cut to virtue; and after the same pattern did Zeno of Citium live his life.
16. Anon., Sententiae Pythagoreorum, 30



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
adornment Wilson, The Sentences of Sextus (2012) 87
antiphon, identity/-ies of Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 150
antiphon, in xenophon Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 150
antiphon, writings Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 150
antiphon Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 150
aretē/-a (virtue, excellence), and enkrateia in xenophon Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418
aretē/-a (virtue, excellence), identified with knowledge Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418
aristotle, on eudaimonia Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 8
asceticsm Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 663
assimilation Wilson, The Sentences of Sextus (2012) 87
bastianini, guido Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 150
blindness Wilson, Philo of Alexandria: On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2010) 106
children Wilson, The Sentences of Sextus (2012) 87
chrysippus, on eudaimonia Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 8
cleanthes, on eudaimonia Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 8
cosmopolitanism, cynic Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 663
courage Wilson, Philo of Alexandria: On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2010) 106
crates Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 663
cynics Wilson, The Sentences of Sextus (2012) 87
decleva caizzi, fernanda Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 150
democracy, antiphon and Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 150
desire Wilson, Philo of Alexandria: On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2010) 106
diels, hermann Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 150
diogenes of sinope xx, xxv, asceticism and self-sufficiency Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 663
diogenes of sinope xx, xxv, cosmopolitanism Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 663
diogenes of sinope xx, xxv Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 663
divinity, freedom from wants Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418
endurance (karteria) Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418
eudaimonia, chrysippus on Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 8
eudaimonia, cleanthes on Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 8
eudaimonia, stoics on Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 8
eudaimonia, zeno on Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 8
eudaimonia/-ē Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 179
eudaimonia Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 8
eudaimonism, socratic Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 179
flatterers Wilson, Philo of Alexandria: On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2010) 106
food Wilson, Philo of Alexandria: On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2010) 106
funghi, maria serena Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 150
gagarin, michael Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 150
imitation Wilson, The Sentences of Sextus (2012) 87
immortality Wilson, Philo of Alexandria: On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2010) 106
justice (dikē), in xenophon Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418
kingship Wilson, The Sentences of Sextus (2012) 87
likeness to god Wilson, The Sentences of Sextus (2012) 87
moderation Wilson, The Sentences of Sextus (2012) 87
nature Wilson, Philo of Alexandria: On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2010) 106
passions Wilson, The Sentences of Sextus (2012) 87
pendrick, gerard j. Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 150
piety Wilson, The Sentences of Sextus (2012) 87
polis, the, diogenes and city-lessness Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 663
politics Iribarren and Koning, Hesiod and the Beginnings of Greek Philosophy (2022) 189
practice (askēsis, meletē), in cynic thought Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 663
practice (askēsis, meletē), in socratic thought Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418
pythagoreanism Wilson, The Sentences of Sextus (2012) 87
self-mastery/self-restraint (enkrateia), in xenophon Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418
self-sufficiency Wilson, Philo of Alexandria: On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2010) 106; Wilson, The Sentences of Sextus (2012) 87
self-sufficiency (autarkeia), cynic Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 663
self-sufficiency (autarkeia) Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418
socrates, and eudaimonism Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 179
socratic literature, of xenophon Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418
stoics, on eudaimonia Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 8
teachability of aretē Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418
the faithful' Wilson, The Sentences of Sextus (2012) 87
toils (ponoi), natural Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 663
volitional asceticism Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 663
wealth Wilson, Philo of Alexandria: On Virtues: Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (2010) 106
wilamowitz-moellendorf, ulrich von Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 150
xenophon, on self-mastery Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418
xenophon, on socrates and eudaimonia Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 179
xenophon Wolfsdorf, Early Greek Ethics (2020) 418
zeno, on eudaimonia Mikalson, Greek Popular Religion in Greek Philosophy (2010) 8