6. Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.7.15, 4.3.13 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
| 1.7.15. Then the Prytanes, stricken with fear, agreed to put the question,—all of them except Socrates, On Socrates’ conduct at this time cp. Plato, Apol. 32B and Xen. Mem. I. i. 18. the son of Sophroniscus; and he said that in no case would he act except in accordance with the law. 4.3.13. Now Agesilaus, on learning these things, at first was overcome with sorrow; but when he had considered that the most of his troops were the sort of men to share gladly in good fortune if good fortune came, but that if they saw anything unpleasant, they were under no compulsion to share in it, I.e., being practically volunteers (cp. ii. 4). —thereupon, changing the report, he said that word had come that Peisander was dead, but victorious in the naval battle. |
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7. Xenophon, Memoirs, 1.1.2-1.1.4, 1.1.11-1.1.15, 1.1.19-1.1.20, 1.4, 4.3, 4.4.2, 4.4.19-4.4.24 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
| 1.1.2. First then, that he rejected the gods acknowledged by the state — what evidence did they produce of that? He offered sacrifices constantly, and made no secret of it, now in his home, now at the altars of the state temples, and he made use of divination with as little secrecy. Indeed it had become notorious that Socrates claimed to be guided by the deity: That immanent divine something, as Cicero terms it, which Socrates claimed as his peculiar possession. it was out of this claim, I think, that the charge of bringing in strange deities arose. 1.1.3. He was no more bringing in anything strange than are other believers in divination, who rely on augury, oracles, coincidences and sacrifices. For these men’s belief is not that the birds or the folk met by accident know what profits the inquirer, but that they are the instruments by which the gods make this known; and that was Socrates ’ belief too. 1.1.4. Only, whereas most men say that the birds or the folk they meet dissuade or encourage them, Socrates said what he meant: for he said that the deity gave him a sign. Many of his companions were counselled by him to do this or not to do that in accordance with the warnings of the deity: and those who followed his advice prospered, and those who rejected it had cause for regret. 1.1.11. He did not even discuss that topic so favoured by other talkers, the Nature of the Universe : and avoided speculation on the so-called Cosmos of the Professors, how it works, and on the laws that govern the phenomena of the heavens: indeed he would argue that to trouble one’s mind with such problems is sheer folly. 1.1.12. In the first place, he would inquire, did these thinkers suppose that their knowledge of human affairs was so complete that they must seek these new fields for the exercise of their brains; or that it was their duty to neglect human affairs and consider only things divine? 1.1.13. Moreover, he marvelled at their blindness in not seeing that man cannot solve these riddles; since even the most conceited talkers on these problems did not agree in their theories, but behaved to one another like madmen. 1.1.14. As some madmen have no fear of danger and others are afraid where there is nothing to be afraid of, as some will do or say anything in a crowd with no sense of shame, while others shrink even from going abroad among men, some respect neither temple nor altar nor any other sacred thing, others worship stocks and stones and beasts, so is it, he held, with those who worry with Universal Nature. Some hold that What is is one, others that it is infinite in number: some that all things are in perpetual motion, others that nothing can ever be moved at any time: some that all life is birth and decay, others that nothing can ever be born or ever die. 1.1.15. Nor were those the only questions he asked about such theorists. Students of human nature, he said, think that they will apply their knowledge in due course for the good of themselves and any others they choose. Do those who pry into heavenly phenomena imagine that, once they have discovered the laws by which these are produced, they will create at their will winds, waters, seasons and such things to their need? Or have they no such expectation, and are they satisfied with knowing the causes of these various phenomena? 1.1.19. For, like most men, indeed, he believed that the gods are heedful of mankind, but with an important difference; for whereas they do not believe in the omniscience of the gods, Socrates thought that they know all things, our words and deeds and secret purposes; that they are present everywhere, and grant signs to men of all that concerns man. IV. iii, 2; Cyropaedia I. vi. 46. 1.1.20. I wonder, then, how the Athenians can have been persuaded that Socrates was a freethinker, when he never said or did anything contrary to sound religion, and his utterances about the gods and his behaviour towards them were the words and actions of a man who is truly religious and deserves to be thought so. 4.4.2. When chairman in the Assemblies he would not permit the people to record an illegal vote, but, upholding the laws, resisted a popular impulse that might even have overborne any but himself. 4.4.19. Do you know what is meant by unwritten laws, Hippias? Yes, those that are uniformly observed in every country. Could you say that men made them? Nay, how could that be, seeing that they cannot all meet together and do not speak the same language? Then by whom have these laws been made, do you suppose? I think that the gods made these laws for men. For among all men the first law is to fear the gods. 4.4.20. Is not the duty of honouring parents another universal law? Yes, that is another. And that parents shall not have sexual intercourse with their children nor children with their parents? Cyropaedia V. i. 10. No, I don’t think that is a law of God. Why so? Because I notice that some transgress it. 4.4.21. Yes, and they do many other things contrary to the laws. But surely the transgressors of the laws ordained by the gods pay a penalty that a man can in no wise escape, as some, when they transgress the laws ordained by man, escape punishment, either by concealment or by violence. 4.4.22. And pray what sort of penalty is it, Socrates, that may not be avoided by parents and children who have intercourse with one another? The greatest, of course. For what greater penalty can men incur when they beget children than begetting them badly? 4.4.23. How do they beget children badly then, if, as may well happen, the fathers are good men and the mothers good women? Surely because it is not enough that the two parents should be good. They must also be in full bodily vigour: unless you suppose that those who are in full vigour are no more efficient as parents than those who have not yet reached that condition or have passed it. of course that is unlikely. Which are the better then? Those who are in full vigour, clearly. Consequently those who are not in full vigour are not competent to become parents? It is improbable, of course. In that case then, they ought not to have children? Certainly not. Therefore those who produce children in such circumstances produce them wrongly? I think so. Who then will be bad fathers and mothers, if not they? I agree with you there too. 4.4.24. Again, is not the duty of requiting benefits universally recognised by law? Yes, but this law too is broken. Then does not a man pay forfeit for the breach of that law too, in the gradual loss of good friends and the necessity of hunting those who hate him? Or is it not true that, whereas those who benefit an acquaintance are good friends to him, he is hated by them for his ingratitude, if he makes no return, and then, because it is most profitable to enjoy the acquaintance of such men, he hunts them most assiduously? Assuredly, Socrates, all this does suggest the work of the gods. For laws that involve in themselves punishment meet for those who break them, must, I think, be framed by a better legislator than man. |
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