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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



10882
Thucydides, The History Of The Peloponnesian War, 3.43.2


καθέστηκε δὲ τἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐθέος λεγόμενα μηδὲν ἀνυποπτότερα εἶναι τῶν κακῶν, ὥστε δεῖν ὁμοίως τόν τε τὰ δεινότατα βουλόμενον πεῖσαι ἀπάτῃ προσάγεσθαι τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὸν τὰ ἀμείνω λέγοντα ψευσάμενον πιστὸν γενέσθαι.Plain good advice has thus come to be no less suspected than bad; and the advocate of the most monstrous measures is not more obliged to use deceit to gain the people, than the best counsellor is to lie in order to be believed.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

4 results
1. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 2.65.8, 3.38.2, 3.38.4, 3.42.3, 3.42.5, 3.43.4-3.43.5, 6.15.2 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2.65.8. The causes of this are not far to seek. Pericles indeed, by his rank, ability, and known integrity, was enabled to exercise an independent control over the multitude—in short, to lead them instead of being led by them; for as he never sought power by improper means, he was never compelled to flatter them, but, on the contrary, enjoyed so high an estimation that he could afford to anger them by contradiction. 3.38.2. Such a man must plainly either have such confidence in his rhetoric as to adventure to prove that what has been once for all decided is still undetermined, or be bribed to try to delude us by elaborate sophisms. 3.38.4. The persons to blame are you who are so foolish as to institute these contests; who go to see an oration as you would to see a sight, take your facts on hearsay, judge of the practicability of a project by the wit of its advocates, and trust for the truth as to past events not to the fact which you saw more than to the clever strictures which you heard; 3.42.3. What is still more intolerable is to accuse a speaker of making a display in order to be paid for it. If ignorance only were imputed, an unsuccessful speaker might retire with a reputation for honesty, if not for wisdom; while the charge of dishonesty makes him suspected, if successful, and thought, if defeated, not only a fool but a rogue. 3.42.5. The good citizen ought to triumph not by frightening his opponents but by beating them fairly in argument; and a wise city without over-distinguishing its best advisers, will nevertheless not deprive them of their due, and far from punishing an unlucky counsellor will not even regard him as disgraced. 3.43.4. Still, considering the magnitude of the interests involved, and the position of affairs, we orators must make it our business to look a little further than you who judge offhand; especially as we, your advisers, are responsible, while you, our audience, are not so. 3.43.5. For if those who gave the advice, and those who took it, suffered equally, you would judge more calmly; as it is, you visit the disasters into which the whim of the moment may have led you, upon the single person of your adviser, not upon yourselves, his numerous companions in error. 6.15.2. By far the warmest advocate of the expedition was, however, Alcibiades, son of Clinias, who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent and also because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and who was, besides, exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes.
2. Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.7.17, 1.7.19-1.7.20, 1.7.25, 1.7.28-1.7.33 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

1.7.17. I accuse them, because they persuaded their colleagues to change their purpose when they wanted to send a letter to the Senate and to you, in which they stated that they assigned to Theramenes and Thrasybulus, with forty-seven triremes, the duty of picking up the shipwrecked, and that they failed to perform this duty. 1.7.19. No! at least not if you take my advice and follow the just and righteous course, the course which will best enable you to learn the truth and to avoid finding out hereafter, to your sorrow, that it is you yourselves who have sinned most grievously, not only against the gods, but against yourselves. The advice I give you is such that, it you follow it, you cannot be deceived either by me or by anyone else, and that with full knowledge you will punish the guilty with whatever punishment you may desire, either all of them together or each one separately, namely, by first granting them at least one day, if not more, to speak in their own defence, and by putting your trust, not so much in others, but in yourselves. 1.7.20. Now you all know, men of Athens, that the decree of Cannonus is exceedingly severe: it provides that if anyone shall wrong the people of Athens, he shall plead his case in fetters before the people, and if he be adjudged guilty, he shall be put to death by being cast into 406 B.C. the pit, and his property shall be confiscated and the tenth part thereof shall belong to the goddess. 1.7.25. As for yourselves, you will be granting a trial in accordance with the law and standing true to religion and your oaths, and you will not be fighting on the side of the Lacedaemonians by putting to death the men who captured seventy ships from them and defeated them,—by putting to death these men, I say, without a trial, in violation of the law. 1.7.28. You would do a monstrous thing if, after granting in the past to Aristarchus, In 411 B.C. Aristarchus helped to establish the short-lived oligarchical government of the Four Hundred. the destroyer of the democracy and afterwards the betrayer of Oenoe to your enemies the Thebans, a day in which to defend himself as he pleased, and allowing him all his other rights under the law,—if, I say, you shall now deprive the generals, who have done everything to your satisfaction, and have defeated the enemy, of these same rights. 1.7.29. Let no such act be yours, men of Athens, but guard the laws, which are your own and above all else have made you supremely great, and do not try to do anything without their sanction. And now come back to the actual circumstances under which the mistakes are thought to have been committed by the generals. When, after winning the battle, they sailed in to the shore, Diomedon urged that they should one and all put out to sea in line and pick up the wreckage and the shipwrecked men, while Erasinides proposed that all should sail with the utmost speed against the enemy at Mytilene. But Thrasyllus said that both things 406 B.C. would be accomplished if they should leave some of the ships there and should sail with the rest against the enemy; 1.7.30. and if this plan were decided upon, he advised that each of the generals, who were eight in number, should leave behind three ships from his own division, and that they should also leave the ten ships of the taxiarchs, the ten of the Samians, and the three of the nauarchs. These amount all told to forty-seven ships, four for each one of the lost vessels, which were twelve in number. 1.7.31. Among the captains who were left behind were both Thrasybulus and Theramenes, the man who accused the generals at the former meeting of the Assembly. And with the rest of the ships they planned to sail against the enemy’s fleet. Now what one of these acts did they not do adequately and well? It is but just, therefore, that those, on the one hand, who were detailed to go against the enemy should be held to account for their lack of success in dealing with the enemy, and that those, on the other hand, who were detailed to recover the shipwrecked, in case they did not do what the generals ordered, should be tried for not recovering them. 1.7.32. This much, however, I can say in defence of both parties, that the storm absolutely prevented them from doing any of the things which the generals had planned. And as witnesses to this fact you have those who were saved by mere chance, among whom is one of our generals, who came through safely on a disabled ship, and whom they now bid you judge by the same vote (although at that time he needed to be picked up himself) by which you judge those who did not do what they 406 B.C. were ordered to do. 1.7.33. Do not, then, men of Athens, in the face of your victory and your good fortune, act like men who are beaten and unfortunate, nor, in the face of heaven’s visitation, show yourselves unreasonable by giving a verdict of treachery instead of helplessness, since they found themselves unable on account of the storm to do what they had been ordered to do; nay, it would be far more just for you to honour the victors with garlands than, yielding to the persuasions of wicked men, to punish them with death.
3. Xenophon, Memoirs, 4.2.5 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

4.2.5. This exordium might be adapted so as to suit candidates for the office of public physician. They might begin their speeches in this strain: Men of Athens, I have never yet studied medicine, nor sought to find a teacher among our physicians; for I have constantly avoided learning anything from the physicians, and even the appearance of having studied their art. Nevertheless I ask you to appoint me to the office of a physician, and I will endeavour to learn by experimenting on you. The exordium set all the company laughing.
4. Aristotle, Rhetoric, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
abstract nominal phrases in thucydides,vs. active / personal phrasing Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 313
antiphon,anti-rhetoric Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 251
arginusae de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 221
aristotle de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 221
athens de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 221
audience de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 221
cleon Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 168, 251
deception,and deliberation Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 168
deception,and democratic constitution Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 168
deception,association with rhetoric Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 251
deception,suspicion of Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 251
democracy,athenian,and noble lies Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 168
democracy,athenian,thucydides depiction of Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 251
democracy de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 221
demosthenes,on logocentricity Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 168
demosthenes,representation of deceit Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 168
demosthenes,works,on the false embassy Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 168
demosthenes Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 168
diodotus,rhetorical strategy of Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 313
diodotus Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 168, 251
emotions,anger/rage de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 221
emotions,anger management de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 221
euryptolemus de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 221
noble lie Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 168
pericles,and balance Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 313
pericles,antitheses involving γνώμη in speeches of Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 313
rhetoric,of anti-rhetoric Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 251
speech,and narrative' de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 221
thucydides,and anti-rhetoric Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 251
thucydides,on mytilenean debate Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 168, 251
thucydides,on paradox of honest liar Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 251
topoi,and interplay with creative strategy Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 168
γνώμη (and γιγνώσκω),and antithesis Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 313
γνώμη (and γιγνώσκω),championed by pericles Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 313