Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

10882

Thucydides, The History Of The Peloponnesian War, 3.42.1

‘οὔτε τοὺς προθέντας τὴν διαγνώμην αὖθις περὶ Μυτιληναίων αἰτιῶμαι, οὔτε τοὺς μεμφομένους μὴ πολλάκις περὶ τῶν μεγίστων βουλεύεσθαι ἐπαινῶ, νομίζω δὲ δύο τὰ ἐναντιώτατα εὐβουλίᾳ εἶναι, τάχος τε καὶ ὀργήν, ὧν τὸ μὲν μετὰ ἀνοίας φιλεῖ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ μετὰ ἀπαιδευσίας καὶ βραχύτητος γνώμης. ‘I do not blame the persons who have reopened the case of the Mitylenians, nor do I approve the protests which we have heard against important questions being frequently debated. I think the two things most opposed to good counsel are haste and passion; haste usually goes hand in hand with folly, passion with coarseness and narrowness of mind.

Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

3 results
1. Plato, Apology of Socrates, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
2. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 1.44.1, 1.76.2, 2.59.3, 2.60.1, 3.36.4, 3.38.1, 3.42.3, 3.42.5, 3.43.4-3.43.5, 3.44.4, 3.45.6, 3.46.1, 3.49.1, 5.87, 5.103.2, 5.113, 6.15.2, 8.1.1 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) 1.44.1. Such were the words of the Corinthians. When the Athenians had heard both out, two assemblies were held. In the first there was a manifest disposition to listen to the representations of Corinth ; in the second, public feeling had changed, and an alliance with Corcyra was decided on, with certain reservations. It was to be a defensive, not an offensive alliance. It did not involve a breach of the treaty with Peloponnese : Athens could not be required to join Corcyra in any attack upon Corinth . But each of the contracting parties had a right to the other's assistance against invasion, whether of his own territory, or that of an ally. 1.76.2. It follows that it was not a very wonderful action, or contrary to the common practice of mankind, if we did accept an empire that was offered to us, and refused to give it up under the pressure of three of the strongest motives, fear, honor, and interest. And it was not we who set the example, for it has always been the law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger. Besides, we believed ourselves to be worthy of our position, and so you thought us till now, when calculations of interest have made you take up the cry of justice—a consideration which no one ever yet brought forward to hinder his ambition when he had a chance of gaining anything by might. 2.59.3. When he saw them exasperated at the present turn of affairs and acting exactly as he had anticipated, he called an assembly, being (it must be remembered) still general, with the double object of restoring confidence and of leading them from these angry feelings to a calmer and more hopeful state of mind. He accordingly came forward and spoke as follows: 2.60.1. ‘I was not unprepared for the indignation of which I have been the object, as I know its causes; and I have called an assembly for the purpose of reminding you upon certain points, and of protesting against your being unreasonably irritated with me, or cowed by your sufferings. 3.36.4. The morrow brought repentance with it and reflection on the horrid cruelty of a decree, which condemned a whole city to the fate merited only by the guilty. 3.38.1. For myself, I adhere to my former opinion, and wonder at those who have proposed to reopen the case of the Mitylenians, and who are thus causing a delay which is all in favour of the guilty, by making the sufferer proceed against the offender with the edge of his anger blunted; although where vengeance follows most closely upon the wrong, it best equals it and most amply requites it. I wonder also who will be the man who will maintain the contrary, and will pretend to show that the crimes of the Mitylenians are of service to us, and our misfortunes injurious to the allies. 3.42.3. What is still more intolerable is to accuse a speaker of making a display in order to be paid for it. If ignorance only were imputed, an unsuccessful speaker might retire with a reputation for honesty, if not for wisdom; while the charge of dishonesty makes him suspected, if successful, and thought, if defeated, not only a fool but a rogue. 3.42.5. The good citizen ought to triumph not by frightening his opponents but by beating them fairly in argument; and a wise city without over-distinguishing its best advisers, will nevertheless not deprive them of their due, and far from punishing an unlucky counsellor will not even regard him as disgraced. 3.43.4. Still, considering the magnitude of the interests involved, and the position of affairs, we orators must make it our business to look a little further than you who judge offhand; especially as we, your advisers, are responsible, while you, our audience, are not so. 3.43.5. For if those who gave the advice, and those who took it, suffered equally, you would judge more calmly; as it is, you visit the disasters into which the whim of the moment may have led you, upon the single person of your adviser, not upon yourselves, his numerous companions in error. 3.44.4. And I require you not to reject my useful considerations for his specious ones: his speech may have the attraction of seeming the more just in your present temper against Mitylene ; but we are not in a court of justice, but in a political assembly; and the question is not justice, but how to make the Mitylenians useful to Athens . 3.45.6. Fortune, too, powerfully helps the delusion, and by the unexpected aid that she sometimes lends, tempts men to venture with inferior means; and this is especially the case with communities, because the stakes played for are the highest, freedom or empire, and, when all are acting together, each man irrationally magnifies his own capacity. 3.46.1. We must not, therefore, commit ourselves to a false policy through a belief in the efficacy of the punishment of death, or exclude rebels from the hope of repentance and an early atonement of their error. 3.49.1. Such were the words of Diodotus. The two opinions thus expressed were the ones that most directly contradicted each other; and the Athenians, notwithstanding their change of feeling, now proceeded to a division, in which the show of hands was almost equal, although the motion of Diodotus carried the day. 5.103.2. Let not this be the case with you, who are weak and hang on a single turn of the scale; nor be like the vulgar, who, abandoning such security as human means may still afford, when visible hopes fail them in extremity, turn to invisible, to prophecies and oracles, and other such inventions that delude men with hopes to their destruction.’ 6.15.2. By far the warmest advocate of the expedition was, however, Alcibiades, son of Clinias, who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent and also because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and who was, besides, exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes. 8.1.1. Such were the events in Sicily . When the news was brought to Athens, for a long while they disbelieved even the most respectable of the soldiers who had themselves escaped from the scene of action and clearly reported the matter, a destruction so complete not being thought credible. When the conviction was forced upon them, they were angry with the orators who had joined in promoting the expedition, just as if they had not themselves voted it, and were enraged also with the reciters of oracles and soothsayers, and all other omenmongers of the time who had encouraged them to hope that they should conquer Sicily .
3. Xenophon, Hellenica, 1.7.12, 1.7.15, 1.7.19-1.7.23, 1.7.26-1.7.27, 1.7.31, 1.7.33-1.7.35 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) 1.7.12. Now Euryptolemus, the son of Peisianax, and some others served a summons upon Callixeinus, alleging that he had made an unconstitutional proposal. And some of the people applauded this act, but the greater number cried out that it was monstrous if the people were to be prevented from doing whatever they wished. 1.7.15. Then the Prytanes, stricken with fear, agreed to put the question,—all of them except Socrates, On Socrates’ conduct at this time cp. Plato, Apol. 32B and Xen. Mem. I. i. 18. the son of Sophroniscus; and he said that in no case would he act except in accordance with the law. 1.7.19. No! at least not if you take my advice and follow the just and righteous course, the course which will best enable you to learn the truth and to avoid finding out hereafter, to your sorrow, that it is you yourselves who have sinned most grievously, not only against the gods, but against yourselves. The advice I give you is such that, it you follow it, you cannot be deceived either by me or by anyone else, and that with full knowledge you will punish the guilty with whatever punishment you may desire, either all of them together or each one separately, namely, by first granting them at least one day, if not more, to speak in their own defence, and by putting your trust, not so much in others, but in yourselves. 1.7.20. Now you all know, men of Athens, that the decree of Cannonus is exceedingly severe: it provides that if anyone shall wrong the people of Athens, he shall plead his case in fetters before the people, and if he be adjudged guilty, he shall be put to death by being cast into 406 B.C. the pit, and his property shall be confiscated and the tenth part thereof shall belong to the goddess. 1.7.21. Under this decree I urge you to try the generals, and, by Zeus, if it so please you, Pericles, my kinsman, first of them all; for it would be base for me to think more of him than of the general interests of the state. 1.7.22. Or if you do not wish to do this, try them under the following law, which applies to temple-robbers and traitors: namely, if anyone shall be a traitor to the state or shall steal sacred property, he shall be tried before a court, and if he be convicted, he shall not be buried in Attica, and his property shall be confiscated. 1.7.23. By whichever of these laws you choose, men of Athens, let the men be tried, each one separately, It was a general principle of Athenian law—perhaps specifically stated in the decree of Cannonus (see above)—that each accused person had the right to a separate trial. and let the day be divided into three parts, one wherein you shall gather and vote as to whether you judge them guilty or not, another wherein the accusers shall present their case, and another wherein the accused shall make their defence. 1.7.26. What is it, pray, that you fear, that you are in such 406 B.C. excessive haste? Do you fear lest you will lose the right to put to death and set free anyone you please if you proceed in accordance with the law, but think that you will retain this right if you proceed in violation of the law, by the method which Callixeinus persuaded the Senate to report to the people, that is, by a single vote? 1.7.27. Yes, but you might possibly be putting to death some one who is really innocent; and repentance afterwards—ah, remember how painful and unavailing it always is, and especially when one’s error has brought about a man’s death. 1.7.31. Among the captains who were left behind were both Thrasybulus and Theramenes, the man who accused the generals at the former meeting of the Assembly. And with the rest of the ships they planned to sail against the enemy’s fleet. Now what one of these acts did they not do adequately and well? It is but just, therefore, that those, on the one hand, who were detailed to go against the enemy should be held to account for their lack of success in dealing with the enemy, and that those, on the other hand, who were detailed to recover the shipwrecked, in case they did not do what the generals ordered, should be tried for not recovering them. 1.7.33. Do not, then, men of Athens, in the face of your victory and your good fortune, act like men who are beaten and unfortunate, nor, in the face of heaven’s visitation, show yourselves unreasonable by giving a verdict of treachery instead of helplessness, since they found themselves unable on account of the storm to do what they had been ordered to do; nay, it would be far more just for you to honour the victors with garlands than, yielding to the persuasions of wicked men, to punish them with death. 1.7.34. When Euryptolemus had thus spoken, he offered a resolution that the men be tried under the decree of Cannonus, each one separately; whereas the proposal of the Senate was to judge them all by a single vote. The vote being now taken as between these two proposals, they decided at first in favour of the resolution of Euryptolemus; but when Menecles interposed an objection under oath Apparently questioning the legality of Euryptolemus’ proposal. Under the law such an objection should have suspended the consideration of the matter before the Assembly, but in this case it seems to have had no such result. and a second vote was taken, they decided in favour of that of the Senate. After this they condemned the generals who took part in the battle, eight in all; and the six who were in Athens were put to death. 1.7.35. And not long afterwards the Athenians repented, and they voted that complaints A προβολή was a complaint presented to the Assembly, alleging an offence against the state. The Assembly, acting as a grand jury, might then hold the accused for trial before a court. be brought against any who had deceived the people, that they furnish bondsmen men until such time as they should be brought to 406 B.C. trial, and that Callixeinus be included among them. Complaints were brought against four others also, and they were put into confinement by their bondsmen. But when there broke out afterwards a factional disturbance, in the course of which Cleophon A popular leader of the democratic party. was put to death, these men escaped, before being brought to trial; Callixeinus indeed returned, at the time when the Piraeus party returned to the city, i.e., in the restoration which followed the overthrow of the Thirty Tyrants ( Xen. Hell. 2.4.39-43 ). but he was hated by everybody and died of starvation.

Subjects of this text:

subject	book bibliographic info
abstract nominal phrases in thucydides,and events and circumstances presented as quasi-agents	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 231
abstract nominal phrases in thucydides,and passive phrases / shades of meaning	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 231
abstract nominal phrases in thucydides,and perfect forms with static implications	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 231
abstract nominal phrases in thucydides,as subjects	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 231
abstract nominal phrases in thucydides,circumstances / conditions / states of affairs stressed by	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 231
abstract nominal phrases in thucydides,vs. active / personal phrasing	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 231
antiphon,anti-rhetoric	Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 250
arginusae	de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 219
athens	de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 219
athens and athenians,and corcyrean alliance	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 227
athens and athenians,and mytilenean revolt	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 227, 229
athens and athenians,justice as concern of	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 229
athens and athenians,vs. spartans	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 229
choice (primarily in thucydides),and freedom	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 298
choice (primarily in thucydides),impairment / erasure of	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 298
choice (primarily in thucydides),scope for	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 227, 231
cleon,irrationality championed by	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 231
cleon	Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 250
deception,association with rhetoric	Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 250
deception,suspicion of	Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 250
democracy,athenian,thucydides depiction of	Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 250
democracy	de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 219
diodotus,and greatest things (freedom or dominion over others)	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 229, 231
diodotus,rhetorical strategy of	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 229, 231
diodotus,vs. cleon	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 229
diodotus,ὀργή defeated by	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 227
diodotus	Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 250
emotions,anger/rage	de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 219
emotions,anger management	de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 219
euryptolemus	de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 219
gorgias,and ekplexis	Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 250
gorgias,and thucydides	Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 250
homer,plan of zeus in	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 229
individuals,withstanding necessity	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 227
invisible things (τὰ ἀφανῆ)	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 298
irrational impulses,and choice	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 231, 298
irrational impulses,and human nature	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 231, 298
irrational impulses,dominating intellect	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 298
mytilene,secession of	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 231
mytilene	de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 219
necessity (in thucydides),and dual motivation model	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 227
parody	de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 219
pericles,exceptionality of	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 298
pericles,prevailing over irrationality	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 227
plataea and plataeans	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 229
quest for power,and self-preservation	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 231
remorse	de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 219
rhetoric,as flattery	Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 250
rhetoric,of anti-rhetoric	Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 250
socrates	de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 219
sparta and spartans,and plataea	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 229
sparta and spartans,responsibility for peloponnesian war	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 227
speech,and narrative	de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 219
thracian allies of athens	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 298
thucydides,and anti-rhetoric	Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 250
thucydides,on mytilenean debate	Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 250
thucydides,on paradox of honest liar	Hesk (2000), Deception and Democracy in Classical Athens, 250
thucydides	de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 219
xenophon'	de Bakker, van den Berg, and Klooster (2022), Emotions and Narrative in Ancient Literature and Beyond, 219
ἐλπίς (hope or expectation) and ἐλπίζω and εὔελπις,and thracian allies	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 298
ὀργή and ὀργίζομαι	Joho (2022), Style and Necessity in Thucydides, 227