Home About Network of subjects Linked subjects heatmap Book indices included Search by subject Search by reference Browse subjects Browse texts

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



10882
Thucydides, The History Of The Peloponnesian War, 1.73-1.79


nanThe object of our mission here was not to argue with your allies, but to attend to the matters on which our State despatched us. However, the vehemence of the outcry that we hear against us has prevailed on us to come forward. It is not to combat the accusations of the cities — indeed you are not the judges before whom either we or they can plead — but to prevent your taking the wrong course on matters of great importance by yielding too readily to the persuasions of your allies. We also wish to show on a review of the whole indictment that we have a fair title to our possessions, and that our country has claims to consideration. 2 We need not refer to remote antiquity: there we could appeal to the voice of tradition, but not to the experience of our audience. But to the Median war and contemporary history we must refer, although we are rather tired of continually bringing this subject forward. In our action during that war we ran great risk to obtain certain advantages: you had your share in the solid results, do not try to rob us of all share in the good that the glory may do us. 3 However, the story shall be told not so much to deprecate hostility as to testify against it, and to show, if you are so ill-advised as to enter into a struggle with Athens, what sort of an antagonist she is likely to prove. 4 We assert that at Marathon we were at the front, and faced the barbarian single-handed. That when he came the second time, unable to cope with him by land we went on board our ships with all our people, and joined in the action at Salamis. This prevented his taking the Peloponnesian states in detail, and ravaging them with his fleet; when the multitude of his vessels would have made any combination for self-defence impossible. 5 The best proof of this was furnished by the invader himself. Defeated at sea, he considered his power to be no longer what it had been, and retired as speedily as possible with the greater part of his army.


nannan, The object of our mission here was not to argue with your allies, but to attend to the matters on which our State despatched us. However, the vehemence of the outcry that we hear against us has prevailed on us to come forward. It is not to combat the accusations of the cities (indeed you are not the judges before whom either we or they can plead), but to prevent your taking the wrong course on matters of great importance by yielding too readily to the persuasions of your allies. We also wish to show on a review of the whole indictment that we have a fair title to our possessions, and that our country has claims to consideration. ,We need not refer to remote antiquity: there we could appeal to the voice of tradition, but not to the experience of our audience. But to the Median war and contemporary history we must refer, although we are rather tired of continually bringing this subject forward. In our action during that war we ran great risk to obtain certain advantages: you had your share in the solid results, do not try to rob us of all share in the good that the glory may do us. ,However, the story shall be told not so much to deprecate hostility as to testify against it, and to show, if you are so ill-advised as to enter into a struggle with Athens, what sort of an antagonist she is likely to prove. ,We assert that at Marathon we were at the front, and faced the barbarian single-handed. That when he came the second time, unable to cope with him by land we went on board our ships with all our people, and joined in the action at Salamis . This prevented his taking the Peloponnesian states in detail, and ravaging them with his fleet; when the multitude of his vessels would have made any combination for self-defence impossible. ,The best proof of this was furnished by the invader himself. Defeated at sea, he considered his power to be no longer what it had been, and retired as speedily as possible with the greater part of his army.


nanSuch, then, was the result of the matter, and it was clearly proved that it was on the fleet of Hellas that her cause depended. Well, to this result we contributed three very useful elements, viz. the largest number of ships, the ablest commander, and the most unhesitating patriotism. Our contingent of ships was little less than two-thirds of the whole four hundred; the commander was Themistocles, through whom chiefly it was that the battle took place in the straits, the acknowledged salvation of our cause. Indeed, this was the reason of your receiving him with honors such as had never been accorded to any foreign visitor. 2 While for daring patriotism we had no competitors. Receiving no reinforcements from behind, seeing everything in front of us already subjugated, we had the spirit, after abandoning our city, after sacrificing our property — instead of deserting the remainder of the league or depriving them of our services by dispersing — to throw ourselves into our ships and meet the danger, without a thought of resenting your neglect to assist us. 3 We assert, therefore, that we conferred on you quite as much as we received. For you had a stake to fight for; the cities which you had left were still filled with your homes, and you had the prospect of enjoying them again; and your coming was prompted quite as much by fear for yourselves as for us; at all events, you never appeared till we had nothing left to lose. But we left behind us a city that was a city no longer, and staked our lives for a city that had an existence only in desperate hope, and so bore our full share in your deliverance and in ours. 4 But if we had copied others, and allowed fears for our territory to make us give in our adhesion to the Mede before you came, or if we had suffered our ruin to break our spirit and prevent us embarking in our ships, your naval inferiority would have made a sea-fight unnecessary, and his objects would have been peaceably attained.


nannan, Such, then, was the result of the matter, and it was clearly proved that it was on the fleet of Hellas that her cause depended. Well, to this result we contributed three very useful elements, viz. the largest number of ships, the ablest commander, and the most unhesitating patriotism. Our contingent of ships was little less than two-thirds of the whole four hundred; the commander was Themistocles, through whom chiefly it was that the battle took place in the straits, the acknowledged salvation of our cause. Indeed, this was the reason of your receiving him with honors such as had never been accorded to any foreign visitor. ,While for daring patriotism we had no competitors. Receiving no reinforcements from behind, seeing everything in front of us already subjugated, we had the spirit, after abandoning our city, after sacrificing our property (instead of deserting the remainder of the league or depriving them of our services by dispersing), to throw ourselves into our ships and meet the danger, without a thought of resenting your neglect to assist us. ,We assert, therefore, that we conferred on you quite as much as we received. For you had a stake to fight for; the cities which you had left were still filled with your homes, and you had the prospect of enjoying them again; and your coming was prompted quite as much by fear for yourselves as for us; at all events, you never appeared till we had nothing left to lose. But we left behind us a city that was a city no longer, and staked our lives for a city that had an existence only in desperate hope, and so bore our full share in your deliverance and in ours. ,But if we had copied others, and allowed fears for our territory to make us give in our adhesion to the Mede before you came, or if we had suffered our ruin to break our spirit and prevent us embarking in our ships, your naval inferiority would have made a sea-fight unnecessary, and his objects would have been peaceably attained.


nanSurely, Lacedaemonians, neither by the patriotism that we displayed at that crisis, nor by the wisdom of our counsels, do we merit our extreme unpopularity with the Hellenes, not at least unpopularity for our empire. 2 That empire we acquired by no violent means, but because you were unwilling to prosecute to its conclusion the war against the barbarian, and because the allies attached themselves to us and spontaneously asked us to assume the command. 3 And the nature of the case first compelled us to advance our empire to its present height; fear being our principal motive, though honor and interest afterwards came in. 4 And at last, when almost all hated us, when some had already revolted and had been subdued, when you had ceased to be the friends that you once were, and had become objects of suspicion and dislike, it appeared no longer safe to give up our empire; especially as all who left us would fall to you. 5 And no one can quarrel with a people for making, in matters of tremendous risk, the best provision that it can for its interest.


nannan, Surely, Lacedaemonians, neither by the patriotism that we displayed at that crisis, nor by the wisdom of our counsels, do we merit our extreme unpopularity with the Hellenes, not at least unpopularity for our empire. ,That empire we acquired by no violent means, but because you were unwilling to prosecute to its conclusion the war against the barbarian, and because the allies attached themselves to us and spontaneously asked us to assume the command. ,And the nature of the case first compelled us to advance our empire to its present height; fear being our principal motive, though honor and interest afterwards came in. ,And at last, when almost all hated us, when some had already revolted and had been subdued, when you had ceased to be the friends that you once were, and had become objects of suspicion and dislike, it appeared no longer safe to give up our empire; especially as all who left us would fall to you. ,And no one can quarrel with a people for making, in matters of tremendous risk, the best provision that it can for its interest.


nanYou, at all events, Lacedaemonians, have used your supremacy to settle the states in Peloponnese as is agreeable to you. And if at the period of which we were speaking you had persevered to the end of the matter, and had incurred hatred in your command, we are sure that you would have made yourselves just as galling to the allies, and would have been forced to choose between a strong government and danger to yourselves. 2 It follows that it was not a very wonderful action, or contrary to the common practice of mankind, if we did accept an empire that was offered to us, and refused to give it up under the pressure of three of the strongest motives, fear, honor, and interest. And it was not we who set the example, for it has always been the law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger. Besides, we believed ourselves to be worthy of our position, and so you thought us till now, when calculations of interest have made you take up the cry of justice — a consideration which no one ever yet brought forward to hinder his ambition when he had a chance of gaining anything by might. 3 And praise is due to all who, if not so superior to human nature as to refuse dominion, yet respect justice more than their position compels them to do. 4 We imagine that our moderation would be best demonstrated by the conduct of others who should be placed in our position; but even our equity has very unreasonably subjected us to condemnation instead of approval.


nannan, You, at all events, Lacedaemonians, have used your supremacy to settle the states in Peloponnese as is agreeable to you. And if at the period of which we were speaking you had persevered to the end of the matter, and had incurred hatred in your command, we are sure that you would have made yourselves just as galling to the allies, and would have been forced to choose between a strong government and danger to yourselves. ,It follows that it was not a very wonderful action, or contrary to the common practice of mankind, if we did accept an empire that was offered to us, and refused to give it up under the pressure of three of the strongest motives, fear, honor, and interest. And it was not we who set the example, for it has always been the law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger. Besides, we believed ourselves to be worthy of our position, and so you thought us till now, when calculations of interest have made you take up the cry of justice—a consideration which no one ever yet brought forward to hinder his ambition when he had a chance of gaining anything by might. ,And praise is due to all who, if not so superior to human nature as to refuse dominion, yet respect justice more than their position compels them to do. , We imagine that our moderation would be best demonstrated by the conduct of others who should be placed in our position; but even our equity has very unreasonably subjected us to condemnation instead of approval.


nanOur abatement of our rights in the contract trials with our allies, and our causing them to be decided by impartial laws at Athens, have gained us the character of being litigious. 2 And none care to inquire why this reproach is not brought against other imperial powers, who treat their subjects with less moderation than we do; the secret being that where force can be used, law is not needed. 3 But our subjects are so habituated to associate with us as equals, that any defeat whatever that clashes with their notions of justice, whether it proceeds from a legal judgment or from the power which our empire gives us, makes them forget to be grateful for being allowed to retain most of their possessions, and more vexed at a part being taken, than if we had from the first cast law aside and openly gratified our covetousness. If we had done so, not even would they have disputed that the weaker must give way to the stronger. 4 Men's indignation, it seems, is more excited by legal wrong than by violent wrong; the first looks like being cheated by an equal, the second like being compelled by a superior. 5 At all events they contrived to put up with much worse treatment than this from the Mede, yet they think our rule severe, and this is to be expected, for the present always weighs heavy on the conquered. This at least is certain. 6 If you were to succeed in overthrowing us and in taking our place, you would speedily lose the popularity with which fear of us has invested you, if your policy of today is at all to tally with the sample that you gave of it during the brief period of your command against the Mede. Not only is your life at home regulated by rules and institutions incompatible with those of others, but your citizens abroad act neither on these rules nor on those which are recognized by the rest of Hellas.


nannan,Our abatement of our rights in the contract trials with our allies, and our causing them to be decided by impartial laws at Athens, have gained us the character of being litigious. ,And none care to inquire why this reproach is not brought against other imperial powers, who treat their subjects with less moderation than we do; the secret being that where force can be used, law is not needed. ,But our subjects are so habituated to associate with us as equals, that any defeat whatever that clashes with their notions of justice, whether it proceeds from a legal judgment or from the power which our empire gives us, makes them forget to be grateful for being allowed to retain most of their possessions, and more vexed at a part being taken, than if we had from the first cast law aside and openly gratified our covetousness. If we had done so, not even would they have disputed that the weaker must give way to the stronger. ,Men's indignation, it seems, is more excited by legal wrong than by violent wrong; the first looks like being cheated by an equal, the second like being compelled by a superior. ,At all events they contrived to put up with much worse treatment than this from the Mede, yet they think our rule severe, and this is to be expected, for the present always weighs heavy on the conquered. This at least is certain. ,If you were to succeed in overthrowing us and in taking our place, you would speedily lose the popularity with which fear of us has invested you, if your policy of to-day is at all to tally with the sample that you gave of it during the brief period of your command against the Mede . Not only is your life at home regulated by rules and institutions incompatible with those of others, but your citizens abroad act neither on these rules nor on those which are recognized by the rest of Hellas .


nanTake time then in forming your resolution, as the matter is of great importance; and do not be persuaded by the opinions and complaints of others to bring trouble on yourselves, but consider the vast influence of accident in war, before you are engaged in it. 2 As it continues, it generally becomes an affair of chances, chances from which neither of us is exempt, and whose event we must risk in the dark. 3 It is a common mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong end, to act first, and wait for disaster to discuss the matter. 4 But we are not yet by any means so misguided, nor, so far as we can see, are you; accordingly, while it is still open to us both to choose aright, we bid you not to dissolve the treaty, or to break your oaths, but to have our differences settled by arbitration according to our agreement. Or else we take the gods who heard the oaths to witness, and if you begin hostilities, whatever line of action you choose, we will try not to be behindhand in repelling you.'


nannan, Take time then in forming your resolution, as the matter is of great importance; and do not be persuaded by the opinions and complaints of others to bring trouble on yourselves, but consider the vast influence of accident in war, before you are engaged in it. ,As it continues, it generally becomes an affair of chances, chances from which neither of us is exempt, and whose event we must risk in the dark. ,It is a common mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong end, to act first, and wait for disaster to discuss the matter. ,But we are not yet by any means so misguided, nor, so far as we can see, are you; accordingly, while it is still open to us both to choose aright, we bid you not to dissolve the treaty, or to break your oaths, but to have our differences settled by arbitration according to our agreement. Or else we take the gods who heard the oaths to witness, and if you begin hostilities, whatever line of action you choose, we will try not to be behindhand in repelling you.’


nanSuch were the words of the Athenians. After the Lacedaemonians had heard the complaints of the allies against the Athenians, and the observations of the latter, they made all withdraw, and consulted by themselves on the question before them. 2 The opinions of the majority all led to the same conclusion; the Athenians were open aggressors, and war must be declared at once. But Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king, came forward, who had the reputation of being at once a wise and a moderate man, and made the following speech: -


nannan, Such were the words of the Athenians. After the Lacedaemonians had heard the complaints of the allies against the Athenians, and the observations of the latter, they made all withdraw, and consulted by themselves on the question before them. ,The opinions of the majority all led to the same conclusion; the Athenians were open aggressors, and war must be declared at once. But Archidamus, the Lacedaemonian king, came forward, who had the reputation of being at once a wise and a moderate man, and made the following speech:—


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

7 results
1. Hesiod, Works And Days, 618-694, 411 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)

411. In time when first your sickles for the field
2. Aristophanes, Clouds, 64-70, 63 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

63. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἵππον προσετίθει πρὸς τοὔνομα
3. Herodotus, Histories, 1.64.1-1.64.2 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)

1.64.1. The Athenians did, and by this means Pisistratus gained Athens for the third time, rooting his sovereignty in a strong guard and revenue collected both from Athens and from the district of the river Strymon, and he took hostage the sons of the Athenians who remained and did not leave the city at once, and placed these in Naxos . 1.64.2. (He had conquered Naxos too and put Lygdamis in charge.) And besides this, he purified the island of Delos as a result of oracles, and this is how he did it: he removed all the dead that were buried in ground within sight of the temple and conveyed them to another part of Delos .
4. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 1.3, 1.17, 1.20, 1.22.4, 1.24, 1.30, 1.32-1.43, 1.46, 1.66, 1.68-1.72, 1.70.3, 1.71.3, 1.74-1.117, 1.75.2, 1.75.4, 1.76.1-1.76.3, 1.120, 1.124, 1.126-1.139, 2.15, 2.39-2.40, 2.48.3, 2.59, 2.63.2, 2.65.11-2.65.12, 3.30, 3.36-3.50, 3.37.2, 3.53-3.67, 4.17-4.20, 4.59-4.64, 4.65.4, 4.85-4.87, 4.92, 5.84-5.111, 6.5, 6.31-6.32, 6.54-6.59, 6.85.1, 8.96.5 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

1.22.4. The absence of romance in my history will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it, I shall be content. In fine, I have written my work, not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession for all time. 1.70.3. Again, they are adventurous beyond their power, and daring beyond their judgment, and in danger they are sanguine; your wont is to attempt less than is justified by your power, to mistrust even what is sanctioned by your judgment, and to fancy that from danger there is no release. 1.71.3. It is the law as in art, so in politics, that improvements ever prevail; and though fixed usages may be best for undisturbed communities, constant necessities of action must be accompanied by the constant improvement of methods. Thus it happens that the vast experience of Athens has carried her further than you on the path of innovation. 1.75.2. That empire we acquired by no violent means, but because you were unwilling to prosecute to its conclusion the war against the barbarian, and because the allies attached themselves to us and spontaneously asked us to assume the command. 1.75.4. And at last, when almost all hated us, when some had already revolted and had been subdued, when you had ceased to be the friends that you once were, and had become objects of suspicion and dislike, it appeared no longer safe to give up our empire; especially as all who left us would fall to you. 1.76.1. You, at all events, Lacedaemonians, have used your supremacy to settle the states in Peloponnese as is agreeable to you. And if at the period of which we were speaking you had persevered to the end of the matter, and had incurred hatred in your command, we are sure that you would have made yourselves just as galling to the allies, and would have been forced to choose between a strong government and danger to yourselves. 1.76.2. It follows that it was not a very wonderful action, or contrary to the common practice of mankind, if we did accept an empire that was offered to us, and refused to give it up under the pressure of three of the strongest motives, fear, honor, and interest. And it was not we who set the example, for it has always been the law that the weaker should be subject to the stronger. Besides, we believed ourselves to be worthy of our position, and so you thought us till now, when calculations of interest have made you take up the cry of justice—a consideration which no one ever yet brought forward to hinder his ambition when he had a chance of gaining anything by might. 1.76.3. And praise is due to all who, if not so superior to human nature as to refuse dominion, yet respect justice more than their position compels them to do. 2.48.3. All speculation as to its origin and its causes, if causes can be found adequate to produce so great a disturbance, I leave to other writers, whether lay or professional; for myself, I shall simply set down its nature, and explain the symptoms by which perhaps it may be recognized by the student, if it should ever break out again. This I can the better do, as I had the disease myself, and watched its operation in the case of others. 2.63.2. Besides, to recede is no longer possible, if indeed any of you in the alarm of the moment has become enamored of the honesty of such an unambitious part. For what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny; to take it perhaps was wrong, but to let it go is unsafe. 2.65.11. This, as might have been expected in a great and sovereign state, produced a host of blunders, and amongst them the Sicilian expedition; though this failed not so much through a miscalculation of the power of those against whom it was sent, as through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures afterwards to assist those who had gone out, but choosing rather to occupy themselves with private cabals for the leadership of the commons, by which they not only paralyzed operations in the field, but also first introduced civil discord at home. 2.65.12. Yet after losing most of their fleet besides other forces in Sicily, and with faction already domit in the city, they could still for three years make head against their original adversaries, joined not only by the Sicilians, but also by their own allies nearly all in revolt, and at last by the king's son, Cyrus, who furnished the funds for the Peloponnesian navy. Nor did they finally succumb till they fell the victims of their own intestine disorders. 4.65.4. So thoroughly had the present prosperity persuaded the citizens that nothing could withstand them, and that they could achieve what was possible and impracticable alike, with means ample or inadequate it mattered not. The secret of this was their general extraordinary success, which made them confuse their strength with their hopes. 8.96.5. But here, as on so many other occasions the Lacedaemonians proved the most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to be at war with. The wide difference between the two characters, the slowness and want of energy of the Lacedaemonians as contrasted with the dash and enterprise of their opponents, proved of the greatest service, especially to a maritime empire like Athens . Indeed this was shown by the Syracusans, who were most like the Athenians in character, and also most successful in combating them.
5. Aristotle, Athenian Constitution, 15.2 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

6. Aristotle, Politics, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

7. Pausanias, Description of Greece, 1.29.6 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

1.29.6. Before the monument is a slab on which are horsemen fighting. Their names are Melanopus and Macartatus, who met their death fighting against the Lacedaemonians and Boeotians on the borders of Eleon and Tanagra . There is also a grave of Thessalian horsemen who, by reason of an old alliance, came when the Peloponnesians with Archidamus invaded Attica with an army for the first time 431 B.C., and hard by that of Cretan bowmen. Again there are monuments to Athenians: to Cleisthenes, who invented the system of the tribes at present existing 508 B.C., and to horsemen who died when the Thessalians shared the fortune of war with the Athenians.


Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
"historiography, classical" Hau, Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus Siculus (2017) 201
"moralising, intertextual" Hau, Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus Siculus (2017) 201
"moralising, macro-level" Hau, Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus Siculus (2017) 201
ability to handle good fortune Hau, Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus Siculus (2017) 201
agricultural calendar Kirichenko, Greek Literature and the Ideal: The Pragmatics of Space from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Age (2022) 88
agriculture, as a metapoetic metaphor in hesiod Kirichenko, Greek Literature and the Ideal: The Pragmatics of Space from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Age (2022) 88
alcibiades Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 259, 449
arrogance Hau, Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus Siculus (2017) 201
athens/athenians Kingsley Monti and Rood, The Authoritative Historian: Tradition and Innovation in Ancient Historiography (2022) 265
athens Papaioannou Serafim and Demetriou, The Ancient Art of Persuasion across Genres and Topics (2019) 92
attica Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 669
authority, poetic Kirichenko, Greek Literature and the Ideal: The Pragmatics of Space from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Age (2022) 88
brasidas Papaioannou Serafim and Demetriou, The Ancient Art of Persuasion across Genres and Topics (2019) 92
cleon Kingsley Monti and Rood, The Authoritative Historian: Tradition and Innovation in Ancient Historiography (2022) 265; Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 271
contingency Kirichenko, Greek Literature and the Ideal: The Pragmatics of Space from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Age (2022) 88
corcyra Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 259, 669
corcyraeans Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 259
corinth Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 259, 669
corinthian gulf Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 449
debate Papaioannou Serafim and Demetriou, The Ancient Art of Persuasion across Genres and Topics (2019) 92
diodotus Kingsley Monti and Rood, The Authoritative Historian: Tradition and Innovation in Ancient Historiography (2022) 265
epidamnos Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 259
eris Kirichenko, Greek Literature and the Ideal: The Pragmatics of Space from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Age (2022) 88
food Kirichenko, Greek Literature and the Ideal: The Pragmatics of Space from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Age (2022) 88
herodotus Hau, Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus Siculus (2017) 201; Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 751
hesiod Kirichenko, Greek Literature and the Ideal: The Pragmatics of Space from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Age (2022) 88
hipparchos, son peisistratos Lalone, Athena Itonia: Geography and Meaning of an Ancient Greek War Goddess (2019) 195
hipparchos (son of peisistratus) Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 669
hippias, tyrant, son of peisistratos Lalone, Athena Itonia: Geography and Meaning of an Ancient Greek War Goddess (2019) 195
intertextuality Hau, Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus Siculus (2017) 201
justice Kirichenko, Greek Literature and the Ideal: The Pragmatics of Space from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Age (2022) 88
ktema es aiei Kingsley Monti and Rood, The Authoritative Historian: Tradition and Innovation in Ancient Historiography (2022) 265
leucimme Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 259
lyric poetry Hau, Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus Siculus (2017) 201
mercenaries, misthotoi, epikouroi Lalone, Athena Itonia: Geography and Meaning of an Ancient Greek War Goddess (2019) 195
mytilene debate Hau, Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus Siculus (2017) 201
narrative Papaioannou Serafim and Demetriou, The Ancient Art of Persuasion across Genres and Topics (2019) 92
nicias Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 218, 449
nikephoros kallistos xanthopoulosnan Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 751
overconfidence Hau, Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus Siculus (2017) 201
patterning Hau, Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus Siculus (2017) 201
peisistratos, tyrant of athens Lalone, Athena Itonia: Geography and Meaning of an Ancient Greek War Goddess (2019) 195
pericles Kingsley Monti and Rood, The Authoritative Historian: Tradition and Innovation in Ancient Historiography (2022) 265; Papaioannou Serafim and Demetriou, The Ancient Art of Persuasion across Genres and Topics (2019) 92
perses Kirichenko, Greek Literature and the Ideal: The Pragmatics of Space from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Age (2022) 88
philo Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 751
phormio Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 218, 449
plague, usefulness of thucydides description of Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 78
plato Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 751
plutarch Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 751
poetry, and aristocratic power Kirichenko, Greek Literature and the Ideal: The Pragmatics of Space from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Age (2022) 88
rhetoric Kirichenko, Greek Literature and the Ideal: The Pragmatics of Space from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Age (2022) 88
salamis Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 751
sicilian debate Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 218
sicilian expedition Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 449
sparta/spartans Kingsley Monti and Rood, The Authoritative Historian: Tradition and Innovation in Ancient Historiography (2022) 265
speeches Papaioannou Serafim and Demetriou, The Ancient Art of Persuasion across Genres and Topics (2019) 92
teutiaplus Papaioannou Serafim and Demetriou, The Ancient Art of Persuasion across Genres and Topics (2019) 92
thucydides, mytilenean debate Kingsley Monti and Rood, The Authoritative Historian: Tradition and Innovation in Ancient Historiography (2022) 265
thucydides, son of melesias, manuscript traditionnan Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 271
thucydides Hau, Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus Siculus (2017) 201; Papaioannou Serafim and Demetriou, The Ancient Art of Persuasion across Genres and Topics (2019) 92
timeliness Kirichenko, Greek Literature and the Ideal: The Pragmatics of Space from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Age (2022) 88
tragedy Hau, Moral History from Herodotus to Diodorus Siculus (2017) 201
trojan war, the Kirichenko, Greek Literature and the Ideal: The Pragmatics of Space from the Archaic to the Hellenistic Age (2022) 88
women' Papaioannou Serafim and Demetriou, The Ancient Art of Persuasion across Genres and Topics (2019) 92