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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



10882
Thucydides, The History Of The Peloponnesian War, 1.144.1


‘πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ περιέσεσθαι, ἢν ἐθέλητε ἀρχήν τε μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι ἅμα πολεμοῦντες καὶ κινδύνους αὐθαιρέτους μὴ προστίθεσθαι: μᾶλλον γὰρ πεφόβημαι τὰς οἰκείας ἡμῶν ἁμαρτίας ἢ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων διανοίας.I have many other reasons to hope for a favorable issue, if you can consent not to combine schemes of fresh conquest with the conduct of the war, and will abstain from willfully involving yourselves in other dangers; indeed, I am more afraid of our own blunders than of the enemy's devices.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

2 results
1. Lysias, Orations, 6 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 1.71.4, 1.77.2, 1.81.6, 1.84.3, 1.121.3, 1.122.1, 1.125.2, 1.140.1, 1.142-1.143, 2.13-2.14, 2.13.2, 2.17, 2.20-2.23, 2.42.4, 2.43.1, 2.43.5-2.43.6, 2.59.3, 2.63, 2.64.1, 2.64.5, 2.65, 2.65.5-2.65.7, 2.65.9, 2.65.11, 2.65.13, 3.38.2, 4.14.3, 6.15.2, 6.28.1, 6.60-6.61, 7.18.2, 7.27.5, 8.1.1-8.1.2 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

1.71.4. Here, at least, let your procrastination end. For the present, assist your allies and Potidaea in particular, as you promised, by a speedy invasion of Attica, and do not sacrifice friends and kindred to their bitterest enemies, and drive the rest of us in despair to some other alliance. 1.77.2. And none care to inquire why this reproach is not brought against other imperial powers, who treat their subjects with less moderation than we do; the secret being that where force can be used, law is not needed. 1.81.6. For let us never be elated by the fatal hope of the war being quickly ended by the devastation of their lands. I fear rather that we may leave it as a legacy to our children; so improbable is it that the Athenian spirit will be the slave of their land, or Athenian experience be cowed by war. 1.84.3. We are both warlike and wise, and it is our sense of order that makes us so. We are warlike, because self-control contains honor as a chief constituent, and honor bravery. And we are wise, because we are educated with too little learning to despise the laws, and with too severe a self-control to disobey them, and are brought up not to be too knowing in useless matters,—such as the knowledge which can give a specious criticism of an enemy's plans in theory, but fails to assail them with equal success in practice,—but are taught to consider that the schemes of our enemies are not dissimilar to our own, and that the freaks of chance are not determinable by calculation. 1.121.3. which they possess shall be raised by us from our respective antecedent resources, and from the monies at Olympia and Delphi . A loan from these enables us to seduce their foreign sailors by the offer of higher pay. For the power of Athens is more mercenary than national; while ours will not be exposed to the same risk, as its strength lies more in men than in money. 1.122.1. We have also other ways of carrying on the war, such as revolt of their allies, the surest method of depriving them of their revenues, which are the source of their strength, and establishment of fortified positions in their country, and various operations which cannot be foreseen at present. For war of all things proceeds least upon definite rules, but draws principally upon itself for contrivances to meet an emergency; and in such cases the party who faces the struggle and keeps his temper best meets with most security, and he who loses his temper about it with correspondent disaster. 1.125.2. This decided, it was still impossible for them to commence at once, from their want of preparation; but it was resolved that the means requisite were to be procured by the different states, and that there was to be no delay. And indeed, in spite of the time occupied with the necessary arrangements, less than a year elapsed before Attica was invaded, and the war openly begun. 1.140.1. ‘There is one principle, Athenians, which I hold to through everything, and that is the principle of no concession to the Peloponnesians. I know that the spirit which inspires men while they are being persuaded to make war, is not always retained in action; that as circumstances change, resolutions change. Yet I see that now as before the same, almost literally the same, counsel is demanded of me; and I put it to those of you, who are allowing yourselves to be persuaded, to support the national resolves even in the case of reverses, or to forfeit all credit for their wisdom in the event of success. For sometimes the course of things is as arbitrary as the plans of man; indeed this is why we usually blame chance for whatever does not happen as we expected. 2.13.2. He also gave the citizens some advice on their present affairs in the same strain as before. They were to prepare for the war, and to carry in their property from the country. They were not to go out to battle, but to come into the city and guard it, and get ready their fleet, in which their real strength lay. They were also to keep a tight rein on their allies—the strength of Athens being derived from the money brought in by their payments, and success in war depending principally upon conduct and capital. 2.42.4. But none of these allowed either wealth with its prospect of future enjoyment to unnerve his spirit, or poverty with its hope of a day of freedom and riches to tempt him to shrink from danger. No, holding that vengeance upon their enemies was more to be desired than any personal blessings, and reckoning this to be the most glorious of hazards, they joyfully determined to accept the risk, to make sure of their vengeance and to let their wishes wait; and while committing to hope the uncertainty of final success, in the business before them they thought fit to act boldly and trust in themselves. Thus choosing to die resisting, rather than to live submitting, they fled only from dishonor, but met danger face to face, and after one brief moment, while at the summit of their fortune, escaped, not from their fear, but from their glory. 2.43.1. So died these men as became Athenians. You, their survivors, must determine to have as unaltering a resolution in the field, though you may pray that it may have a happier issue. And not contented with ideas derived only from words of the advantages which are bound up with the defence of your country, though these would furnish a valuable text to a speaker even before an audience so alive to them as the present, you must yourselves realize the power of Athens, and feed your eyes upon her from day to day, till love of her fills your hearts; and then when all her greatness shall break upon you, you must reflect that it was by courage, sense of duty, and a keen feeling of honor in action that men were enabled to win all this, and that no personal failure in an enterprise could make them consent to deprive their country of their valor, but they laid it at her feet as the most glorious contribution that they could offer. 2.43.5. For it is not the miserable that would most justly be unsparing of their lives; these have nothing to hope for: it is rather they to whom continued life may bring reverses as yet unknown, and to whom a fall, if it came, would be most tremendous in its consequences. 2.43.6. And surely, to a man of spirit, the degradation of cowardice must be immeasurably more grievous than the unfelt death which strikes him in the midst of his strength and patriotism! 2.59.3. When he saw them exasperated at the present turn of affairs and acting exactly as he had anticipated, he called an assembly, being (it must be remembered) still general, with the double object of restoring confidence and of leading them from these angry feelings to a calmer and more hopeful state of mind. He accordingly came forward and spoke as follows: 2.64.1. But you must not be seduced by citizens like these nor be angry with me,—who, if I voted for war, only did as you did yourselves,—in spite of the enemy having invaded your country and done what you could be certain that he would do, if you refused to comply with his demands; and although besides what we counted for, the plague has come upon us—the only point indeed at which our calculation has been at fault. It is this, I know, that has had a large share in making me more unpopular than I should otherwise have been,—quite undeservedly, unless you are also prepared to give me the credit of any success with which chance may present you. 2.64.5. Hatred and unpopularity at the moment have fallen to the lot of all who have aspired to rule others; but where odium must be incurred, true wisdom incurs it for the highest objects. Hatred also is shortlived; but that which makes the splendor of the present and the glory of the future remains for ever unforgotten. 2.65.5. For as long as he was at the head of the state during the peace, he pursued a moderate and conservative policy; and in his time its greatness was at its height. When the war broke out, here also he seems to have rightly gauged the power of his country. 2.65.6. He outlived its commencement two years and six months, and the correctness of his previsions respecting it became better known by his death. 2.65.7. He told them to wait quietly, to pay attention to their marine, to attempt no new conquests, and to expose the city to no hazards during the war, and doing this, promised them a favorable result. What they did was the very contrary, allowing private ambitions and private interests, in matters apparently quite foreign to the war, to lead them into projects unjust both to themselves and to their allies—projects whose success would only conduce to the honor and advantage of private persons, and whose failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war. 2.65.9. Whenever he saw them unseasonably and insolently elated, he would with a word reduce them to alarm; on the other hand, if they fell victims to a panic, he could at once restore them to confidence. In short, what was nominally a democracy became in his hands government by the first citizen. 2.65.11. This, as might have been expected in a great and sovereign state, produced a host of blunders, and amongst them the Sicilian expedition; though this failed not so much through a miscalculation of the power of those against whom it was sent, as through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures afterwards to assist those who had gone out, but choosing rather to occupy themselves with private cabals for the leadership of the commons, by which they not only paralyzed operations in the field, but also first introduced civil discord at home. 2.65.13. So superfluously abundant were the resources from which the genius of Pericles foresaw an easy triumph in the war over the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians. 3.38.2. Such a man must plainly either have such confidence in his rhetoric as to adventure to prove that what has been once for all decided is still undetermined, or be bribed to try to delude us by elaborate sophisms. 4.14.3. Great was the melee, and quite in contradiction to the naval tactics usual to the two combatants; the Lacedaemonians in their excitement and dismay being actually engaged in a sea-fight on land, while the victorious Athenians, in their eagerness to push their success as far as possible, were carrying on a land-fight from their ships. 6.15.2. By far the warmest advocate of the expedition was, however, Alcibiades, son of Clinias, who wished to thwart Nicias both as his political opponent and also because of the attack he had made upon him in his speech, and who was, besides, exceedingly ambitious of a command by which he hoped to reduce Sicily and Carthage, and personally to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes. 6.28.1. Information was given accordingly by some resident aliens and body servants, not about the Hermae but about some previous mutilations of other images perpetrated by young men in a drunken frolic, and of mock celebrations of the mysteries, averred to take place in private houses. 7.18.2. But the Lacedaemonians derived most encouragement from the belief that Athens, with two wars on her hands, against themselves and against the Siceliots, would be more easy to subdue, and from the conviction that she had been the first to infringe the truce. In the former war, they considered, the offence had been more on their own side, both on account of the entrance of the Thebans into Plataea in time of peace, and also of their own refusal to listen to the Athenian offer of arbitration, in spite of the clause in the former treaty that where arbitration should be offered there should be no appeal to arms. For this reason they thought that they deserved their misfortunes, and took to heart seriously the disaster at Pylos and whatever else had befallen them. 7.27.5. They were deprived of their whole country: more than twenty thousand slaves had deserted, a great part of them artisans, and all their sheep and beasts of burden were lost; and as the cavalry rode out daily upon excursions to Decelea and to guard the country, their horses were either lamed by being constantly worked upon rocky ground, or wounded by the enemy. 8.1.1. Such were the events in Sicily . When the news was brought to Athens, for a long while they disbelieved even the most respectable of the soldiers who had themselves escaped from the scene of action and clearly reported the matter, a destruction so complete not being thought credible. When the conviction was forced upon them, they were angry with the orators who had joined in promoting the expedition, just as if they had not themselves voted it, and were enraged also with the reciters of oracles and soothsayers, and all other omenmongers of the time who had encouraged them to hope that they should conquer Sicily . 8.1.2. Already distressed at all points and in all quarters, after what had now happened, they were seized by a fear and consternation quite without example. It was grievous enough for the state and for every man in his proper person to lose so many heavy infantry, cavalry, and able-bodied troops, and to see none left to replace them; but when they saw, also, that they had not sufficient ships in their docks, or money in the treasury, or crews for the ships, they began to despair of salvation. They thought that their enemies in Sicily would immediately sail with their fleet against Piraeus, inflamed by so signal a victory; while their adversaries at home, redoubling all their preparations, would vigorously attack them by sea and land at once, aided by their own revolted confederates.


Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
abstract nominal phrases in thucydides, and events and circumstances presented as quasi-agents Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 307
abstract nominal phrases in thucydides, circumstances / conditions / states of affairs stressed by Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 103
alcibiades, on necessities of power Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 103
alcibiades, vs. pericles Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 103
alcibiades Kazantzidis and Spatharas, Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art (2018) 138; Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 543
articular infinitive Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 103
athenian empire Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 267
athenians at sparta (speech of), on moderation of necessity Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 103
attica Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 267
choice (primarily in thucydides), and freedom Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 307
choice (primarily in thucydides), qualified by necessity Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 307
choice (primarily in thucydides), scope for Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 307
consolation Kazantzidis and Spatharas, Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art (2018) 138
corcyra Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 457
cowardice Kazantzidis and Spatharas, Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art (2018) 138
daring/boldness (tolme) Kazantzidis and Spatharas, Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art (2018) 138
expectation (negative and positive) Kazantzidis and Spatharas, Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art (2018) 138
herms Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 543
hope, and fear Kazantzidis and Spatharas, Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art (2018) 138
individuals, withstanding necessity Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 307
irrational impulses, athenians beset by Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 307
nicias Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 168
pericles, and agency Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 307
pericles, and ideal Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 273
pericles, and pessimism Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 307
pericles, and strategy in peloponnesian war Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 103
pericles Kazantzidis and Spatharas, Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art (2018) 138
plague' Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 457
politics, hope in greek and roman Kazantzidis and Spatharas, Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art (2018) 138
quest for power, and self-preservation Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 103
quest for power, as necessity Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 103
quest for power, as uncontrollable Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 103
sicilian expedition Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 168, 457, 543
sicily Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 168, 543
thucydides, son of melesias, causes, causality Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 457
xenophon, ps.-xenophon, ath. pol. Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 543
ἵστημι, compounds of Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 103
ὀργή and ὀργίζομαι Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 307