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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



10882
Thucydides, The History Of The Peloponnesian War, 1.118.2


ταῦτα δὲ ξύμπαντα ὅσα ἔπραξαν οἱ Ἕλληνες πρός τε ἀλλήλους καὶ τὸν βάρβαρον ἐγένετο ἐν ἔτεσι πεντήκοντα μάλιστα μεταξὺ τῆς τε Ξέρξου ἀναχωρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου: ἐν οἷς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τήν τε ἀρχὴν ἐγκρατεστέραν κατεστήσαντο καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ μέγα ἐχώρησαν δυνάμεως, οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι αἰσθόμενοι οὔτε ἐκώλυον εἰ μὴ ἐπὶ βραχύ, ἡσύχαζόν τε τὸ πλέον τοῦ χρόνου, ὄντες μὲν καὶ πρὸ τοῦ μὴ ταχεῖς ἰέναι ἐς τοὺς πολέμους, ἢν μὴ ἀναγκάζωνται, τὸ δέ τι καὶ πολέμοις οἰκείοις ἐξειργόμενοι, πρὶν δὴ ἡ δύναμις τῶν Ἀθηναίων σαφῶς ᾔρετο καὶ τῆς ξυμμαχίας αὐτῶν ἥπτοντο. τότε δὲ οὐκέτι ἀνασχετὸν ἐποιοῦντο, ἀλλ’ ἐπιχειρητέα ἐδόκει εἶναι πάσῃ προθυμίᾳ καὶ καθαιρετέα ἡ ἰσχύς, ἢν δύνωνται, ἀραμένοις τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον.All these actions of the Hellenes against each other and the barbarian occurred in the fifty years' interval between the retreat of Xerxes and the beginning of the present war. During this interval the Athenians succeeded in placing their empire on a firmer basis, and advanced their own home power to a very great height. The Lacedaemonians, though fully aware of it, opposed it only for a little while, but remained inactive during most of the period, being of old slow to go to war except under the pressure of necessity, and in the present instance being hampered by wars at home; until the growth of the Athenian power could be no longer ignored, and their own confederacy became the object of its encroachments. They then felt that they could endure it no longer, but that the time had come for them to throw themselves heart and soul upon the hostile power, and break it, if they could, by commencing the present war.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

5 results
1. Hesiod, Works And Days, 101-105, 90-100 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)

100. Which brought the Death-Gods. Now in misery
2. Thucydides, The History of The Peloponnesian War, 1.70-1.71, 1.70.4, 1.84.2, 1.84.4, 1.88-1.118, 1.89.1-1.89.2, 1.118.1, 1.125.2, 1.126.1, 1.138.3, 1.139.1, 1.140.1, 2.65.5-2.65.13, 3.45.5-3.45.6, 3.82.2, 4.17-4.20, 5.18, 5.23, 5.43.2-5.43.3, 6.12.1, 6.15, 6.33.6, 8.96.5 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

1.70.4. Further, there is promptitude on their side against procrastination on yours; they are never at home, you are never from it: for they hope by their absence to extend their acquisitions, you fear by your advance to endanger what you have left behind. 1.84.2. The quality which they condemn is really nothing but a wise moderation; thanks to its possession, we alone do not become insolent in success and give way less than others in misfortune; we are not carried away by the pleasure of hearing ourselves cheered on to risks which our judgment condemns; nor, if annoyed, are we any the more convinced by attempts to exasperate us by accusation. 1.84.4. In practice we always base our preparations against an enemy on the assumption that his plans are good; indeed, it is right to rest our hopes not on a belief in his blunders, but on the soundness of our provisions. Nor ought we to believe that there is much difference between man and man, but to think that the superiority lies with him who is reared in the severest school. 1.89.1. The way in which Athens came to be placed in the circumstances under which her power grew was this. 1.89.2. After the Medes had returned from Europe, defeated by sea and land by the Hellenes, and after those of them who had fled with their ships to Mycale had been destroyed, Leotychides, King of the Lacedaemonians, the commander of the Hellenes at Mycale, departed home with the allies from Peloponnese . But the Athenians and the allies from Ionia and Hellespont, who had now revolted from the king, remained and laid siege to Sestos, which was still held by the Medes. After wintering before it, they became masters of the place on its evacuation by the barbarians; and after this they sailed away from Hellespont to their respective cities. 1.118.1. After this, though not many years later, we at length come to what has been already related, the affairs of Corcyra and Potidaea, and the events that served as a pretext for the present war. 1.125.2. This decided, it was still impossible for them to commence at once, from their want of preparation; but it was resolved that the means requisite were to be procured by the different states, and that there was to be no delay. And indeed, in spite of the time occupied with the necessary arrangements, less than a year elapsed before Attica was invaded, and the war openly begun. 1.126.1. This interval was spent in sending embassies to Athens charged with complaints, in order to obtain as good a pretext for war as possible, in the event of her paying no attention to them. 1.138.3. For Themistocles was a man who exhibited the most indubitable signs of genius; indeed, in this particular he has a claim on our admiration quite extraordinary and unparalleled. By his own native capacity, alike unformed and unsupplemented by study, he was at once the best judge in those sudden crises which admit of little or of no deliberation, and the best prophet of the future, even to its most distant possibilities. An able theoretical expositor of all that came within the sphere of his practice, he was not without the power of passing an adequate judgment in matters in which he had no experience. He could also excellently divine the good and evil which lay hid in the unseen future. In fine, whether we consider the extent of his natural powers, or the slightness of his application, this extraordinary man must be allowed to have surpassed all others in the faculty of intuitively meeting an emergency. 1.139.1. To return to the Lacedaemonians. The history of their first embassy, the injunctions which it conveyed, and the rejoinder which it provoked, concerning the expulsion of the accursed persons, have been related already. It was followed by a second, which ordered Athens to raise the siege of Potidaea, and to respect the independence of Aegina . Above all, it gave her most distinctly to understand that war might be prevented by the revocation of the Megara decree, excluding the Megarians from the use of Athenian harbors and of the market of Athens . 1.140.1. ‘There is one principle, Athenians, which I hold to through everything, and that is the principle of no concession to the Peloponnesians. I know that the spirit which inspires men while they are being persuaded to make war, is not always retained in action; that as circumstances change, resolutions change. Yet I see that now as before the same, almost literally the same, counsel is demanded of me; and I put it to those of you, who are allowing yourselves to be persuaded, to support the national resolves even in the case of reverses, or to forfeit all credit for their wisdom in the event of success. For sometimes the course of things is as arbitrary as the plans of man; indeed this is why we usually blame chance for whatever does not happen as we expected. 2.65.5. For as long as he was at the head of the state during the peace, he pursued a moderate and conservative policy; and in his time its greatness was at its height. When the war broke out, here also he seems to have rightly gauged the power of his country. 2.65.6. He outlived its commencement two years and six months, and the correctness of his previsions respecting it became better known by his death. 2.65.7. He told them to wait quietly, to pay attention to their marine, to attempt no new conquests, and to expose the city to no hazards during the war, and doing this, promised them a favorable result. What they did was the very contrary, allowing private ambitions and private interests, in matters apparently quite foreign to the war, to lead them into projects unjust both to themselves and to their allies—projects whose success would only conduce to the honor and advantage of private persons, and whose failure entailed certain disaster on the country in the war. 2.65.8. The causes of this are not far to seek. Pericles indeed, by his rank, ability, and known integrity, was enabled to exercise an independent control over the multitude—in short, to lead them instead of being led by them; for as he never sought power by improper means, he was never compelled to flatter them, but, on the contrary, enjoyed so high an estimation that he could afford to anger them by contradiction. 2.65.9. Whenever he saw them unseasonably and insolently elated, he would with a word reduce them to alarm; on the other hand, if they fell victims to a panic, he could at once restore them to confidence. In short, what was nominally a democracy became in his hands government by the first citizen. 2.65.10. With his successors it was different. More on a level with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude. 2.65.11. This, as might have been expected in a great and sovereign state, produced a host of blunders, and amongst them the Sicilian expedition; though this failed not so much through a miscalculation of the power of those against whom it was sent, as through a fault in the senders in not taking the best measures afterwards to assist those who had gone out, but choosing rather to occupy themselves with private cabals for the leadership of the commons, by which they not only paralyzed operations in the field, but also first introduced civil discord at home. 2.65.12. Yet after losing most of their fleet besides other forces in Sicily, and with faction already domit in the city, they could still for three years make head against their original adversaries, joined not only by the Sicilians, but also by their own allies nearly all in revolt, and at last by the king's son, Cyrus, who furnished the funds for the Peloponnesian navy. Nor did they finally succumb till they fell the victims of their own intestine disorders. 2.65.13. So superfluously abundant were the resources from which the genius of Pericles foresaw an easy triumph in the war over the unaided forces of the Peloponnesians. 3.45.5. Hope also and cupidity, the one leading and the other following, the one conceiving the attempt, the other suggesting the facility of succeeding, cause the widest ruin, and, although invisible agents, are far stronger than the dangers that are seen. 3.45.6. Fortune, too, powerfully helps the delusion, and by the unexpected aid that she sometimes lends, tempts men to venture with inferior means; and this is especially the case with communities, because the stakes played for are the highest, freedom or empire, and, when all are acting together, each man irrationally magnifies his own capacity. 3.82.2. The sufferings which revolution entailed upon the cities were many and terrible, such as have occurred and always will occur, as long as the nature of mankind remains the same; though in a severer or milder form, and varying in their symptoms, according to the variety of the particular cases. In peace and prosperity states and individuals have better sentiments, because they do not find themselves suddenly confronted with imperious necessities; but war takes away the easy supply of daily wants, and so proves a rough master, that brings most men's characters to a level with their fortunes. 5.43.2. Foremost amongst these was Alcibiades, son of Clinias, a man yet young in years for any other Hellenic city, but distinguished by the splendor of his ancestry. Alcibiades thought the Argive alliance really preferable, not that personal pique had not also a great deal to do with his opposition; he being offended with the Lacedaemonians for having negotiated the treaty through Nicias and Laches, and having overlooked him on account of his youth, and also for not having shown him the respect due to the ancient connection of his family with them as their Proxeni, which, renounced by his grandfather, he had lately himself thought to renew by his attentions to their prisoners taken in the island. 6.12.1. We should also remember that we are but now enjoying some respite from a great pestilence and from war, to the no small benefit of our estates and persons, and that it is right to employ these at home on our own behalf, instead of using them on behalf of these exiles whose interest it is to lie as fairly as they can, who do nothing but talk themselves and leave the danger to others, and who if they succeed will show no proper gratitude, and if they fail will drag down their friends with them. 6.33.6. Thus these very Athenians rose by the defeat of the Mede, in a great measure due to accidental causes, from the mere fact that Athens had been the object of his attack; and this may very well be the case with us also. 8.96.5. But here, as on so many other occasions the Lacedaemonians proved the most convenient people in the world for the Athenians to be at war with. The wide difference between the two characters, the slowness and want of energy of the Lacedaemonians as contrasted with the dash and enterprise of their opponents, proved of the greatest service, especially to a maritime empire like Athens . Indeed this was shown by the Syracusans, who were most like the Athenians in character, and also most successful in combating them.
3. Dionysius of Halycarnassus, On Thucydides, 27, 50, 11 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4. Josephus Flavius, Jewish Antiquities, 20.160, 20.214 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

20.214. Costobarus also, and Saulus, did themselves get together a multitude of wicked wretches, and this because they were of the royal family; and so they obtained favor among them, because of their kindred to Agrippa; but still they used violence with the people, and were very ready to plunder those that were weaker than themselves. And from that time it principally came to pass that our city was greatly disordered, and that all things grew worse and worse among us.
5. New Testament, Mark, 9.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

9.5. Peter answered Jesus, "Rabbi, it is good for us to be here. Let's make three tents: one for you, one for Moses, and one for Elijah.


Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
abstract nominal phrases in thucydides, processes suggested by Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 97, 99
aegean Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 275
alcibiades, and athenian decision in favour of sicilian expedition Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 97
alcibiades Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 275
alcidas Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 275
archaeology, αὐξάνω in Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 97
athenian character Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 275
athenians at sparta (speech of), and greatest things (fear, honour, and advantage) Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 93
athenians at sparta (speech of), and pentecontaetia Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 93
athenians at sparta (speech of), apologetic of athens Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 93
athenians at sparta (speech of), on necessity of athenian empire Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 93
athens Tomson, Studies on Jews and Christians in the First and Second Centuries (2019) 560
athens and athenians, exposed to forces beyond their control Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 93, 97
attica Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 275
choice (primarily in thucydides), qualified by necessity Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 99
corcyraeans Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 577
corinth Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 577
danger, hope as a dangerous emotion/state of mind Kazantzidis and Spatharas, Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art (2018) 114
demosthenes Michalopoulos et al., The Rhetoric of Unity and Division in Ancient Literature (2021) 283
diodotus Kazantzidis and Spatharas, Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art (2018) 114
dionysius of halicarnassus Michalopoulos et al., The Rhetoric of Unity and Division in Ancient Literature (2021) 283
education Michalopoulos et al., The Rhetoric of Unity and Division in Ancient Literature (2021) 283
epidamnos Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 577
ethnography' Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 725
helots Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 565
hope, and eros Kazantzidis and Spatharas, Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art (2018) 114
hope, and fear Kazantzidis and Spatharas, Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art (2018) 114
judaea (roman province; see also yehud) Tomson, Studies on Jews and Christians in the First and Second Centuries (2019) 560
judea (region) Tomson, Studies on Jews and Christians in the First and Second Centuries (2019) 560
necessity (in thucydides), and circumstances / material conditions / states of affairs Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 93, 97
necessity (in thucydides), and processes Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 97, 99
necessity (in thucydides), of athenian empire Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 93, 97, 99
nicias Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 275
pandora Kazantzidis and Spatharas, Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art (2018) 114
pentecontaetia, and archaeology Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 97
pentecontaetia, athenians presented as purposeful in? Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 99
pentecontaetia, depersonalizing style in Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 93, 97, 99
persian empire/period Tomson, Studies on Jews and Christians in the First and Second Centuries (2019) 560
politics, hope in greek and roman Kazantzidis and Spatharas, Hope in Ancient Literature, History, and Art (2018) 114
present things / circumstances (τὰ παρόντα, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, τὰ πράγματα etc.) Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 93
quest for power, as insatiable Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 99
quest for power, as necessity Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 93
quest for power, as uncontrollable Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 97, 99
revolt/war, under nero (great ~) Tomson, Studies on Jews and Christians in the First and Second Centuries (2019) 560
rhetoric, rhetorical Tomson, Studies on Jews and Christians in the First and Second Centuries (2019) 560
roman, empire Tomson, Studies on Jews and Christians in the First and Second Centuries (2019) 560
sicyonians Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 577
thucydides, son of melesias, audience, reader Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 725
thucydides, son of melesias, authorial statements, judgementnan Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 275
thucydides, son of melesias, causes, causality Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 725
thucydides, son of melesias, documents, letters, treaties etc. Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 577
thucydides, son of melesias, language Rengakos and Tsakmakis, Brill's Companion to Thucydides (2006) 725
thucydides Michalopoulos et al., The Rhetoric of Unity and Division in Ancient Literature (2021) 283
war Tomson, Studies on Jews and Christians in the First and Second Centuries (2019) 560
xerxes Tomson, Studies on Jews and Christians in the First and Second Centuries (2019) 560
zealot, zealots Tomson, Studies on Jews and Christians in the First and Second Centuries (2019) 560
αὐξάνω Joho, Style and Necessity in Thucydides (2022) 97