Home About Network of subjects Linked subjects heatmap Book indices included Search by subject Search by reference Browse subjects Browse texts

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



11455
Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 3.591
NaN


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

12 results
1. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.75, 5.79 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.75. quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis! qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus vereque omnia ista nomina possideat, quae irrideri ab inperitis solent. rectius enim appellabitur rex quam Tarquinius, qui nec se nec suos regere potuit, rectius magister populi—is enim est dictator dictator est BE —quam Sulla, qui trium pestiferorum vitiorum, luxuriae, avaritiae, crudelitatis, magister fuit, rectius dives quam Crassus, qui nisi eguisset, numquam Euphraten nulla belli causa transire voluisset. recte eius omnia dicentur, qui scit uti solus omnibus, recte etiam pulcher appellabitur— animi enim liniamenta sunt pulchriora quam corporis quam corporis NV quam corporibus ABE corporibus ( om. quam) R —, recte solus liber nec dominationi cuiusquam parens nec oboediens cupiditati, recte invictus, cuius etiamsi corpus constringatur, animo tamen vincula inici nulla possint, nec expectet ullum tempus aetatis, uti tum uti tum Se. ut tum (ut in ras., sequente ras. 2 vel 3 litt. ) N virtutum ABE ututū R ubi tum V denique iudicetur beatusne fuerit, cum extremum vitae diem morte confecerit, quod ille unus e septem sapientibus non sapienter Croesum monuit; 5.79. Respondebo me non quaerere, inquam, hoc tempore quid virtus efficere possit, sed quid constanter dicatur, quid ipsum a se dissentiat. Quo igitur, igitur ( i. e. quoniam ita quaeris, accuratius dic cur id facias ) om. BE inquit, modo? Quia, cum a Zenone, inquam, hoc magnifice tamquam ex oraculo editur: 'Virtus ad beate vivendum se ipsa contenta est', et Quare? Post vocab. Quare in N reliqua desunt, cum sequatur pravumve quid consentiens quid et q. s. Acad. poster. I 19 sqq. inquit, respondet: add. Se. Quia, nisi quod honestum est, nullum est aliud bonum. Non quaero iam verumne sit; illud dico, ea, quae dicat, praeclare inter se cohaerere. 3.75.  "Then, how dignified, how lofty, how consistent is the character of the Wise Man as they depict it! Since reason has proved that moral worth is the sole good, it follows that he must always be happy, and that all those titles which the ignorant are so fond of deriding do in very truth belong to him. For he will have a better claim to the title of King than Tarquin, who could not rule either himself or his subjects; a better right to the name of 'Master of the People' (for that is what a dictator is) than Sulla, who was a master of three pestilential vices, licentiousness, avarice and cruelty; a better right to be called rich than Crassus, who had he lacked nothing could never have been induced to cross the Euphrates with no pretext for war. Rightly will he be said to own all things, who alone knows how to use all things; rightly also will he be styled beautiful, for the features of the soul are fairer than those of the body; rightly the one and only free man, as subject to no man's authority, and slave of no appetite; rightly unconquerable, for though his body be thrown into fetters, no bondage can enchain his soul. 5.79.  "My reply will be," said I, "that I am not at the present asking what result virtue can produce, but what is a consistent and what a self-contradictory account of it." "How do you mean?" said he. "Why," I said, "first Zeno enunciates the lofty and oracular utterance, 'Virtue need not look outside herself for happiness'; 'Why?' says some one. 'Because,' he answers, 'nothing else is good but what is morally good.' I am not now asking whether this is true; I merely say that Zeno's statements are admirably logical and consistent.
2. Cicero, Lucullus, 136 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3. Cicero, Paradoxa Stoicorum, 6 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4. Philo of Alexandria, On The Migration of Abraham, 197 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

197. What, then, ought he who hears this answer, and who is by nature inclined to receive instruction, to do, but to draw him out at once from thence? Accordingly, we are told, "He ran up and took him out from thence, because he who was abiding among the vessels of the soul, that is, the body and the outward senses, was not worthy to hear the doctrines and laws of the kingdom (and by the kingdom, we mean wisdom, since we call the wise man a king); but when he has risen up and changed his place, then the mist around him is dissipated, and he will be able to see clearly. Very appropriately, therefore, does the companion of knowledge think it right to leave the region of the outward sense, by name Charran;
5. Philo of Alexandria, On The Change of Names, 152 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

152. And these are not my words only, but those of the most holy scriptures, in which certain persons are introduced as saying to Abraham, "Thou art a king from God among Us;" not out of consideration for his resources (for what resources could a man have who was an emigrant and who had no city to inhabit, but who was wandering over a great extent of impassable country?), but because they saw that he had a royal disposition in his mind, so that they confessed, in the words of Moses, that he was the only wise king.
6. Philo of Alexandria, On Sobriety, 56 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

7. Philo of Alexandria, On Dreams, 2.244 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

2.244. for those who behold the excellence of Abraham say unto him, "Thou art a king, sent from God among Us:" proposing as a maxim, for those who study philosophy, that the wise man alone is a ruler and a king, and that virtue is the only irresponsible authority and sovereignty. XXXVII.
8. Epictetus, Discourses, 4.1.173 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

9. Lucian, Philosophies For Sale, 20 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

10. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.32-7.33, 7.92, 7.101, 7.120, 7.122, 7.125, 7.127 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.32. Hence he had been well trained even before he left his native place. And thus it came about that on his arrival at Athens he attached himself to Crates. And it seems, he adds, that, when the rest were at a loss how to express their views, Zeno framed a definition of the end. They say that he was in the habit of swearing by capers just as Socrates used to swear by the dog. Some there are, and among them Cassius the Sceptic and his disciples, who accuse Zeno at length. Their first count is that in the beginning of his Republic he pronounced the ordinary education useless: the next is that he applies to all men who are not virtuous the opprobrious epithets of foemen, enemies, slaves, and aliens to one another, parents to children, brothers to brothers, friends to friends. 7.33. Again, in the Republic, making an invidious contrast, he declares the good alone to be true citizens or friends or kindred or free men; and accordingly in the view of the Stoics parents and children are enemies, not being wise. Again, it is objected, in the Republic he lays down community of wives, and at line 200 prohibits the building of sanctuaries, law-courts and gymnasia in cities; while as regards a currency he writes that we should not think it need be introduced either for purposes of exchange or for travelling abroad. Further, he bids men and women wear the same dress and keep no part of the body entirely covered. 7.92. Panaetius, however, divides virtue into two kinds, theoretical and practical; others make a threefold division of it into logical, physical, and ethical; while by the school of Posidonius four types are recognized, and more than four by Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater, and their followers. Apollophanes for his part counts but one, namely, practical wisdom.Amongst the virtues some are primary, some are subordinate to these. The following are the primary: wisdom, courage, justice, temperance. Particular virtues are magimity, continence, endurance, presence of mind, good counsel. And wisdom they define as the knowledge of things good and evil and of what is neither good nor evil; courage as knowledge of what we ought to choose, what we ought to beware of, and what is indifferent; justice . . .; 7.101. And they say that only the morally beautiful is good. So Hecato in his treatise On Goods, book iii., and Chrysippus in his work On the Morally Beautiful. They hold, that is, that virtue and whatever partakes of virtue consists in this: which is equivalent to saying that all that is good is beautiful, or that the term good has equal force with the term beautiful, which comes to the same thing. Since a thing is good, it is beautiful; now it is beautiful, therefore it is good. They hold that all goods are equal and that all good is desirable in the highest degree and admits of no lowering or heightening of intensity. of things that are, some, they say, are good, some are evil, and some neither good nor evil (that is, morally indifferent). 7.120. The Stoics approve also of honouring parents and brothers in the second place next after the gods. They further maintain that parental affection for children is natural to the good, but not to the bad. It is one of their tenets that sins are all equal: so Chrysippus in the fourth book of his Ethical Questions, as well as Persaeus and Zeno. For if one truth is not more true than another, neither is one falsehood more false than another, and in the same way one deceit is not more so than another, nor sin than sin. For he who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus and he who is only one furlong away are equally not in Canopus, and so too he who commits the greater sin and he who commits the less are equally not in the path of right conduct. 7.122. though indeed there is also a second form of slavery consisting in subordination, and a third which implies possession of the slave as well as his subordination; the correlative of such servitude being lordship; and this too is evil. Moreover, according to them not only are the wise free, they are also kings; kingship being irresponsible rule, which none but the wise can maintain: so Chrysippus in his treatise vindicating Zeno's use of terminology. For he holds that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary attribute of the ruler, and that no bad man is acquainted with this science. Similarly the wise and good alone are fit to be magistrates, judges, or orators, whereas among the bad there is not one so qualified. 7.125. Furthermore, the wise man does all things well, just as we say that Ismenias plays all airs on the flute well. Also everything belongs to the wise. For the law, they say, has conferred upon them a perfect right to all things. It is true that certain things are said to belong to the bad, just as what has been dishonestly acquired may be said, in one sense, to belong to the state, in another sense to those who are enjoying it.They hold that the virtues involve one another, and that the possessor of one is the possessor of all, inasmuch as they have common principles, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his work On Virtues, Apollodorus in his Physics according to the Early School, and Hecato in the third book of his treatise On Virtues. 7.127. It is a tenet of theirs that between virtue and vice there is nothing intermediate, whereas according to the Peripatetics there is, namely, the state of moral improvement. For, say the Stoics, just as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust. Nor again are there degrees of justice and injustice; and the same rule applies to the other virtues. Further, while Chrysippus holds that virtue can be lost, Cleanthes maintains that it cannot. According to the former it may be lost in consequence of drunkenness or melancholy; the latter takes it to be inalienable owing to the certainty of our mental apprehension. And virtue in itself they hold to be worthy of choice for its own sake. At all events we are ashamed of bad conduct as if we knew that nothing is really good but the morally beautiful. Moreover, they hold that it is in itself sufficient to ensure well-being: thus Zeno, and Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Virtues, and Hecato in the second book of his treatise On Goods:
11. Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.59.5-2.59.6, 2.99.3, 2.101.14-2.101.20 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

12. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.187, 1.222, 1.224, 1.226, 2.1181, 3.29-3.30, 3.262, 3.265, 3.593, 3.617, 3.658, 3.663, 3.674, 3.682



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
change (metabolē) to wisdom, between opposite states Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59, 60
change (metabolē) to wisdom, in ethics Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59, 60
change (metabolē) to wisdom Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59, 60
chrysippus, on the fact that zeno used terms in their proper significations Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 60
chrysippus Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 33
cicero Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59
cleanthes Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 33
crates of thebes Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 33
excellence (aretē), as tenor Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59
paradoxes Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 33
plutarch Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59, 60
proclus Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59
sage, as beautiful Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59
sage, as king Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59
sage, as rich Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59, 60
sage, as virtuous' Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 59
sage, as virtuous Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 60
slavery (δουλεία), stoics on Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 33
stobaeus Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 60
stoics/stoicism, on slavery (δουλεία) Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 33
stoics/stoicism, on virtue (ἀρετή) Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 33
stoics/stoicism, on will (βούλησις) Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 33
virtue (ἀρετή, virtus), stoics on Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 33
will (βούλησις, voluntas), stoics on Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 33
zeno of citium Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 33