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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



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Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 3.266
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1. Cicero, Lucullus, 113 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 5.68-5.72 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5.68. Sed ne verbis solum attingamus ea quae eaque v. KRV 1 volumus ostendere, proponenda quaedam quasi moventia sunt, quae nos magis ad cognitionem intellegentiamque convertant. sumatur enim nobis quidam praestans vir optumis optumus V artibus, isque animo parumper et cogitatione cognitione K fingatur. primum ingenio eximio sit necesse est; tardis enim mentibus virtus non facile comitatur; deinde deinde denique K ad investigandam vestigandam K veritatem studio incitato. ex quo triplex ille animi fetus fetus KR (ę) factus GV existet, unus I II III ad-scribunt G 1 V 1 in cognitione rerum positus et in explicatione naturae, alter aliter K in discriptione expetendarum fugiendarumque rerum fugiendarumque vererumne vivendi GKV (ve exp. et be supra ne scr. V 3 ) R 1 ut v. (fugiendarumque rerum . post vivendi quod in ras. certo dispicitur alia manus adscripscrat ue) H 1 (fugiendar verer nevivendi. Verba cū ratio ss.non H 1 sed alia manus eiusdem aetatis sec. Stroux ) et in ratio ne We.bene quod fin. 5,15 certa de causa deest add. Po. cl. ac.1, 19 fin. 5, 11. 16 et in ratione be ne vivendi, tertius in iudicando, in ante iud. om. K iudicando nequid KRH quid cuique rei sit consequens quid repugs, in quo inest omnis inest omnis est H cum subtilitas disserendi, tum veritas iudicandi. 5.69. quo tandem igitur gaudio adfici necesse est est V esset GK C RH est et K 1 sapientis animum cum his habitantem pernoctantemque curis! ut, cum totius mundi motus conversionesque perspexerit ut, quod del.Bentl.,pendet a verbis cum — curis (= so da b ). Ciceronem pergere voluisse ut, cum... perspexerit,... ipse se adgnoscat coniunctumque cum divina mente se sentiat, ex quo insatiabili gaudio compleatur cum similitudo verborum v. 9—10 et 436,5—9 tum locus gemellus leg. 1,61 declarant. sideraque viderit innumerabilia caelo inhaerentia cum eius ipsius motu congruere certis infixa sedibus, septem alia suos quaeque tenere cursus multum inter se aut altitudine aut humilitate distantia, quorum vagi motus rata tamen et certa sui cursus spatia definiant—horum nimirum aspectus impulit illos veteres et admonuit, ut plura quaererent; inde est est enim G 1 indagatio nata initiorum et tamquam seminum, unde essent omnia orta generata concreta, quaeque cuiusque generis vel iimi iimi animi H vel animantis animantis iimantis K vel muti vel loquentis loquentes GR 1 V 1 origo, quae vita, qui interitus quae int. GR 1 V 1 quaeque ex alio in aliud vicissitudo atque mutatio, unde terra et quibus librata ponderibus, quibus cavernis maria sustineantur, qua sustineantur, qua Dav sustineant. In qua X (sustineantur vel sustineat s ) omnia delata gravitate medium mundi locum semper expetant, expectant qui est idem infimus in rutundo. rotundo KV c? H 5.70. haec tractanti tractanti s V 3 tractandi X (-i ex -o K 1 ) animo et noctes et dies cogitanti cogitandi KV 1 cogitanti G existit illa a a s om. X deo deo H Delphis praecepta cognitio, ut ipsa se mens agnoscat coniunctamque cum divina mente se sentiat, ex quo insatiabili gaudio compleatur. completur Bentl. ipsa enim cogitatio de vi et natura deorum studium incendit incedit GRV 1 illius aeternitatem aeternitatem Sey. aeternitatis (aeterni status Mdv. ad fin.1, 60 ) imitandi, neque se in brevitate vitae conlocatam conlocata GRV 1 collocatam H ( bis ) conlocatum s We. putat, cum rerum causas alias ex aliis aptas et necessitate nexas videt, quibus ab aeterno tempore fluentibus in aeternum ratio tamen mensque moderatur. 5.71. Haec ille intuens atque suspiciens suspiciens V sed pic in r. 1 suscipiens K 1 vel potius omnis partis orasque circumspiciens quanta rursus animi tranquillitate tranquillitati K humana et citeriora considerat! hinc illa cognitio virtutis existit, efflorescunt genera partesque virtutum, invenitur, quid sit quod natura spectet expectet G 1 expectetur Gr extremum in bonis, quid in malis ultumum, sumatur...436, 20 ultimum H ( extrema bis ) quo referenda sint officia, quae degendae degente G 1 aetatis ratio deligenda. diligenda X corr. s quibus et et add. K c talibus rebus exquisitis hoc vel maxime efficitur, quod hac hac ac G 1 hic V 1 disputatione agimus, ut virtus ad beate vivendum sit se ipsa contenta. 5.72. Sequitur tertia, quae per omnis partis sapientiae manat et funditur, quae rem definit, definivit X (dif. K) corr. s V 3 genera dispertit, sequentia adiungit, perfecta concludit, vera et falsa diiudicat, disserendi ratio et scientia. ex qua cum summa utilitas existit extitit K ( in 18 corr K c ) ad res ponderandas, tum maxume maxime GKH ingenua delectatio et digna sapientia. Sed haec otii. sed haec otii om. H transeat idem iste sapiens ad rem publicam tuendam. quid eo possit esse praestantius, cum †contineri contineri del.Lb. cum temperantia suas adpetitiones contineat ( vel queat continere), prudentia fere desiderat Po.cl.p.371, 22 off.3,96.116; 2,77.rep.6,1 (rei publicae rector...sapiens sit et iustus et temperans eqs.) prudentia utilitatem civium cernat, iustitia sequitur...437, 8 iustitia H nihil in suam domum inde derivet, derivet -iv- scr. G 2 reliquis utatur tot tam variisque virtutibus? adiunge fructum amicitiarum, in quo doctis positum est cum consilium omnis vitae consentiens et paene conspirans, tum summa iucunditas e e et V 1 (ex V rec ) cotidiano cultu atque victu. victu s V 3 victurus GRV 1 victus K cf.Th.l.l.IV,1333 Quid haec tandem vita desiderat, quo quo quod GK sit beatior? cui refertae tot cui rei refertae etot G cui rei referta etot R cui rei referta et tot V cui rei refertae et tot K corr. Man. tantisque gaudiis Fortuna ipsa cedat necesse est. quodsi gaudere talibus bonis animi, id est virtutibus, beatum est omnesque sapientes is gaudiis perfruuntur, omnis eos beatos esse confiteri necesse est. Etiamne etiamne -ne eras.in R in cruciatu atque tormentis?
3. Andronicus of Rhodes, On Emotions, 2 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4. Philo of Alexandria, Questions On Genesis, 1.11 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

5. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

441c. and a faculty engendered by reason, or rather to be itself reason which is in accord with virtue and is firm and unshaken. They also think that the passionate and irrational part of the soul is not distinguished from the rational by any difference or by its nature, but is the same part, which, indeed, they term intelligence and the governing part; it is, they say, wholly transformed and changes both during its emotional states and in the alterations brought about in accordance with an acquired disposition or condition and thus becomes both vice and virtue; it contains nothing irrational within itself, but is called irrational whenever, by the overmastering power of our impulses, which have become strong and prevail, it is hurried on to something outrageous which contravenes the convictions of reason.
6. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 5.5.40 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.87, 7.89, 7.92-7.93, 7.121, 7.162, 7.177, 7.201 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. 7.89. By the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chrysippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of man, whereas Cleanthes takes the nature of the universe alone as that which should be followed, without adding the nature of the individual.And virtue, he holds, is a harmonious disposition, choice-worthy for its own sake and not from hope or fear or any external motive. Moreover, it is in virtue that happiness consists; for virtue is the state of mind which tends to make the whole of life harmonious. When a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness of external pursuits or sometimes to the influence of associates. For the starting-points of nature are never perverse. 7.92. Panaetius, however, divides virtue into two kinds, theoretical and practical; others make a threefold division of it into logical, physical, and ethical; while by the school of Posidonius four types are recognized, and more than four by Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Antipater, and their followers. Apollophanes for his part counts but one, namely, practical wisdom.Amongst the virtues some are primary, some are subordinate to these. The following are the primary: wisdom, courage, justice, temperance. Particular virtues are magimity, continence, endurance, presence of mind, good counsel. And wisdom they define as the knowledge of things good and evil and of what is neither good nor evil; courage as knowledge of what we ought to choose, what we ought to beware of, and what is indifferent; justice . . .; 7.93. magimity as the knowledge or habit of mind which makes one superior to anything that happens, whether good or evil equally; continence as a disposition never overcome in that which concerns right reason, or a habit which no pleasures can get the better of; endurance as a knowledge or habit which suggests what we are to hold fast to, what not, and what is indifferent; presence of mind as a habit prompt to find out what is meet to be done at any moment; good counsel as knowledge by which we see what to do and how to do it if we would consult our own interests.Similarly, of vices some are primary, others subordinate: e.g. folly, cowardice, injustice, profligacy are accounted primary; but incontinence, stupidity, ill-advisedness subordinate. Further, they hold that the vices are forms of ignorance of those things whereof the corresponding virtues are the knowledge. 7.121. But Heraclides of Tarsus, who was the disciple of Antipater of Tarsus, and Athenodorus both assert that sins are not equal.Again, the Stoics say that the wise man will take part in politics, if nothing hinders him – so, for instance, Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Various Types of Life – since thus he will restrain vice and promote virtue. Also (they maintain) he will marry, as Zeno says in his Republic, and beget children. Moreover, they say that the wise man will never form mere opinions, that is to say, he will never give assent to anything that is false; that he will also play the Cynic, Cynicism being a short cut to virtue, as Apollodorus calls it in his Ethics; that he will even turn cannibal under stress of circumstances. They declare that he alone is free and bad men are slaves, freedom being power of independent action, whereas slavery is privation of the same; 7.162. After meeting Polemo, says Diocles of Magnesia, while Zeno was suffering from a protracted illness, he recanted his views. The Stoic doctrine to which he attached most importance was the wise man's refusal to hold mere opinions. And against this doctrine Persaeus was contending when he induced one of a pair of twins to deposit a certain sum with Ariston and afterwards got the other to reclaim it. Ariston being thus reduced to perplexity was refuted. He was at variance with Arcesilaus; and one day when he saw an abortion in the shape of a bull with a uterus, he said, Alas, here Arcesilaus has had given into his hand an argument against the evidence of the senses. 7.177. 6. SPHAERUSAmongst those who after the death of Zeno became pupils of Cleanthes was Sphaerus of Bosporus, as already mentioned. After making considerable progress in his studies, he went to Alexandria to the court of King Ptolemy Philopator. One day when a discussion had arisen on the question whether the wise man could stoop to hold opinion, and Sphaerus had maintained that this was impossible, the king, wishing to refute him, ordered some waxen pomegranates to be put on the table. Sphaerus was taken in and the king cried out, You have given your assent to a presentation which is false. But Sphaerus was ready with a neat answer. I assented not to the proposition that they are pomegranates, but to another, that there are good grounds for thinking them to be pomegranates. Certainty of presentation and reasonable probability are two totally different things. Mnesistratus having accused him of denying that Ptolemy was a king, his reply was, Being of such quality as he is, Ptolemy is indeed a king. 7.201. [2] Ethics dealing with the common view and the sciences and virtues thence arising.First series:Against the Touching up of Paintings, addressed to Timonax, one book.How it is we name each Thing and form a Conception of it, one book.of Conceptions, addressed to Laodamas, two books.of Opinion or Assumption, addressed to Pythonax, three books.Proofs that the Wise Man will not hold Opinions, one book.of Apprehension, of Knowledge and of Ignorance, four books.of Reason, two books.of the Use of Reason, addressed to Leptines.Second series:That the Ancients rightly admitted Dialectic as well as Demonstration, addressed to Zeno, two books.
8. Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.59.5-2.59.6 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

9. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 2.131, 3.4, 3.39, 3.257, 3.262, 3.264-3.265, 3.548



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
aristo Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 61
change (metabolē) to wisdom, between opposite states Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 61
change (metabolē) to wisdom, in ethics Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 61
change (metabolē) to wisdom, in logic Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 61
change (metabolē) to wisdom Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 61
chrysippus, demonstrations for the doctrine that the sage will not hold opinions Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 61
chrysippus, on ends Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 40
dialectic, definition of Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 61
diogenes laertius Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 40, 61
excellence (aretē), as cognition Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 40
excellence (aretē), as tenor Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 40
excellence (aretē), logic as Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 40
excellence (aretē), physics as Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 40
excellence (aretē), related to cosmic nature Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 40
excellence (aretē) Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 40
gods, philo of alexandria on Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 82
knowledge (epistēmē) Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 61
logic, as an excellence Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 40
logic, dialectic and rhetoric as parts of Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 61
paradox Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 61
parts of philosophy, interrelatedness and knowledge Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 40
parts of philosophy Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 40
philo of alexandria, on god Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 82
philo of alexandria, on the tree of knowledge Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 82
philo of alexandria, on virtue (ἀρετή) Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 82
philo of alexandria Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 82
plutarch Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 40, 61
sage, as virtuous Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 61
sage, holds no opinions Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 61
septuagint Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 82
tree of knowledge Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 82
virtue (ἀρετή, virtus), philo of alexandria on Brouwer and Vimercati, Fate, Providence and Free Will: Philosophy and Religion in Dialogue in the Early Imperial Age (2020) 82
wisdom (sophia), as knowledge of human and divine matters' Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 40