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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



11991
Stobaeus, Eclogues, 2.39.5
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Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

10 results
1. Plato, Laches, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

198b. Nic. Certainly I do. Soc. So much for that; thus far we agree: but let us pass on to what is to be dreaded and what to be dared, and make sure that you and we do not take two different views of these. Let me tell you our view of them, and if you do not agree with it, you shall instruct us. We hold that the dreadful are things that cause fear, and the safely ventured are those that do not; and fear is caused not by past or present, but by expected evils: for fear is expectation of coming evil. You are of the same mind with us in this, are you not, Laches?
2. Plato, Protagoras, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

358d. it is not in human nature, apparently, to do so—to wish to go after what one thinks to be evil in preference to the good; and when compelled to choose one of two evils, nobody will choose the greater when he may the lesser.
3. Aristotle, Soul, 1.1 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

4. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2.3 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

5. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.13-3.14, 3.75, 4.11 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.13. sed videamus ne haec oratio sit hominum adsentantium nostrae inbecillitati et indulgentium mollitudini; nos autem audeamus non solum ramos amputare miseriarum, sed omnis radicum fibras fybras X evellere. tamen aliquid relinquetur fortasse; ita sunt altae alta GKV ( corr. 2? ) H stirpes stultitiae; sed relinquetur id solum quod erit necessarium. Illud quidem sic habeto, nisi sanatus animus sit, quod sine philosophia fieri non potest, finem miseriarum nullum fore. sed... 15 fore quam ob rem, quoniam coepimus, tradamus nos ei curandos: sanabimur, si volemus. et progrediar quidem longius: non enim de aegritudine solum, quamquam id quidem quidem in mg. add. R c primum, sed de omni animi, ut ego posui, perturbatione, morbo, ut Graeci volunt, explicabo. et primo, si placet, Stoicorum more agamus, qui breviter astringere solent argumenta; deinde nostro instituto vagabimur. 3.14. Qui fortis est, idem est fidens (quoniam confidens sqq. St. fr. 3, 570 mala consuetudine loquendi loquendum Non. L 1 in vitio ponitur, ductum verbum a a add. V 2 confidendo, quod laudis in ante laudis add. V 2 est). qui autem est fidens, is profecto non extimescit; discrepat enim a timendo qui... 4 a timendo fidens (fidere Quich. ) Non. 443, 9 confidere. confidens Non. atqui, atqui R 2 ( cf. We. ) atque in quem cadit aegritudo, in eundem timor; quarum enim rerum praesentia sumus in aegritudine, easdem inpendentes et venientes inpendentis..venientis e corr. V aut 2 timemus. ita fit ut fortitudini aegritudo repugnet. ita. ... repugnet del. Hei. veri simile est igitur, in quem cadat cadit G aegritudo, cadere in eundem eundem eum Non. timorem et infractionem infractionem V ( exp. rec ) quidem quidem quandam ut v. in mg. R rec animi in quem... 10 animi Non. 122,28 et demissionem. demisionem GKR 1 dimis ionem V 1 quae in quem cadunt, in eundem cadit, ut serviat, ut victum, si quando, si quando aliquando (ali in r. 2 ) V se esse fateatur. quae qui recipit, recipiat idem necesse est timiditatem et ignaviam. non cadunt autem haec in virum fortem: igitur ne aegritudo quidem. at nemo sapiens nisi fortis: non cadet cadit V 2 H cadat K ergo in sapientem aegritudo. 3.75. additur ad hanc definitionem a Zenone recte, ut illa opinio praesentis mali sit recens. hoc autem verbum sic interpretantur, ut non tantum illud recens esse velint, quod paulo ante acciderit, sed quam diu in illo opinato malo vis quaedam insit, ut ut s et X vigeat et habeat quandam viriditatem, tam diu appelletur appellatur K recens. ut Artemisia illa, Mausoli Cariae regis uxor, quae nobile illud Halicarnasi alicarnasi X fecit sepulcrum, quam diu vixit, vixit in luctu eodemque etiam confecta contabuit. huic erat illa opinio cotidie recens; quae tum denique non appellatur appellabatur X corr. V 2 recens, cum vetustate exaruit. Haec igitur officia sunt consolantium, tollere aegritudinem funditus aut sedare aut detrahere aut detr. V ( ss. 2 ) quam plurumum aut supprimere nec pati manare longius aut ad alia traducere. 4.11. sit igitur hic hic K 1 fons; utamur tamen in his perturbationibus describendis discrib. Mue. sed cf. Th. l. l. 5, 663 Stoicorum definitionibus et partitionibus, parti cipationibus R 1 particionibus GVH qui mihi videntur in hac quaestione versari acutissime. Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, ut perturbatio Zeno fr. 205 sit, quod pa/qos pat OC K patos R ( p ex ) PL T w C H ille dicit, aversa a a om. V 1 ( add. c ) recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. quidam brevius perturbationem esse adpetitum vehementiorem, sed vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discesserit a naturae constantia. partes autem perturbationum volunt ex duobus opinatis bonis nasci et ex duobus opinatis malis; ita esse quattuor, ex bonis libidinem et laetitiam, ut sit laetitia praesentium bonorum, libido futurorum, ex malis metum et aegritudinem nasci censent, metum futuris, aegritudinem praesentibus; quae enim venientia metuuntur, eadem adficiunt aegritudine aegritudinem K ( corr. 2 ) RH instantia.
6. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.2.1-4.2.6, 4.3.1-4.3.2, 4.7.2, 5.1.4, 5.6.42 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7. Gellius, Attic Nights, 19.1 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

8. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.110-7.114 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure. 7.111. They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others' prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself. 7.112. Heaviness or vexation is grief which weighs us down, annoyance that which coops us up and straitens us for want of room, distress a pain brought on by anxious thought that lasts and increases, anguish painful grief, distraction irrational grief, rasping and hindering us from viewing the situation as a whole.Fear is an expectation of evil. Under fear are ranged the following emotions: terror, nervous shrinking, shame, consternation, panic, mental agony. Terror is a fear which produces fright; shame is fear of disgrace; nervous shrinking is a fear that one will have to act; consternation is fear due to a presentation of some unusual occurrence; 7.113. panic is fear with pressure exercised by sound; mental agony is fear felt when some issue is still in suspense.Desire or craving is irrational appetency, and under it are ranged the following states: want, hatred, contentiousness, anger, love, wrath, resentment. Want, then, is a craving when it is baulked and, as it were, cut off from its object, but kept at full stretch and attracted towards it in vain. Hatred is a growing and lasting desire or craving that it should go ill with somebody. Contentiousness is a craving or desire connected with partisanship; anger a craving or desire to punish one who is thought to have done you an undeserved injury. The passion of love is a craving from which good men are free; for it is an effort to win affection due to the visible presence of beauty. 7.114. Wrath is anger which has long rankled and has become malicious, waiting for its opportunity, as is illustrated by the lines:Even though for the one day he swallow his anger, yet doth he still keep his displeasure thereafter in his heart, till he accomplish it.Resentment is anger in an early stage.Pleasure is an irrational elation at the accruing of what seems to be choiceworthy; and under it are ranged ravishment, malevolent joy, delight, transport. Ravishment is pleasure which charms the ear. Malevolent joy is pleasure at another's ills. Delight is the mind's propulsion to weakness, its name in Greek (τέρψις) being akin to τρέψις or turning. To be in transports of delight is the melting away of virtue.
9. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 129-132, 128

10. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 3.394



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; but only in special senses in zeno, panaetius, posidonius Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 64
apatheia\u2003 Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75
appetite (epithumia) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 34
aristotle Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75
body Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), distress and pleasure as involving, but not being (pace zeno), contraction/expansion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 34
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), impulse is a judgement Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 64
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), or about the appropriateness of actual expansion or contraction Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 34
cognitive theory Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75
distress Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 34
emotions, identified with judgements by chrysippus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 34
emotions, shifting from one emotion to another Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 34
emotions passions Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75
epicurus/epicureans Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75
fear Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 34, 64
fluttering (ptoia) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 34
freshness of judgement and fading of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 64
harmony Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75
impulse (hormē), impulse in adult humans is assent or judgement for chrysippus and seneca Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 64
inwood, brad Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 64
kidd, ian Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 64
passions emotions Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75
plato, fear as expectation of evil Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 64
plato, tripartite division of soul Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 64
plato Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75
pleasure Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 34
pohlenz, max Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 64
seneca, the younger, stoic, and is a judgement Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 64
soul, seearistotle, chrysippus, plato, posidonius, ; division of Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 64
stoicism Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75
therapeia\u2003 Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75
tieleman, teun Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 64
zeno of citium, stoic, and oscillation or fluttering Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 34
zeno of citium, stoic, appetite and fear as reaching and leaning away Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 34
zeno of citium, stoic, different view of emotion from chrysippus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 64
zeno of citium, stoic, distress and pleasure as contraction and expansion of soul Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 34
zeno of citium, stoic, emotion as movement of the soul Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 34
zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 64
zeno of citium, stoic, judgement insufficient for distress and pleasure when not fresh Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 64
zeno of citium, stoic, not accept plato's irrational part of the soul" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 64