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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



10313
Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 8.397
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Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

8 results
1. Cicero, Lucullus, 21-22, 37-38, 57, 145 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.1.7-1.1.12 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

3. New Testament, John, 1.41 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

1.41. He first found his own brother, Simon, and said to him, "We have found the Messiah!" (which is, being interpreted, Christ).
4. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 2.1.1-2.1.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

5. Gellius, Attic Nights, 19.1.14-19.1.21 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

6. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.151-7.157, 8.337-8.396, 8.398-8.481, 11.250-11.251 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 2.144-2.192 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

8. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.65-7.66, 7.177, 9.90, 9.94, 9.96-9.97, 9.99-9.101 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.65. for here the agent includes himself in the sphere of his action. The oblique cases are genitive, dative, and accusative.A judgement is that which is either true or false, or a thing complete in itself, capable of being denied in and by itself, as Chrysippus says in his Dialectical Definitions: A judgement is that which in and by itself can be denied or affirmed, e.g. `It is day,' `Dion is walking.' The Greek word for judgement (ἀξίωμα) is derived from the verb ἀξιοῦν, as signifying acceptance or rejection; for when you say It is day, you seem to accept the fact that it is day. Now, if it really is day, the judgement before us is true, but if not, it is false. 7.66. There is a difference between judgement, interrogation, and inquiry, as also between imperative, adjurative, optative, hypothetical, vocative, whether that to which these terms are applied be a thing or a judgement. For a judgement is that which, when we set it forth in speech, becomes an assertion, and is either false or true: an interrogation is a thing complete in itself like a judgement but demanding an answer, e.g. Is it day? and this is so far neither true nor false. Thus It is day is a judgement; Is it day? an interrogation. An inquiry is something to which we cannot reply by signs, as you can nod Yes to an interrogation; but you must express the answer in words, He lives in this or that place. 7.177. 6. SPHAERUSAmongst those who after the death of Zeno became pupils of Cleanthes was Sphaerus of Bosporus, as already mentioned. After making considerable progress in his studies, he went to Alexandria to the court of King Ptolemy Philopator. One day when a discussion had arisen on the question whether the wise man could stoop to hold opinion, and Sphaerus had maintained that this was impossible, the king, wishing to refute him, ordered some waxen pomegranates to be put on the table. Sphaerus was taken in and the king cried out, You have given your assent to a presentation which is false. But Sphaerus was ready with a neat answer. I assented not to the proposition that they are pomegranates, but to another, that there are good grounds for thinking them to be pomegranates. Certainty of presentation and reasonable probability are two totally different things. Mnesistratus having accused him of denying that Ptolemy was a king, his reply was, Being of such quality as he is, Ptolemy is indeed a king. 9.94. We must not assume that what convinces us is actually true. For the same thing does not convince every one, nor even the same people always. Persuasiveness sometimes depends on external circumstances, on the reputation of the speaker, on his ability as a thinker or his artfulness, on the familiarity or the pleasantness of the topic.Again, they would destroy the criterion by reasoning of this kind. Even the criterion has either been critically determined or not. If it has not, it is definitely untrustworthy, and in its purpose of distinguishing is no more true than false. If it has, it will belong to the class of particular judgements, so that one and the same thing determines and is determined, and the criterion which has determined will have to be determined by another, that other by another, and so on ad infinitum. 9.96. They deny, too, that there is such a thing as a sign. If there is, they say, it must either be sensible or intelligible. Now it is not sensible, because what is sensible is a common attribute, whereas a sign is a particular thing. Again, the sensible is one of the things which exist by way of difference, while the sign belongs to the category of relative. Nor is a sign an object of thought, for objects of thought are of four kinds, apparent judgements on things apparent, non-apparent judgements on things non-apparent, non-apparent on apparent, or apparent on non-apparent; and a sign is none of these, so that there is no such thing as a sign. A sign is not apparent on apparent, for what is apparent needs no sign; nor is it non-apparent on non-apparent, for what is revealed by something must needs appear; 9.97. nor is it non-apparent on apparent, for that which is to afford the means of apprehending something else must itself be apparent; nor, lastly, is it apparent on non-apparent, because the sign, being relative, must be apprehended along with that of which it is the sign, which is not here the case. It follows that nothing uncertain can be apprehended; for it is through signs that uncertain things are said to be apprehended.Causes, too, they destroy in this way. A cause is something relative; for it is relative to what can be caused, namely, the effect. But things which are relative are merely objects of thought and have no substantial existence. 9.99. But if both be alike causes, there will be nothing to be acted upon Nor can an incorporeal thing be the cause of an incorporeal thing, for the same reason. And a thing incorporeal cannot be the cause of a body, since nothing incorporeal creates anything corporeal. And, lastly, a body cannot be the cause of anything incorporeal, because what is produced must be of the material operated upon; but if it is not operated upon because it is incorporeal, it cannot be produced by anything whatever. Therefore there is no such thing as a cause. A corollary to this is their statement that the first principles of the universe have no real existence; for in that case something must have been there to create and act.Furthermore there is no motion; for that which moves moves either in the place where it is or in a place where it is not. But it cannot move in the place where it is, still less in any place where it is not. Therefore there is no such thing as motion. 9.100. They used also to deny the possibility of learning. If anything is taught, they say, either the existent is taught through its existence or the non-existent through its non-existence. But the existent is not taught through its existence, for the nature of existing things is apparent to and recognized by all; nor is the non-existent taught through the nonexistent, for with the non-existent nothing is ever done, so that it cannot be taught to anyone.Nor, say they, is there any coming into being. For that which is does not come into being, since it is; nor yet that which is not, for it has no substantial existence, and that which is neither substantial nor existent cannot have had the chance of coming into being either. 9.101. There is nothing good or bad by nature, for if there is anything good or bad by nature, it must be good or bad for all persons alike, just as snow is cold to all. But there is no good or bad which is such to all persons in common; therefore there is no such thing as good or bad by nature. For either all that is thought good by anyone whatever must be called good, or not all. Certainly all cannot be so called; since one and the same thing is thought good by one person and bad by another; for instance, Epicurus thought pleasure good and Antisthenes thought it bad; thus on our supposition it will follow that the same thing is both good and bad. But if we say that not all that anyone thinks good is good, we shall have to judge the different opinions; and this is impossible because of the equal validity of opposing arguments. Therefore the good by nature is unknowable.


Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
(lekta) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
appearance (phantasia, impression) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
appearances (kataleptic) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
assent (sunkatathesis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
being (coming into) Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 84
chrysippus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
cicero Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
cognitive / cognition Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
coptic Edelmann-Singer et al., Sceptic and Believer in Ancient Mediterranean Religions (2020) 230
cosmos (visible world, universe) / cosmology Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
criterion Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 84
demonstration Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 84
diogenes laertius Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 84
epictetus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
ethics Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 84
false belief / false judgment / false opinion Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
gnostic, gnosticism Edelmann-Singer et al., Sceptic and Believer in Ancient Mediterranean Religions (2020) 230
good (moral) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
goods (external, material, conventional) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
judgment (krisis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
learning Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 84
logic Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 84
philosophy Edelmann-Singer et al., Sceptic and Believer in Ancient Mediterranean Religions (2020) 230
physics Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 84
plutarch Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
pyrrho Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 84
reason (human) / rational faculty (logos, logistikon) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
resurrection Edelmann-Singer et al., Sceptic and Believer in Ancient Mediterranean Religions (2020) 230
seneca Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
sextus empiricus Edelmann-Singer et al., Sceptic and Believer in Ancient Mediterranean Religions (2020) 230; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 84
soul / mind (psuchē, animus) vii, intellect (nous) / thoughts (dianoiai) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
soul / mind (psuchē, animus) vii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
stobaeus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
stoicism / stoic / stoa Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
truth Edelmann-Singer et al., Sceptic and Believer in Ancient Mediterranean Religions (2020) 230
virtue / moral virtue (aretē)' Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191