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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



10313
Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.253
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Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

13 results
1. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

183a. THEO. So it seems. SOC. This would be a fine result of the correction of our answer, when we were so eager to show that all things are in motion, just for the purpose of making that answer prove to be correct. But this, I think, did prove to be true, that if all things are in motion, every answer to any question whatsoever is equally correct, and we may say it is thus or not thus—or, if you prefer, becomes thus, to avoid giving them fixity by using the word is. THEO. You are right. SOC. Except, Theodorus, that I said thus, and not thus ; but we ought not even to say thus ;
2. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

27d. ourselves we must also invoke so to proceed, that you may most easily learn and I may most clearly expound my views regarding the subject before us. Tim.
3. Cicero, Academica, 2.18 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.10 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so,' 'he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason.
5. Cicero, Lucullus, 18, 21-22, 30-31, 57, 77-78, 83-85, 104 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

6. Cicero, Academica Posteriora, 40 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

7. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

8. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 2.1.1-2.1.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

9. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 117.13 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

10. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.30, 7.34-7.38, 7.46-7.252, 7.254-7.442, 8.70 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

11. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.46, 7.49-7.52, 7.54, 7.63, 7.65-7.66, 7.111, 9.107-9.108 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.46. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it. Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind's assent to impressions. 7.49. The Stoics agree to put in the forefront the doctrine of presentation and sensation, inasmuch as the standard by which the truth of things is tested is generically a presentation, and again the theory of assent and that of apprehension and thought, which precedes all the rest, cannot be stated apart from presentation. For presentation comes first; then thought, which is capable of expressing itself, puts into the form of a proposition that which the subject receives from a presentation. 7.50. There is a difference between the process and the outcome of presentation. The latter is a semblance in the mind such as may occur in sleep, while the former is the act of imprinting something on the soul, that is a process of change, as is set forth by Chrysippus in the second book of his treatise of the Soul (De anima). For, says he, we must not take impression in the literal sense of the stamp of a seal, because it is impossible to suppose that a number of such impressions should be in one and the same spot at one and the same time. The presentation meant is that which comes from a real object, agrees with that object, and has been stamped, imprinted and pressed seal-fashion on the soul, as would not be the case if it came from an unreal object. 7.51. According to them some presentations are data of sense and others are not: the former are the impressions conveyed through one or more sense-organs; while the latter, which are not data of sense, are those received through the mind itself, as is the case with incorporeal things and all the other presentations which are received by reason. of sensuous impressions some are from real objects and are accompanied by yielding and assent on our part. But there are also presentations that are appearances and no more, purporting, as it were, to come from real objects.Another division of presentations is into rational and irrational, the former being those of rational creatures, the latter those of the irrational. Those which are rational are processes of thought, while those which are irrational have no name. Again, some of our impressions are scientific, others unscientific: at all events a statue is viewed in a totally different way by the trained eye of a sculptor and by an ordinary man. 7.52. The Stoics apply the term sense or sensation (αἴσθησις) to three things: (1) the current passing from the principal part of the soul to the senses, (2) apprehension by means of the senses, (3) the apparatus of the sense-organs, in which some persons are deficient. Moreover, the activity of the sense-organs is itself also called sensation. According to them it is by sense that we apprehend black and white, rough and smooth, whereas it is by reason that we apprehend the conclusions of demonstration, for instance the existence of gods and their providence. General notions, indeed, are gained in the following ways: some by direct contact, some by resemblance, some by analogy, some by transposition, some by composition, and some by contrariety. 7.54. The standard of truth they declare to be the apprehending presentation, i.e. that which comes from a real object – according to Chrysippus in the twelfth book of his Physics and to Antipater and Apollodorus. Boethus, on the other hand, admits a plurality of standards, namely intelligence, sense-perception, appetency, and knowledge; while Chrysippus in the first book of his Exposition of Doctrine contradicts himself and declares that sensation and preconception are the only standards, preconception being a general notion which comes by the gift of nature (an innate conception of universals or general concepts). Again, certain others of the older Stoics make Right Reason the standard; so also does Posidonius in his treatise On the Standard. 7.63. To the department dealing with things as such and things signified is assigned the doctrine of expressions, including those which are complete in themselves, as well as judgements and syllogisms and that of defective expressions comprising predicates both direct and reversed.By verbal expression they mean that of which the content corresponds to some rational presentation. of such expressions the Stoics say that some are complete in themselves and others defective. Those are defective the enunciation of which is unfinished, as e.g. writes, for we inquire Who? Whereas in those that are complete in themselves the enunciation is finished, as Socrates writes. And so under the head of defective expressions are ranged all predicates, while under those complete in themselves fall judgements, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries. 7.65. for here the agent includes himself in the sphere of his action. The oblique cases are genitive, dative, and accusative.A judgement is that which is either true or false, or a thing complete in itself, capable of being denied in and by itself, as Chrysippus says in his Dialectical Definitions: A judgement is that which in and by itself can be denied or affirmed, e.g. `It is day,' `Dion is walking.' The Greek word for judgement (ἀξίωμα) is derived from the verb ἀξιοῦν, as signifying acceptance or rejection; for when you say It is day, you seem to accept the fact that it is day. Now, if it really is day, the judgement before us is true, but if not, it is false. 7.66. There is a difference between judgement, interrogation, and inquiry, as also between imperative, adjurative, optative, hypothetical, vocative, whether that to which these terms are applied be a thing or a judgement. For a judgement is that which, when we set it forth in speech, becomes an assertion, and is either false or true: an interrogation is a thing complete in itself like a judgement but demanding an answer, e.g. Is it day? and this is so far neither true nor false. Thus It is day is a judgement; Is it day? an interrogation. An inquiry is something to which we cannot reply by signs, as you can nod Yes to an interrogation; but you must express the answer in words, He lives in this or that place. 7.111. They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others' prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself. 9.107. Against this criterion of appearances the dogmatic philosophers urge that, when the same appearances produce in us different impressions, e.g. a round or square tower, the Sceptic, unless he gives the preference to one or other, will be unable to take any course; if on the other hand, say they, he follows either view, he is then no longer allowing equal value to all apparent facts. The Sceptics reply that, when different impressions are produced, they must both be said to appear; for things which are apparent are so called because they appear. The end to be realized they hold to be suspension of judgement, which brings with it tranquillity like its shadow: so Timon and Aenesidemus declare. 9.108. For in matters which are for us to decide we shall neither choose this nor shrink from that; and things which are not for us to decide but happen of necessity, such as hunger, thirst and pain, we cannot escape, for they are not to be removed by force of reason. And when the dogmatists argue that he may thus live in such a frame of mind that he would not shrink from killing and eating his own father if ordered to do so, the Sceptic replies that he will be able so to live as to suspend his judgement in cases where it is a question of arriving at the truth, but not in matters of life and the taking of precautions. Accordingly we may choose a thing or shrink from a thing by habit and may observe rules and customs. According to some authorities the end proposed by the Sceptics is insensibility; according to others, gentleness.
12. Stobaeus, Eclogues, 3.18.24

13. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.60, 2.53-2.54



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
(lekta) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
academic philosophy, attitude towards auctoritas Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
academy Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
activeness (of converts) Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171
aenesidemus Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
agency / agent, human Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
animals (general) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
antiochus Bryan, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263; Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
antiochus of ascalon Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55, 235
appearance (phantasia, impression) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
appearances (kataleptic) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
archilochus Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
aristotle, and scepticism Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55
aristotle Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 235
assent (sunkatathesis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
assent / adsensio / adsensus / συγκατάθεσις Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 130
atticus t. pomponius Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 130
auctoritas Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
awakening Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
belief, dogmatic belief Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
belief (doxa) Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 235
cicero Bryan, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263; Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
clitomachus Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 130
cognitive / cognition Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
cognitive aspect Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 172
conversion, philosophical Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
conversion, process Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
criterion Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
diogenes laertius Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
doctrines (dogma, decreta) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
doxography Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
drunkenness Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
emotions / passions (pathē, pathēmata) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
epictetus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
euripides Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
figment Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171
homer Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
imagination Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171
impression Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
impulse (hormē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
katalepsis, kataleptic impression Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 235
kataleptic representation / comprehensive representation / καταληπτικὴ φαντασία Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 130
mental Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171
mind Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
modes of pyrrhonian scepticism Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55
orthodoxy Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
passions Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 172
perception Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
perception / comprehensio / κατάληψις Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 130
philo of larisa Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 235
philo of larissa Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51
plato, theaeteus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 235
plato Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51
plutarch Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
principles/ archai Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51
probable / probability / probabilitas / πιθανόν Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 130
psychic Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171
pyrrho Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
pyrrhonism Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
rational Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 172
reason (human) / rational faculty (logos, logistikon) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
representation / φαντασία Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 130
rich/wealthy Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 172
scepticism, pyrrhonean Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55
sedley, david Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
seneca Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
senses Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
senses / sense-perception (aisthēsis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
sextus empiricus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55; Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 130; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
socrates Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51
soul Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
soul / mind (psuchē, animus) vii, intellect (nous) / thoughts (dianoiai) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
soul / mind (psuchē, animus) vii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
stoicism / stoic / stoa Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
tension of the soul Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 172
tranquility Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
tranquillity, truth' Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55
truth Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
value (axia) / valuation Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
varro Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51
vice (kakos) / viciousness (kakia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
virtue / moral virtue (aretē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
way of life Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
zeno of citium, and platos theaetetus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 235
zeno of citium, epistemology of Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 235
zeno of citium Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 130