Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

10313

Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.248
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Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

20 results
1. Plato, Phaedo, 74e, 74d (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
2. Plato, Sophist, 236e, 236d (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
3. Plato, Theaetetus, 152c, 183a, 152b (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) 152b. SOC. It is likely that a wise man is not talking nonsense; so let us follow after him. Is it not true that sometimes, when the same wind blows, one of us feels cold, and the other does not? or one feels slightly and the other exceedingly cold? THEAET. Certainly. SOC. Then in that case, shall we say that the wind is in itself cold or not cold or shall we accept Protagoras’s saying that it is cold for him who feels cold and not for him who does not? THEAET. Apparently we shall accept that. SOC. Then it also seems cold, or not, to each of the two? THEAET. Yes. SOC. But seems denotes perceiving? THEAET. It does.
4. Plato, Timaeus, 34a, 27d (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE) 27d. ourselves we must also invoke so to proceed, that you may most easily learn and I may most clearly expound my views regarding the subject before us. Tim.
5. Cicero, Academica, 1.41 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) 1.41. visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem sed is solum quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur; id autem visum cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile—feretis haec? hoc Dav. ' ATT. nos vero inquit; inquam Ald. quonam quoniam ng 1 quam p 1 ; (quo)nam ... sed in ras. p enim alio alio om. *dn modo katalhmpto diceres? — VA. “sed cum acceptum iam et approbatum probatum *g esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem is rebus quae manu prenderentur; ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat at, del. Man. ac gf cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re in re iure mw usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis (nova enim dicebat) usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprensum id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita erat comprensum ut convelli ratione non posset scientiam, sin aliter inscientiam nominabat; ex qua existebat existebat Pl. -erat p -eret rw extiterat *g etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla imb. adsensio Pl. et cum falso incognitoque communis.
6. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.63 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) 1.63. optime vero Epicurus, quod exiguam dixit fortunam intervenire sapienti maximasque ab eo et ab eo et om. R et ( ante gravissimas) om. V gravissimas res consilio ipsius et ratione administrari neque maiorem voluptatem ex infinito tempore aetatis percipi posse, quam ex hoc percipiatur, quod videamus esse finitum. In dialectica autem vestra nullam existimavit esse nec ad melius vivendum nec ad commodius disserendum viam. viam om. R In physicis plurimum posuit. ea scientia et verborum vis et natura orationis et consequentium repugtiumve ratio potest perspici. percipi R omnium autem rerum natura cognita levamur superstitione, liberamur mortis metu, non conturbamur ignoratione rerum, e qua ipsa horribiles existunt saepe formidines. denique etiam morati melius erimus, cum didicerimus quid natura desideret. tum vero, si stabilem scientiam rerum tenebimus, servata illa, quae quasi delapsa de caelo est ad cognitionem omnium, regula, ad quam omnia iudicia rerum omnium rerum regula R 1 dirigentur, numquam ullius oratione victi sententia desistemus.
7. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.10 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE) 1.10. Those however who seek to learn my personal opinion on the various questions show an unreasonable degree of curiosity. In discussion it is not so much weight of authority as force of argument that should be demanded. Indeed the authority of those who profess to teach is often a positive hindrance to those who desire to learn; they cease to employ their own judgement, and take what they perceive to be the verdict of their chosen master as settling the question. In fact I am not disposed to approve the practice traditionally ascribed to the Pythagoreans, who, when questioned as to the grounds of any assertion that they advanced in debate, are said to have been accustomed to reply 'He himself said so,' 'he himself' being Pythagoras. So potent was an opinion already decided, making authority prevail unsupported by reason.
8. Cicero, Lucullus, 18, 22, 57, 77, 104 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
9. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 4.513-4.521 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
10. Philo of Alexandria, On Planting, 142 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
11. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.28.28-1.28.30, 2.11.20, 2.11.22-2.11.25, 3.3.14-3.3.15, 4.12.12 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
12. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 1.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
13. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 89.11 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
14. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 4.38.2, 4.39.1, 5.2.3 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
15. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.30, 7.34-7.38, 7.46-7.247, 7.249-7.442 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
16. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.46, 7.50, 7.52, 7.111, 9.107-9.108, 10.27, 10.32 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE) 7.46. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it. Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind's assent to impressions. 7.50. There is a difference between the process and the outcome of presentation. The latter is a semblance in the mind such as may occur in sleep, while the former is the act of imprinting something on the soul, that is a process of change, as is set forth by Chrysippus in the second book of his treatise of the Soul (De anima). For, says he, we must not take impression in the literal sense of the stamp of a seal, because it is impossible to suppose that a number of such impressions should be in one and the same spot at one and the same time. The presentation meant is that which comes from a real object, agrees with that object, and has been stamped, imprinted and pressed seal-fashion on the soul, as would not be the case if it came from an unreal object. 7.52. The Stoics apply the term sense or sensation (αἴσθησις) to three things: (1) the current passing from the principal part of the soul to the senses, (2) apprehension by means of the senses, (3) the apparatus of the sense-organs, in which some persons are deficient. Moreover, the activity of the sense-organs is itself also called sensation. According to them it is by sense that we apprehend black and white, rough and smooth, whereas it is by reason that we apprehend the conclusions of demonstration, for instance the existence of gods and their providence. General notions, indeed, are gained in the following ways: some by direct contact, some by resemblance, some by analogy, some by transposition, some by composition, and some by contrariety. 7.111. They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others' prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself. 9.107. Against this criterion of appearances the dogmatic philosophers urge that, when the same appearances produce in us different impressions, e.g. a round or square tower, the Sceptic, unless he gives the preference to one or other, will be unable to take any course; if on the other hand, say they, he follows either view, he is then no longer allowing equal value to all apparent facts. The Sceptics reply that, when different impressions are produced, they must both be said to appear; for things which are apparent are so called because they appear. The end to be realized they hold to be suspension of judgement, which brings with it tranquillity like its shadow: so Timon and Aenesidemus declare. 9.108. For in matters which are for us to decide we shall neither choose this nor shrink from that; and things which are not for us to decide but happen of necessity, such as hunger, thirst and pain, we cannot escape, for they are not to be removed by force of reason. And when the dogmatists argue that he may thus live in such a frame of mind that he would not shrink from killing and eating his own father if ordered to do so, the Sceptic replies that he will be able so to live as to suspend his judgement in cases where it is a question of arriving at the truth, but not in matters of life and the taking of precautions. Accordingly we may choose a thing or shrink from a thing by habit and may observe rules and customs. According to some authorities the end proposed by the Sceptics is insensibility; according to others, gentleness. 10.27. hence he has frequently repeated himself and set down the first thought that occurred to him, and in his haste has left things unrevised, and he has so many citations that they alone fill his books: nor is this unexampled in Zeno and Aristotle. Such, then, in number and character are the writings of Epicurus, the best of which are the following:of Nature, thirty-seven books.of Atoms and Void.of Love.Epitome of Objections to the Physicists.Against the Megarians.Problems.Sovran Maxims.of Choice and Avoidance.of the End.of the Standard, a work entitled Canon.Chaeredemus.of the Gods.of Piety. 10.32. Nor is there anything which can refute sensations or convict them of error: one sensation cannot convict another and kindred sensation, for they are equally valid; nor can one sensation refute another which is not kindred but heterogeneous, for the objects which the two senses judge are not the same; nor again can reason refute them, for reason is wholly dependent on sensation; nor can one sense refute another, since we pay equal heed to all. And the reality of separate perceptions guarantees the truth of our senses. But seeing and hearing are just as real as feeling pain. Hence it is from plain facts that we must start when we draw inferences about the unknown. For all our notions are derived from perceptions, either by actual contact or by analogy, or resemblance, or composition, with some slight aid from reasoning. And the objects presented to mad-men and to people in dreams are true, for they produce effects – i.e. movements in the mind – which that which is unreal never does.
17. Plotinus, Enneads, 5.8.7, 6.7.1-6.7.2 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
18. Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.63.6-2.63.7 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
19. Stobaeus, Eclogues, 3.18.24
20. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.60, 2.53

Subjects of this text:

subject	book bibliographic info
(sense) perception	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 226
academic philosophy, attitude towards auctoritas	Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
academy	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
activeness (of converts)	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171
aenesidemus	Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
aisthesis	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 226
alcinous	Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144
antiochus	Bryan, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263; Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
antiochus of ascalon	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55
apprehension katalepsis, comprehensio	Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 155
archilochus	Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
aristotle, and scepticism	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55
arnim, johannes von	Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 188
assent / adsensio / adsensus / συγκατάθεσις	Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 130
atticus t. pomponius	Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 130
auctoritas	Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
awakening	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
belief, dogmatic belief	Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
bénatouïl, thomas	Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 188
canon and criterion of truth	Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144
cicero	Bryan, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263; Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144; Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 155; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
clitomachus	Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 130
cognition	Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 188
cognitive aspect	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 172
cognitive impression	Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 188
conversion, philosophical	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
conversion, process	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
criterion	Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
criterion (of truth)	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 226
demiurge	Gerson and Wilberding, The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (2022) 213
diogenes laertius	Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
doxography	Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
drunkenness	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
epictetus	Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144
epicurus, on nature and the self	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 226
epicurus and epicureans	Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144
euripides	Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
false beliefs, falsehood	Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 155
figment	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171
homer	Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
imagination	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171
impression	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
impression phantasia, representation, cataleptic kataleptike	Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 155
irenaeus of lyons, against heresies	Ayres Champion and Crawford, The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions (2023) 76
irenaeus of lyons, learning through experience, on	Ayres Champion and Crawford, The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions (2023) 76
irenaeus of lyons, maturity, on	Ayres Champion and Crawford, The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions (2023) 76
irenaeus of lyons, truth, on perception of	Ayres Champion and Crawford, The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions (2023) 76
irenaeus of lyons	Ayres Champion and Crawford, The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions (2023) 76
katalepsis, kataleptic impression	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 226
katalepsis	Ayres Champion and Crawford, The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions (2023) 76
kataleptic representation / comprehensive representation / καταληπτικὴ φαντασία	Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 130
knowledge	Gerson and Wilberding, The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (2022) 213
lucretius	Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144
mathematics	Gerson and Wilberding, The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (2022) 213
memory	Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 155
mental	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171
mind	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
modes of pyrrhonian scepticism	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55
participation	Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144
passions	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 172
perception	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
perception / comprehensio / κατάληψις	Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 130
philo of larissa	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51
philosophy, philosophical	Pezzini and Taylor,Language and Nature in the Classical Roman World (2019)" 155
plato, theaeteus	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 226
plato, timaeus	Gerson and Wilberding, The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (2022) 213
plato	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51
principles/ archai	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51
probable / probability / probabilitas / πιθανόν	Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 130
protagoras	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 226
psychic	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171
pyrrho	Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
pyrrhonism	Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
rational	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 172
representation / φαντασία	Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 130
rich/wealthy	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 172
rule	Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144
scepticism, pyrrhonean	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55
sedley, david	Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
seneca	Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144
sensation	Gerson and Wilberding, The New Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (2022) 213
senses	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
sextus empiricus	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55; Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 130; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
socrates	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51
soul	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
tension of the soul	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 172
tranquility	Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
tranquillity, truth	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55
truth'	Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144
truth	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
varro	Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51
way of life	Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 171, 172
zeno of citium, and platos theaetetus	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 226
zeno of citium, epistemology of	Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 226
zeno of citium	Maso, CIcero's Philosophy (2022) 130