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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



10313
Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.211-7.216
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Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

9 results
1. Plato, Theaetetus, 183a (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

183a. THEO. So it seems. SOC. This would be a fine result of the correction of our answer, when we were so eager to show that all things are in motion, just for the purpose of making that answer prove to be correct. But this, I think, did prove to be true, that if all things are in motion, every answer to any question whatsoever is equally correct, and we may say it is thus or not thus—or, if you prefer, becomes thus, to avoid giving them fixity by using the word is. THEO. You are right. SOC. Except, Theodorus, that I said thus, and not thus ; but we ought not even to say thus ;
2. Plato, Timaeus, 27d (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

27d. ourselves we must also invoke so to proceed, that you may most easily learn and I may most clearly expound my views regarding the subject before us. Tim.
3. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.63 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.63. optime vero Epicurus, quod exiguam dixit fortunam intervenire sapienti maximasque ab eo et ab eo et om. R et ( ante gravissimas) om. V gravissimas res consilio ipsius et ratione administrari neque maiorem voluptatem ex infinito tempore aetatis percipi posse, quam ex hoc percipiatur, quod videamus esse finitum. In dialectica autem vestra nullam existimavit esse nec ad melius vivendum nec ad commodius disserendum viam. viam om. R In physicis plurimum posuit. ea scientia et verborum vis et natura orationis et consequentium repugtiumve ratio potest perspici. percipi R omnium autem rerum natura cognita levamur superstitione, liberamur mortis metu, non conturbamur ignoratione rerum, e qua ipsa horribiles existunt saepe formidines. denique etiam morati melius erimus, cum didicerimus quid natura desideret. tum vero, si stabilem scientiam rerum tenebimus, servata illa, quae quasi delapsa de caelo est ad cognitionem omnium, regula, ad quam omnia iudicia rerum omnium rerum regula R 1 dirigentur, numquam ullius oratione victi sententia desistemus.
4. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 4.513-4.521 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.28.28-1.28.30, 2.11.20, 2.11.22-2.11.25, 3.3.14-3.3.15, 4.12.12 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

6. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 1.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

7. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 89.11 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

8. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.30, 7.34-7.38, 7.46-7.210, 7.212-7.442 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

9. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 9.107-9.108, 10.27, 10.32 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

9.107. Against this criterion of appearances the dogmatic philosophers urge that, when the same appearances produce in us different impressions, e.g. a round or square tower, the Sceptic, unless he gives the preference to one or other, will be unable to take any course; if on the other hand, say they, he follows either view, he is then no longer allowing equal value to all apparent facts. The Sceptics reply that, when different impressions are produced, they must both be said to appear; for things which are apparent are so called because they appear. The end to be realized they hold to be suspension of judgement, which brings with it tranquillity like its shadow: so Timon and Aenesidemus declare. 9.108. For in matters which are for us to decide we shall neither choose this nor shrink from that; and things which are not for us to decide but happen of necessity, such as hunger, thirst and pain, we cannot escape, for they are not to be removed by force of reason. And when the dogmatists argue that he may thus live in such a frame of mind that he would not shrink from killing and eating his own father if ordered to do so, the Sceptic replies that he will be able so to live as to suspend his judgement in cases where it is a question of arriving at the truth, but not in matters of life and the taking of precautions. Accordingly we may choose a thing or shrink from a thing by habit and may observe rules and customs. According to some authorities the end proposed by the Sceptics is insensibility; according to others, gentleness. 10.27. hence he has frequently repeated himself and set down the first thought that occurred to him, and in his haste has left things unrevised, and he has so many citations that they alone fill his books: nor is this unexampled in Zeno and Aristotle. Such, then, in number and character are the writings of Epicurus, the best of which are the following:of Nature, thirty-seven books.of Atoms and Void.of Love.Epitome of Objections to the Physicists.Against the Megarians.Problems.Sovran Maxims.of Choice and Avoidance.of the End.of the Standard, a work entitled Canon.Chaeredemus.of the Gods.of Piety. 10.32. Nor is there anything which can refute sensations or convict them of error: one sensation cannot convict another and kindred sensation, for they are equally valid; nor can one sensation refute another which is not kindred but heterogeneous, for the objects which the two senses judge are not the same; nor again can reason refute them, for reason is wholly dependent on sensation; nor can one sense refute another, since we pay equal heed to all. And the reality of separate perceptions guarantees the truth of our senses. But seeing and hearing are just as real as feeling pain. Hence it is from plain facts that we must start when we draw inferences about the unknown. For all our notions are derived from perceptions, either by actual contact or by analogy, or resemblance, or composition, with some slight aid from reasoning. And the objects presented to mad-men and to people in dreams are true, for they produce effects – i.e. movements in the mind – which that which is unreal never does.


Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
academic philosophy, attitude towards auctoritas Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
academy Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
aenesidemus Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
alcinous Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144
antiochus Bryan, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263; Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
antiochus of ascalon Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55
archilochus Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
aristotle, and scepticism Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55
auctoritas Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
belief, dogmatic belief Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
canon and criterion of truth Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144
cicero Bryan, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263; Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
criterion Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
diogenes laertius Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
doxography Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
epictetus Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144
epicurus and epicureans Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144
euripides Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
homer Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
lucretius Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144
modes of pyrrhonian scepticism Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55
participation Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144
philo of larissa Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51
plato Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51
principles/ archai Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51
pyrrho Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
pyrrhonism Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
rule Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144
scepticism, pyrrhonean Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55
sedley, david Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
seneca Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144
sextus empiricus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
socrates Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51
tranquility Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
tranquillity, truth Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55
truth' Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 144
varro Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51