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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



10313
Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.151-7.157
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27 results
1. Plato, Theaetetus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

183a. THEO. So it seems. SOC. This would be a fine result of the correction of our answer, when we were so eager to show that all things are in motion, just for the purpose of making that answer prove to be correct. But this, I think, did prove to be true, that if all things are in motion, every answer to any question whatsoever is equally correct, and we may say it is thus or not thus—or, if you prefer, becomes thus, to avoid giving them fixity by using the word is. THEO. You are right. SOC. Except, Theodorus, that I said thus, and not thus ; but we ought not even to say thus ;
2. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

27d. ourselves we must also invoke so to proceed, that you may most easily learn and I may most clearly expound my views regarding the subject before us. Tim.
3. Cicero, Academica, 1.41-1.42, 2.32, 2.66-2.67, 2.77-2.78, 2.84, 2.145 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.41. visis non omnibus adiungebat fidem sed is solum quae propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum quae viderentur; id autem visum cum ipsum per se cerneretur, comprehendibile—feretis haec? hoc Dav. ' ATT. nos vero inquit; inquam Ald. quonam quoniam ng 1 quam p 1 ; (quo)nam ... sed in ras. p enim alio alio om. *dn modo katalhmpto diceres? — VA. “sed cum acceptum iam et approbatum probatum *g esset, comprehensionem appellabat, similem is rebus quae manu prenderentur; ex quo etiam nomen hoc duxerat at, del. Man. ac gf cum eo verbo antea nemo tali in re in re iure mw usus esset, plurimisque idem novis verbis (nova enim dicebat) usus est. Quod autem erat sensu comprensum id ipsum sensum appellabat, et si ita erat comprensum ut convelli ratione non posset scientiam, sin aliter inscientiam nominabat; ex qua existebat existebat Pl. -erat p -eret rw extiterat *g etiam opinio, quae esset imbecilla imb. adsensio Pl. et cum falso incognitoque communis. 1.42. sed inter scientiam et inscientiam comprehensionem illam quam dixi collocabat, eamque neque in rectis neque in pravis paruis *g numerabat, sed soli credendum esse dicebat. E quo sensibus etiam fidem tribuebat, quod ut supra dixi comprehensio facta sensibus et vera esse illi et fidelis videbatur, non quod quod om. *g, in ras. p omnia quae essent in re comprehenderet, sed quia nihil quod cadere in eam eam nat. Man. n. eam Fab. posset relinqueret, quodque natura quasi normam scientiae et principium sui dedisset unde postea notiones rerum in animis imprimerentur; e quibus non principia solum sed latiores quaedam ad rationem inveniendam viae reperiuntur. aperituntur Man. -rirentur Dav. reperirentur Gr. errorem autem et temeritatem et ignorantiam ignorationem s et opinationem et suspicionem et uno nomine omnia quae essent aliena firmae et constantis assensionis a virtute sapientiaque removebat. Atque in his fere commutatio constitit omnis dissensioque Zenonis a superioribus.”
4. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.49, 3.75, 4.64, 4.77, 5.43 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.49. Eadem fortitudinis ratio reperietur. nam neque laborum perfunctio neque perpessio dolorum per se ipsa allicit nec patientia nec assiduitas assiduitates ANV nec vigiliae nec ea ea om. BE ipsa, quae laudatur, industria, ne fortitudo quidem, sed ista sequimur, ut sine cura metuque vivamus animumque et corpus, quantum efficere possimus, possimus AEN possumus molestia liberemus. ut enim mortis metu omnis quietae vitae status perturbatur, et ut succumbere doloribus eosque humili animo inbecilloque ferre miserum est, ob eamque debilitatem animi multi parentes, parentis R multi amicos, non nulli patriam, plerique autem se ipsos penitus perdiderunt, sic robustus animus et excelsus omni est liber cura et angore, cum et mortem contemnit, qua qui qui quia A 1 BE affecti sunt in eadem causa sunt, qua ante quam nati, et ad dolores ita paratus est, ut meminerit maximos morte finiri, parvos multa habere intervalla requietis, mediocrium nos esse dominos, ut, si tolerabiles sint, feramus, si minus, animo aequo e vita, cum ea non placeat, tamquam e theatro exeamus. quibus rebus intellegitur nec timiditatem ignaviamque vituperari nec fortitudinem patientiamque laudari suo nomine, sed illas reici, quia dolorem pariant, has optari, quia voluptatem. 3.75. quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis! qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus vereque omnia ista nomina possideat, quae irrideri ab inperitis solent. rectius enim appellabitur rex quam Tarquinius, qui nec se nec suos regere potuit, rectius magister populi—is enim est dictator dictator est BE —quam Sulla, qui trium pestiferorum vitiorum, luxuriae, avaritiae, crudelitatis, magister fuit, rectius dives quam Crassus, qui nisi eguisset, numquam Euphraten nulla belli causa transire voluisset. recte eius omnia dicentur, qui scit uti solus omnibus, recte etiam pulcher appellabitur— animi enim liniamenta sunt pulchriora quam corporis quam corporis NV quam corporibus ABE corporibus ( om. quam) R —, recte solus liber nec dominationi cuiusquam parens nec oboediens cupiditati, recte invictus, cuius etiamsi corpus constringatur, animo tamen vincula inici nulla possint, nec expectet ullum tempus aetatis, uti tum uti tum Se. ut tum (ut in ras., sequente ras. 2 vel 3 litt. ) N virtutum ABE ututū R ubi tum V denique iudicetur beatusne fuerit, cum extremum vitae diem morte confecerit, quod ille unus e septem sapientibus non sapienter Croesum monuit; 4.64. atque hoc loco similitudines eas, quibus illi uti solent, dissimillimas proferebas. proferebas p. 107, 23 sqq. quis enim ignorat, si plures ex alto emergere velint, propius fore eos quidem ad respirandum, qui ad summam iam aquam aquam iam BE adpropinquent, sed nihilo magis respirare posse quam eos, qui sint in profundo? nihil igitur adiuvat procedere et progredi in virtute, quo minus miserrimus sit, ante quam ad eam pervenerit, quoniam in aqua nihil adiuvat, et, quoniam catuli, qui iam dispecturi dispecturi NV despecturi sunt, caeci aeque et ii, qui modo nati, Platonem quoque necesse est, quoniam nondum videbat sapientiam, aeque caecum caecum ceco R animo ac ac RNV et BE Phalarim fuisse? 4.77. Urgent tamen et nihil remittunt. Quoniam, inquiunt, omne peccatum inbecillitatis et inconstantiae est, haec autem vitia in omnibus stultis aeque magna sunt, necesse est paria esse peccata. Quasi vero aut concedatur in omnibus stultis aeque magna esse vitia, et eadem inbecillitate et inconstantia L. Tubulum fuisse, qua qua BE quam illum, cuius is condemnatus est rogatione, P. Scaevolam, et quasi nihil inter res quoque ipsas, in quibus peccatur, intersit, ut, quo hae maiores minoresve sint, eo, quae peccentur in his rebus, aut 5.43. est enim natura sic generata vis hominis, ut ad omnem virtutem percipiendam facta videatur, ob eamque causam parvi virtutum simulacris, quarum in se habent semina, sine doctrina moventur; sunt enim prima elementa naturae, quibus auctis auctis actis R virtutis quasi germen germen I. F. Gronov. carmen efficitur. nam cum ita nati factique simus, ut et agendi aliquid et diligendi aliquos et liberalitatis et referendae gratiae principia in nobis contineremus atque ad scientiam, prudentiam, fortitudinem aptos animos haberemus a contrariisque rebus alienos, non sine causa eas, quas dixi, in pueris virtutum quasi scintillas videmus, e quibus accendi philosophi ratio debet, ut eam quasi deum ducem subsequens ad naturae perveniat extremum. nam, ut saepe iam dixi, in infirma aetate inbecillaque mente vis naturae quasi per caliginem cernitur; cum autem progrediens confirmatur animus, agnoscit ille quidem ille quidem Mdv. quid ille BE quidem ille RNV naturae vim, sed ita, ut progredi possit longius, per se sit tantum tantum Mdv. tamen inchoata. 3.75.  "Then, how dignified, how lofty, how consistent is the character of the Wise Man as they depict it! Since reason has proved that moral worth is the sole good, it follows that he must always be happy, and that all those titles which the ignorant are so fond of deriding do in very truth belong to him. For he will have a better claim to the title of King than Tarquin, who could not rule either himself or his subjects; a better right to the name of 'Master of the People' (for that is what a dictator is) than Sulla, who was a master of three pestilential vices, licentiousness, avarice and cruelty; a better right to be called rich than Crassus, who had he lacked nothing could never have been induced to cross the Euphrates with no pretext for war. Rightly will he be said to own all things, who alone knows how to use all things; rightly also will he be styled beautiful, for the features of the soul are fairer than those of the body; rightly the one and only free man, as subject to no man's authority, and slave of no appetite; rightly unconquerable, for though his body be thrown into fetters, no bondage can enchain his soul. 4.64.  It was at this point that you brought forward those extremely false analogies which the Stoics are so fond of employing. of course everybody knows that if there are several people plunged in deep water and trying to get out, those already approaching the surface, though nearer to breathing, will be no more able actually to breathe than those at the bottom. You infer that improvement and progress in virtue are of no avail to save a man from being utterly wretched, until he has actually arrived at virtue, since to rise in the water is of no avail. Again, since puppies on the point of opening their eyes are as blind as those only just born, it follows that Plato, not having yet attained to the vision of wisdom, was just as blind mentally as Phalaris! 4.77.  "However, they press the matter, and will not give way. Every transgression, they argue, is a proof of weakness and instability of character; but all the foolish possess these vices in an equal manner; therefore all transgressions must be equal. As though it were admitted that all foolish people possess an equal degree of vice, and that Lucius Tubulus was exactly as weak and unstable as Publius Scaevola who brought in the bill for his condemnation; and as though there were no difference also between the respective circumstances in which the transgressions are committed, so that the magnitude of the transgression varies in proportion to the importance of the circumstances! 5.43.  It is that human capacity is so constituted by nature that it appears designed to achieve every kind of virtue; hence children, without instruction, are actuated by semblances of the virtues, of which they possess in themselves the seeds, for these are primary elements of our nature, and they sprout and blossom into virtue. For we are so constituted from birth as to contain within us the primary instincts of action, of affection, of liberality and of gratitude; we are also gifted with minds that are adapted to knowledge, prudence and courage, and averse from their opposites; hence there is a reason why we observe in children those sparks of virtue I have mentioned, from which the philosopher's torch of reason must be kindled, that he may follow reason as his divine guide and so arrive at nature's goal. For as I have repeatedly said already, in the years of immaturity when the intellect is weak the powers of our nature are discerned as through a mist; but as the mind grows older and stronger it learns to know the capacity of our nature, while recognizing that this nature is susceptible of further development and has by itself only reached an incomplete condition.
5. Cicero, Lucullus, 18, 21-22, 30-31, 37-38, 57, 77-78, 83-85, 145 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

6. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.23, 4.15, 4.46, 4.60 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.23. hoc propemodum verbo Graeci omnem animi perturbationem appellant; vocant enim pa/qos, Pa OOC G 1 patos H id est morbum, quicumque est motus in animo turbidus. nos melius: aegris enim corporibus simillima animi est aegritudo, at at ex aut G 2 aegrotationes X non similis aegrotationis est libido, non inmoderata laetitia, quae est voluptas animi elata et gestiens. genstiens hic et 331, 21 G 1 ipse etiam metus non est morbi admodum similis, quamquam aegritudini aegritudine X corr. V 1? B 1 est finitimus, sed proprie, ut aegrotatio in corpore, sic aegritudo in animo nomen habet sed... 329,1 nomen habet (nominavet L 1 ) Non, 443,23 non seiunctum a dolore. doloris huius igitur origo nobis explicanda est, id est causa efficiens aegritudinem in animo tamquam aegrotationem in corpore. nam ut medici causa morbi morbi verborum Non. inventa om. Non. del. R c inventa curationem esse inventam putant, nam ... 5 putant Non. 493,20 sic nos causa aegritudinis reperta medendi repertãedendi G 1 corr. 2 repertā medendi R ( - postea add. ) reperiemur V facultatem reperiemus. 4.15. sed quae iudicia quasque opiniones perturbationum esse dixi, non in eis perturbationes solum positas esse dicunt, verum illa etiam etiam ilia H quae efficiuntur perturbationibus, ut aegritudo quasi morsum aliquem doloris efficiat, metus recessum quendam animi et fugam, laetitia profusam hilaritatem, libido lubido K x li bido R effrenatam effrenata X corr. K 2 R c adpetentiam. opinationem autem, quam in omnis definitiones superiores inclusimus, volunt esse inbecillam adsensionem. 4.46. Reliquas quoque partis aegritudinis utilis esse dicunt, misericordiam ad opem ferendam et calamitates calamitates post indignorum rep. X del. V 3 hominum indignorum sublevandas; ipsum illud aemulari obtrectare non esse inutile, cum aut se non idem videat consecutum, quod alium, aut alium idem, quod se; metum vero si qui quis GV rec sustulisset, omnem vitae diligentiam sublatam fore, quae summa esset in eis esse K qui leges, qui magistratus, qui leges qui magistratus in r. V c qui paupertatem, qui ignominiam, qui mortem, qui dolorem timerent. tenerent K Haec tamen ita disputant, ut resecanda esse fateantur, evelli penitus dicant nec posse nec opus esse et in omnibus fere rebus mediocritatem esse optumam existiment. existimant s quae cum exponunt, nihilne tibi videntur an aliquid dicere? Mihi vero dicere aliquid, itaque expecto, quid ad ista. ista ( eras. m) K Reperiam fortasse, sed illud ante: 4.60. sed omnis eius modi perturbatio animi animi enim V 1 placatione abluatur illa quidem, cum doceas nec nec s V 3 et X bonum illud esse, ex quo laetitia aut aut V et G 1 libido oriatur, nec malum, ex quo aut metus aut aegritudo; verum tamen haec est certa et propria sanatio, si doceas ipsas perturbationes per se esse vitiosas nec habere quicquam aut naturale aut necessarium, ut ut aut R 1 V ipsam ipsa GRV 1 aegritudinem leniri videmus, cum obicimus obicibus GKR maerentibus imbecillitatem inbecil itatem G animi ecfeminati, cumque eorum gravitatem constantiamque gravitate constantiaque GRV 1 laudamus, qui non turbulente humana patiantur. quod quidem solet eis etiam accidere, qui illa mala esse censent, ferenda ferendum K tamen aequo animo arbitrantur. arbitratur GRV 1 putat puta GRV 1 aliquis aliquid K idem fuit fort. in R (aliqui esse) esse voluptatem bonum, alius autem pecuniam; tamen et ille ab intemperantia et hic ab avaritia hic abaritia V 1 avocari potest. illa autem altera ratio et oratio, et oratio om. V quae simul et opinionem falsam falsa GRV 1 tollit et et om. K 1 aegritudinem aegritudine GRV 1 detrahit, est ea quidem utilior, sed raro proficit neque est ad volgus adhibenda.
7. Cicero, Academica Posteriora, 40 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

8. Diogenes of Oenoanda, Fragments, 5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

9. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.1.7-1.1.12, 1.28.1-1.28.2, 1.28.4-1.28.5, 2.23.30-2.23.35, 3.3.2-3.3.4, 3.23.16 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

10. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 6.12, 8.1-11.1, 8.6, 10.23 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

10.23. All things are lawful for me," but not all things areprofitable. "All things are lawful for me," but not all things buildup.
11. New Testament, Hebrews, 6.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

6.4. For concerning those who were once enlightened and tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Spirit
12. New Testament, Romans, 3.29-3.30 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

3.29. Or is God the God of Jews only? Isn't he the God of Gentiles also? Yes, of Gentiles also 3.30. since indeed there is one God who will justify the circumcised by faith, and the uncircumcised through faith.
13. New Testament, Luke, 2.30, 3.6, 17.31-17.32 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

2.30. For my eyes have seen your salvation 3.6. All flesh will see God's salvation.' 17.31. In that day, he who will be on the housetop, and his goods in the house, let him not go down to take them away. Let him who is in the field likewise not turn back. 17.32. Remember Lot's wife!
14. New Testament, Matthew, 7.14 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

7.14. How narrow is the gate, and restricted is the way that leads to life! Few are those who find it.
15. Plutarch, Against Colotes, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

16. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

17. Plutarch, Marius, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

18. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 1.5, 1.20.3, 2.1.1-2.1.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

19. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 50.9, 76.9, 95.37, 107.12, 116.5, 117.13 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

20. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 8.1.1.3 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

21. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.4.16-4.4.17, 4.4.21, 4.4.23-4.4.24, 4.4.29, 4.7.1-4.7.4, 5.1.4 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

22. Gellius, Attic Nights, 17.19, 19.1.14-19.1.21 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

23. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 7.30, 7.34-7.38, 7.46-7.150, 7.152-7.442, 8.70, 8.397 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

24. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 2.13, 7.46-7.47, 7.49-7.51, 7.54, 7.63, 7.65-7.66, 7.87-7.89, 7.98, 7.118-7.119, 7.122, 7.159, 7.165, 7.177, 9.107-9.108 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

2.13. When news was brought him that he was condemned and his sons were dead, his comment on the sentence was, Long ago nature condemned both my judges and myself to death; and on his sons, I knew that my children were born to die. Some, however, tell this story of Solon, and others of Xenophon. That he buried his sons with his own hands is asserted by Demetrius of Phalerum in his work On Old Age. Hermippus in his Lives says that he was confined in the prison pending his execution; that Pericles came forward and asked the people whether they had any fault to find with him in his own public career; to which they replied that they had not. Well, he continued, I am a pupil of Anaxagoras; do not then be carried away by slanders and put him to death. Let me prevail upon you to release him. So he was released; but he could not brook the indignity he had suffered and committed suicide. 7.46. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it. Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind's assent to impressions. 7.47. By wariness they mean a strong presumption against what at the moment seems probable, so as not to be taken in by it. Irrefutability is strength in argument so as not to be brought over by it to the opposite side. Earnestness (or absence of frivolity) is a habit of referring presentations to right reason. Knowledge itself they define either as unerring apprehension or as a habit or state which in reception of presentations cannot be shaken by argument. Without the study of dialectic, they say, the wise man cannot guard himself in argument so as never to fall; for it enables him to distinguish between truth and falsehood, and to discriminate what is merely plausible and what is ambiguously expressed, and without it he cannot methodically put questions and give answers. 7.49. The Stoics agree to put in the forefront the doctrine of presentation and sensation, inasmuch as the standard by which the truth of things is tested is generically a presentation, and again the theory of assent and that of apprehension and thought, which precedes all the rest, cannot be stated apart from presentation. For presentation comes first; then thought, which is capable of expressing itself, puts into the form of a proposition that which the subject receives from a presentation. 7.50. There is a difference between the process and the outcome of presentation. The latter is a semblance in the mind such as may occur in sleep, while the former is the act of imprinting something on the soul, that is a process of change, as is set forth by Chrysippus in the second book of his treatise of the Soul (De anima). For, says he, we must not take impression in the literal sense of the stamp of a seal, because it is impossible to suppose that a number of such impressions should be in one and the same spot at one and the same time. The presentation meant is that which comes from a real object, agrees with that object, and has been stamped, imprinted and pressed seal-fashion on the soul, as would not be the case if it came from an unreal object. 7.51. According to them some presentations are data of sense and others are not: the former are the impressions conveyed through one or more sense-organs; while the latter, which are not data of sense, are those received through the mind itself, as is the case with incorporeal things and all the other presentations which are received by reason. of sensuous impressions some are from real objects and are accompanied by yielding and assent on our part. But there are also presentations that are appearances and no more, purporting, as it were, to come from real objects.Another division of presentations is into rational and irrational, the former being those of rational creatures, the latter those of the irrational. Those which are rational are processes of thought, while those which are irrational have no name. Again, some of our impressions are scientific, others unscientific: at all events a statue is viewed in a totally different way by the trained eye of a sculptor and by an ordinary man. 7.54. The standard of truth they declare to be the apprehending presentation, i.e. that which comes from a real object – according to Chrysippus in the twelfth book of his Physics and to Antipater and Apollodorus. Boethus, on the other hand, admits a plurality of standards, namely intelligence, sense-perception, appetency, and knowledge; while Chrysippus in the first book of his Exposition of Doctrine contradicts himself and declares that sensation and preconception are the only standards, preconception being a general notion which comes by the gift of nature (an innate conception of universals or general concepts). Again, certain others of the older Stoics make Right Reason the standard; so also does Posidonius in his treatise On the Standard. 7.63. To the department dealing with things as such and things signified is assigned the doctrine of expressions, including those which are complete in themselves, as well as judgements and syllogisms and that of defective expressions comprising predicates both direct and reversed.By verbal expression they mean that of which the content corresponds to some rational presentation. of such expressions the Stoics say that some are complete in themselves and others defective. Those are defective the enunciation of which is unfinished, as e.g. writes, for we inquire Who? Whereas in those that are complete in themselves the enunciation is finished, as Socrates writes. And so under the head of defective expressions are ranged all predicates, while under those complete in themselves fall judgements, syllogisms, questions, and inquiries. 7.65. for here the agent includes himself in the sphere of his action. The oblique cases are genitive, dative, and accusative.A judgement is that which is either true or false, or a thing complete in itself, capable of being denied in and by itself, as Chrysippus says in his Dialectical Definitions: A judgement is that which in and by itself can be denied or affirmed, e.g. `It is day,' `Dion is walking.' The Greek word for judgement (ἀξίωμα) is derived from the verb ἀξιοῦν, as signifying acceptance or rejection; for when you say It is day, you seem to accept the fact that it is day. Now, if it really is day, the judgement before us is true, but if not, it is false. 7.66. There is a difference between judgement, interrogation, and inquiry, as also between imperative, adjurative, optative, hypothetical, vocative, whether that to which these terms are applied be a thing or a judgement. For a judgement is that which, when we set it forth in speech, becomes an assertion, and is either false or true: an interrogation is a thing complete in itself like a judgement but demanding an answer, e.g. Is it day? and this is so far neither true nor false. Thus It is day is a judgement; Is it day? an interrogation. An inquiry is something to which we cannot reply by signs, as you can nod Yes to an interrogation; but you must express the answer in words, He lives in this or that place. 7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. 7.88. And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or, in other words, in accordance with our own human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things, that is to say, the right reason which pervades all things, and is identical with this Zeus, lord and ruler of all that is. And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. Diogenes then expressly declares the end to be to act with good reason in the selection of what is natural. Archedemus says the end is to live in the performance of all befitting actions. 7.89. By the nature with which our life ought to be in accord, Chrysippus understands both universal nature and more particularly the nature of man, whereas Cleanthes takes the nature of the universe alone as that which should be followed, without adding the nature of the individual.And virtue, he holds, is a harmonious disposition, choice-worthy for its own sake and not from hope or fear or any external motive. Moreover, it is in virtue that happiness consists; for virtue is the state of mind which tends to make the whole of life harmonious. When a rational being is perverted, this is due to the deceptiveness of external pursuits or sometimes to the influence of associates. For the starting-points of nature are never perverse. 7.98. of mental goods some are habits, others are dispositions, while others again are neither the one nor the other. The virtues are dispositions, while accomplishments or avocations are matters of habit, and activities as such or exercise of faculty neither the one nor the other. And in general there are some mixed goods: e.g. to be happy in one's children or in one's old age. But knowledge is a pure good. Again, some goods are permanent like the virtues, others transitory like joy and walking-exercise. 7.118. Again, the good are genuinely in earnest and vigilant for their own improvement, using a manner of life which banishes evil out of sight and makes what good there is in things appear. At the same time they are free from pretence; for they have stripped off all pretence or make-up whether in voice or in look. Free too are they from all business cares, declining to do anything which conflicts with duty. They will take wine, but not get drunk. Nay more, they will not be liable to madness either; not but what there will at times occur to the good man strange impressions due to melancholy or delirium, ideas not determined by the principle of what is choiceworthy but contrary to nature. Nor indeed will the wise man ever feel grief; seeing that grief is irrational contraction of the soul, as Apollodorus says in his Ethics. 7.119. They are also, it is declared, godlike; for they have a something divine within them; whereas the bad man is godless. And yet of this word – godless or ungodly – there are two senses, one in which it is the opposite of the term godly, the other denoting the man who ignores the divine altogether: in this latter sense, as they note, the term does not apply to every bad man. The good, it is added, are also worshippers of God; for they have acquaintance with the rites of the gods, and piety is the knowledge of how to serve the gods. Further, they will sacrifice to the gods and they keep themselves pure; for they avoid all acts that are offences against the gods, and the gods think highly of them: for they are holy and just in what concerns the gods. The wise too are the only priests; for they have made sacrifices their study, as also establishing holy places, purifications, and all the other matters appertaining to the gods. 7.122. though indeed there is also a second form of slavery consisting in subordination, and a third which implies possession of the slave as well as his subordination; the correlative of such servitude being lordship; and this too is evil. Moreover, according to them not only are the wise free, they are also kings; kingship being irresponsible rule, which none but the wise can maintain: so Chrysippus in his treatise vindicating Zeno's use of terminology. For he holds that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary attribute of the ruler, and that no bad man is acquainted with this science. Similarly the wise and good alone are fit to be magistrates, judges, or orators, whereas among the bad there is not one so qualified. 7.159. Chrysippus in the second book of his Physics declares it to be in substance identical with vital breath or spirit. This, he thinks, can be seen from the seeds cast into the earth, which, if kept till they are old, do not germinate, plainly because their fertility has evaporated. Sphaerus and his followers also maintain that semen derives its origin from the whole of the body; at all events every part of the body can be reproduced from it. That of the female is according to them sterile, being, as Sphaerus says, without tension, scanty, and watery. By ruling part of the soul is meant that which is most truly soul proper, in which arise presentations and impulses and from which issues rational speech. And it has its seat in the heart.Such is the summary of their Physics which I have deemed adequate, my aim being to preserve a due proportion in my work. But the points on which certain of the Stoics differed from the rest are the following. 7.165. 3. HERILLUSHerillus of Carthage declared the end of action to be Knowledge, that is, so to live always as to make the scientific life the standard in all things and not to be misled by ignorance. Knowledge he defined as a habit of mind, not to be upset by argument, in the acceptance of presentations. Sometimes he used to say there was no single end of action, but it shifted according to varying circumstances and objects, as the same bronze might become a statue either of Alexander or of Socrates. He made a distinction between end-in-chief and subordinate end: even the unwise may aim at the latter, but only the wise seek the true end of life. Everything that lies between virtue and vice he pronounced indifferent. His writings, though they do not occupy much space, are full of vigour and contain some controversial passages in reply to Zeno. 7.177. 6. SPHAERUSAmongst those who after the death of Zeno became pupils of Cleanthes was Sphaerus of Bosporus, as already mentioned. After making considerable progress in his studies, he went to Alexandria to the court of King Ptolemy Philopator. One day when a discussion had arisen on the question whether the wise man could stoop to hold opinion, and Sphaerus had maintained that this was impossible, the king, wishing to refute him, ordered some waxen pomegranates to be put on the table. Sphaerus was taken in and the king cried out, You have given your assent to a presentation which is false. But Sphaerus was ready with a neat answer. I assented not to the proposition that they are pomegranates, but to another, that there are good grounds for thinking them to be pomegranates. Certainty of presentation and reasonable probability are two totally different things. Mnesistratus having accused him of denying that Ptolemy was a king, his reply was, Being of such quality as he is, Ptolemy is indeed a king. 9.107. Against this criterion of appearances the dogmatic philosophers urge that, when the same appearances produce in us different impressions, e.g. a round or square tower, the Sceptic, unless he gives the preference to one or other, will be unable to take any course; if on the other hand, say they, he follows either view, he is then no longer allowing equal value to all apparent facts. The Sceptics reply that, when different impressions are produced, they must both be said to appear; for things which are apparent are so called because they appear. The end to be realized they hold to be suspension of judgement, which brings with it tranquillity like its shadow: so Timon and Aenesidemus declare. 9.108. For in matters which are for us to decide we shall neither choose this nor shrink from that; and things which are not for us to decide but happen of necessity, such as hunger, thirst and pain, we cannot escape, for they are not to be removed by force of reason. And when the dogmatists argue that he may thus live in such a frame of mind that he would not shrink from killing and eating his own father if ordered to do so, the Sceptic replies that he will be able so to live as to suspend his judgement in cases where it is a question of arriving at the truth, but not in matters of life and the taking of precautions. Accordingly we may choose a thing or shrink from a thing by habit and may observe rules and customs. According to some authorities the end proposed by the Sceptics is insensibility; according to others, gentleness.
25. Origen, Commentary On John, 2.10 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

26. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None

27. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.60, 1.66, 2.54, 2.393, 3.378, 3.389-3.395, 3.397-3.398, 3.401, 3.407-3.409, 3.413-3.416



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
(lekta) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 191, 192
(prokoptōn) vii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 240
academic philosophy, attitude towards auctoritas Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
academics, the academy Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 96
academy Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
action-tendency Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 71
actions / acts (stoic), appropriate (kathēkonta) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 240
actions / acts (stoic), erroneous / errors (hamartēmata) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 192, 213, 240
aenesidemus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 96; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
agency / agent, human Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
anger, as weakness Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 234
animals (general) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
antiochus Bryan, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263; Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
antiochus of ascalon Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55, 96
apatheia (passionlessness) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 213
appearance (phantasia, impression) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 191, 192, 213, 240
appearances (kataleptic) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 191, 192
archilochus Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
aristo of chios Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 189
aristotle, and scepticism Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55
arius didymus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 240
art (technē, skill) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 192
assent, faulty Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 71
assent Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 68, 69, 70
assent (sunkatathesis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 191, 192, 213
athens, athenians Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 96
auctoritas Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
awakening Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
bad (evil) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 213
belief, dogmatic belief Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
belief Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 189
belief (doxa) Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 96, 231
body / bodies (corporeal, material, matter, physical) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 192, 240
carneades Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 96
cataleptic Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
character (diathesis, hexis, disposition, stable state) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 240
choice (hairesis) / choosing (haireisthai) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 240
chrysippus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191, 213
cicero, on academic sceptics Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 96
cicero Bryan, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263; Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 191, 192, 240; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
cleanthes Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 189
clement of alexandria, on interpretation of scripture Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 413
cognition, and emotion Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 71
cognition Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 68, 69
cognitive / cognition Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 191, 192, 213, 240
cognitive impression Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 68, 69
conversion, philosophical Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
cosmos (visible world, universe) / cosmology Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
courage Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 68
criterion Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
death Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 68
determinism, dialectic Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 96
diogenes laertius, general diogenes of babylon Celykte, The Stoic Theory of Beauty (2020) 97
diogenes laertius Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 191; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
diogenes of oenoanda Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 234
distress (lupē, grief, pain) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 213
doctrines (dogma, decreta) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
doxography Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
emotion, ancient philosophical theory of Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 71
emotions / passions (pathē, pathēmata) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 213
end Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 189
epictetus Celykte, The Stoic Theory of Beauty (2020) 97; Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 191, 213
epistemology, pauls Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 138
epistemology, stoic Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 138
epistemology, suneidēsis Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 138
epoche Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 96
eudaimonia (flourishing, happiness) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 240
euripides Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
exegesis, in clement of alexandria Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 413
exhortation Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 234
false belief / false judgment / false opinion Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191, 192, 240
fear, of death Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 234
fear (phobos) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 213
figment Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
flattery Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 234
freedom (eleutheria) / free (eleutheros) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 213
galen of pergamum Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 213
gentleness Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 234
good (moral) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191, 213, 240
goods (external, material, conventional) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191
habit / habituate / habitude (ethos, ethizesthai, hexis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 192
herillus Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 189
homer Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
identity of indiscernibles Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 231
ignorance Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
impression Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182; Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 71; Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 68, 69, 70
impulse Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 71
impulse (hormē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 213
indifferents Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 71
infallible knowledge Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 231
instantaneous change (metabolē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 240
irrational Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
irrational (alogos) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 213
jewish practices/torah observance Wilson, Paul and the Jewish Law: A Stoic Ethical Perspective on his Inconsistency (2022) 138
judgment Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 192, 213
judgment (krisis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191, 192, 213
katalepsis, kataleptic impression Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 231
knowledge Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 68, 69, 70
knowledge (epistēmē, gnōsis) / epistemology Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 192, 240
logos Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 231
male as constituent factor for groups Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
menedemus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 96
menn, stephen Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 189
mental Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
metaphor Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 234
mind Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
modes of pyrrhonian scepticism Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55
opinion Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 71
opinion (doxa) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 192, 213, 240
orthodoxy Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
perception Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
perfect (teleios) / perfection (teleiōsis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 192
philo of larisa Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 96
philo of larissa Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51
philosopher, moral Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 234
plato, theaeteus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 231
plato Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51
platonism (middle / imperial) vi–viii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 213
pleasure Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 234
pleasure (hēdonē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 213
plutarch Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 191, 240; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 96
principles/ archai Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51
psychic Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
pyrrho Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
pyrrhonism Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
rational Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
reason Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 71
reason (human) / rational faculty (logos, logistikon) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 191, 192, 240
reproof Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 234
sage (wise person) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 192, 213, 240
scepticism, academic Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 96, 231
scepticism, pyrrhonean Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55, 96
scripture, as weapon/criterion against heresy Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 413
sedley, david Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 263
self-mastery (enkrateia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 213
seneca Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 191, 213; Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 234
senses Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
senses / sense-perception (aisthēsis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 192
sextus empiricus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55, 96; Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
soberness Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
socrates Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51; Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 96
soul Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
soul / mind (psuchē, animus) vii, intellect (nous) / thoughts (dianoiai) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 191
soul / mind (psuchē, animus) vii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 191, 213
stobaeus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 191, 213
stoicism, cognition Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 234
stoicism, orthodox borrowing from Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 413
stoicism Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 234
stoicism / stoic / stoa, neostoicism (greco-roman) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 213
stoicism / stoic / stoa Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 191, 192, 213, 240
strength Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
techniques Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 70
tenor Jedan, Stoic Virtues: Chrysippus and the Religious Character of Stoic Ethics (2009) 69, 70
tension of the soul Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
titration point Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 240
training (askēsis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 192
tranquility Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 111
tranquillity, truth Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 55, 231
truth Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
value (axia) / valuation Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 213
value system Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 71
varro Frede and Laks, Traditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background and Aftermath (2001) 51
vice Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182; Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 234
vice (kakos) / viciousness (kakia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188
virtue Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182; Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 234
virtue / moral virtue (aretē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 188, 191, 240
vital breath Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
wakefulness Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
way of life Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
weakness Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 234
weapon' Malherbe et al., Light from the Gentiles: Hellenistic Philosophy and Early Christianity: Collected Essays of Abraham J (2014) 234
wisdom Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 182
wise man Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 231
zeno of citium, and platos theaetetus Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 231
zeno of citium, epistemology of Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 231
δοξοσοφία Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 413
κατάληψις Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 413
οἴησις Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 413