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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



10313
Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 11.22-11.26
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Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

8 results
1. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.60-3.61 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.60. Sed cum ab his omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes, in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem. in quo enim plura sunt quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est de vita excedere. ex quo ex quo RV e quo (equo) apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser. 3.61. nam bonum illud et malum, quod saepe iam dictum est, postea consequitur, prima autem illa naturae sive secunda sive contraria sub iudicium sapientis et dilectum cadunt, estque illa subiecta quasi materia materie BE sapientiae. itaque et manendi in vita et migrandi ratio omnis iis iis edd. in V his rebus, quas supra dixi, metienda. nam neque virtute retinetur ille in add. Se. vita, nec iis, qui qui que BER sine virtute sunt, mors est oppetenda. et et Urs. ut saepe officium est sapientis desciscere a vita, cum sit beatissimus, si id oportune facere possit, quod est convenienter naturae. sic naturae sic B naturae vivere sic ( etiam E) enim censent, oportunitatis esse beate vivere. itaque a sapientia praecipitur se ipsam, si usus sit, sapiens ut relinquat. quam ob rem cum vitiorum ista vis non sit, ut causam afferant mortis voluntariae, perspicuum est etiam stultorum, qui idem miseri sint, officium esse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte rerum earum, earum rerum BE quas secundum naturam esse dicimus. et quoniam excedens e vita et manens aeque miser est nec diuturnitas magis ei magis ei ei (et E) magis BE vitam fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur iis, qui pluribus naturalibus frui possint, esse in vita manendum. 3.60.  But since these neutral things form the basis of all appropriate acts, there is good ground for the dictum that it is with these things that all our practical deliberations deal, including the will to live and the will to quit this life. When a man's circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life. This makes it plain that it is on occasion appropriate for the Wise Man to quit life although he is happy, and also of the Foolish Man to remain in life although he is miserable. 3.61.  For with the Stoics good and evil, as has repeatedly been said already, are a subsequent outgrowth; whereas the primary things of nature, whether favourable or the reverse, fall under the judgment and choice of the Wise Man, and form so to speak the subject-matter, the given material with which wisdom deals. Therefore the reasons both for remaining in life and for departing from it are to be measured entirely by the primary things of nature aforesaid. For the virtuous man is not necessarily retained in life by virtue, and also those who are devoid of virtue need not necessarily seek death. And very often it is appropriate for the Wise Man to abandon life at a moment when he is enjoying supreme happiness, if an opportunity offers for making a timely exit. For the Stoic view is that happiness, which means life in harmony with nature, is a matter of seizing the right moment. So that Wisdom her very self upon occasion bids the Wise Man to leave her. Hence, as vice does not possess the power of furnishing a reason for suicide, it is clear that even for the foolish, who are also miserable, it is appropriate to remain alive if they possess a predomice of those things which we pronounce to be in accordance with nature. And since the fool is equally miserable when departing from life and when remaining in it, and the undesirability of his life is not increased by its prolongation, there is good ground for saying that those who are in a position to enjoy a preponderance of things that are natural ought to remain in life.
2. Plutarch, Placita Philosophorum (874D-911C), 1.6 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

3. Seneca The Younger, De Vita Beata (Dialogorum Liber Vii), 22.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

4. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 41.2, 104.21 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

5. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 5.27 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

6. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 9.86, 11.14, 11.23-11.26, 11.45, 11.61-11.67, 11.73, 11.110-11.161 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.28, 7.176, 9.101 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.28. And in very truth in this species of virtue and in dignity he surpassed all mankind, ay, and in happiness; for he was ninety-eight when he died and had enjoyed good health without an ailment to the last. Persaeus, however, in his ethical lectures makes him die at the age of seventy-two, having come to Athens at the age of twenty-two. But Apollonius says that he presided over the school for fifty-eight years. The manner of his death was as follows. As he was leaving the school he tripped and fell, breaking a toe. Striking the ground with his fist, he quoted the line from the Niobe:I come, I come, why dost thou call for me?and died on the spot through holding his breath. 7.176. His end was as follows. He had severe inflammation of the gums, and by the advice of his doctors he abstained from food for two whole days. As it happened, this treatment succeeded, so that the doctors were for allowing him to resume his usual diet. To this, however, he would not consent, but declaring that he had already got too far on the road, he went on fasting the rest of his days until his death at the same age as Zeno according to some authorities, having spent nineteen years as Zeno's pupil.My lighter verse on him runs thus:I praise Cleanthes, but praise Hades more,Who could not bear to see him grown so old,So gave him rest at last among the dead,Who'd drawn such load of water while alive. 9.101. There is nothing good or bad by nature, for if there is anything good or bad by nature, it must be good or bad for all persons alike, just as snow is cold to all. But there is no good or bad which is such to all persons in common; therefore there is no such thing as good or bad by nature. For either all that is thought good by anyone whatever must be called good, or not all. Certainly all cannot be so called; since one and the same thing is thought good by one person and bad by another; for instance, Epicurus thought pleasure good and Antisthenes thought it bad; thus on our supposition it will follow that the same thing is both good and bad. But if we say that not all that anyone thinks good is good, we shall have to judge the different opinions; and this is impossible because of the equal validity of opposing arguments. Therefore the good by nature is unknowable.
8. Papyri, Derveni Papyrus, 6.4



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
bren, tad Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 172
chrysippus Alvarez, The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries (2018) 41
cooper, john Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 172
daimons Alvarez, The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries (2018) 41
divination Alvarez, The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries (2018) 41
erinyes Alvarez, The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries (2018) 41
gods Alvarez, The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries (2018) 41
good / bad Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 95
indifferents, preferred and dispreferred, contrast with good and benefit Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 172
indifferents, preferred and dispreferred, theory explained Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 172
objectivity/subjectivity Celykte, The Stoic Theory of Beauty (2020) 70
plutarch Alvarez, The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries (2018) 41
punishments Alvarez, The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries (2018) 41
pyrrhonism Vogt, Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius (2015) 95
sacrifices Alvarez, The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries (2018) 41
seneca, the younger, stoic, indifferents valuable for novices Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 172
servants of the gods (minor deities) Alvarez, The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries (2018) 41
souls Alvarez, The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries (2018) 41
stoicism Alvarez, The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries (2018) 41
stoics Alvarez, The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries (2018) 41
suicide, permissible occasions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 172
zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia)' Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 172
zeus Alvarez, The Derveni Papyrus: Unearthing Ancient Mysteries (2018) 41