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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



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Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 2.4.1
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28 results
1. Aristotle, Soul, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2.6, 7.1-7.2, 7.5, 7.7-7.8, 7.10, 10.8 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

3. Cicero, Academica, 2.108 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4. Cicero, On Fate, 40 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5. Cicero, De Oratore, 1.44 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.44. Missos facio mathematicos, grammaticos, musicos, quorum artibus vestra ista dicendi vis ne minima quidem societate coniungitur. Quam ob rem ista tanta tamque multa profitenda, Crasse, non censeo; satis id est magnum, quod potes praestare, ut in iudiciis ea causa, quamcumque tu dicis, melior et probabilior esse videatur, ut in contionibus et in sententiis dicendis ad persuadendum tua plurimum valeat oratio, denique ut prudentibus diserte, stultis etiam vere videare dicere. Hoc amplius si quid poteris, non id mihi videbitur orator, sed Crassus sua quadam propria, non communi oratorum facultate posse.'
6. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.22, 3.24-3.25, 3.30, 3.61, 3.64, 3.66, 3.68, 3.72, 3.74-3.76, 3.80, 3.83, 4.11-4.12, 4.14, 4.43-4.57, 4.59, 4.65 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.22. Haec sic sic R c? V c si X dicuntur a Stoicis concludunturque contortius. sed latius aliquando aliquando cf. 323,22 aliquanto s male, cf. de orat. 1, 133 opt. gen. 23 dicenda sunt et diffusius; sententiis tamen utendum eorum potissimum, qui qui ex quā ut v. G 2 maxime forti et, ut ita dicam, virili utuntur ratione atque sententia. nam Peripatetici, familiares nostri, quibus nihil est uberius, nihil eruditius, nihil gravius, mediocritates vel perturbationum vel morborum animi mihi non sane probant. omne enim malum, etiam mediocre, mediocre iocre in r. G 2 malum malum Bouh. magnum alt. id om. H est; nos autem id agimus, ut id in sapiente nullum sit omnino. nam ut corpus, etiamsi mediocriter aegrum est, sanum non est, sic in animo ista mediocritas caret sanitate. itaque praeclare nostri, ut alia multa, molestiam sollicitudinem angorem propter similitudinem corporum aegrorum aegritudinem aegritudinem cf. Aug. civ. 14,17 ext. nominaverunt. 3.24. Est igitur causa omnis in opinione, nec vero aegritudinis St. fr. 3, 385 solum, sed etiam reliquarum omnium perturbationum, quae sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures. nam cum omnis perturbatio sit animi motus vel rationis expers vel rationem aspers vel rationi non oboediens, isque motus aut boni aut mali opinione citetur bifariam, quattuor perturbationes aequaliter distributae sunt. nam duae sunt ex opinione boni; quarum altera, voluptas gestiens, id est praeter modum elata aelata G 1 R 1 laetitia, opinione praesentis magni alicuius boni, altera, cupiditas, quae recte vel libido dici potest, quae est inmoderata adpetitio opinati magni boni rationi non obtemperans, post obtemperans add. vel cupiditas recte vel libido dici potest X quae retinent sec. Dav. edd., in v. 17. 8 verba cupiditas — potest delentes. sed ut voluptatis sic cupi- ditatis nomen appositionis locum tenere debebat. de cupiditate autem praedicandam erat 'opinione futuri boni turbatur'; quod cum iam in enuntiato relativo expressum esset, anacoluthon natum est. ad boni 17 V c in mg. adscr. : et quidem magis significat nomen libidinis magnitudinem erroris. itaque in ea cupiditate quae flagrantissima est proprie plerumque nomen hoc ponitur si omnis appetitio opinati boni haec] ut H 3.25. —ergo haec duo genera, voluptas gestiens et libido, bonorum opinione turbantur, ut ut in at corr. V 2 duo reliqua, metus et et om. H s aegritudo, malorum. nam et metus est post metus add. V c s non male. opinio magni mali inpendentis inpendentes G 1 R 1 V 1 ( corr. G 2 R 1 V 1 ) et aegritudo est opinio magni mali praesentis, et quidem recens opinio talis mali, ut in eo rectum recte H videatur esse angi, id autem est, ut ut om. G 1 dolore V is qui doleat oportere opinetur se dolere. his autem perturbationibus, quas in quas in quasi in GKH quas in R vitam vitam Lb. vita ( cf. off. 3,34 ) homini H hominum stultitia quasi quasdam Furias inmittit atque incitat,, 3 omne ... 330, 4 incitat H omnibus viribus atque opibus repugdum est, si volumus hoc, quod datum est vitae, tranquille placideque traducere. Sed cetera alias; nunc aegritudinem, si possumus, depellamus. id enim sit sit (si V 1 )] est Bouh. sed cf. fin. 4,25 propositum, quandoquidem eam tu videri tibi in sapientem cadere dixisti, quod ego nullo modo existimo; taetra enim res est, misera, detestabilis, omni omne GRV ( corr. R 1 V 1 ) contentione, velis, ut ita dicam, remisque fugienda. 3.30. quod autem Theseus a docto se audisse dicit, id de se ipso de ipso K 1 ( ex dese ipse) V 1 (se add. 1 ) Anax. A 33 loquitur Euripides. fuerat enim auditor Anaxagorae, quem ferunt nuntiata morte filii dixisse: sciebam me genuisse mortalem. quae vox declarat is esse haec acerba, quibus non fuerint cogitata. ergo id quidem non dubium, quin omnia, quae mala putentur, sint inprovisa graviora. itaque quamquam non haec una res efficit maximam aegritudinem, tamen, quoniam multum potest provisio animi et praeparatio ad minuendum dolorem, sint semper omnia homini humana meditata. et et ex e V c nimirum haec est illa praestans et divina sapientia, et perceptas penitus et pertractatas res humanas habere, nihil admirari, ammirari GR 1 V cum acciderit, nihil, ante quam evenerit, non evenire posse arbitrari. Quam ob rem o/mnis, cum secu/ndae res sunt ma/xume, tum ma/xume tum maxume add. K c maxime alt. loco GRV bis H Medita/ri secum opo/rtet, quo pacto a/dversam adversum KRH aerumna/m ferant. fuerant H ferat K 1 Peri/cla, pericula X damna pe/regre rediens se/mper secum co/gitet, pericla damna exilia peregre rediens semper cogitet Ter. codd. Aut fi/li filii p. X peccatum au/t uxoris mo/rtem aut morbum fi/liae, Commu/nia esse haec, ne/ quid horum umquam a/ccidat animo/ novum; c. e. haec, fieri posse, ut ne quid animo sit novom Ter. Quicqui/d praeter praeter propter K spem eve/niat, omne id de/putare esse i/n lucro. ergo .. 22 lucro H ... 22 Ter. Phormio 241–6 ergo hoc hoc ex haec G 2 Terentius a philosophia sumptum cum tam commode dixerit, nos, e quorum fontibus id haustum est, non et dicemus hoc melius et constantius sentiemus? 3.61. Omnibus enim modis fulciendi sunt, qui ruunt nec cohaerere possunt propter magnitudinem aegritudinis. ex quo ipsam aegritudinem lu/phn a\gP HN fere X ( L ex A V) Chrysippus quasi Chrys. fr. eth. 485 solutionem totius hominis appellatam omnibus modis... 12 appellat putat. appellat amputat KR 1 V ( cf. H et praef. ) Quae tota poterit evelli explicata, ut ut aut V 1 principio dixi, dixi cf. p. 329, 2sqq. causa aegritudinis; est enim nulla alia nisi opinio et iudicium magni praesentis atque urgentis mali. est... 15 mali itaque et dolor corporis, cuius est morsus acerrumus, perferetur perferetur X ( cf. Po. comm. ad 1, 29 ) perfertur V c spe proposita boni, et acta aetas honeste ac splendide tantam adfert consolationem, ut eos qui ita vixerint aut non attingat aegritudo aegritudo del. Dav. aut perleviter pungat animi dolor. Sed ad hanc opinionem magni mali cum illa etiam opinio accessit oportere, rectum esse, rectū esse esse scr. V c ad officium pertinere ferre perferre V ( sed per in r. rec ) illud aegre quod acciderit, tum denique efficitur illa gravis aegritudinis perturbatio. tum ... 23 perturbatio om. H 3.64. haec omnia recta vera debita putantes faciunt in dolore, maximeque declaratur declaratur hoc sana cf. Mue. ( off. 1, 61 ) hoc quasi officii iudicio fieri, quod, si qui forte, cum se in luctu esse vellent, aliquid fecerunt humanius aut si hilarius locuti sunt, revocant se rursus ad maestitiam peccatique se insimulant, quod dolere dolore K 1 V 1 intermiserint. pueros vero matres et magistri castigare etiam solent, nec verbis solum, sed etiam verberibus, si quid in domestico luctu hilarius ab is factum est aut dictum, plorare cogunt. Quid? ipsa remissio luctus cum est consecuta intellectumque intellectaque X corr. V c est est om. K 1 nihil profici maerendo, nonne res declarat fuisse totum illud voluntarium? 3.66. Ergo in potestate est abicere dolorem, cum velis, tempori servientem. an est ullum tempus, quoniam quidem res in nostra potestate est, cui cui cum V non ponendae curae et aegritudinis add. Dav. ex s . aut aegritudinis aut curae del. alii ( iam in V curaer sec. Str. ut vid. ) causa serviamus? vides ... 22 serviamus constabat eos, qui concidentem volneribus Cn. Pompeium vidissent, GN. X cum in illo ipso acerbissimo miserrimoque spectaculo sibi timerent, quod se classe hostium circumfusos viderent, nihil aliud tum egisse, nisi ut remiges hortarentur et ut salutem adipiscerentur fuga; posteaquam Tyrum venissent, tum adflictari lamentarique coepisse. timor igitur ab his aegritudinem potuit repellere, ratio ab sapienti viro ab sapienti viro Bentl. ac sapientia vera ( def. Linde Era- nos XII p. 175 ) non poterit? Quid est autem quod plus valeat ad ponendum dolorem, quam cum est intellectum nil nihil KH profici et frustra esse susceptum? si igitur deponi potest, etiam non suscipi potest; voluntate igitur et iudicio suscipi aegritudinem confitendum est. si timor aliquoties ab aegritudine potest repellere ... 351, 6 est H 3.68. Philosophi summi nequedum neque nondum X corr. V 3 tamen sapientiam consecuti nonne intellegunt in summo se malo esse? sunt enim insipientes, neque insipientia ullum maius malum est. neque tamen lugent. quid ita? quia huic generi malorum non adfingitur non affingitur V (non af in r. V c n ante g del. idem ) nodfingitur R 1 illa opinio, rectum esse et aequum et ad officium pertinere aegre ferre, quod sapiens non sis, quod idem adfingimus huic aegritudini, in qua luctus inest, quae omnium maxuma est. 3.72. Sed plures sunt causae suscipiendi doloris: primum illa opinio mali, quo viso atque persuaso aegritudo aegritudo add. V c insequitur necessario. deinde etiam gratum mortuis se facere, si graviter eos lugeant, arbitrantur. sed ... 16 arbitrantur H accedit superstitio muliebris quaedam; existumant enim diis inmortalibus se facilius satis facturos, si eorum plaga perculsi adflictos se et stratos esse fateantur. sed haec inter se quam repugnent, plerique non vident. laudant enim eos, qui aequo animo moriantur; qui alterius mortem aequo animo ferant, eos putant vituperandos. quasi fieri ullo modo possit, quod in amatorio sermone dici solet, ut quisquam plus alterum diligat quam se. 3.74. Sed nimirum hoc maxume maxumum X me ss. B est exprimendum, exprimendum X ( con- fessio adversariis exprimenda est cf. Verr. 4, 112 Liv. 21, 18, 5 Lucan. 6, 599 manibus exprime verum ) experimentum ( et antea maxumum) edd. ( sed hoc uerbum Tullianum non est, illudque hanc—diuturna ratione conclusum, non ex experientia sumptum ) cum constet aegritudinem aegritudinem V -ne GKR vetustate tolli, tollit X sed ult. t eras. V hanc vim non esse in die diē V positam, sed in cogitatione diuturna. diurna X corr. B 1 s nam si et eadem res est et idem est homo, qui potest quicquam de dolore mutari, si neque de eo, propter quod dolet, quicquam est mutatum neque de eo, qui qui quod G 1 dolet? cogitatio igitur diuturna diurna X corr. B 1 s nihil esse in re mali dolori medetur, non ipsa diuturnitas. Hic mihi adferunt mediocritates. mediocritas X -tates V c Non. quae si naturales sunt, quid opus est consolatione? at hae mihi afferentur med.... 24 consolatione Non. 29, 27 natura enim ipsa terminabit modum; sin opinabiles, opinio tota tollatur. Satis dictum esse arbitror aegritudinem esse opinionem mali praesentis, satis arbitror dictum esse ... 355, 1 praesentis H in qua opinione illud insit, ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat. 3.75. additur ad hanc definitionem a Zenone recte, ut illa opinio praesentis mali sit recens. hoc autem verbum sic interpretantur, ut non tantum illud recens esse velint, quod paulo ante acciderit, sed quam diu in illo opinato malo vis quaedam insit, ut ut s et X vigeat et habeat quandam viriditatem, tam diu appelletur appellatur K recens. ut Artemisia illa, Mausoli Cariae regis uxor, quae nobile illud Halicarnasi alicarnasi X fecit sepulcrum, quam diu vixit, vixit in luctu eodemque etiam confecta contabuit. huic erat illa opinio cotidie recens; quae tum denique non appellatur appellabatur X corr. V 2 recens, cum vetustate exaruit. Haec igitur officia sunt consolantium, tollere aegritudinem funditus aut sedare aut detrahere aut detr. V ( ss. 2 ) quam plurumum aut supprimere nec pati manare longius aut ad alia traducere. 3.76. sunt qui unum officium consolantis cons olantis R 1 consulantis GK 1 V 1 putent putent docere Lb. Cleanthes fr. 576 malum illud omnino non esse, ut Cleanthi placet; sunt qui non magnum malum, ut Peripatetici; sunt qui abducant a malis ad bona, ut Epicurus; sunt qui satis satis om. G 1 putent ostendere nihil inopinati inopiti GRV 1 (n exp. c ) opiti K accidisse, ut Cyrenaici lac. stat. Po. ut Cyrenaici pro nihil mali (nihil a mali V 1 ) Dav. cogitari potest: ut Cyr. atque hi quoque, si verum quaeris, efficere student ut non multum adesse videatur aut nihil mall. Chr. cf. § 52–59. 61 extr. Chrys. fr. eth. 486 nihil mali. Chrysippus autem caput esse censet in consolando detrahere detra in r. V c illam opinionem maerentis, qua se maerentis se X (mer. KR) qd add. V 2 maerentis si vel maerentl si s ( sed sec. Chr. omnes qui maerent in illa opinione sunt; non recte p. 275, 19 confert Va. Op. 1, 70 ) qua Po. officio fungi putet iusto atque debito. sunt etiam qui haec omnia genera consolandi colligant abducunt... 21 putant... 356, 2 colligunt X 356, 2 colligant V 2 abducant et putent Ern. ( obloq. Küh. Sey. cf. tamen nat. deor. 2, 82 al. ). inconcinnitatem modorum def. Gaffiot cf. ad p. 226, 23 —alius enim alio modo movetur—, ut fere nos in Consolatione omnia omnia bis scripsit, prius erasit G omnia exp. et in mg. scr. fecimus. omne genus consolandi V c in consolationem unam coniecimus; erat enim in tumore animus, et omnis in eo temptabatur curatio. sed sumendum tempus est non minus in animorum morbis quam in corporum; ut Prometheus ille Aeschyli, cui cum dictum esset: Atqui/, Prometheu, te ho/c tenere exi/stimo, Mede/ri posse ra/tionem ratione ratione G 1 RV 1 ( alterum exp. G 2 V 1 ratione rationem K 1 (ratione del. K 2 ) orationem Stephanus ( ft. recte cf. lo/goi ) iracu/ndiae, v. 377 respondit: Siquide/m qui qui et ss. V c tempesti/vam medicinam a/dmovens Non a/dgravescens adgr. ss. V c vo/lnus inlida/t manu. manus X s exp. V 3.80. Sed nescio quo pacto ab eo, quod erat a te a te ante K propositum, aberravit oratio. tu enim de sapiente quaesieras, cui aut malum videri nullum potest, quod vacet turpitudine, aut ita parvum malum, ut id obruatur sapientia vixque appareat, qui qui add. V 2 nihil opinione adfingat adsumatque ad aegritudinem nec id putet esse rectum, tum post rectum add. V c se quam maxume excruciari luctuque confici, quo pravius nihil esse possit. edocuit tamen ratio, ut mihi quidem videtur, cum hoc ipsum proprie non quaereretur hoc tempore, num num V x nunc X num quid We. sed cf. Mue. quod esset malum nisi quod idem dici turpe posset, tamen ut videremus, viderimus V 1 quicquid esset in aegritudine mali, id non naturale esse, sed voluntario iudicio et opinionis errore contractum. 3.83. Hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata illa ilia ita G 1 maerens, morsus tamen tamen tantum Bentl. sed cf. p. 323, 11 quo Cic. hic respicit et contractiuncula quaedam contractiuncuculae quaedam (quadam G quandam V 1 ) relinquentur W Non. (relincuntur) corr. Bentl. cf. 9 hanc et Sen. ad Marc. 7, 1 animi relinquetur. hoc... 9 relinquentur Non. 92, 24 hanc dicant sane naturalem, dum aegritudinis nomen absit grave taetrum funestum, quod cum sapientia esse atque, ut ita dicam, habitare nullo modo possit. At quae at quae Bentl. atque stirpes sunt aegritudinis, quam multae, quam amarae! quae ipso ipso om. V trunco everso omnes eligendae elidendae R 2 sunt et, si necesse erit, singulis disputationibus. superest enim nobis hoc, cuicuimodi cuicuimodi cuiusmodi V 3 est, otium. sed ratio una omnium est aegritudinum, plura sed plura H nomina. nam et invidere aegritudinis est et aemulari et obtrectare et misereri et angi, lugere, maerere, aerumna adfici, lamentari, sollicitari, sollicitari add. G 2 dolere, dolore V in molestia esse, adflictari, desperare. 4.11. sit igitur hic hic K 1 fons; utamur tamen in his perturbationibus describendis discrib. Mue. sed cf. Th. l. l. 5, 663 Stoicorum definitionibus et partitionibus, parti cipationibus R 1 particionibus GVH qui mihi videntur in hac quaestione versari acutissime. Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, ut perturbatio Zeno fr. 205 sit, quod pa/qos pat OC K patos R ( p ex ) PL T w C H ille dicit, aversa a a om. V 1 ( add. c ) recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. quidam brevius perturbationem esse adpetitum vehementiorem, sed vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discesserit a naturae constantia. partes autem perturbationum volunt ex duobus opinatis bonis nasci et ex duobus opinatis malis; ita esse quattuor, ex bonis libidinem et laetitiam, ut sit laetitia praesentium bonorum, libido futurorum, ex malis metum et aegritudinem nasci censent, metum futuris, aegritudinem praesentibus; quae enim venientia metuuntur, eadem adficiunt aegritudine aegritudinem K ( corr. 2 ) RH instantia. 4.12. laetitia autem et libido in bonorum opinione versantur, cum libido ad id, quod videtur bonum, inlecta inlecta s iniecta X et sqq. cf. Barlaami eth. sec. Stoicos 2, 11 qui hinc haud pauca adsumpsit. inflammata rapiatur, laetitia ut adepta iam aliquid concupitum ecferatur et gestiat. natura natura s V rec naturae X (-re K) enim omnes ea, Stoic. fr. 3, 438 quae bona videntur, secuntur fugiuntque contraria; quam ob rem simul obiecta species est speciei est H speci est KR ( add. c ) speciest GV cuiuspiam, quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura. id cum constanter prudenterque fit, eius modi adpetitionem Stoici bou/lhsin BO gL AHClN KR bo gL HC in G bo ga HCin V appellant, nos appellemus appellemus We. appellamus X (apell G) cf. v. 26, fin. 3, 20 voluntatem, eam eam iam V illi putant in solo esse sapiente; quam sic definiunt: voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat. quae autem ratione adversante adversante Po. ( cf. p.368, 6; 326, 3; St. fr. 3, 462 a)peiqw=s tw=| lo/gw| w)qou/menon e)pi\ plei=on adversa X (d del. H 1 ) a ratione aversa Or. incitata est vehementius, ea libido est vel cupiditas effrenata, quae in omnibus stultis invenitur. 4.14. praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum stultorum Dav. stulta autem aegritudo est, eaque eaque Ba. ea qua X (ea qu e M 1 ) adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. itaque haec prima definitio difin. V est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. itaque ... 6 contractio Non. 93, 1 sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam cf. Aug. civ. 14, 8 aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur. Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et St. fr. 3, 380 et 393 opinione. itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, vitiose GKR sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate. est ergo ergo igitur H s aegritudo aegritudo om. G 1 add. 1 et 2 opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri ecferri haec ferri VK c (eff. K 2 ) rectum esse videatur, laetitia...15 videatur om. G 1, add. G 2 in mg. inf. ( lemmata laetitia metus adscr. 1 cf. praef. ) metus opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile intollerabile V esse videatur, libido lubido K, in lib. corr. G 1 (libido etiam in mg. ) R 1 opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse. 4.43. quorum est talis oratio: primum multis verbis iracundiam laudant, cotem fortitudinis esse dicunt, multoque et imit. Lact. inst. 6, 14 in hostem et in inprobum et in probum V (im ss. 2 ) et inprobum GK (imp.) R (imp.) civem vehementioris vehementiores V (e ex i 2 ) iratorum impetus esse, levis autem ratiunculas eorum, qui ita cogitarent: proelium rectum est hoc fieri, convenit dimicare demicare K 1 pro legibus, pro libertate, pro patria; haec nullam habent habent Peripateticorum argumentatio- nem recta oratione C. referre pergit ut mox v. 13 vim, nisi ira excanduit fortitudo. noctu eqs. ( cf. p. 447, 26 fin. 3, 62. 64 al. ) nec vero de bellatoribus solum disputant: imperia severiora nulla esse putant sine aliqua acerbitate iracundiae; oratorem denique non modo accusantem, sed ne defendentem quidem probant sine aculeis iracundiae, quae etiamsi non adsit, tamen verbis atque motu simulandam arbitrantur, ut auditoris iram oratoris incendat actio. virum denique videri negant qui irasci nesciet, nesciet W (nesciat edd. plur. ) o(/stis ou)de/pote o0rgisqh/setai, tou=ton ou)d ' a)/ndra dokei=n ei/(nai/ fasin Cf. o( sofo\s o)rgisqh/setai, amaturum esse p. 398, 5 vincetur 427, 28 al. Hor. ars 35 eamque, quam lenitatem nos dicimus, vitioso lentitudinis vitiosolitudinis K nomine nomine in mg. G 1 appellant. eamque ... 13 appellant Non. 134, 4 4.44. Nec vero nevero G 1 solum hanc libidinem laudant—est enim ira, ut modo modo cf. p. 371, 7 321, 18 Lact. ira 17, 20 definivi, ulciscendi libido—, sed ipsum illud genus vel alt. vel om. KR libidinis vel cupiditatis ad summam utilitatem esse dicunt a natura datum; nihil enim quemquam nisi quod lubeat praeclare facere posse. noctu sqq. Val. Max. 8, 14 ext. 1 ambulabat in publico Themistocles, quod somnum capere non posset, posset: indicatur non externa ambulandi causa, sed ratio qua adductus adulescens inquietus consilium ambulandi ceperit (cum pro quod Sey. ) quaerentibusque respondebat Miltiadis militiadis ( alt. i del. V 3 ) trophaeis GR( corr. R 1 )V militia adstropheis K (tropea miliciadis Val. Max. ) tropaeis se e somno suscitari. suscitare X corr. V rec s cui non sunt auditae Demosthenis demostenis X dolore GR 1 V 1 vigiliae? qui dolere se aiebat, agebat K si quando opificum antelucana victus esset industria. philosophiae denique ipsius principes numquam in suis studiis tantos progressus sine flagranti cupiditate facere potuissent. ultimas terras lustrasse Pythagoran Democritum Platonem accepimus. ubi enim quicquid quiquid G 1 esset esse G 1 K quod disci dici GR 1 V 1 ( corr. R 1 V 1 ) posset, eo veniendum iudicaverunt. num num nam R 1 putamus haec fieri sine summo cupiditatis ardore potuisse? 4.45. Ipsam aegritudinem, quam nos ut taetram et inmanem beluam fugiendam fugienda X (-ā V c ) diximus, diximus p. 330, 10 non sine magna utilitate a natura dicunt constitutam, ut homines homines s omnes X castigationes V 1 castigationibus reprehensionibus ignominiis adfici se adfici se adficisse X ( corr. V 3 ) in delicto dolerent. impunitas enim peccatorum data videtur eis qui ignominiam et infamiam ferunt sine dolore; morderi est melius conscientia. ex quo est illud e vita ductum evicta d. V Afr. fr.409 ab Afranio: nam cum dissolutus filius: heu me miserum! eume K tum severus pater: dum modo doleat aliquid, doleat quidlubet. 4.46. Reliquas quoque partis aegritudinis utilis esse dicunt, misericordiam ad opem ferendam et calamitates calamitates post indignorum rep. X del. V 3 hominum indignorum sublevandas; ipsum illud aemulari obtrectare non esse inutile, cum aut se non idem videat consecutum, quod alium, aut alium idem, quod se; metum vero si qui quis GV rec sustulisset, omnem vitae diligentiam sublatam fore, quae summa esset in eis esse K qui leges, qui magistratus, qui leges qui magistratus in r. V c qui paupertatem, qui ignominiam, qui mortem, qui dolorem timerent. tenerent K Haec tamen ita disputant, ut resecanda esse fateantur, evelli penitus dicant nec posse nec opus esse et in omnibus fere rebus mediocritatem esse optumam existiment. existimant s quae cum exponunt, nihilne tibi videntur an aliquid dicere? Mihi vero dicere aliquid, itaque expecto, quid ad ista. ista ( eras. m) K Reperiam fortasse, sed illud ante: 4.47. videsne, quanta fuerit apud Academicos verecundia? plane enim dicunt, quod ad rem pertineat: Peripateticis Peripateticis haec igitur continent quae Academici ( qui verecunde nihil ipsi adfirmant ) dicunt Ciceroque ipse ut Aca- demicus amplectitur ( cf. p. 364, 4 ) respondetur a Stoicis; digladientur illi per me licet, cui nihil est necesse nisi, ubi sit illud, quod veri simillimum videatur, anquirere. quid est igitur quod occurrat in hac quaestione, e quo e quo B 2 s aequa X (e qua V rec ) possit attingi aliquid veri simile, quo longius mens humana progredi non potest? definitio perturbationis, qua quae KV 1 Zeno fr. 205 recte Zenonem usum puto. ita enim definit, ut perturbatio sit aversa a a GrB s om. X ratione contra naturam animi commotio, vel brevius, ut perturbatio sit adpetitus vehementior, vehementior vehementior semel in X autem intellegatur is qui procul absit a naturae constantia. 4.48. quid ad has definitiones possim possint ' Bern. 1 ' Bentl. sed ( ut p. 387, 20 sqq. ) C. ipse definitiones excutit; cf. v. 2–4 et p. 389, 25; 410, 3 dicere? atque atque Tregder atqui haec pleraque sunt prudenter acuteque disserentium, illa quidem ex rhetorum pompa: ardores animorum cotesque virtutum. an vero vir fortis, nisi stomachari coepit, non potest fortis esse? gladiatorium id quidem. id quidem ex idem K 1 quamquam in eis ipsis videmus saepe constantiam: conlocuntur, versus ign. conloquuntur G(?) congrediuntur, quaerunt quaerunt Schlen- ger, Phil. 12, 288 quaeruntur GVR 1 (a del. 1 ) queruntur K aliquid, postulant, ut magis placati quam irati esse videantur, sed in illo genere sit sane Pacideianus pacidianus X (plac. V) aliquis hoc animo, ut narrat Lucil. 153 Lucilius: Occidam illum equidem et vincam, si id quaeritis inquit, Verum illud credo fore: in os prius accipiam ipse Quam gladium in stomacho furi furi Ti. suria GRV sura K ( def. Ro b b. p. 100 ) furia Marx spurci Sey. ac pulmonibus sisto. pulmonibus isto VG 1 Odi hominem, iratus pugno, nec longius quicquam Nobis, nobis s vobis X ( ubis R 1? ) quam dextrae gladium dum accommodet accomodet V ( prius o in r. c ) alter; Usque adeo studio atque odio illius ecferor hęc feror K c ira; at at s V rec ac sine hac hac ac G gladiatoria iracundia videmus progredientem apud Homerum Aiacem multa cum hilaritate, H 211 7. cum depugnaturus esset cum Hectore; 4.49. cuius, ut arma sumpsit, ingressio laetitiam attulit attollit K sociis, terrorem autem autem add. G 2 hostibus, ut ipsum Hectorem, haect. KV (6 G) quem ad modum est apud Homerum, toto pectore trementem provocasse ad pugnam paeniteret. atque atque V hi conlocuti inter se, prius quam manum consererent, leniter et quiete nihil ne in ipsa quidem pugna iracunde rabioseve fecerunt. ego ne Torquatum quidem illum, qui hoc cognomen cognomen e corr. V rec B s cognovit nomen X invenit, iratum existimo Gallo torquem detraxisse, nec Marcellum apud Clastidium ideo fortem fuisse, quia fuerit iratus. 4.50. de Africano quidem, quia notior est nobis propter recentem memoriam, vel iurare possum non illum iracundia tum inflammatum fuisse, cum in acie M. Alliennium aciem alliennium KRG ( ex ali- 1 ) acie malliennium V Paelignum pelignum KV e corr. scuto protexerit gladiumque hosti in pectus infixerit. de L. Bruto fortasse dubitarim, an propter infinitum odium tyranni ecfrenatius effren. K 1 (hecfren. c ) e fren. V 1 in Arruntem arrunte X invaserit; video enim utrumque comminus comminus eqs. Ennii verba latere susp. Mue. adhuc G 1 ictu cecidisse contrario. quid igitur huc adhibetis iram? an fortitudo, nisi insanire coepit, impetus suos non habet? quid? Herculem, quem in caelum ista ipsa, quam vos iracundiam esse vultis, sustulit fortitudo, iratumne ratumne X corr. V 3 s censes conflixisse cum Erymanthio erymathio X (erim. V) corr. R 2 apro aut aut ut R 1 ( corr. c? ) K leone Nemeaeo? nemaeo X an etiam Theseus Marathonii tauri marathonii auri GV 1 ( corr. c ) marathonii auri R 1 marathoniit auri K cornua conprehendit comp. KR iratus? vide ne fortitudo minime sit rabiosa sitque iracundia tota levitatis. 4.51. Neque enim est ulla fortitudo, quae rationis est expers. contemnendae res humanae sunt, sunt B sint X neglegenda mors est, patibiles et dolores et labores putandi — haec 'contemnendae... 7 putandi' — haec dist. Po. ( cf. p. 307, 23 ) cum constituta sunt iudicio atque sententia, tum est robusta illa et stabilis fortitudo, nisi forte, quae vehementer acriter animose fiunt, iracunde fieri suspicamur. mihi ne mihi ne B mi nime X (minime V) Scipio quidem ille pontufex maxumus, qui hoc Stoicorum stoicicorum GV verum esse declaravit, numquam privatum esse sapientem, iratus videtur fuisse Ti. Ti ex tam K c Graccho gracho X tum, cum consulem languentem reliquit atque ipse privatus, ut si consul consul ĕet K (ĕ c ) esset, qui rem publicam salvam salvam s salva X esse vellent, vellent We. vellet hęc quid VK c se sequi iussit. 4.52. nescio, ecquid ipsi nos fortiter in re p. fecerimus: si quid fecimus, certe irati non fecimus. an est quicquam similius insaniae insaniae s insania X quam ira? quam bene Ennius initium dixit Enn. fr. inc. 18 insaniae. color, vox, oculi, spiritus, inpotentia dictorum ac factorum quam partem habent sanitatis? quid Achille Homerico foedius, quid Agamemnone in iurgio? nam Aiacem quidem ira ad furorem mortemque perduxit. non igitur desiderat fortitudo advocatam iracundiam; satis est instructa parata armata per sese. nam isto quidem modo isto modo quidem s corr. We. licet dicere utilem vinulentiam ad fortitudinem, utilem vinul.... 27 utilem om. V etiam dementiam, quod et insani et ebrii multa faciunt saepe vehementius. semper Aiax fortis, fortissimus tamen in furore; nam Trag. inc. 64 nam poetae tribuunt alii Fa/cinus fecit ma/ximum, cum Da/nais inclina/ntibus Summa/m rem perfeci/t perfecit s perficit X manu. manu Bentl. manus s manu sua restituit proelium Insaniens G. Hermann op. 7, 382 sed cf. Plasberg, Festschr. f. Vahlen 224, qui recte proel. r. ins. Ciceroni, non poetae tribuisse vid. proelium restituit insaniens: 4.53. dicamus igitur utilem insaniam? insaniem KR Tracta definitiones fortitudinis: intelleges eam stomacho non egere. fortitudo est igitur adfectio Sphaerus St. fr. 1, 628 cf. Chrys. 3, 285 animi legi summae legissumme K (summe V) optemp. G in perpetiendis rebus obtemperans vel conservatio stabilis iudicii in eis in eis ex meis V c rebus quae formidolosae videntur subeundis et repellendis vel scientia rerum formidolosarum contrariarumque contrariarumque alt. a ex u eff. rumque in r. scr. V c aut aut et Hei. perferendarum aut s ( sed omnino neglegenda est ou)de/tera vel a)dia/fora cf. fin. 4, 71 ) omnino neglegendarum conservans conservens V 1 earum rerum stabile iudicium vel brevius, ut Chrysippus chris. V (nam superiores definitiones erant Sphaeri, spheri X hominis in primis bene definientis, ut putant Stoici; sunt enim omnino omnes fere similes, sed declarant communis notiones alia magis alia)—quo modo igitur Chrysippus? chris. V fortitudo est inquit scientia rerum perferendarum vel adfectio animi in patiendo ac perferendo summae legi parens sine timore. quamvis licet insectemur istos, ut Carneades solebat, metuo ne soli soli add. K c philosophi sint. quae quae ex qui K 1 enim istarum definitionum non aperit notionem nostram, quam habemus omnes de fortitudine tectam atque involutam? qua aperta quis est qui aut bellatori aut imperatori aut oratori quaerat aliquid neque eos existumet sine rabie quicquam fortiter facere posse? 4.54. Quid? Stoici, qui omnes insipientes insanos esse dicunt, nonne ista conligunt? colligunt G 1 ( corr. 1 ) KcV rec ( ex colig.) remove perturbationes maxumeque maxumequae G 1 RV 1 videbantur K iracundiam: iam videbuntur monstra mostra R 1 nostra G dicere. nunc autem ita ita add. K c disserunt, sic se dicere omnes stultos insanire, ut male olere omne caenum. St. fr. 3, 665 cf. Aug. soliloq. 1, 11, 19 at non semper. commove: senties. sic iracundus non semper iratus est; lacesse: iam videbis furentem. Quid? ista bellatrix iracundia, cum domum rediit, qualis est cum uxore, cum liberis, cum familia? an tum quoque est utilis? est igitur aliquid quod quod add. V 1 perturbata mens melius possit facere quam constans? an quisquam potest sine perturbatione mentis irasci? bene igitur nostri, cum omnia essent in moribus moribus V c s morbus GR 1 V 1 morbis KR e corr. vitia, quod nullum erat iracundia foedius, iracundos solos solus V 1 morosos nominaverunt. 4.55. Oratorem vero irasci minime decet, simulare non dedecet. simulare n. dedecet om. V decet X an tibi irasci tum videmur, cum quid in causis acrius et vehementius dicimus? quid? cum iam rebus transactis et praeteritis orationes scribimus, num irati scribimus? ecquis ecquis s etquis X hoc animadvertit? Accius Atr. 233 animadvortet de orat. 3, 217 M (animum advertit L), quod hic quoque fort. restituendum vincite! —num aut egisse umquam iratum Aesopum aut scripsisse existimas existimamus KR iratum Accium? aguntur ista praeclare, et ab oratore quidem melius, si modo est orator, est orator melius G 1 quam ab ullo histrione, istrione X ( str. G 1 ) sed aguntur leniter et mente tranquilla. Libidinem vero laudare cuius est libidinis? lubid. GRK c Themistoclem mihi et Demosthenen demostenen X proferri G 1 profertis, additis Pythagoran Democritum Platonem. quid? vos studia libidinem libidine GK vocatis? quae vel optimarum rerum, ut ea sunt quae profertis, sedata tamen et et add. G 2 tranquilla esse debent. Iam aegritudinem laudare, unam rem maxime detestabilem, quorum est tandem philosophorum? at ad KR commode dixit Afranius: dum modo doleat aliquid, fr. 409 cf. p. 383, 13 doleat doleat lateat G 1 quidlibet. quidlibet hic X dixit enim de adulescente perdito ac dissoluto, nos autem de constanti viro ac sapienti sapienti ex -e V 1 quaerimus. et quidem ipsam illam iram centurio habeat aut signifer vel ceteri, de quibus dici non necesse est, ne rhetorum aperiamus mysteria. utile est enim uti motu utinmotu K 1 animi, qui uti ratione non potest. nos autem, ut testificor saepe, de sapiente quaerimus. quoque ( item post Afranii versum ) 4.56. At etiam etiam enim Sey. sed cf. p. 383, 14 aemulari utile est, obtrectare, obtrectari X misereri. cur misereare potius quam feras opem, si id facere possis? an sine misericordia liberales esse non possumus? non enim suscipere ipsi aegritudines propter alios debemus, sed alios, si possumus, levare aegritudine. obtrectare vero alteri aut illa vitiosa aemulatione, quae rivalitati similis est, aemulari quid habet utilitatis, cum sit aemulantis angi alieno bono quod ipse non habeat, obtrectantis opt. G autem angi alieno bono, quod id etiam alius habeat? qui qui s quis GKCRV quid K 1 (quis id M) app. V c id adprobari possit, aegritudinem suscipere pro experientia, si quid habere velis? nam nam B s non X solum habere velle summa dementia est. Mediocritates autem malorum quis laudare recte possit? 4.57. quis enim potest, in quo libido cupiditasve sit, non libidinosus et cupidus esse? in quo ira, non iracundus? in quo angor, non anxius? in quo timor, non timidus? libidinosum igitur et iracundum et anxium et timidum censemus esse sapientem? de cuius excellentia excelentia R 1 V 1 multa quidem dici quamvis fuse fuse om. V possunt B 1 e corr. s possit X lateque possunt, sed brevissime illo modo, sapientiam sapientia GV 1 sapientem K 1 esse dici ... 390, 1 esse in ras. eius- dem spatii K 1 ( ante ras. ult. verbum fuit cognitionemque cf. p. 390, 2 ) rerum divinarum et humanarum scientiam cognitionemque, quae cuiusque rei causa sit; ex quo efficitur, ut divina imitetur, humana omnia inferiora virtute ducat. in hanc tu igitur tamquam in mare, quod est ventis subiectum, perturbationem cadere cadere om. R 1 ( add. 2? ) tibi dixisti videri? quid est quod tantam gravitatem constantiamque perturbet? an inprovisum aliquid aut repentinum? quid potest accidere tale ei, ei ut v. K et GRV cui nihil, quod homini evenire possit, non praemeditatum sit ? nam quod aiunt nimia add. Bouhier ( cf. 3, 34 Phil. 11, 7 ) resecari oportere, naturalia relinqui, quid tandem potest esse naturale, quod idem nimium esse possit? sunt enim omnia ista ex errorum orta radicibus, quae evellenda et extrahenda et extrahenda om. V penitus, non circumcidenda nec amputanda sunt. 4.59. ad te at V 1 igitur mihi iam convertenda omnis oratio est; simulas enim quaerere te de sapiente, quaeris autem fortasse de te. Earum eorum s earum X igitur perturbationum, quas exposui, variae sunt curationes. nam neque omnis aegritudo una ratione sedatur sadatur V (alia est enim lugenti, alia miseranti aut invidenti adhibenda adhibenda add. G 2 medicina); est etiam in omnibus quattuor perturbationibus illa distinctio, utrum ad universam perturbationem, quae est aspernatio rationis aut aut V adpetitus vehementior, an ad singulas, ut ad metum lubidinem libid. K 1 V reliquas reliquas V 1 (que add. 3 ) reliquias GKR melius adhibeatur oratio, et utrum illudne non videatur aegre ferundum, ex quo suscepta sit aegritudo, an omnium rerum tollenda tollenda s toleranda X omnino omni V 1 aegritudo, ut, si quis aegre ferat se pauperem esse, idne disputes, paupertatem malum non esse, an hominem aegre ferre nihil oportere. nimirum hoc melius, ne, si si add. K c forte de paupertate non persuaseris, sit aegritudini concedendum; aegritudine autem sublata propriis rationibus, quibus heri usi sumus, quodam modo etiam paupertatis malum tollitur. 4.65. videamus nunc de bonorum, id est de laetitia et de cupiditate. mihi quidem in tota ratione ea, quae eaque KR pertinet pertinet s pertinent X ad animi perturbationem, una res videtur causam continere, omnis eas esse in nostra potestate, omnis iudicio susceptas, omnis voluntarias. hic igitur error est eripiendus, haec detrahenda opinio haec detrahenda opinio ne consererent Gr atque ut in malis opinatis tolerabilia, tollerabilia X ( corr. R c? ) sic in bonis sedatiora sunt efficienda ea quae magna et laetabilia ducuntur. dicuntur W corr. Wo. atque hoc quidem commune malorum et bonorum, bonorum et malorum G 1 ut, si iam difficile sit persuadere nihil earum rerum, quae perturbent perturbant K 1 animum, aut in bonis aut in malis esse habendum, tamen alia ad alium motum curatio sit adhibenda aliaque ratione malevolus, alia amator, alia rursus anxius, alia timidus corrigendus.
7. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 3.294-3.313 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

8. Ovid, Tristia, 3.5.33-3.5.34 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

9. Epictetus, Discourses, 2.18.5, 2.18.7-2.18.26, 2.18.28-2.18.29, 3.2.1-3.2.4, 3.24.108, 3.24.117, 3.28, 4.8.23, 4.10.23 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

10. Lucan, Pharsalia, 7.789-7.795, 7.802, 7.809 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

11. Seneca The Younger, De Consolatione Ad Marciam, 1.7 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

12. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 1.3.6-1.3.7, 1.6, 1.6.2, 1.9.2, 1.16.5, 2.1.3-2.1.4, 2.2.1-2.2.2, 2.2.4-2.2.6, 2.3.1-2.3.5, 2.4, 2.4.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

13. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 13.4, 13.12, 57.3-57.4, 85.9-85.12, 85.15, 92.3, 99.18, 113.18, 116.3 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

14. Seneca The Younger, Thyestes, 1054-1068, 176-180, 190-191, 691-714, 885, 888, 911-912, 1053 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

15. Statius, Thebais, 11.87-11.88 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

16. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On The Soul, 72.26-73.2 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

17. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Fate, 33 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

18. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.2.8-4.2.18, 4.2.27, 4.3.2, 4.4.16-4.4.17, 4.4.21, 4.4.23-4.4.24, 4.4.29, 4.5.42-4.5.43, 4.6.27, 4.7.1-4.7.5, 4.7.9, 4.7.12-4.7.17, 5.1.4, 5.4.14 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

19. Gellius, Attic Nights, 19.1, 19.1.15-19.1.16 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

20. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 5.26 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

21. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 11.158 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

22. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.110 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure.
23. Origen, On First Principles, 3.2.2 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

3.2.2. We, however, who see the reason (of the thing) more clearly, do not hold this opinion, taking into account those (sins) which manifestly originate as a necessary consequence of our bodily constitution. Must we indeed suppose that the devil is the cause of our feeling hunger or thirst? Nobody, I think, will venture to maintain that. If, then, he is not the cause of our feeling hunger and thirst, wherein lies the difference when each individual has attained the age of puberty, and that period has called forth the incentives of the natural heat? It will undoubtedly follow, that as the devil is not the cause of our feeling hunger and thirst, so neither is he the cause of that appetency which naturally arises at the time of maturity, viz., the desire of sexual intercourse. Now it is certain that this cause is not always so set in motion by the devil that we should be obliged to suppose that bodies would nor possess a desire for intercourse of that kind if the devil did not exist. Let us consider, in the next place, if, as we have already shown, food is desired by human beings, not from a suggestion of the devil, but by a kind of natural instinct, whether, if there were no devil, it were possible for human experience to exhibit such restraint in partaking of food as never to exceed the proper limits; i.e., that no one would either take otherwise than the case required, or more than reason would allow; and so it would result that men, observing due measure and moderation in the matter of eating, would never go wrong. I do not think, indeed, that so great moderation could be observed by men (even if there were no instigation by the devil inciting thereto), as that no individual, in partaking of food, would go beyond due limits and restraint, until he had learned to do so from long usage and experience. What, then, is the state of the case? In the matter of eating and drinking it was possible for us to go wrong, even without any incitement from the devil, if we should happen to be either less temperate or less careful (than we ought); and are we to suppose, then, in our appetite for sexual intercourse, or in the restraint of our natural desires, our condition is not something similar? I am of opinion, indeed, that the same course of reasoning must be understood to apply to other natural movements as those of covetousness, or of anger, or of sorrow, or of all those generally which through the vice of intemperance exceed the natural bounds of moderation. There are therefore manifest reasons for holding the opinion, that as in good things the human will is of itself weak to accomplish any good (for it is by divine help that it is brought to perfection in everything); so also, in things of an opposite nature we receive certain initial elements, and, as it were, seeds of sins, from those things which we use agreeably to nature; but when we have indulged them beyond what is proper, and have not resisted the first movements to intemperance, then the hostile power, seizing the occasion of this first transgression, incites and presses us hard in every way, seeking to extend our sins over a wider field, and furnishing us human beings with occasions and beginnings of sins, which these hostile powers spread far and wide, and, if possible, beyond all limits. Thus, when men at first for a little desire money, covetousness begins to grow as the passion increases, and finally the fall into avarice takes place. And after this, when blindness of mind has succeeded passion, and the hostile powers, by their suggestions, hurry on the mind, money is now no longer desired, but stolen, and acquired by force, or even by shedding human blood. Finally, a confirmatory evidence of the fact that vices of such enormity proceed from demons, may be easily seen in this, that those individuals who are oppressed either by immoderate love, or incontrollable anger, or excessive sorrow, do not suffer less than those who are bodily vexed by devils. For it is recorded in certain histories, that some have fallen into madness from a state of love, others from a state of anger, not a few from a state of sorrow, and even from one of excessive joy; which results, I think, from this, that those opposing powers, i.e., those demons, having gained a lodgment in their minds which has been already laid open to them by intemperance, have taken complete possession of their sensitive nature, especially when no feeling of the glory of virtue has aroused them to resistance.
24. Augustine, Confessions, 8.5, 8.9-8.10 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

8.5. 10. But when that man of Yours, Simplicianus, related this to me about Victorinus, I burned to imitate him; and it was for this end he had related it. But when he had added this also, that in the time of the Emperor Julian, there was a law made by which Christians were forbidden to teach grammar and oratory, and he, in obedience to this law, chose rather to abandon the wordy school than Your word, by which You make eloquent the tongues of the dumb, Wisdom 10:21 - he appeared to me not more brave than happy, in having thus discovered an opportunity of waiting on You only, which thing I was sighing for, thus bound, not with the irons of another, but my own iron will. My will was the enemy master of, and thence had made a chain for me and bound me. Because of a perverse will was lust made; and lust indulged in became custom; and custom not resisted became necessity. By which links, as it were, joined together (whence I term it a chain), did a hard bondage hold me enthralled. givest away thy strength to resist him in the rest; when the hem is worn, the whole garment will ravel out, if it be not mended by timely repentance. See Müller, Lehre von der Sünde, book v., where the beginnings and alarming progress of evil in the soul are graphically described. See 9JKLJKLsec. 18, note, below}-- But that new will which had begun to develope in me, freely to worship You, and to wish to enjoy You, O God, the only sure enjoyment, was not able as yet to overcome my former wilfulness, made strong by long indulgence. Thus did my two wills, one old and the other new, one carnal, the other spiritual, contend within me; and by their discord they unstrung my soul. 11. Thus came I to understand, from my own experience, what I had read, how that the flesh lusts against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh. Galatians 5:17 I verily lusted both ways; yet more in that which I approved in myself, than in that which I disapproved in myself. For in this last it was now rather not I, Romans 7:20 because in much I rather suffered against my will than did it willingly. And yet it was through me that custom became more combative against me, because I had come willingly whither I willed not. And who, then, can with any justice speak against it, when just punishment follows the sinner? Nor had I now any longer my wonted excuse, that as yet I hesitated to be above the world and serve You, because my perception of the truth was uncertain; for now it was certain. But I, still bound to the earth, refused to be Your soldier; and was as much afraid of being freed from all embarrassments, as we ought to fear to be embarrassed. 12. Thus with the baggage of the world was I sweetly burdened, as when in slumber; and the thoughts wherein I meditated upon You were like the efforts of those desiring to awake, who, still overpowered with a heavy drowsiness, are again steeped therein. And as no one desires to sleep always, and in the sober judgment of all waking is better, yet does a man generally defer to shake off drowsiness, when there is a heavy lethargy in all his limbs, and, though displeased, yet even after it is time to rise with pleasure yields to it, so was I assured that it were much better for me to give up myself to Your charity, than to yield myself to my own cupidity; but the former course satisfied and vanquished me, the latter pleased me and fettered me. Nor had I anything to answer You calling to me, Awake, you that sleep, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give you light. Ephesians 5:14 And to You showing me on every side, that what Thou said was true, I, convicted by the truth, had nothing at all to reply, but the drawling and drowsy words: Presently, lo, presently; Leave me a little while. But presently, presently, had no present; and my leave me a little while went on for a long while. In vain did I delight in Your law after the inner man, when another law in my members warred against the law of my mind, and brought me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. For the law of sin is the violence of custom, whereby the mind is drawn and held, even against its will; deserving to be so held in that it so willingly falls into it. O wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death but Your grace only, through Jesus Christ our Lord? 8.9. 21. Whence is this monstrous thing? And why is it? Let Your mercy shine on me, that I may inquire, if so be the hiding-places of man's punishment, and the darkest contritions of the sons of Adam, may perhaps answer me. Whence is this monstrous thing? And why is it? The mind commands the body, and it obeys immediately; the mind commands itself, and is resisted. The mind commands the hand to be moved, and such readiness is there that the command is scarce to be distinguished from the obedience. Yet the mind is mind, and the hand is body. The mind commands the mind to will, and yet, though it be itself, it obeys not. Whence this monstrous thing? And why is it? I repeat, it commands itself to will, and would not give the command unless it willed; yet is not that done which it commands. But it wills not entirely; therefore it commands not entirely. For so far forth it commands, as it wills; and so far forth is the thing commanded not done, as it wills not. For the will commands that there be a will;- not another, but itself. But it does not command entirely, therefore that is not which it commands. For were it entire, it would not even command it to be, because it would already be. It is, therefore, no monstrous thing partly to will, partly to be unwilling, but an infirmity of the mind, that it does not wholly rise, sustained by truth, pressed down by custom. And so there are two wills, because one of them is not entire; and the one is supplied with what the other needs. 8.10. 22. Let them perish from Your presence, O God, as vain talkers and deceivers Titus 1:10 of the soul do perish, who, observing that there were two wills in deliberating, affirm that there are two kinds of minds in us - one good, the other evil. They themselves verily are evil when they hold these evil opinions; and they shall become good when they hold the truth, and shall consent unto the truth, that Your apostle may say unto them, You were sometimes darkness, but now are you light in the Lord. Ephesians 5:8 But, they, desiring to be light, not in the Lord, but in themselves, conceiving the nature of the soul to be the same as that which God is, are made more gross darkness; for that through a shocking arrogancy they went farther from You, the true Light, which lights every man that comes into the world. John 1:9 Take heed what you say, and blush for shame; draw near unto Him and be lightened, and your faces shall not be ashamed. I, when I was deliberating upon serving the Lord my God now, as I had long purposed - I it was who willed, I who was unwilling. It was I, even I myself. I neither willed entirely, nor was entirely unwilling. Therefore was I at war with myself, and destroyed by myself. And this destruction overtook me against my will, and yet showed not the presence of another mind, but the punishment of my own. Now, then, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwells in me, Romans 7:17 - the punishment of a more unconfined sin, in that I was a son of Adam. 23. For if there be as many contrary natures as there are conflicting wills, there will not now be two natures only, but many. If any one deliberate whether he should go to their conventicle, or to the theatre, those men at once cry out, Behold, here are two natures - one good, drawing this way, another bad, drawing back that way; for whence else is this indecision between conflicting wills? But I reply that both are bad - that which draws to them, and that which draws back to the theatre. But they believe not that will to be other than good which draws to them. Supposing, then, one of us should deliberate, and through the conflict of his two wills should waver whether he should go to the theatre or to our church, would not these also waver what to answer? For either they must confess, which they are not willing to do, that the will which leads to our church is good, as well as that of those who have received and are held by the mysteries of theirs, or they must imagine that there are two evil natures and two evil minds in one man, at war one with the other; and that will not be true which they say, that there is one good and another bad; or they must be converted to the truth, and no longer deny that where any one deliberates, there is one soul fluctuating between conflicting wills. 24. Let them no more say, then, when they perceive two wills to be antagonistic to each other in the same man, that the contest is between two opposing minds, of two opposing substances, from two opposing principles, the one good and the other bad. For Thou, O true God, disprove, check, and convince them; like as when both wills are bad, one deliberates whether he should kill a man by poison, or by the sword; whether he should take possession of this or that estate of another's, when he cannot both; whether he should purchase pleasure by prodigality, or retain his money by covetousness; whether he should go to the circus or the theatre, if both are open on the same day; or, thirdly, whether he should rob another man's house, if he have the opportunity; or, fourthly, whether he should commit adultery, if at the same time he have the means of doing so - all these things concurring in the same point of time, and all being equally longed for, although impossible to be enacted at one time. For they rend the mind amid four, or even (among the vast variety of things men desire) more antagonistic wills, nor do they yet affirm that there are so many different substances. Thus also is it in wills which are good. For I ask them, is it a good thing to have delight in reading the apostle, or good to have delight in a sober psalm, or good to discourse on the gospel? To each of these they will answer, It is good. What, then, if all equally delight us, and all at the same time? Do not different wills distract the mind, when a man is deliberating which he should rather choose? Yet are they all good, and are at variance until one be fixed upon, whither the whole united will may be borne, which before was divided into many. Thus, also, when above eternity delights us, and the pleasure of temporal good holds us down below, it is the same soul which wills not that or this with an entire will, and is therefore torn asunder with grievous perplexities, while out of truth it prefers that, but out of custom forbears not this.
25. Augustine, Against Julian, 3.1.2, 4.8.52, 4.41 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

26. Augustine, The City of God, 9.5, 14.6, 14.9 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

9.5. We need not at present give a careful and copious exposition of the doctrine of Scripture, the sum of Christian knowledge, regarding these passions. It subjects the mind itself to God, that He may rule and aid it, and the passions, again, to the mind, to moderate and bridle them, and turn them to righteous uses. In our ethics, we do not so much inquire whether a pious soul is angry, as why he is angry; not whether he is sad, but what is the cause of his sadness; not whether he fears, but what he fears. For I am not aware that any right thinking person would find fault with anger at a wrongdoer which seeks his amendment, or with sadness which intends relief to the suffering, or with fear lest one in danger be destroyed. The Stoics, indeed, are accustomed to condemn compassion. But how much more honorable had it been in that Stoic we have been telling of, had he been disturbed by compassion prompting him to relieve a fellow-creature, than to be disturbed by the fear of shipwreck! Far better and more humane, and more consot with pious sentiments, are the words of Cicero in praise of C sar, when he says, Among your virtues none is more admirable and agreeable than your compassion. And what is compassion but a fellow-feeling for another's misery, which prompts us to help him if we can? And this emotion is obedient to reason, when compassion is shown without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven. Cicero, who knew how to use language, did not hesitate to call this a virtue, which the Stoics are not ashamed to reckon among the vices, although, as the book of the eminent Stoic, Epictetus, quoting the opinions of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the school, has taught us, they admit that passions of this kind invade the soul of the wise man, whom they would have to be free from all vice. Whence it follows that these very passions are not judged by them to be vices, since they assail the wise man without forcing him to act against reason and virtue; and that, therefore, the opinion of the Peripatetics or Platonists and of the Stoics is one and the same. But, as Cicero says, mere logomachy is the bane of these pitiful Greeks, who thirst for contention rather than for truth. However, it may justly be asked, whether our subjection to these affections, even while we follow virtue, is a part of the infirmity of this life? For the holy angels feel no anger while they punish those whom the eternal law of God consigns to punishment, no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the miserable, no fear while they aid those who are in danger; and yet ordinary language ascribes to them also these mental emotions, because, though they have none of our weakness, their acts resemble the actions to which these emotions move us; and thus even God Himself is said in Scripture to be angry, and yet without any perturbation. For this word is used of the effect of His vengeance, not of the disturbing mental affection. 14.6. But the character of the human will is of moment; because, if it is wrong, these motions of the soul will be wrong, but if it is right, they will be not merely blameless, but even praiseworthy. For the will is in them all; yea, none of them is anything else than will. For what are desire and joy but a volition of consent to the things we wish? And what are fear and sadness but a volition of aversion from the things which we do not wish? But when consent takes the form of seeking to possess the things we wish, this is called desire; and when consent takes the form of enjoying the things we wish, this is called joy. In like manner, when we turn with aversion from that which we do not wish to happen, this volition is termed fear; and when we turn away from that which has happened against our will, this act of will is called sorrow. And generally in respect of all that we seek or shun, as a man's will is attracted or repelled, so it is changed and turned into these different affections. Wherefore the man who lives according to God, and not according to man, ought to be a lover of good, and therefore a hater of evil. And since no one is evil by nature, but whoever is evil is evil by vice, he who lives according to God ought to cherish towards evil men a perfect hatred, so that he shall neither hate the man because of his vice, nor love the vice because of the man, but hate the vice and love the man. For the vice being cursed, all that ought to be loved, and nothing that ought to be hated, will remain. 14.9. But so far as regards this question of mental perturbations, we have answered these philosophers in the ninth book of this work, showing that it is rather a verbal than a real dispute, and that they seek contention rather than truth. Among ourselves, according to the sacred Scriptures and sound doctrine, the citizens of the holy city of God, who live according to God in the pilgrimage of this life, both fear and desire, and grieve and rejoice. And because their love is rightly placed, all these affections of theirs are right. They fear eternal punishment, they desire eternal life; they grieve because they themselves groan within themselves, waiting for the adoption, the redemption of their body; Romans 8:23 they rejoice in hope, because there shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. 1 Corinthians 15:54 In like manner they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve in sin, they rejoice in good works. They fear to sin, because they hear that because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold. Matthew 24:12 They desire to persevere, because they hear that it is written, He that endures to the end shall be saved. Matthew 10:22 They grieve for sin, hearing that If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 They rejoice in good works, because they hear that the Lord loves a cheerful giver. 2 Corinthians 9:7 In like manner, according as they are strong or weak, they fear or desire to be tempted, grieve or rejoice in temptation. They fear to be tempted, because they hear the injunction, If a man be overtaken in a fault, you which are spiritual restore such an one in the spirit of meekness; considering yourself, lest you also be tempted. Galatians 6:l They desire to be tempted, because they hear one of the heroes of the city of God saying, Examine me, O Lord, and tempt me: try my reins and my heart. They grieve in temptations, because they see Peter weeping; Matthew 26:75 they rejoice in temptations, because they hear James saying, My brethren, count it all joy when you fall into various temptations. James 1:2 And not only on their own account do they experience these emotions, but also on account of those whose deliverance they desire and whose perdition they fear, and whose loss or salvation affects them with grief or with joy. For if we who have come into the Church from among the Gentiles may suitably instance that noble and mighty hero who glories in his infirmities, the teacher (doctor) of the nations in faith and truth, who also labored more than all his fellow apostles, and instructed the tribes of God's people by his epistles, which edified not only those of his own time, but all those who were to be gathered in - that hero, I say, and athlete of Christ, instructed by Him, anointed of His Spirit, crucified with Him, glorious in Him, lawfully maintaining a great conflict on the theatre of this world, and being made a spectacle to angels and men, 1 Corinthians 4:9 and pressing onwards for the prize of his high calling, Philippians 3:14 - very joyfully do we with the eyes of faith behold him rejoicing with them that rejoice, and weeping with them that weep; Romans 12:15 though hampered by fightings without and fears within; 2 Corinthians 7:5 desiring to depart and to be with Christ; Philippians 1:23 longing to see the Romans, that he might have some fruit among them as among other Gentiles; Romans 1:11-13 being jealous over the Corinthians, and fearing in that jealousy lest their minds should be corrupted from the chastity that is in Christ; 2 Corinthians 11:1-3 having great heaviness and continual sorrow of heart for the Israelites, Romans 9:2 because they, being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God; Romans 10:3 and expressing not only his sorrow, but bitter lamentation over some who had formally sinned and had not repented of their uncleanness and fornications. 2 Corinthians 12:21 If these emotions and affections, arising as they do from the love of what is good and from a holy charity, are to be called vices, then let us allow these emotions which are truly vices to pass under the name of virtues. But since these affections, when they are exercised in a becoming way, follow the guidance of right reason, who will dare to say that they are diseases or vicious passions? Wherefore even the Lord Himself, when He condescended to lead a human life in the form of a slave, had no sin whatever, and yet exercised these emotions where He judged they should be exercised. For as there was in Him a true human body and a true human soul, so was there also a true human emotion. When, therefore, we read in the Gospel that the hard-heartedness of the Jews moved Him to sorrowful indignation, Mark 3:5 that He said, I am glad for your sakes, to the intent you may believe, John 11:15 that when about to raise Lazarus He even shed tears, John 11:35 that He earnestly desired to eat the passover with His disciples, Luke 22:15 that as His passion drew near His soul was sorrowful, Matthew 26:38 these emotions are certainly not falsely ascribed to Him. But as He became man when it pleased Him, so, in the grace of His definite purpose, when it pleased Him He experienced those emotions in His human soul. But we must further make the admission, that even when these affections are well regulated, and according to God's will, they are peculiar to this life, not to that future life we look for, and that often we yield to them against our will. And thus sometimes we weep in spite of ourselves, being carried beyond ourselves, not indeed by culpable desire; but by praiseworthy charity. In us, therefore, these affections arise from human infirmity; but it was not so with the Lord Jesus, for even His infirmity was the consequence of His power. But so long as we wear the infirmity of this life, we are rather worse men than better if we have none of these emotions at all. For the apostle vituperated and abominated some who, as he said, were without natural affection. Romans 1:31 The sacred Psalmist also found fault with those of whom he said, I looked for some to lament with me, and there was none. For to be quite free from pain while we are in this place of misery is only purchased, as one of this world's literati perceived and remarked, at the price of blunted sensibilities both of mind and body. And therefore that which the Greeks call ἀπαθεια, and what the Latins would call, if their language would allow them, impassibilitas, if it be taken to mean an impassibility of spirit and not of body, or, in other words, a freedom from those emotions which are contrary to reason and disturb the mind, then it is obviously a good and most desirable quality, but it is not one which is attainable in this life. For the words of the apostle are the confession, not of the common herd, but of the eminently pious, just, and holy men: If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 When there shall be no sin in a man, then there shall be this απάθεια . At present it is enough if we live without crime; and he who thinks he lives without sin puts aside not sin, but pardon. And if that is to be called apathy, where the mind is the subject of no emotion, then who would not consider this insensibility to be worse than all vices? It may, indeed, reasonably be maintained that the perfect blessedness we hope for shall be free from all sting of fear or sadness; but who that is not quite lost to truth would say that neither love nor joy shall be experienced there? But if by apathy a condition be meant in which no fear terrifies nor any pain annoys, we must in this life renounce such a state if we would live according to God's will, but may hope to enjoy it in that blessedness which is promised as our eternal condition. For that fear of which the Apostle John says, There is no fear in love; but perfect love casts out fear, because fear has torment. He that fears is not made perfect in love, 1 John 4:18 - that fear is not of the same kind as the Apostle Paul felt lest the Corinthians should be seduced by the subtlety of the serpent; for love is susceptible of this fear, yea, love alone is capable of it. But the fear which is not in love is of that kind of which Paul himself says, For you have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear. Romans 8:15 But as for that clean fear which endures for ever, if it is to exist in the world to come (and how else can it be said to endure for ever?), it is not a fear deterring us from evil which may happen, but preserving us in the good which cannot be lost. For where the love of acquired good is unchangeable, there certainly the fear that avoids evil is, if I may say so, free from anxiety. For under the name of clean fear David signifies that will by which we shall necessarily shrink from sin, and guard against it, not with the anxiety of weakness, which fears that we may strongly sin, but with the tranquillity of perfect love. Or if no kind of fear at all shall exist in that most imperturbable security of perpetual and blissful delights, then the expression, The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring for ever, must be taken in the same sense as that other, The patience of the poor shall not perish forever. For patience, which is necessary only where ills are to be borne, shall not be eternal, but that which patience leads us to will be eternal. So perhaps this clean fear is said to endure for ever, because that to which fear leads shall endure. And since this is so - since we must live a good life in order to attain to a blessed life, a good life has all these affections right, a bad life has them wrong. But in the blessed life eternal there will be love and joy, not only right, but also assured; but fear and grief there will be none. Whence it already appears in some sort what manner of persons the citizens of the city of God must be in this their pilgrimage, who live after the spirit, not after the flesh - that is to say, according to God, not according to man - and what manner of persons they shall be also in that immortality whither they are journeying. And the city or society of the wicked, who live not according to God, but according to man, and who accept the doctrines of men or devils in the worship of a false and contempt of the true divinity, is shaken with those wicked emotions as by diseases and disturbances. And if there be some of its citizens who seem to restrain and, as it were, temper those passions, they are so elated with ungodly pride, that their disease is as much greater as their pain is less. And if some, with a vanity monstrous in proportion to its rarity, have become enamored of themselves because they can be stimulated and excited by no emotion, moved or bent by no affection, such persons rather lose all humanity than obtain true tranquillity. For a thing is not necessarily right because it is inflexible, nor healthy because it is insensible.
27. Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.88.8-2.88.12 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

28. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 3.378, 3.391, 3.462



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
(hēgemonikon) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 198
(lekta) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 194, 198
(prokoptōn) vii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
achilles Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 277
actions / acts (stoic), appropriate (kathēkonta) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 194
actions / acts (stoic), erroneous / errors (hamartēmata) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
agency / agent, human Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 194
akrasia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 56, 303, 314; Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 277
alcinous, middle platonist author of didasklikos, utility of emotions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
alexander of aphrodisias, aristotelian, proairesis involved in all action that is upto us Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 328
alexander the great Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 277
anger, definitions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
anger Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 250; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30, 191
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; did christ exhibit apatheia? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; does punishment require anger? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; not even then Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; reasons for and against apatheia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
apatheia (passionlessness) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 212
appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 42, 66
appearance (phantasia, impression) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 194
appearances (kataleptic) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 194
appetite (epithumia), appetitive (epithumētikon) as lowest part of plato's tripartite soul" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 43, 44
approach–avoidance Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 314
appropriate (kathēkon) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
aquinas (thomas), in primary sense implies electio/proairesis, so excludes animals Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 328
aristotle, proairesis Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 328
aristotle, rejects plato's purely intellectual conception of human happiness" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 43
aristotle Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
assent, to appearances in stoicism Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 42
assent, voluntary Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
assent (sunkatathesis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 194
atreus Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 250
augustine, anti-pelagianism Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
augustine, emotion an act of will Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
augustine, it is pride and vanity to deny this Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
augustine, lust Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
augustine, relation to stoics Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
augustine, two wills in humans Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
augustine, utility of emotions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
augustus, anger Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 277
bad (evil) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 198, 212
belief/s, nature of Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 19, 20
belief/s, role in emotion Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 19, 20
belief (doxa), in stoicism differs by assent Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 42
body / bodies (corporeal, material, matter, physical) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 212
bonhöffer, adolf Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
broadie, sarah Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 140
caesar, c. julius, lucan Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 152
capaneus Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 152
caston, victor Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 328
christ, did christ have emotions? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
christology, natures of christ, augustine Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
christology, natures of christ, basil of caesarea Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
christology, natures of christ, jerome Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
christology, natures of christ, origen and rufinus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), akrasia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 56
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), appetite is judgement that there is future benefit and it is appropriate to reach for it Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), contraction/expansion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 37
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), distress is judgement that there is present harm and it is appropriate to feel a sinking Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), false judgement distinguished from zeno's disobedient or akratic judgement" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 56
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), fear is judgement that there is future harm and it is appropriate to avoid it Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), hence emotion voluntary Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), impulse is a judgement Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 42, 43, 328
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), instead of being divided, it oscillates (ptoia) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 56
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), intellectualist account of emotions as identical with judgements (contrast zeno) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), judgement distinguished from appearance as involving assent Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 42
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), of the two judgements in emotion, one is about present or future, but not past, harm or benefit Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), or about the appropriateness of actual expansion or contraction Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30, 31
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), pleasure is judgement that there is present benefit and it is appropriate to feel expansion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), rejects plato's tripartition of soul, in favour of unitary rational command centre" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 303
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), second judgement is impulse (hormē) construed as a judgement about how it is appropriate (kathēkein) to react Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 42, 43
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), the second judgement is about the appropriateness of actual or imagined pursuit or avoidance Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 31
chrysippus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 198
cicero, and seneca Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 20
cicero, division of emotions Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 19
cicero, emotions Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 19, 20
cicero, fear Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 20
cicero, stoicism and virility Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 20
cicero Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 194, 198, 212
cognitive / cognition Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 198
contraction, expansion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 31
cosmos (visible world, universe) / cosmology, greco-roman / mediterranean world Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
crantor, platonist, utility of emotions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
descartes Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 328
desire, stoic identification of desire with judgement controversial Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 42, 43, 44
destruction Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 250
dialogue Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 250
diogenes of babylon Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
dis Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 152
disease (nosos, nosēma) / illness Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 212
distress, definition Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
distress Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
distress (lupē, grief, pain) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 198, 212
doctrines (dogma, decreta) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 194
doxography / doxographer Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 194
emotions, agreed by stoics that emotion is impulse Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 42, 43
emotions, are emotions all desires? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 140
emotions, as deceptive Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 20
emotions, as disorders/ sickness / disease of the soul Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 19
emotions, difficulty to tame Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 152
emotions, emotion voluntary? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
emotions, formation of human Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 19, 20
emotions, identified with judgements by chrysippus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30, 31, 37, 42, 43, 44, 45
emotions, nature of Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 19, 20
emotions, seneca makes zeno's disobedience to reason a distinct third stage in anger" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 63
emotions, shifting from one emotion to another Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 56
emotions, stoic views Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 19, 20
emotions, the judgements are about harm or benefit at hand and the appropriate reaction to it, illustrated for pleasure, distress, appetite, fear Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
emotions, zeno, emotion is not false judgement, but is disobedient to one's better judgement" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 56, 60
emotions / passions (pathē, pathēmata) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 198, 212
engberg-pedersen, troels Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 44
epictetus, stoic, first movements not escaped by sage Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
epictetus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 198
ethics / ethical theory Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
false belief / false judgment / false opinion Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 194
fear, and hope ( spes ) Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 20
fear, as mental construct Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 20
fear, definitions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
fear, stoic division of emotions Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 19
fear Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30, 140
first movements, 2 kinds. mental, bites and little soul movements caused by appearance, without assent and emotion having yet occurred Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 66
first movements, in stoics not the same as emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 66
first movements, involuntary Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
first movements, not escaped by sage Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
fluttering (ptoia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 198; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 56
freedom, and boulēsis Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 328
freedom (eleutheria) / free (eleutheros) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 212
fresh (prosphatos) / freshness (of a passion) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 198
galen, platonizing ecletic doctor, anger not useful for punishment Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
galen, platonizing ecletic doctor, complains of contradictions in chrysippus' account of emotion" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 56, 60
galen of pergamum Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 198, 212
gauthier, r.-a Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 328
goal (telos) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 212
good (moral) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 194
hannibal, as caesar Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 152
helmbold, w.c. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 31
hieronymus of rhodes, aristotelian, no time to check anger, anger not useful for punishment Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
impulse (hormē), impulse in adult humans is assent or judgement for chrysippus and seneca Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 42, 43, 328
impulse (hormē), impulse not sufficient for action Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 44, 45
impulse (hormē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 194, 198
indifferents, preferred and dispreferred, indifferents selected, not chosen Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 328
indifferents, preferred and dispreferred Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 328
instinctive Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 111
inwood, brad Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 31, 44
irrational (alogos) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 198
judgement, in stoicism, assent to appearance Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 42
judgment (krisis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 194, 198
julian of eclanum, bishop, pelagian opponent of augustine Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
juno, anger of Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 277
kakodaimonia (unhappiness, misery) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 198
lament Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 250
ledbetter, grace m. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
lloyd, a. c. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 44
lord's prayer and forgiveness, need for daily forgiveness" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
lottin, o. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 66
lust Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 140
marcus aurelius Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; aristotelians Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; but not for lust or pride Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; does punishment require anger? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; lactantius Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; not all emotions acceptable Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; platonists, crantor, alcinous Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
metriopatheia, moderate, moderation of, emotion; utility of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
moderation (metriopatheia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 212
monologue Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 250
musonius rufus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 198
nature (phusis) / natural, human Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 198
nature (phusis) / natural, kind / type / purpose Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
olympus Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 250
opinion (doxa) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 198
ovid, akrasia in Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 277
panaetius Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 20
passion, pre-passion Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 111
passion Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 250
pelagius and pelagianism, hence alleged to believe apatheia and sinlessness attainable Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
peripateticism / peripatetic Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 212
philodemus, epicurean, ordinary anger not useful for punishment Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
philosophy Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 250
pity, definitions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
plato, anger not useful for punishment Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
plato, tripartite division of soul Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 43, 44, 63, 303
plato Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
platonism (middle / imperial) vi–viii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
pleasure, definitions Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
pleasure Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 30
plot Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 250
plutarch Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 198
plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, anger not useful for punishment Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
pohlenz, max Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 44, 63
posidonius, stoic, capacities not parts Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 314
posidonius, stoic, reply to chrysippus' intellectualist account of emotion as judgement, judgement not invariably needed for emotion" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 42
posidonius Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
power Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 250
pre-passions (propatheiai) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 212
pride, augustine, denial of need for forgiveness is pride or vanity Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
pride, per contra root of all other sins in ecclesiasticus, augustine, and gregory the great Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
proairesis, alexander Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 328
proairesis, aquinas'electio" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 328
punishment, corrective purpose in stoics Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
punishment, not served by ordinary anger Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
reason, highest part of plato's tripartite soul" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 43, 44
reason Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 111
reason (human) / rational faculty (logos, logistikon) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 194, 198
recta ratio Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 19
revenge Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 250
rist, john Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 44, 66
sacrifice Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 250
sage (wise person) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 212
school (scholē) / sect (hairesis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
self-mastery (enkrateia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
seneca, the younger, stoic, and is a judgement Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 42, 43, 328
seneca, the younger, stoic, anger not useful for punishment Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
seneca, the younger, stoic, contrast with emotion, which is a voluntary judgement Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
seneca, the younger, stoic, first movements involuntary, not escaped by sage Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
seneca, the younger, stoic, first movements of body or soul caused by appearance without assent or emotion having yet occurred Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 66, 69
seneca, the younger, stoic, hence emotion subject to therapy Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
seneca, the younger, stoic, third movements accommodate zeno's disobedience to reason as a stage in anger distinct from chrysippus' mistaken judgement of reason" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 63
seneca, the younger, stoic, will is a judgement, seneca not separate it off from reason Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 44
seneca, the younger, stoic, zeno's akrasia, lack of control, comes in with third movements" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 56
seneca, the younger, stoic Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
seneca, three-stage analysis of irascibility in de ira Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 277
seneca Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 111; Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 194, 198, 212
sensation Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 111
sharples, r. w. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 328
shock Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 111
socrates, model for apatheia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
socrates Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
sorabji, richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191, 328
soul, seearistotle, chrysippus, plato, posidonius, ; division of Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 43, 44, 63, 303
soul, seearistotle, chrysippus, plato, posidonius, ; parts vs. capacities Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 314
soul / mind (psuchē, animus) vii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 194, 198
stobaeus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 194, 198
stoic Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 250
stoicism, greek Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 19
stoicism / stoic / stoa, neostoicism (greco-roman) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
stoicism / stoic / stoa Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 194, 212
stoics/stoicism Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 277
suffering Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 111
system / model Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
temptation Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 56, 303, 314
therapy, philosophical contributions to therapy (i) voluntariness of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45, 69
therapy, therapy can exploit half-truths in chrysippus' analysis, e.g. a non-conceptual necessity for judgements" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 140
thillet, p. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 328
thumos, middle part of plato's tripartite soul" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 43, 44
thyestes Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 250
tisiphone, and megaera Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 152
tisiphone Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 152
tydeus Agri, Reading Fear in Flavian Epic: Emotion, Power, and Stoicism (2022) 152
unnatural / against nature (kata phusin) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 198
up to us/in our power (eph' hēmin)" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
utility of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 191
value (axia) / valuation Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 194
vanity, augustine, denial of need for forgiveness is vanity or pride Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
vengeance Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 250
voluntariness of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45, 69
will, boulēsis Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 328
will, present in all our decisions' Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 328
will, proairesis Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 328
will, seneca does not disagree Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 44
will, two wills in humans Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 399
will, will (voluntas) in seneca in broad sense covers irrational impulse Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 42
will, will in stoicism as judgement that it is appropriate to act Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 42, 43
will Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 43, 45
william of auxerre Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 328
zeno (of citium) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
zeno of citium, stoic, and involves akrasia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 56, 303
zeno of citium, stoic, and oscillation or fluttering Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 56
zeno of citium, stoic, different view of emotion from chrysippus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 56, 60, 63
zeno of citium, stoic, emotion is not false judgement, but disobedience to one's better judgement" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 56, 60
zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 140, 191, 303, 314, 328, 399