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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



10235
Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 2.3.4
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Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

26 results
1. Plato, Republic, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Aristotle, Soul, None (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

3. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 2.1-2.11 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

4. Cicero, Lucullus, 57, 38 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.24-3.25, 3.75, 3.82-3.83, 4.11-4.14 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.24. Est igitur causa omnis in opinione, nec vero aegritudinis St. fr. 3, 385 solum, sed etiam reliquarum omnium perturbationum, quae sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures. nam cum omnis perturbatio sit animi motus vel rationis expers vel rationem aspers vel rationi non oboediens, isque motus aut boni aut mali opinione citetur bifariam, quattuor perturbationes aequaliter distributae sunt. nam duae sunt ex opinione boni; quarum altera, voluptas gestiens, id est praeter modum elata aelata G 1 R 1 laetitia, opinione praesentis magni alicuius boni, altera, cupiditas, quae recte vel libido dici potest, quae est inmoderata adpetitio opinati magni boni rationi non obtemperans, post obtemperans add. vel cupiditas recte vel libido dici potest X quae retinent sec. Dav. edd., in v. 17. 8 verba cupiditas — potest delentes. sed ut voluptatis sic cupi- ditatis nomen appositionis locum tenere debebat. de cupiditate autem praedicandam erat 'opinione futuri boni turbatur'; quod cum iam in enuntiato relativo expressum esset, anacoluthon natum est. ad boni 17 V c in mg. adscr. : et quidem magis significat nomen libidinis magnitudinem erroris. itaque in ea cupiditate quae flagrantissima est proprie plerumque nomen hoc ponitur si omnis appetitio opinati boni haec] ut H 3.25. —ergo haec duo genera, voluptas gestiens et libido, bonorum opinione turbantur, ut ut in at corr. V 2 duo reliqua, metus et et om. H s aegritudo, malorum. nam et metus est post metus add. V c s non male. opinio magni mali inpendentis inpendentes G 1 R 1 V 1 ( corr. G 2 R 1 V 1 ) et aegritudo est opinio magni mali praesentis, et quidem recens opinio talis mali, ut in eo rectum recte H videatur esse angi, id autem est, ut ut om. G 1 dolore V is qui doleat oportere opinetur se dolere. his autem perturbationibus, quas in quas in quasi in GKH quas in R vitam vitam Lb. vita ( cf. off. 3,34 ) homini H hominum stultitia quasi quasdam Furias inmittit atque incitat,, 3 omne ... 330, 4 incitat H omnibus viribus atque opibus repugdum est, si volumus hoc, quod datum est vitae, tranquille placideque traducere. Sed cetera alias; nunc aegritudinem, si possumus, depellamus. id enim sit sit (si V 1 )] est Bouh. sed cf. fin. 4,25 propositum, quandoquidem eam tu videri tibi in sapientem cadere dixisti, quod ego nullo modo existimo; taetra enim res est, misera, detestabilis, omni omne GRV ( corr. R 1 V 1 ) contentione, velis, ut ita dicam, remisque fugienda. 3.75. additur ad hanc definitionem a Zenone recte, ut illa opinio praesentis mali sit recens. hoc autem verbum sic interpretantur, ut non tantum illud recens esse velint, quod paulo ante acciderit, sed quam diu in illo opinato malo vis quaedam insit, ut ut s et X vigeat et habeat quandam viriditatem, tam diu appelletur appellatur K recens. ut Artemisia illa, Mausoli Cariae regis uxor, quae nobile illud Halicarnasi alicarnasi X fecit sepulcrum, quam diu vixit, vixit in luctu eodemque etiam confecta contabuit. huic erat illa opinio cotidie recens; quae tum denique non appellatur appellabatur X corr. V 2 recens, cum vetustate exaruit. Haec igitur officia sunt consolantium, tollere aegritudinem funditus aut sedare aut detrahere aut detr. V ( ss. 2 ) quam plurumum aut supprimere nec pati manare longius aut ad alia traducere. 3.82. et tamen, ut medici uti medici K ( er. n) toto corpore curando minimae etiam parti, si condoluit, medentur, sic philosophia cum universam aegritudinem sustulit, sustulit aegritudinem sustulit tamen si X (sustullit G 1 V 1 condoluit tamen si K 1 medenturaegr. sustulit add. c ) corr. Keil, Quaest. Tull. p. XVIII etiam, si quis error alicunde alicunde Ern. aliunde extitit, si paupertas momordit, si ignominia pupugit, pupigit G 1 R 1 V 1 si quid tenebrarum obfudit exilium, exsilium GV 1 aut eorum quae quaeque (quaeque G) modo X corr. s modo dixi si quid si quid sicut K extitit. etsi singularum rerum sunt propriae consolationes, de quibus audies tu quidem, cum voles. sed ad eundem fontem revertendum est, aegritudinem omnem procul abesse a sapiente, quod iis sit, quod frustra suscipiatur, quod non natura exoriatur, sed iudicio, sed opinione, sed quadam invitatione ad dolendum, cum id decreverimus ita fieri oportere. 3.83. Hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata illa ilia ita G 1 maerens, morsus tamen tamen tantum Bentl. sed cf. p. 323, 11 quo Cic. hic respicit et contractiuncula quaedam contractiuncuculae quaedam (quadam G quandam V 1 ) relinquentur W Non. (relincuntur) corr. Bentl. cf. 9 hanc et Sen. ad Marc. 7, 1 animi relinquetur. hoc... 9 relinquentur Non. 92, 24 hanc dicant sane naturalem, dum aegritudinis nomen absit grave taetrum funestum, quod cum sapientia esse atque, ut ita dicam, habitare nullo modo possit. At quae at quae Bentl. atque stirpes sunt aegritudinis, quam multae, quam amarae! quae ipso ipso om. V trunco everso omnes eligendae elidendae R 2 sunt et, si necesse erit, singulis disputationibus. superest enim nobis hoc, cuicuimodi cuicuimodi cuiusmodi V 3 est, otium. sed ratio una omnium est aegritudinum, plura sed plura H nomina. nam et invidere aegritudinis est et aemulari et obtrectare et misereri et angi, lugere, maerere, aerumna adfici, lamentari, sollicitari, sollicitari add. G 2 dolere, dolore V in molestia esse, adflictari, desperare. 4.11. sit igitur hic hic K 1 fons; utamur tamen in his perturbationibus describendis discrib. Mue. sed cf. Th. l. l. 5, 663 Stoicorum definitionibus et partitionibus, parti cipationibus R 1 particionibus GVH qui mihi videntur in hac quaestione versari acutissime. Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, ut perturbatio Zeno fr. 205 sit, quod pa/qos pat OC K patos R ( p ex ) PL T w C H ille dicit, aversa a a om. V 1 ( add. c ) recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. quidam brevius perturbationem esse adpetitum vehementiorem, sed vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discesserit a naturae constantia. partes autem perturbationum volunt ex duobus opinatis bonis nasci et ex duobus opinatis malis; ita esse quattuor, ex bonis libidinem et laetitiam, ut sit laetitia praesentium bonorum, libido futurorum, ex malis metum et aegritudinem nasci censent, metum futuris, aegritudinem praesentibus; quae enim venientia metuuntur, eadem adficiunt aegritudine aegritudinem K ( corr. 2 ) RH instantia. 4.12. laetitia autem et libido in bonorum opinione versantur, cum libido ad id, quod videtur bonum, inlecta inlecta s iniecta X et sqq. cf. Barlaami eth. sec. Stoicos 2, 11 qui hinc haud pauca adsumpsit. inflammata rapiatur, laetitia ut adepta iam aliquid concupitum ecferatur et gestiat. natura natura s V rec naturae X (-re K) enim omnes ea, Stoic. fr. 3, 438 quae bona videntur, secuntur fugiuntque contraria; quam ob rem simul obiecta species est speciei est H speci est KR ( add. c ) speciest GV cuiuspiam, quod bonum videatur, ad id adipiscendum impellit ipsa natura. id cum constanter prudenterque fit, eius modi adpetitionem Stoici bou/lhsin BO gL AHClN KR bo gL HC in G bo ga HCin V appellant, nos appellemus appellemus We. appellamus X (apell G) cf. v. 26, fin. 3, 20 voluntatem, eam eam iam V illi putant in solo esse sapiente; quam sic definiunt: voluntas est, quae quid cum ratione desiderat. quae autem ratione adversante adversante Po. ( cf. p.368, 6; 326, 3; St. fr. 3, 462 a)peiqw=s tw=| lo/gw| w)qou/menon e)pi\ plei=on adversa X (d del. H 1 ) a ratione aversa Or. incitata est vehementius, ea libido est vel cupiditas effrenata, quae in omnibus stultis invenitur. 4.13. itemque cum ita ita om. H movemur, ut in bono simus aliquo, dupliciter id contingit. nam cum ratione curatione K 1 (ũ 2 ) animus movetur placide atque constanter, tum illud gaudium dicitur; cum autem iiter et effuse animus exultat, tum illa laetitia gestiens vel nimia dici potest, quam ita definiunt: sine ratione animi elationem. quoniamque, quoniam quae X praeter K 1 (quae del. V rec ) ut bona natura adpetimus, app. KR 2? (H 367, 24) sic a malis natura declinamus, quae declinatio si cum del. Bentl. ratione fiet, cautio appelletur, appellatur K 1 V rec s eaque intellegatur in solo esse sapiente; quae autem sine ratione et cum exanimatione humili atque fracta, nominetur metus; est igitur metus a a Gr.(?) s om. X ratione aversa cautio. cautio Cic. dicere debebat: declinatio 4.14. praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum stultorum Dav. stulta autem aegritudo est, eaque eaque Ba. ea qua X (ea qu e M 1 ) adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. itaque haec prima definitio difin. V est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. itaque ... 6 contractio Non. 93, 1 sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam cf. Aug. civ. 14, 8 aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur. Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et St. fr. 3, 380 et 393 opinione. itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, vitiose GKR sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate. est ergo ergo igitur H s aegritudo aegritudo om. G 1 add. 1 et 2 opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri ecferri haec ferri VK c (eff. K 2 ) rectum esse videatur, laetitia...15 videatur om. G 1, add. G 2 in mg. inf. ( lemmata laetitia metus adscr. 1 cf. praef. ) metus opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile intollerabile V esse videatur, libido lubido K, in lib. corr. G 1 (libido etiam in mg. ) R 1 opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse.
6. Posidonius Apamensis Et Rhodius, Fragments, 154 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

7. Philo of Alexandria, On The Migration of Abraham, 137 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

137. Come, and at once abandoning all other things, learn to know yourselves, and tell us plainly what ye yourselves are in respect of your bodies, in respect of your souls, in respect of your external senses, and in respect of your reason. Tell us now with respect to one, and that the smallest, perhaps, of the senses, what sight is, and how it is that you see; tell us what hearing is, and how it is that you hear; tell us what taste is, what touch is, what smell is, and how it is that you exercise the energies of each of these faculties; and what the sources of them are from which they originate.
8. Philo of Alexandria, Questions On Genesis, 1.79, 4.15-4.16, 4.19 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

9. Philo of Alexandria, That The Worse Attacks The Better, 139, 138 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

138. Having shown, therefore, as far as we could by the most unmistakeable testimony of Moses that, to rejoice is the peculiar property of the wise man, we will now also show that to hope also belongs to him alone; and here again we shall have no need of any other witness than Moses; for he tells us that the name of the son of Seth was Enos: and Enos, being interpreted, means hope. "He hoped first," says Moses, "to call upon the name of the Lord his God." Speaking wisely: for to a man inspired with the principles of truth what can be more akin and appropriate than a hope and expectation of the acquisition of good things from the one bounteous God? This, if one must speak the plain truth, is, properly speaking, the only real birth of men, as those who do not hope in God have no share in rational nature.
10. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.18.1-1.18.2, 1.28.1-1.28.2, 2.18.5, 2.18.7-2.18.26, 2.18.28-2.18.29, 3.2.1-3.2.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

11. New Testament, Ephesians, 4.26-4.27, 4.30 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

4.26. Be angry, and don't sin." Don't let the sun go down on your wrath 4.27. neither give place to the devil. 4.30. Don't grieve the Holy Spirit of God, in whom you were sealed for the day of redemption.
12. Plutarch, Against Colotes, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

13. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

14. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

15. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 1.9.3, 2.1.5, 2.2.1-2.2.2, 2.2.4-2.2.6, 2.3.1-2.3.3, 2.3.5, 2.4.1-2.4.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

16. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 99.18, 113.18, 116.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

17. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.2.10-4.2.18, 4.4.16-4.4.17, 4.4.24, 4.7.1-4.7.4, 4.7.12-4.7.17, 4.7.37, 5.1.4 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

18. Gellius, Attic Nights, 19.1.15 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

19. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 5.26 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

20. Posidonius Olbiopolitanus, Fragments, 154 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

21. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.110 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure.
22. Origen, On First Principles, 3.2.2 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

3.2.2. We, however, who see the reason (of the thing) more clearly, do not hold this opinion, taking into account those (sins) which manifestly originate as a necessary consequence of our bodily constitution. Must we indeed suppose that the devil is the cause of our feeling hunger or thirst? Nobody, I think, will venture to maintain that. If, then, he is not the cause of our feeling hunger and thirst, wherein lies the difference when each individual has attained the age of puberty, and that period has called forth the incentives of the natural heat? It will undoubtedly follow, that as the devil is not the cause of our feeling hunger and thirst, so neither is he the cause of that appetency which naturally arises at the time of maturity, viz., the desire of sexual intercourse. Now it is certain that this cause is not always so set in motion by the devil that we should be obliged to suppose that bodies would nor possess a desire for intercourse of that kind if the devil did not exist. Let us consider, in the next place, if, as we have already shown, food is desired by human beings, not from a suggestion of the devil, but by a kind of natural instinct, whether, if there were no devil, it were possible for human experience to exhibit such restraint in partaking of food as never to exceed the proper limits; i.e., that no one would either take otherwise than the case required, or more than reason would allow; and so it would result that men, observing due measure and moderation in the matter of eating, would never go wrong. I do not think, indeed, that so great moderation could be observed by men (even if there were no instigation by the devil inciting thereto), as that no individual, in partaking of food, would go beyond due limits and restraint, until he had learned to do so from long usage and experience. What, then, is the state of the case? In the matter of eating and drinking it was possible for us to go wrong, even without any incitement from the devil, if we should happen to be either less temperate or less careful (than we ought); and are we to suppose, then, in our appetite for sexual intercourse, or in the restraint of our natural desires, our condition is not something similar? I am of opinion, indeed, that the same course of reasoning must be understood to apply to other natural movements as those of covetousness, or of anger, or of sorrow, or of all those generally which through the vice of intemperance exceed the natural bounds of moderation. There are therefore manifest reasons for holding the opinion, that as in good things the human will is of itself weak to accomplish any good (for it is by divine help that it is brought to perfection in everything); so also, in things of an opposite nature we receive certain initial elements, and, as it were, seeds of sins, from those things which we use agreeably to nature; but when we have indulged them beyond what is proper, and have not resisted the first movements to intemperance, then the hostile power, seizing the occasion of this first transgression, incites and presses us hard in every way, seeking to extend our sins over a wider field, and furnishing us human beings with occasions and beginnings of sins, which these hostile powers spread far and wide, and, if possible, beyond all limits. Thus, when men at first for a little desire money, covetousness begins to grow as the passion increases, and finally the fall into avarice takes place. And after this, when blindness of mind has succeeded passion, and the hostile powers, by their suggestions, hurry on the mind, money is now no longer desired, but stolen, and acquired by force, or even by shedding human blood. Finally, a confirmatory evidence of the fact that vices of such enormity proceed from demons, may be easily seen in this, that those individuals who are oppressed either by immoderate love, or incontrollable anger, or excessive sorrow, do not suffer less than those who are bodily vexed by devils. For it is recorded in certain histories, that some have fallen into madness from a state of love, others from a state of anger, not a few from a state of sorrow, and even from one of excessive joy; which results, I think, from this, that those opposing powers, i.e., those demons, having gained a lodgment in their minds which has been already laid open to them by intemperance, have taken complete possession of their sensitive nature, especially when no feeling of the glory of virtue has aroused them to resistance.
23. Augustine, The City of God, 9.4 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

9.4. Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental emotions, which the Greeks call παθη, while some of our own writers, as Cicero, call them perturbations, some affections, and some, to render the Greek word more accurately, passions. Some say that even the wise man is subject to these perturbations, though moderated and controlled by reason, which imposes laws upon them, and so restrains them within necessary bounds. This is the opinion of the Platonists and Aristotelians; for Aristotle was Plato's disciple, and the founder of the Peripatetic school. But others, as the Stoics, are of opinion that the wise man is not subject to these perturbations. But Cicero, in his book De Finibus, shows that the Stoics are here at variance with the Platonists and Peripatetics rather in words than in reality; for the Stoics decline to apply the term goods to external and bodily advantages, because they reckon that the only good is virtue, the art of living well, and this exists only in the mind. The other philosophers, again, use the simple and customary phraseology, and do not scruple to call these things goods, though in comparison of virtue, which guides our life, they are little and of small esteem. And thus it is obvious that, whether these outward things are called goods or advantages, they are held in the same estimation by both parties, and that in this matter the Stoics are pleasing themselves merely with a novel phraseology. It seems, then, to me that in this question, whether the wise man is subject to mental passions, or wholly free from them, the controversy is one of words rather than of things; for I think that, if the reality and not the mere sound of the words is considered, the Stoics hold precisely the same opinion as the Platonists and Peripatetics. For, omitting for brevity's sake other proofs which I might adduce in support of this opinion, I will state but one which I consider conclusive. Aulus Gellius, a man of extensive erudition, and gifted with an eloquent and graceful style, relates, in his work entitled Noctes Attic that he once made a voyage with an eminent Stoic philosopher; and he goes on to relate fully and with gusto what I shall barely state, that when the ship was tossed and in danger from a violent storm, the philosopher grew pale with terror. This was noticed by those on board, who, though themselves threatened with death, were curious to see whether a philosopher would be agitated like other men. When the tempest had passed over, and as soon as their security gave them freedom to resume their talk, one of the passengers, a rich and luxurious Asiatic, begins to banter the philosopher, and rally him because he had even become pale with fear, while he himself had been unmoved by the impending destruction. But the philosopher availed himself of the reply of Aristippus the Socratic, who, on finding himself similarly bantered by a man of the same character, answered, You had no cause for anxiety for the soul of a profligate debauchee, but I had reason to be alarmed for the soul of Aristippus. The rich man being thus disposed of, Aulus Gellius asked the philosopher, in the interests of science and not to annoy him, what was the reason of his fear? And he willing to instruct a man so zealous in the pursuit of knowledge, at once took from his wallet a book of Epictetus the Stoic, in which doctrines were advanced which precisely harmonized with those of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the Stoical school. Aulus Gellius says that he read in this book that the Stoics maintain that there are certain impressions made on the soul by external objects which they call phantasi, and that it is not in the power of the soul to determine whether or when it shall be invaded by these. When these impressions are made by alarming and formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the soul even of the wise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear, or is depressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work of reason and self-control; but this does not imply that the mind accepts these evil impressions, or approves or consents to them. For this consent is, they think, in a man's power; there being this difference between the mind of the wise man and that of the fool, that the fool's mind yields to these passions and consents to them, while that of the wise man, though it cannot help being invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken firmness a true and steady persuasion of those things which it ought rationally to desire or avoid. This account of what Aulus Gellius relates that he read in the book of Epictetus about the sentiments and doctrines of the Stoics I have given as well as I could, not, perhaps, with his choice language, but with greater brevity, and, I think, with greater clearness. And if this be true, then there is no difference, or next to none, between the opinion of the Stoics and that of the other philosophers regarding mental passions and perturbations, for both parties agree in maintaining that the mind and reason of the wise man are not subject to these. And perhaps what the Stoics mean by asserting this, is that the wisdom which characterizes the wise man is clouded by no error and sullied by no taint, but, with this reservation that his wisdom remains undisturbed, he is exposed to the impressions which the goods and ills of this life (or, as they prefer to call them, the advantages or disadvantages) make upon them. For we need not say that if that philosopher had thought nothing of those things which he thought he was immediately to lose, life and bodily safety, he would not have been so terrified by his danger as to betray his fear by the pallor of his cheek. Nevertheless, he might suffer this mental disturbance, and yet maintain the fixed persuasion that life and bodily safety, which the violence of the tempest threatened to destroy, are not those good things which make their possessors good, as the possession of righteousness does. But in so far as they persist that we must call them not goods but advantages, they quarrel about words and neglect things. For what difference does it make whether goods or advantages be the better name, while the Stoic no less than the Peripatetic is alarmed at the prospect of losing them, and while, though they name them differently, they hold them in like esteem? Both parties assure us that, if urged to the commission of some immorality or crime by the threatened loss of these goods or advantages, they would prefer to lose such things as preserve bodily comfort and security rather than commit such things as violate righteousness. And thus the mind in which this resolution is well grounded suffers no perturbations to prevail with it in opposition to reason, even though they assail the weaker parts of the soul; and not only so, but it rules over them, and, while it refuses its consent and resists them, administers a reign of virtue. Such a character is ascribed to Æneas by Virgil when he says, He stands immovable by tears, Nor tenderest words with pity hears.
24. Nemesius, On The Nature of Man, 21 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

25. Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.88.8-2.88.12 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

26. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 3.175, 3.378, 3.391, 3.462



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
(hēgemonikon) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 198
(lekta) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 193, 198
(prokoptōn) vii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
academic / academy, the Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 193
actions / acts (stoic), erroneous / errors (hamartēmata) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 193
alcinous, middle platonist author of didasklikos Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 41
andronicus of rhodes, aristotelian, emotion as irrational movement of the soul through the supposition (hupolēpsis), not mere appearance, of good or bad Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 41
anger deSilva, Ephesians (2022) 237
animals, as criterion of emotion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 238
appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 41, 66, 68
appearance (phantasia, impression) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 193
appearances (kataleptic) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 193
aristotle, but human emotion can be said to involve either Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 41
aristotle, unlike plato, distinguishes appearance (phantasia) from belief Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 41
aristotle Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
aspasius, aristotelian, emotion can be produced by mere appearance, pace andronicus, and by appearance of pleasure, rather than of good Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 41
assent, to appearances in stoicism Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 41
assent (sunkatathesis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 193
augustine Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
bad (evil) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 198
becker, lawrence Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237, 238
belief (doxa), distinguished from appearance (phantasia) in aristotle and stoics Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 41
belief (doxa), in stoicism differs by assent Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 41
belief (doxa), not distinguished from appearance in plato Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 41
bites, sharp, little contractions caused by appearance of evil Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68
chrysippus, on involuntary feelings Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), contraction/expansion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 41
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), judgement distinguished from appearance as involving assent Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 41
chrysippus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 198
cicero, on species-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237, 238
cicero Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 193, 198
cognitive / cognition Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 193, 198
compassion, conversion, significance of deSilva, Ephesians (2022) 237
concession Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 193
consolation Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 238
contraction, expansion, a perceptible spatial movement of the physical soul in the chest Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 41
contraction, expansion, physiological reinterpretation Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 41
contraction (sustole), involuntary or pre-emotional Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 238
cooper, john Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
cosmos (visible world, universe) / cosmology, greco-roman / mediterranean world Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
destiny / fate Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 193
diogenes of babylon Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
distress (lupē, grief, pain) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 198
emotions, causation of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
emotions, examples of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237, 238
emotions, identified with judgements by chrysippus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 41
emotions, meaning of pathos Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68
emotions, modern theories Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237, 238
emotions, per contra, aristotle, galen, emotions cannot be understood without physical basis Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68
emotions, seneca makes zeno's disobedience to reason a distinct third stage in anger" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 63
emotions / passions (pathē, pathēmata) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 193, 198
epictetus, stoic, bites Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68
epictetus, stoic, first movements not escaped by sage Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68
epictetus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 193, 198
ethics / ethical theory Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
eupatheiai, classified by species Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237, 238
eusebius of emesus Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 238
false belief / false judgment / false opinion Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 193
feelings, physical alterations underlying Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
first movements, 2 kinds. mental, bites and little soul movements caused by appearance, without assent and emotion having yet occurred Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 66, 68
first movements, in stoics not the same as emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 66
first movements, not escaped by sage Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68
first movements, physical, e.g. pallor, erection, glaring caused by appearance, without assent and emotion having yet occurred Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68
fluttering (ptoia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 198
fresh (prosphatos) / freshness (of a passion) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 198
galen, platonizing ecletic doctor, stoic bites in the soul reinterpreted as physiological Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 41
galen, platonizing ecletic doctor Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 209
galen of pergamum Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 198
genus-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237, 238
holler, ernst Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
imagination Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
impressions, in aristotle Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
impressions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
impulse (hormē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 193, 198
irrational (alogos) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 198
joy, in philo Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 238
judgement, in stoicism, assent to appearance Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 41
judgment (krisis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 193, 198
kakodaimonia (unhappiness, misery) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 198
lottin, o. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 66
marcus aurelius Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
medea Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 238
musonius rufus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 198
nature (phusis) / natural, human Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 198
nature (phusis) / natural, kind / type / purpose Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
odysseus Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 238
opinion (doxa) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 193, 198
orientation, innate (oikeiosis), influence Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 238
origins of error, value as source Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
plato, tripartite division of soul Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 63
plato Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
platonism (middle / imperial) vi–viii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
plutarch, as source Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
plutarch Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 193, 198
plutarch of chaeroneia, middle platonist, but also accuses aristotelians of accepting the cruelty of anger Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 209
pohlenz, max Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 238; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 63
posidonius, on causes of emotion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
posidonius, stoic, reply to chrysippus' intellectualist account of emotion as judgement, judgement not invariably needed for emotion" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 41
posidonius, stoic, though bites are recognized by posidonius Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68
posidonius Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
pre-emotions, criticism Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
pre-emotions, origins of stoic concept Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
procopius of gaza Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 238
prothumia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68
reaching (orexis) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237, 238
reason (human) / rational faculty (logos, logistikon) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 198
rist, john Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 66, 209
school (scholē) / sect (hairesis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
self-mastery (enkrateia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
seneca, on anger Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
seneca, on grief and consolation Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 238
seneca, the younger, stoic, aristotelian metriopatheia ridiculed as belief in moderate disease Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 209
seneca, the younger, stoic, first movements of body or soul caused by appearance without assent or emotion having yet occurred Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 66, 68
seneca, the younger, stoic, moderation of anger impractical Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 209
seneca, the younger, stoic, third movements accommodate zeno's disobedience to reason as a stage in anger distinct from chrysippus' mistaken judgement of reason" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 63
seneca Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 193, 198
sin, sins deSilva, Ephesians (2022) 237
skeptical (new) academy Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 193
skepticism / scepticism (pyrrhonism) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 193
socrates Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
sorabji, richard Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
soul, seearistotle, chrysippus, plato, posidonius, ; division of Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 63
soul / mind (psuchē, animus) vii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 193, 198
stobaeus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 193, 198
stoicism / stoic / stoa, neostoicism (greco-roman) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
stoicism / stoic / stoa Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31, 193
system / model Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
theophrastus, aristotelian, metriopatheia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 209
training (askēsis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 193
unnatural / against nature (kata phusin) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 198
weeping, involuntary Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
zeno (of citium) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 31
zeno of citium, stoic, different view of emotion from chrysippus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 63
zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia)' Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 209