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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



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Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 2.2.2
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1. Cicero, Academica, 2.108 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 2.73 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.73. hoc ille tuus non vult omnibusque ex rebus voluptatem quasi mercedem exigit. sed ad illum redeo. si voluptatis causa cum Gallo apud Anienem depugnavit provocatus et ex eius spoliis sibi et torquem et cognomen induit ullam ullam ed. Veneta a. 1480 nullam aliam ob causam, nisi quod ei talia facta digna viro videbantur, fortem non puto. iam si pudor, si modestia, si pudicitia, si uno verbo temperantia poenae aut infamiae metu coe+rcebuntur, non sanctitate sua se tuebuntur, quod adulterium, quod stuprum, quae libido non se proripiet ac proiciet aut occultatione proposita aut inpunitate aut licentia? 2.73.  This your great master does not allow; he expects everything to pay — to yield its quota of pleasure. But I return to old Torquatus. If it was to win pleasure that he accepted the Gallic warrior's challenge to single combat on the banks of the Anio, and if he despoiled him and assumed his necklet and the corresponding surname for any other reason than that he thought such deeds became a man, I do not consider him brave. Again, if modesty, self-control, chastity, if in a word Temperance is to depend for its sanction on the fear of punishment or of disgrace, and not to maintain itself by its own intrinsic sacredness, what form of adultery, vice or lust will not break loose and run riot when it is assured of concealment, impunity or indulgence.
3. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.58, 2.84 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.58. the nature of the world itself, which encloses and contains all things in its embrace, is styled by Zeno not merely 'craftsmanlike' but actually 'a craftsman,' whose foresight plans out the work to serve its use and purpose in every detail. And as the other natural substances are generated, reared and sustained each by its own seeds, so the world-nature experiences all those motions of the will, those impulses of conation and desire, that the Greeks call hormae, and follows these up with the appropriate actions in the same way as do we ourselves, who experience emotions and sensations. Such being the nature of the world-mind, it can therefore correctly be designated as prudence or providence (for in Greek it is termed pronoia); and this providence is chiefly directed and concentrated upon three objects, namely to secure for the world, first, the structure best fitted for survival; next, absolute completeness; but chiefly, consummate beauty and embellishment of every kind. 2.84. And those things which travel towards the centre of the earth which is its lowest point, those which move from the centre upwards, and those which rotate in circles round the centre, constitute the one continuous nature of the world. Again the continuum of the world's nature is constituted by the cyclic transmutations of the four kinds of matter. For earth turns into water, water into air, air into aether, and then the process is reversed, and aether becomes air, air water, and water earth, the lowest of the four. Thus the parts of the world are held in union by the constant passage up and down, thenceforth, of these four elements of which all things are composed.
4. Cicero, On Duties, 1.136 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.136. Sed quo modo in omni vita rectissime praecipitur, ut perturbationes fugiamus, id est motus animi nimios rationi non optemperantes, sic eius modi motibus sermo debet vacare, ne aut ira exsistat aut cupiditas aliqua aut pigritia aut ignavia aut tale aliquid appareat, maximeque curandum est, ut eos, quibuscum sermonem conferemus, et vereri et diligere videamur. Obiurgationes etiam non numquam incidunt necessariae, in quibus utendum est fortasse et vocis contentione maiore et verborum gravitate acriore, id agendum etiam, ut ea facere videamur irati. Sed, ut ad urendum et secandum, sic ad hoc genus castigandi raro invitique veniemus nec umquam nisi necessario, si nulla reperietur alia medicina; sed tamen ira procul absit,cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest. 1.136.  But as we have a most excellent rule for every phase of life, to avoid exhibitions of passion, that is, mental excitement that is excessive and uncontrolled by reason; so our conversation ought to be free from such emotions: let there be no exhibition of anger or inordinate desire, of indolence or indifference, or anything of the kind. We must also take the greatest care to show courtesy and consideration toward those with whom we converse. It may sometimes happen that there is need of administering reproof. On such occasions we should, perhaps, use a more emphatic tone of voice and more forcible and severe terms and even assume an appearance of being angry. But we shall have recourse to this sort of reproof, as we do to cautery and amputation, rarely and reluctantly — never at all, unless it is unavoidable and no other remedy can be discovered. We may seem angry, but anger should be far from us; for in anger nothing right or judicious can be done.
5. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.24-3.25, 3.40, 3.64-3.71, 3.80, 3.83, 4.11, 4.14, 4.61, 4.65, 4.76, 4.79, 4.83 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.24. Est igitur causa omnis in opinione, nec vero aegritudinis St. fr. 3, 385 solum, sed etiam reliquarum omnium perturbationum, quae sunt genere quattuor, partibus plures. nam cum omnis perturbatio sit animi motus vel rationis expers vel rationem aspers vel rationi non oboediens, isque motus aut boni aut mali opinione citetur bifariam, quattuor perturbationes aequaliter distributae sunt. nam duae sunt ex opinione boni; quarum altera, voluptas gestiens, id est praeter modum elata aelata G 1 R 1 laetitia, opinione praesentis magni alicuius boni, altera, cupiditas, quae recte vel libido dici potest, quae est inmoderata adpetitio opinati magni boni rationi non obtemperans, post obtemperans add. vel cupiditas recte vel libido dici potest X quae retinent sec. Dav. edd., in v. 17. 8 verba cupiditas — potest delentes. sed ut voluptatis sic cupi- ditatis nomen appositionis locum tenere debebat. de cupiditate autem praedicandam erat 'opinione futuri boni turbatur'; quod cum iam in enuntiato relativo expressum esset, anacoluthon natum est. ad boni 17 V c in mg. adscr. : et quidem magis significat nomen libidinis magnitudinem erroris. itaque in ea cupiditate quae flagrantissima est proprie plerumque nomen hoc ponitur si omnis appetitio opinati boni haec] ut H 3.25. —ergo haec duo genera, voluptas gestiens et libido, bonorum opinione turbantur, ut ut in at corr. V 2 duo reliqua, metus et et om. H s aegritudo, malorum. nam et metus est post metus add. V c s non male. opinio magni mali inpendentis inpendentes G 1 R 1 V 1 ( corr. G 2 R 1 V 1 ) et aegritudo est opinio magni mali praesentis, et quidem recens opinio talis mali, ut in eo rectum recte H videatur esse angi, id autem est, ut ut om. G 1 dolore V is qui doleat oportere opinetur se dolere. his autem perturbationibus, quas in quas in quasi in GKH quas in R vitam vitam Lb. vita ( cf. off. 3,34 ) homini H hominum stultitia quasi quasdam Furias inmittit atque incitat,, 3 omne ... 330, 4 incitat H omnibus viribus atque opibus repugdum est, si volumus hoc, quod datum est vitae, tranquille placideque traducere. Sed cetera alias; nunc aegritudinem, si possumus, depellamus. id enim sit sit (si V 1 )] est Bouh. sed cf. fin. 4,25 propositum, quandoquidem eam tu videri tibi in sapientem cadere dixisti, quod ego nullo modo existimo; taetra enim res est, misera, detestabilis, omni omne GRV ( corr. R 1 V 1 ) contentione, velis, ut ita dicam, remisque fugienda. 3.40. quodsi cui, ut ait idem, simul animus cum re concidit animus rem condidit X corr. V c s , a gravibus illis antiquis philosophis petenda medicina est, non est non V est si non X ab his voluptariis. quam enim isti bonorum copiam dicunt? fac sane esse summum bonum non dolere—quamquam id non vocatur voluptas, sed non necesse est nunc omnia—: idne est, quo traducti luctum levemus? sit sane summum malum dolere: dolore in dolere corr. G 2 K 2 V 2 in eo igitur qui non est, si malo careat, continuone fruitur summo bono? 3.64. haec omnia recta vera debita putantes faciunt in dolore, maximeque declaratur declaratur hoc sana cf. Mue. ( off. 1, 61 ) hoc quasi officii iudicio fieri, quod, si qui forte, cum se in luctu esse vellent, aliquid fecerunt humanius aut si hilarius locuti sunt, revocant se rursus ad maestitiam peccatique se insimulant, quod dolere dolore K 1 V 1 intermiserint. pueros vero matres et magistri castigare etiam solent, nec verbis solum, sed etiam verberibus, si quid in domestico luctu hilarius ab is factum est aut dictum, plorare cogunt. Quid? ipsa remissio luctus cum est consecuta intellectumque intellectaque X corr. V c est est om. K 1 nihil profici maerendo, nonne res declarat fuisse totum illud voluntarium? 3.65. Quid ille Terentianus terentianus K 2 mg. V rec terrentianus X ipse se poeniens, poenitens (pen. K)X e a\g TON T e lM w PO g M e NOC fere X id est e(auto timwrou/menos ? Decre/vi tantispe/r decrevi tant. V ( prius t V c ) me minus iniu/riae, Chreme/s, me ... 7 Chreme s V c in r. (s scr. V 1 ) meo gnato fa/cere, dum fia/m miser. hic decernit, ut miser sit. num quis igitur quicquam decernit invitus? malo quidem me quovis dignum deputem— malo se dignum deputat, nisi miser sit. vides Ter. 147. 8. 135 ergo opinionis esse, non naturae malum. Quid, quos res quid quod res H ipsa lugere prohibet? ut apud Homerum cotidianae neces interitusque multorum sedationem maerendi adferunt, apud quem ita dicitur: Namque nimis multos atque omni luce cadentis T 226 cadentis ( i/ptousin ) Man. carentis Cernimus, ut nemo possit maerore vacare. Quo magis est aequum tumulis mandare peremptos Firmo animo et luctum lacrimis finire diurnis. 3.66. Ergo in potestate est abicere dolorem, cum velis, tempori servientem. an est ullum tempus, quoniam quidem res in nostra potestate est, cui cui cum V non ponendae curae et aegritudinis add. Dav. ex s . aut aegritudinis aut curae del. alii ( iam in V curaer sec. Str. ut vid. ) causa serviamus? vides ... 22 serviamus constabat eos, qui concidentem volneribus Cn. Pompeium vidissent, GN. X cum in illo ipso acerbissimo miserrimoque spectaculo sibi timerent, quod se classe hostium circumfusos viderent, nihil aliud tum egisse, nisi ut remiges hortarentur et ut salutem adipiscerentur fuga; posteaquam Tyrum venissent, tum adflictari lamentarique coepisse. timor igitur ab his aegritudinem potuit repellere, ratio ab sapienti viro ab sapienti viro Bentl. ac sapientia vera ( def. Linde Era- nos XII p. 175 ) non poterit? Quid est autem quod plus valeat ad ponendum dolorem, quam cum est intellectum nil nihil KH profici et frustra esse susceptum? si igitur deponi potest, etiam non suscipi potest; voluntate igitur et iudicio suscipi aegritudinem confitendum est. si timor aliquoties ab aegritudine potest repellere ... 351, 6 est H 3.67. Idque idque itaque K 1 indicatur eorum patientia, qui cum multa sint saepe perpessi, facilius ferunt ferant X cf. praef. quicquid accidit, obduruisseque obduruisseque iam Tr. obduruisse quam X (e ex am corr. V 2 ) iam sese sese V contra fortunam arbitrantur, ut ille apud Euripidem: Eur. Phrix. fr. 821 ( Chrys. fr. eth. 482 ) Si mi/hi nunc tristis pri/mum inluxisse/t dies Nec tam ae/rumnoso na/vigavisse/m navigassem X salo, Esse/t dolendi cau/sa, ut iniecto e/culei Freno/ repente ta/ctu exagitantu/r novo; Sed ia/m subactus subiactus GV 1 (i del. 2 ) sub- iectus KRP mi/seriis opto/rpui. obt. KR c defetigatio igitur miseriarum aegritudines cum faciat leniores, intellegi necesse est non rem ipsam causam atque ipsam atque causam W trp. Er. fontem fontem fon in r. V c esse maeroris. 3.68. Philosophi summi nequedum neque nondum X corr. V 3 tamen sapientiam consecuti nonne intellegunt in summo se malo esse? sunt enim insipientes, neque insipientia ullum maius malum est. neque tamen lugent. quid ita? quia huic generi malorum non adfingitur non affingitur V (non af in r. V c n ante g del. idem ) nodfingitur R 1 illa opinio, rectum esse et aequum et ad officium pertinere aegre ferre, quod sapiens non sis, quod idem adfingimus huic aegritudini, in qua luctus inest, quae omnium maxuma est. 3.69. itaque Aristoteles veteres philosophos Arist. fr. 53 accusans, qui existumavissent philosophiam suis ingeniis esse perfectam, ait eos aut stultissimos aut gloriosissimos fuisse; sed sed si V se videre, quod paucis annis magna accessio facta esset, brevi tempore philosophiam plane absolutam fore. Aristoteles . .. 352, 3 fore libere redd. Lact. inst. 3, 28, 20 Theophrastus autem moriens accusasse naturam dicitur, quod cervis et cornicibus vitam diuturnam, quorum id nihil interesset, hominibus, quorum maxime interfuisset, tam tamen KR 1 exiguam vitam dedisset; quorum si aetas potuisset esse longinquior, futurum fuisse ut omnibus perfectis artibus omni doctrina hominum vita erudiretur. querebatur quaerebatur VK 2 quaerebat GK 1 (quer-) R igitur se tum, cum illa videre coepisset, extingui. quid? ex ceteris philosophis nonne optumus et gravissumus quisque confitetur multa se ignorare et multa multa V 2 s multi sibi etiam atque etiam esse discenda? 3.70. neque tamen, cum se in media stultitia, qua nihil quia n. G 1 est peius, haerere intellegant, aegritudine premuntur; nulla enim admiscetur opinio officiosi doloris. Quid, qui non putant lugendum lungendum GV 1 ( prius n eras. ) iungen- dum KR viris? sqq. cf. Hier. epist. 60, 5 qualis fuit Q. Maxumus fuitque maxumus G 2 (quae G 1 ) KV ( ss. m. 3 ) ac fortasse R 1 (Q post fuit in r. m. al. ) efferens efferrens GR 1 V filium consularem, qualis L. Paulus paullus RG 1 e corr. V 1 (l eras. ) cf.p. 263, 17; 274, 19; 457, 7 duobus paucis lucius et marcus X diebus amissis amisis G 1 R 1 V 1 filiis, qualis M. Cato praetore designato mortuo filio, quales reliqui, quos in Consolatione consolationem G -ne V conlegimus. 3.71. quid hos aliud placavit nisi quod luctum et maerorem esse non putabant viri? ergo id, quod alii rectum opites aegritudini se solent dedere, id hi turpe putantes aegritudinem reppulerunt. ex quo intellegitur non in natura, sed in opinione esse aegritudinem. Contra dicuntur haec: quis tam demens, ut sua voluntate maereat? natura adfert dolorem, cui quidem Crantor, inquiunt, vester cedendum putat; premit enim atque instat, nec resisti potest. itaque Oileus oileus V ille apud Sophoclem, qui Telamonem antea de Aiacis morte morte V consolatus esset, is cum audivisset audisset K de suo, fractus est. de cuius commutata mente sic dicitur: Nec ve/ro tanta prae/ditus sapie/ntia Soph.fr. 666 Quisqua/m est, quisquamst edd. qui aliorum aeru/mnam dictis a/dlevans Non i/dem, cum fortu/na mutata i/mpetum Conve/rtat, convertit Sey. clade ut subita X corr. s clade su/bita frangatu/r sua, Ut i/lla ad alios di/cta et praecepta e/xcidant. ex p. G 2 haec cum disputant, hoc student efficere, naturae obsisti nullo modo posse; idem iidem Ern. (idem tamen Phil. 2, 91 al. ) hi (= i cf. praef. ) W et Sey. tamen fatentur graviores aegritudines suscipi, quam natura cogat. quae est igitur amentia—? ut nos quoque idem ab illis illis Urs. ex s allis requiramus. 3.80. Sed nescio quo pacto ab eo, quod erat a te a te ante K propositum, aberravit oratio. tu enim de sapiente quaesieras, cui aut malum videri nullum potest, quod vacet turpitudine, aut ita parvum malum, ut id obruatur sapientia vixque appareat, qui qui add. V 2 nihil opinione adfingat adsumatque ad aegritudinem nec id putet esse rectum, tum post rectum add. V c se quam maxume excruciari luctuque confici, quo pravius nihil esse possit. edocuit tamen ratio, ut mihi quidem videtur, cum hoc ipsum proprie non quaereretur hoc tempore, num num V x nunc X num quid We. sed cf. Mue. quod esset malum nisi quod idem dici turpe posset, tamen ut videremus, viderimus V 1 quicquid esset in aegritudine mali, id non naturale esse, sed voluntario iudicio et opinionis errore contractum. 3.83. Hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata illa ilia ita G 1 maerens, morsus tamen tamen tantum Bentl. sed cf. p. 323, 11 quo Cic. hic respicit et contractiuncula quaedam contractiuncuculae quaedam (quadam G quandam V 1 ) relinquentur W Non. (relincuntur) corr. Bentl. cf. 9 hanc et Sen. ad Marc. 7, 1 animi relinquetur. hoc... 9 relinquentur Non. 92, 24 hanc dicant sane naturalem, dum aegritudinis nomen absit grave taetrum funestum, quod cum sapientia esse atque, ut ita dicam, habitare nullo modo possit. At quae at quae Bentl. atque stirpes sunt aegritudinis, quam multae, quam amarae! quae ipso ipso om. V trunco everso omnes eligendae elidendae R 2 sunt et, si necesse erit, singulis disputationibus. superest enim nobis hoc, cuicuimodi cuicuimodi cuiusmodi V 3 est, otium. sed ratio una omnium est aegritudinum, plura sed plura H nomina. nam et invidere aegritudinis est et aemulari et obtrectare et misereri et angi, lugere, maerere, aerumna adfici, lamentari, sollicitari, sollicitari add. G 2 dolere, dolore V in molestia esse, adflictari, desperare. 4.11. sit igitur hic hic K 1 fons; utamur tamen in his perturbationibus describendis discrib. Mue. sed cf. Th. l. l. 5, 663 Stoicorum definitionibus et partitionibus, parti cipationibus R 1 particionibus GVH qui mihi videntur in hac quaestione versari acutissime. Est igitur Zenonis haec definitio, ut perturbatio Zeno fr. 205 sit, quod pa/qos pat OC K patos R ( p ex ) PL T w C H ille dicit, aversa a a om. V 1 ( add. c ) recta ratione contra naturam animi commotio. quidam brevius perturbationem esse adpetitum vehementiorem, sed vehementiorem eum volunt esse, qui longius discesserit a naturae constantia. partes autem perturbationum volunt ex duobus opinatis bonis nasci et ex duobus opinatis malis; ita esse quattuor, ex bonis libidinem et laetitiam, ut sit laetitia praesentium bonorum, libido futurorum, ex malis metum et aegritudinem nasci censent, metum futuris, aegritudinem praesentibus; quae enim venientia metuuntur, eadem adficiunt aegritudine aegritudinem K ( corr. 2 ) RH instantia. 4.14. praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum stultorum Dav. stulta autem aegritudo est, eaque eaque Ba. ea qua X (ea qu e M 1 ) adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. itaque haec prima definitio difin. V est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. itaque ... 6 contractio Non. 93, 1 sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam cf. Aug. civ. 14, 8 aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur. Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et St. fr. 3, 380 et 393 opinione. itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, vitiose GKR sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate. est ergo ergo igitur H s aegritudo aegritudo om. G 1 add. 1 et 2 opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri ecferri haec ferri VK c (eff. K 2 ) rectum esse videatur, laetitia...15 videatur om. G 1, add. G 2 in mg. inf. ( lemmata laetitia metus adscr. 1 cf. praef. ) metus opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile intollerabile V esse videatur, libido lubido K, in lib. corr. G 1 (libido etiam in mg. ) R 1 opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse. 4.61. quaedam autem sunt aegritudines, quas levare illa ulla V rec medicina nullo modo possit, ut, si quis aegre ferat nihil in se esse virtutis, nihil animi, nihil officii, nihil honestatis, propter mala is is ex si G 2 agatur G 1 quidem angatur, sed alia quaedam sit ad eum admovenda curatio, et talis quidem, quae possit esse omnium etiam de ceteris rebus discrepantium philosophorum. inter omnis enim convenire oportet commotiones animorum a recta ratione aversas esse vitiosas, vitiosas om. V 3 ut, etiamsi vel mala sint illa, quae quae ex quem V 3 metum aegritudinemve, vel vel ...17 vel Bentl. nec ... nec bona, quae cupiditatem laetitiamve moveant, tamen sit vitiosa ipsa commotio. constantem enim quendam volumus, sedatum, gravem, humana omnia spernentem spernentem Anon. ap. Lb. illum esse, quem prementem (praem. GKH)X ( vix Cice- ronianum, licet Sen. de ira 3, 6, 1 dicat : animus quietus semper, omnia infra se premens cf. Tusc. p. 405, 20 omnia subter se habet) praemeditantem Se. magimum et fortem virum virum add. G 3 dicimus. talis autem nec maerens nec timens nec cupiens nec gestiens esse quisquam potest. eorum enim haec sunt, qui eventus quae ventus G 1 ( corr. 1 ) V 1 ( corr. 3 ) humanos superiores quam suos animos esse ducunt. ducunt s di- cunt X 4.65. videamus nunc de bonorum, id est de laetitia et de cupiditate. mihi quidem in tota ratione ea, quae eaque KR pertinet pertinet s pertinent X ad animi perturbationem, una res videtur causam continere, omnis eas esse in nostra potestate, omnis iudicio susceptas, omnis voluntarias. hic igitur error est eripiendus, haec detrahenda opinio haec detrahenda opinio ne consererent Gr atque ut in malis opinatis tolerabilia, tollerabilia X ( corr. R c? ) sic in bonis sedatiora sunt efficienda ea quae magna et laetabilia ducuntur. dicuntur W corr. Wo. atque hoc quidem commune malorum et bonorum, bonorum et malorum G 1 ut, si iam difficile sit persuadere nihil earum rerum, quae perturbent perturbant K 1 animum, aut in bonis aut in malis esse habendum, tamen alia ad alium motum curatio sit adhibenda aliaque ratione malevolus, alia amator, alia rursus anxius, alia timidus corrigendus. 4.76. nam ut illa praeteream, quae sunt furoris, futuris K 1 furoris haec ipsa per sese sese V ( exp. 3 ) quam habent levitatem, quae videntur esse mediocria, Iniu/riae Ter. Eun. 59–63 Suspi/ciones i/nimicitiae induciae RV indu/tiae Bellu/m pax rursum! ince/rta haec si tu si tu s sit ut X ( prius t exp. V 3 ) po/stules Ratio/ne certa fa/cere, nihilo plu/s plus add. G 2 agas, Quam si/ des operam, ut cu/m ratione insa/nias. haec inconstantia mutabilitasque mentis quem non ipsa pravitate deterreat? est etiam etiam Man. enim illud, quod in omni perturbatione dicitur, demonstrandum, nullam esse nisi opinabilem, nisi iudicio susceptam, nisi voluntariam. etenim si naturalis amor esset, amor esset ex amorem et K c et amarent omnes et semper amarent et idem amarent, et idem amarent om. H neque alium pudor, alium cogitatio, alium satietas deterreret. etenim ... 26 deterreret H deterret G 1 Ira vero, quae quae -ae in r. V 2 quam diu perturbat animum, dubitationem insaniae non habet, cuius inpulsu imp. KR existit etiam inter fratres tale iurgium: 4.79. Ubi sunt ergo isti, qui iracundiam utilem dicunt —potest utilis esse insania?—aut naturalem? an an s hanc X quicquam est secundum est sec. s es sec. R esse sec. GKV naturam, quod fit repugte ratione? quo modo autem, si naturalis esset ira, ira add. G 2 aut alius alio magis iracundus esset, aut finem haberet prius quam esset aut finem ... 4 esset add. V 3 ulta, ulta Man. ulla ulciscendi lubido, aut quemquam paeniteret, quod fecisset fecisse V 1 per iram? ut Alexandrum regem videmus, qui cum interemisset Clitum clitum iditum K familiarem suum, vix a se manus abstinuit; tanta vis fuit paenitendi. quibus cognitis quis est qui dubitet dubitat K quin hic quoque motus animi sit totus opinabilis ac voluntarius? Quis enim dubitarit quin aegrotationes animi, qualis est avaritia, gloriae cupiditas, ex eo, quod magni magna V aestumetur ea res ex qua animus aegrotat, oriantur? oriantur s oriatur unde intellegi debet perturbationem quoque omnem esse in opinione. 4.83. itaque non fortuito factum videtur, sed a te ratione propositum, ut separatim de aegritudine et de ceteris perturbationibus disputaremus; in ea est enim fons miseriarum et caput. sed et alt. et om. V aegritudinis et reliquorum animi morborum una sanatio est, omnis opinabilis esse et voluntarios ea reque requae GKR (quae ... videatur in r. K 1 ) suscipi, quod ita rectum esse videatur. hunc errorem quasi radicem malorum omnium stirpitus stirpitus Statil. Max. ap. Char. GL. 2, 219, 25 philosophia se extracturam pollicetur.
6. Cicero, Academica Posteriora, 1.38 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

7. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 3.294-3.313 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

8. Ovid, Tristia, 3.5.33-3.5.34 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

9. Epictetus, Discourses, 3.24.108, 3.24.117, 3.28, 4.8.23, 4.10.23 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

10. New Testament, Ephesians, 6.12 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

6.12. For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against the principalities, against the powers, against the world's rulers of the darkness of this age, and against the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places.
11. New Testament, Hebrews, 2.13-2.14, 4.15 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

2.13. Again, "I will put my trust in him." Again, "Behold, here am I and the children whom God has given me. 2.14. Since then the children have shared in flesh and blood, he also himself in like manner partook of the same, that through death he might bring to nothing him who had the power of death, that is, the devil 4.15. For we don't have a high priest who can't be touched with the feeling of our infirmities, but one who has been in all points tempted like we are, yet without sin.
12. New Testament, Matthew, 26.37, 26.41 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

26.37. He took with him Peter and the two sons of Zebedee, and began to be sorrowful and severely troubled. 26.41. Watch and pray, that you don't enter into temptation. The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak.
13. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

441c. and a faculty engendered by reason, or rather to be itself reason which is in accord with virtue and is firm and unshaken. They also think that the passionate and irrational part of the soul is not distinguished from the rational by any difference or by its nature, but is the same part, which, indeed, they term intelligence and the governing part; it is, they say, wholly transformed and changes both during its emotional states and in the alterations brought about in accordance with an acquired disposition or condition and thus becomes both vice and virtue; it contains nothing irrational within itself, but is called irrational whenever, by the overmastering power of our impulses, which have become strong and prevail, it is hurried on to something outrageous which contravenes the convictions of reason.
14. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 1.1.2, 1.3.6-1.3.7, 1.12, 1.16.7, 2.1.3-2.1.4, 2.2.1, 2.2.3-2.2.6, 2.3.1-2.3.5, 2.4.1-2.4.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

15. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 7.1-7.6, 57.3-57.4, 83.26, 88.7, 99.17-99.18, 108.10, 113.18, 121.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

16. Seneca The Younger, Medea, 395, 45, 385 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

17. Seneca The Younger, Oedipus, 626 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

18. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Mixture, 216.14-218.6 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

19. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.2.8-4.2.18, 4.6.24-4.6.27, 4.6.35-4.6.37, 4.6.40-4.6.41 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

20. Gellius, Attic Nights, 7.2.6-7.2.7, 19.1, 19.1.15-19.1.16 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

21. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.2.3 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

22. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.110 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.110. And in things intermediate also there are duties; as that boys should obey the attendants who have charge of them.According to the Stoics there is an eight-fold division of the soul: the five senses, the faculty of speech, the intellectual faculty, which is the mind itself, and the generative faculty, being all parts of the soul. Now from falsehood there results perversion, which extends to the mind; and from this perversion arise many passions or emotions, which are causes of instability. Passion, or emotion, is defined by Zeno as an irrational and unnatural movement in the soul, or again as impulse in excess.The main, or most universal, emotions, according to Hecato in his treatise On the Passions, book ii., and Zeno in his treatise with the same title, constitute four great classes, grief, fear, desire or craving, pleasure.
23. Nag Hammadi, The Tripartite Tractate, 77.11, 80.14 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

24. Origen, Against Celsus, 4.45 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

4.45. And whereas Celsus ought to have recognised the love of truth displayed by the writers of sacred Scripture, who have not concealed even what is to their discredit, and thus been led to accept the other and more marvellous accounts as true, he has done the reverse, and has characterized the story of Lot and his daughters (without examining either its literal or its figurative meaning) as worse than the crimes of Thyestes. The figurative signification of that passage of history it is not necessary at present to explain, nor what is meant by Sodom, and by the words of the angels to him who was escaping thence, when they said: Look not behind you, neither stay in all the surrounding district; escape to the mountain, lest you be consumed; nor what is intended by Lot and his wife, who became a pillar of salt because she turned back; nor by his daughters intoxicating their father, that they might become mothers by him. But let us in a few words soften down the repulsive features of the history. The nature of actions - good, bad, and indifferent - has been investigated by the Greeks; and the more successful of such investigators lay down the principle that intention alone gives to actions the character of good or bad, and that all things which are done without a purpose are, strictly speaking, indifferent; that when the intention is directed to a becoming end, it is praiseworthy; when the reverse, it is censurable. They have said, accordingly, in the section relating to things indifferent, that, strictly speaking, for a man to have sexual intercourse with his daughters is a thing indifferent, although such a thing ought not to take place in established communities. And for the sake of hypothesis, in order to show that such an act belongs to the class of things indifferent, they have assumed the case of a wise man being left with an only daughter, the entire human race besides having perished; and they put the question whether the father can fitly have intercourse with his daughter, in order, agreeably to the supposition, to prevent the extermination of mankind. Is this to be accounted sound reasoning among the Greeks, and to be commended by the influential sect of the Stoics; but when young maidens, who had heard of the burning of the world, though without comprehending (its full meaning), saw fire devastating their city and country, and supposing that the only means left of rekindling the flame of human life lay in their father and themselves, should, on such a supposition, conceive the desire that the world should continue, shall their conduct be deemed worse than that of the wise man who, according to the hypothesis of the Stoics, acts becomingly in having intercourse with his daughter in the case already supposed, of all men having been destroyed? I am not unaware, however, that some have taken offense at the desire of Lot's daughters, and have regarded their conduct as very wicked; and have said that two accursed nations - Moab and Ammon - have sprung from that unhallowed intercourse. And yet truly sacred Scripture is nowhere found distinctly approving of their conduct as good, nor yet passing sentence upon it as blameworthy. Nevertheless, whatever be the real state of the case, it admits not only of a figurative meaning, but also of being defended on its own merits.
25. Origen, On First Principles, 3.2.2, 4.4.4 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

3.2.2. We, however, who see the reason (of the thing) more clearly, do not hold this opinion, taking into account those (sins) which manifestly originate as a necessary consequence of our bodily constitution. Must we indeed suppose that the devil is the cause of our feeling hunger or thirst? Nobody, I think, will venture to maintain that. If, then, he is not the cause of our feeling hunger and thirst, wherein lies the difference when each individual has attained the age of puberty, and that period has called forth the incentives of the natural heat? It will undoubtedly follow, that as the devil is not the cause of our feeling hunger and thirst, so neither is he the cause of that appetency which naturally arises at the time of maturity, viz., the desire of sexual intercourse. Now it is certain that this cause is not always so set in motion by the devil that we should be obliged to suppose that bodies would nor possess a desire for intercourse of that kind if the devil did not exist. Let us consider, in the next place, if, as we have already shown, food is desired by human beings, not from a suggestion of the devil, but by a kind of natural instinct, whether, if there were no devil, it were possible for human experience to exhibit such restraint in partaking of food as never to exceed the proper limits; i.e., that no one would either take otherwise than the case required, or more than reason would allow; and so it would result that men, observing due measure and moderation in the matter of eating, would never go wrong. I do not think, indeed, that so great moderation could be observed by men (even if there were no instigation by the devil inciting thereto), as that no individual, in partaking of food, would go beyond due limits and restraint, until he had learned to do so from long usage and experience. What, then, is the state of the case? In the matter of eating and drinking it was possible for us to go wrong, even without any incitement from the devil, if we should happen to be either less temperate or less careful (than we ought); and are we to suppose, then, in our appetite for sexual intercourse, or in the restraint of our natural desires, our condition is not something similar? I am of opinion, indeed, that the same course of reasoning must be understood to apply to other natural movements as those of covetousness, or of anger, or of sorrow, or of all those generally which through the vice of intemperance exceed the natural bounds of moderation. There are therefore manifest reasons for holding the opinion, that as in good things the human will is of itself weak to accomplish any good (for it is by divine help that it is brought to perfection in everything); so also, in things of an opposite nature we receive certain initial elements, and, as it were, seeds of sins, from those things which we use agreeably to nature; but when we have indulged them beyond what is proper, and have not resisted the first movements to intemperance, then the hostile power, seizing the occasion of this first transgression, incites and presses us hard in every way, seeking to extend our sins over a wider field, and furnishing us human beings with occasions and beginnings of sins, which these hostile powers spread far and wide, and, if possible, beyond all limits. Thus, when men at first for a little desire money, covetousness begins to grow as the passion increases, and finally the fall into avarice takes place. And after this, when blindness of mind has succeeded passion, and the hostile powers, by their suggestions, hurry on the mind, money is now no longer desired, but stolen, and acquired by force, or even by shedding human blood. Finally, a confirmatory evidence of the fact that vices of such enormity proceed from demons, may be easily seen in this, that those individuals who are oppressed either by immoderate love, or incontrollable anger, or excessive sorrow, do not suffer less than those who are bodily vexed by devils. For it is recorded in certain histories, that some have fallen into madness from a state of love, others from a state of anger, not a few from a state of sorrow, and even from one of excessive joy; which results, I think, from this, that those opposing powers, i.e., those demons, having gained a lodgment in their minds which has been already laid open to them by intemperance, have taken complete possession of their sensitive nature, especially when no feeling of the glory of virtue has aroused them to resistance.
26. Augustine, The City of God, 14.9 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

14.9. But so far as regards this question of mental perturbations, we have answered these philosophers in the ninth book of this work, showing that it is rather a verbal than a real dispute, and that they seek contention rather than truth. Among ourselves, according to the sacred Scriptures and sound doctrine, the citizens of the holy city of God, who live according to God in the pilgrimage of this life, both fear and desire, and grieve and rejoice. And because their love is rightly placed, all these affections of theirs are right. They fear eternal punishment, they desire eternal life; they grieve because they themselves groan within themselves, waiting for the adoption, the redemption of their body; Romans 8:23 they rejoice in hope, because there shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. 1 Corinthians 15:54 In like manner they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve in sin, they rejoice in good works. They fear to sin, because they hear that because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold. Matthew 24:12 They desire to persevere, because they hear that it is written, He that endures to the end shall be saved. Matthew 10:22 They grieve for sin, hearing that If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 They rejoice in good works, because they hear that the Lord loves a cheerful giver. 2 Corinthians 9:7 In like manner, according as they are strong or weak, they fear or desire to be tempted, grieve or rejoice in temptation. They fear to be tempted, because they hear the injunction, If a man be overtaken in a fault, you which are spiritual restore such an one in the spirit of meekness; considering yourself, lest you also be tempted. Galatians 6:l They desire to be tempted, because they hear one of the heroes of the city of God saying, Examine me, O Lord, and tempt me: try my reins and my heart. They grieve in temptations, because they see Peter weeping; Matthew 26:75 they rejoice in temptations, because they hear James saying, My brethren, count it all joy when you fall into various temptations. James 1:2 And not only on their own account do they experience these emotions, but also on account of those whose deliverance they desire and whose perdition they fear, and whose loss or salvation affects them with grief or with joy. For if we who have come into the Church from among the Gentiles may suitably instance that noble and mighty hero who glories in his infirmities, the teacher (doctor) of the nations in faith and truth, who also labored more than all his fellow apostles, and instructed the tribes of God's people by his epistles, which edified not only those of his own time, but all those who were to be gathered in - that hero, I say, and athlete of Christ, instructed by Him, anointed of His Spirit, crucified with Him, glorious in Him, lawfully maintaining a great conflict on the theatre of this world, and being made a spectacle to angels and men, 1 Corinthians 4:9 and pressing onwards for the prize of his high calling, Philippians 3:14 - very joyfully do we with the eyes of faith behold him rejoicing with them that rejoice, and weeping with them that weep; Romans 12:15 though hampered by fightings without and fears within; 2 Corinthians 7:5 desiring to depart and to be with Christ; Philippians 1:23 longing to see the Romans, that he might have some fruit among them as among other Gentiles; Romans 1:11-13 being jealous over the Corinthians, and fearing in that jealousy lest their minds should be corrupted from the chastity that is in Christ; 2 Corinthians 11:1-3 having great heaviness and continual sorrow of heart for the Israelites, Romans 9:2 because they, being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God; Romans 10:3 and expressing not only his sorrow, but bitter lamentation over some who had formally sinned and had not repented of their uncleanness and fornications. 2 Corinthians 12:21 If these emotions and affections, arising as they do from the love of what is good and from a holy charity, are to be called vices, then let us allow these emotions which are truly vices to pass under the name of virtues. But since these affections, when they are exercised in a becoming way, follow the guidance of right reason, who will dare to say that they are diseases or vicious passions? Wherefore even the Lord Himself, when He condescended to lead a human life in the form of a slave, had no sin whatever, and yet exercised these emotions where He judged they should be exercised. For as there was in Him a true human body and a true human soul, so was there also a true human emotion. When, therefore, we read in the Gospel that the hard-heartedness of the Jews moved Him to sorrowful indignation, Mark 3:5 that He said, I am glad for your sakes, to the intent you may believe, John 11:15 that when about to raise Lazarus He even shed tears, John 11:35 that He earnestly desired to eat the passover with His disciples, Luke 22:15 that as His passion drew near His soul was sorrowful, Matthew 26:38 these emotions are certainly not falsely ascribed to Him. But as He became man when it pleased Him, so, in the grace of His definite purpose, when it pleased Him He experienced those emotions in His human soul. But we must further make the admission, that even when these affections are well regulated, and according to God's will, they are peculiar to this life, not to that future life we look for, and that often we yield to them against our will. And thus sometimes we weep in spite of ourselves, being carried beyond ourselves, not indeed by culpable desire; but by praiseworthy charity. In us, therefore, these affections arise from human infirmity; but it was not so with the Lord Jesus, for even His infirmity was the consequence of His power. But so long as we wear the infirmity of this life, we are rather worse men than better if we have none of these emotions at all. For the apostle vituperated and abominated some who, as he said, were without natural affection. Romans 1:31 The sacred Psalmist also found fault with those of whom he said, I looked for some to lament with me, and there was none. For to be quite free from pain while we are in this place of misery is only purchased, as one of this world's literati perceived and remarked, at the price of blunted sensibilities both of mind and body. And therefore that which the Greeks call ἀπαθεια, and what the Latins would call, if their language would allow them, impassibilitas, if it be taken to mean an impassibility of spirit and not of body, or, in other words, a freedom from those emotions which are contrary to reason and disturb the mind, then it is obviously a good and most desirable quality, but it is not one which is attainable in this life. For the words of the apostle are the confession, not of the common herd, but of the eminently pious, just, and holy men: If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. 1 John 1:8 When there shall be no sin in a man, then there shall be this απάθεια . At present it is enough if we live without crime; and he who thinks he lives without sin puts aside not sin, but pardon. And if that is to be called apathy, where the mind is the subject of no emotion, then who would not consider this insensibility to be worse than all vices? It may, indeed, reasonably be maintained that the perfect blessedness we hope for shall be free from all sting of fear or sadness; but who that is not quite lost to truth would say that neither love nor joy shall be experienced there? But if by apathy a condition be meant in which no fear terrifies nor any pain annoys, we must in this life renounce such a state if we would live according to God's will, but may hope to enjoy it in that blessedness which is promised as our eternal condition. For that fear of which the Apostle John says, There is no fear in love; but perfect love casts out fear, because fear has torment. He that fears is not made perfect in love, 1 John 4:18 - that fear is not of the same kind as the Apostle Paul felt lest the Corinthians should be seduced by the subtlety of the serpent; for love is susceptible of this fear, yea, love alone is capable of it. But the fear which is not in love is of that kind of which Paul himself says, For you have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear. Romans 8:15 But as for that clean fear which endures for ever, if it is to exist in the world to come (and how else can it be said to endure for ever?), it is not a fear deterring us from evil which may happen, but preserving us in the good which cannot be lost. For where the love of acquired good is unchangeable, there certainly the fear that avoids evil is, if I may say so, free from anxiety. For under the name of clean fear David signifies that will by which we shall necessarily shrink from sin, and guard against it, not with the anxiety of weakness, which fears that we may strongly sin, but with the tranquillity of perfect love. Or if no kind of fear at all shall exist in that most imperturbable security of perpetual and blissful delights, then the expression, The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring for ever, must be taken in the same sense as that other, The patience of the poor shall not perish forever. For patience, which is necessary only where ills are to be borne, shall not be eternal, but that which patience leads us to will be eternal. So perhaps this clean fear is said to endure for ever, because that to which fear leads shall endure. And since this is so - since we must live a good life in order to attain to a blessed life, a good life has all these affections right, a bad life has them wrong. But in the blessed life eternal there will be love and joy, not only right, but also assured; but fear and grief there will be none. Whence it already appears in some sort what manner of persons the citizens of the city of God must be in this their pilgrimage, who live after the spirit, not after the flesh - that is to say, according to God, not according to man - and what manner of persons they shall be also in that immortality whither they are journeying. And the city or society of the wicked, who live not according to God, but according to man, and who accept the doctrines of men or devils in the worship of a false and contempt of the true divinity, is shaken with those wicked emotions as by diseases and disturbances. And if there be some of its citizens who seem to restrain and, as it were, temper those passions, they are so elated with ungodly pride, that their disease is as much greater as their pain is less. And if some, with a vanity monstrous in proportion to its rarity, have become enamored of themselves because they can be stimulated and excited by no emotion, moved or bent by no affection, such persons rather lose all humanity than obtain true tranquillity. For a thing is not necessarily right because it is inflexible, nor healthy because it is insensible.
27. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 261 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

28. Basil of Caesarea, Letters, 261 (4th cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

29. Stobaeus, Eclogues, 2.7.10



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
achilles Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 277
aeons Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 63, 94
akrasia Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 277
alexander the great Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 277
anger, and brutishness Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 130
anger, as temporary insanity Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 130
anger Lateiner and Spatharas, The Ancient Emotion of Disgust (2016) 6
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; did christ exhibit apatheia? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 349
apatheia, freedom from, eradication of, emotion (; some emotions for stoics compatible with apatheia, esp. eupatheiai and the right kind of homosexual love Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
appearance (phantasia), distinguished from judgement, belief, as involving assent Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 66, 68
arena Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 253
aristotle, influence on seneca Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 243
aristotle, later aristotelians Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 243
aristotle, on brutishness Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 243
assent, voluntary Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
atreus Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 253
audience Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 253
augustus, anger Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 277
becker, lawrence Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 243
beliefs, role in emotion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
bites, sharp, little contractions caused by appearance of evil Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68
blending mixing Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 63
body Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94
bonhöffer, adolf Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50, 69
bren, tad Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
brutishness Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 243
caution (eulabeia), stoic eupatheia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
christ, did christ have emotions? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 349
christology, natures of christ, origen and rufinus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 349
chrysippus, on directive faculty Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), eupatheia distinguished from emotion as being true judgement, not disobedient to reason and not unstable Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), hence emotion voluntary Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
chrysippus, treatises of, on the law Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
chrysippus Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 63
cicero, on beliefs in emotion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cicero, on species-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233, 243
cicero, translates prohairesis Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cognitive theory Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 63, 94
cooper, john Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
cylinder analogy Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
damascius, neoplatonist, pleasure of intellect a eupatheia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
damascius, neoplatonist, switches from plato's to aristotle's definition of pleasure" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
directive faculty, in emotions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
disgust elicitors, \xa0 embodied Lateiner and Spatharas, The Ancient Emotion of Disgust (2016) 6
drunkenness, and brutishness Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 243
emotions, as contumacious Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 130, 243
emotions, emotion voluntary? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
emotions, examples of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233, 243
emotions, identified with judgements by chrysippus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45, 50
emotions, meaning of pathos Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68
emotions, moderation in (metriopatheia) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 243
emotions, modern theories Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 243
emotions, overwhelming Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 130
emotions, per contra, aristotle, galen, emotions cannot be understood without physical basis Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68
emotions, seneca makes zeno's disobedience to reason a distinct third stage in anger" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 63
emotions passions Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 63, 94
epictetus, stoic, bites Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68
epictetus, stoic, first movements not escaped by sage Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68, 69
epistemology Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 63
eupatheiai, classified by species Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233, 243
eupatheiai, equanimous states, applied to mystical experience Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
eupatheiai, equanimous states, distinguished from emotion (pathos) by being true judgements, not disobedient to reason and not unstable Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
eupatheiai, equanimous states, eulabeia (caution) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
eupatheiai, equanimous states, eupatheia already used by plato Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
eupatheiai, equanimous states, khara (joy) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
eupatheiai, equanimous states, love or eupatheia, in mystical experience Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
eupatheiai, equanimous states, to intellectual pleasure Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
excessiveness (pleonasmos) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
fastidium Lateiner and Spatharas, The Ancient Emotion of Disgust (2016) 6
father, the Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 63, 94
first movements, 2 kinds. mental, bites and little soul movements caused by appearance, without assent and emotion having yet occurred Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 66, 68
first movements, in stoics not the same as emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 66
first movements, involuntary Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
first movements, not escaped by sage Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68, 69
first movements, origen Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 349
first movements, physical, e.g. pallor, erection, glaring caused by appearance, without assent and emotion having yet occurred Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68
free will Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94
genus-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
harmony Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 63
herculaneum papyri Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
impressions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
impulse (hormē), impulse not sufficient for action Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
indifferents, preferred and dispreferred, indifferents selected, not chosen Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
indifferents, preferred and dispreferred Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
instinctive Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 111
inwood, brad Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 243; Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
joy (khara, latin gaudium), stoic eupatheia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
juno, anger of Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 277
laughter Lateiner and Spatharas, The Ancient Emotion of Disgust (2016) 6
lottin, o. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 66
love, mystical love as a eupatheia in plotinus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
love, the right kind of homosexual love is not an emotion (pathos) in stoics Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
medea Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 253
mental conflict Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
metaphor Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 253
metatheatre Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 253
metriopatheia (moderation in emotion) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 243
movement primus motus Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94
movements, three movements in seneca Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 130, 243
offensive Lateiner and Spatharas, The Ancient Emotion of Disgust (2016) 6
ontology Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 63
orientation, innate (oikeiosis), and prohairesis Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
orientation, innate (oikeiosis), knowledge of stoic thought Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
origen, church father, connects first movements with bad thoughts, thus blurring distinction from emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 349
origen, church father, natures of christ Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 349
ovid, akrasia in Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 277
passion, pre-passion Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 111
passion Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 253
passions emotions Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94
performance Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 253
peripatetics Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 243
philo of alexandria, jewish philosopher, confused with bites Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
philo of alexandria, jewish philosopher, eupatheiai Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
philosophy Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 253
pity Lateiner and Spatharas, The Ancient Emotion of Disgust (2016) 6
plato, eupathein Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
plato, on brutishness Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 243
plato, tripartite division of soul Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 63
platonism Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94
pleroma Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 63, 94
plutarch, on mental conflict Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
pohlenz, max Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 63
posidonius, stoic, though bites are recognized by posidonius Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68
prohairesis Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
prothumia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 68
proto-passions primus motus and first motions Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94
psyche, part-based and monistic models Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
psychê (psychic substance) Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 63
psychic humans/powers Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 63
rationality, required for emotion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 130
reaching (orexis) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233, 243
reason Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 111
rist, john Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 66
rozin, p.\xa0 Lateiner and Spatharas, The Ancient Emotion of Disgust (2016) 6
rufinus, christian, translator into latin, natures of christ Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 349
rufinus, christian, translator into latin Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 349
sage, stoic Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
selection Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 243
seneca, and aristotle Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 243
seneca, the younger, stoic, contrast with emotion, which is a voluntary judgement Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
seneca, the younger, stoic, first movements involuntary, not escaped by sage Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
seneca, the younger, stoic, first movements of body or soul caused by appearance without assent or emotion having yet occurred Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 66, 68, 69
seneca, the younger, stoic, hence emotion subject to therapy Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
seneca, the younger, stoic, third movements accommodate zeno's disobedience to reason as a stage in anger distinct from chrysippus' mistaken judgement of reason" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 63
seneca, three-stage analysis of irascibility in de ira Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 277
seneca, three movements, Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 130, 243
seneca Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 111; Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94
sensation Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 111
shock Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 111
socrates, model for apatheia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
sophia Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94
soul, seearistotle, chrysippus, plato, posidonius, ; division of Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 63
spectacle Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 253
spectators Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 253
stoic Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 253
stoicism Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 63, 94
stoics/stoicism Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 277
suffering Clarke, King, Baltussen, Pain Narratives in Greco-Roman Writings: Studies in the Representation of Physical and Mental Suffering (2023) 111
theophrastus Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 243
therapy, philosophical contributions to therapy (i) voluntariness of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45, 69
torture' Lateiner and Spatharas, The Ancient Emotion of Disgust (2016) 6
triumph Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 253
tyrants Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 243
up to us/in our power (eph' hēmin)" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
valentinian/valentinians Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94
vice Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 253
violence Harrison, Brill's Companion to Roman Tragedy (2015) 253
volition, terminology of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
voluntariness of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45, 69
von arnim, joachim Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
will, will (boulēsis) as a eupatheia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 50
will Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
zeno of citium, on mental conflict Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 233
zeno of citium, stoic, different view of emotion from chrysippus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 63
zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia) Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 349