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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



10243
Seneca The Younger, Letters, 83.9


nanZeno, that greatest of men, the revered founder of our brave and holy school of philosophy, wishes to discourage us from drunkenness. Listen, then, to his arguments proving that the good man will not get drunk: "No one entrusts a secret to a drunken man; but one will entrust a secret to a good man; therefore, the good man will not get drunk." Mark how ridiculous Zeno is made when we set up a similar syllogism in contrast with his. There are many, but one will be enough: "No one entrusts a secret to a man when he is asleep; but one entrusts a secret to a good man; therefore, the good man does not go to sleep.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

12 results
1. Hebrew Bible, Genesis, 15.2-15.4 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

15.2. וְאֶת־הַחִתִּי וְאֶת־הַפְּרִזִּי וְאֶת־הָרְפָאִים׃ 15.2. וַיֹּאמֶר אַבְרָם אֲדֹנָי יֱהוִה מַה־תִּתֶּן־לִי וְאָנֹכִי הוֹלֵךְ עֲרִירִי וּבֶן־מֶשֶׁק בֵּיתִי הוּא דַּמֶּשֶׂק אֱלִיעֶזֶר׃ 15.3. וַיֹּאמֶר אַבְרָם הֵן לִי לֹא נָתַתָּה זָרַע וְהִנֵּה בֶן־בֵּיתִי יוֹרֵשׁ אֹתִי׃ 15.4. וְהִנֵּה דְבַר־יְהוָה אֵלָיו לֵאמֹר לֹא יִירָשְׁךָ זֶה כִּי־אִם אֲשֶׁר יֵצֵא מִמֵּעֶיךָ הוּא יִירָשֶׁךָ׃ 15.2. And Abram said: ‘O Lord GOD, what wilt Thou give me, seeing I go hence childless, and he that shall be possessor of my house is Eliezer of Damascus?’" 15.3. And Abram said: ‘Behold, to me Thou hast given no seed, and, lo, one born in my house is to be mine heir.’" 15.4. And, behold, the word of the LORD came unto him, saying: ‘This man shall not be thine heir; but he that shall come forth out of thine own bowels shall be thine heir.’"
2. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.20, 3.22, 3.58-3.61 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.20. Progrediamur igitur, quoniam, quoniam qui ideo BE (discerpto, ut vid., q uo in qi io cf. ad p. 104,24 et ad p. 31, 25) inquit, ab his principiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere debent quae sequuntur. sequitur autem haec prima divisio: Aestimabile esse dicunt—sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus appellemus Bentl. appellamus — id, quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit, quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi a)ci/an vocant, illi ... vocant Pearc. ille ... vocat contraque inaestimabile, quod sit superiori contrarium. initiis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum primum primum enim BE ('suspicari aliquis possit enim ortum esse ex hominis' Mdv.) est officium—id enim appello kaqh=kon —, ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria. qua qua AVN 2 que BN 1 q (= quae) ER inventa selectione et item reiectione sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, intelligi BE intellegit A intelligit RNV quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici. 3.22. cum vero illa, quae officia esse dixi, proficiscantur ab initiis naturae, necesse est ea ad haec ad ea hec R referri, ut recte dici possit omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturae, nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturae conciliationibus honesta actio; consequens enim est est enim BE et post oritur, ut dixi. est tamen ea secundum naturam multoque nos ad se expetendam magis hortatur quam superiora omnia. Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne quis sequi existimet, ut duo sint ultima bonorum. etenim, etenim ( cf. p. 106,4 etenim si; contra p. 107, 5 ut si; p. 110, 17 ut enim) Se. ut enim si cui propositum sit conliniare hastam aliquo hastam aliquo N astam aliquo A aliquo hastam BE hastam aliquā V hastam ( om. aliquo) R aut sagittam, sicut nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia, quae possit, ut conliniet secl. Mdv. huic in eius modi similitudine omnia sint sint sunt R facienda, ut conliniet, et tamen, ut omnia faciat, quo propositum adsequatur, sit sit Ern. sed (Sed RNV) hoc quasi ultimum, quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat, quasi seligendum, non expetendum. 3.58. Sed cum, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse dicamus, consentaneum tamen est fungi officio, cum id officium nec in bonis ponamus nec in malis. est enim aliquid in his rebus probabile, et quidem ita, ut eius ratio reddi possit, ergo ut etiam probabiliter acti ratio reddi possit. est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit. ex quo intellegitur officium medium quiddam quiddam Mdv. quoddam esse, quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis. quoniamque in iis iis edd. his rebus, quae neque in virtutibus sunt neque in vitiis, est tamen quiddam, quod usui possit esse, tollendum id non est. est autem eius generis actio quoque quaedam, et quidem talis, ut ratio postulet agere aliquid et facere eorum. quod autem ratione actum est, actum est Mdv. actum sit ABEN fit V id officium appellamus. est igitur officium eius generis, quod nec in bonis ponatur nec in ratione ... ponatur nec in om. R contrariis. 3.59. Atque Atque dett. Atqui (At qui) perspicuum etiam illud est, in istis rebus mediis aliquid agere sapientem. iudicat igitur, cum agit, officium illud esse. quod quoniam numquam fallitur in iudicando, erit in mediis rebus officium. quod efficitur hac etiam conclusione rationis: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit autem etiam del. Lamb. inchoatum, ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito iuste fit fit Lamb. facit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. quoniamque quoniamque quandoque RV non dubium est quin in iis, iis V his quae media dicimus, dicamus A sit aliud sumendum, aliud reiciendum, quicquid ita fit aut aut autem A ut BE dicitur, omne omne Grut. omni officio continetur. ex quo intellegitur, quoniam se ipsi ipsi BE ipsos omnes natura diligant, tam insipientem quam sapientem sumpturum, quae secundum naturam sint, reiecturumque contraria. ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis, ex quo efficitur versari in iis, iis edd. his quae media dicamus. 3.60. Sed cum ab his omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes, in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem. in quo enim plura sunt quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est de vita excedere. ex quo ex quo RV e quo (equo) apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser. 3.61. nam bonum illud et malum, quod saepe iam dictum est, postea consequitur, prima autem illa naturae sive secunda sive contraria sub iudicium sapientis et dilectum cadunt, estque illa subiecta quasi materia materie BE sapientiae. itaque et manendi in vita et migrandi ratio omnis iis iis edd. in V his rebus, quas supra dixi, metienda. nam neque virtute retinetur ille in add. Se. vita, nec iis, qui qui que BER sine virtute sunt, mors est oppetenda. et et Urs. ut saepe officium est sapientis desciscere a vita, cum sit beatissimus, si id oportune facere possit, quod est convenienter naturae. sic naturae sic B naturae vivere sic ( etiam E) enim censent, oportunitatis esse beate vivere. itaque a sapientia praecipitur se ipsam, si usus sit, sapiens ut relinquat. quam ob rem cum vitiorum ista vis non sit, ut causam afferant mortis voluntariae, perspicuum est etiam stultorum, qui idem miseri sint, officium esse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte rerum earum, earum rerum BE quas secundum naturam esse dicimus. et quoniam excedens e vita et manens aeque miser est nec diuturnitas magis ei magis ei ei (et E) magis BE vitam fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur iis, qui pluribus naturalibus frui possint, esse in vita manendum. 3.20.  "To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value — axia as the Stoics call it — this they pronounce to be 'valuable' (for so I suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term 'valueless.' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are 'things to be taken' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly 'things to be rejected,' the first 'appropriate act' (for so I render the Greek kathēkon) is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by 'appropriate action'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. 3.22.  But since those actions which I have termed 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary natural objects, it follows that the former are means to the latter. Hence it may correctly be said that all 'appropriate acts' are means to the end of attaining the primary needs of nature. Yet it must not be inferred that their attainment is the ultimate Good, inasmuch as moral action is not one of the primary natural attractions, but is an outgrowth of these, a later development, as I have said. At the same time moral action is in accordance with nature, and stimulates our desire far more strongly than all the objects that attracted us earlier. But at this point a caution is necessary at the outset. It will be an error to infer that this view implies two Ultimate Goods. For though if a man were to make it his purpose to take a true aim with a spear or arrow at some mark, his ultimate end, corresponding to the ultimate good as we pronounce it, would be to do all he could to aim straight: the man in this illustration would have to do everything to aim straight, and yet, although he did everything to attain his purpose, his 'ultimate End,' so to speak, would be what corresponded to what we call the Chief Good in the conduct of life, whereas the actual hitting of the mark would be in our phrase 'to be chosen' but not 'to be desired.' 3.58.  "But although we pronounce Moral Worth to be the sole good, it is nevertheless consistent to perform an appropriate act, in spite of the fact that we count appropriate action neither a good nor an evil. For in the sphere of these neutral things there is an element of reasonableness, in the sense that an account can be rendered of it, and therefore in the sense that an account can also be rendered of its performance; and this proves that an appropriate act is an intermediate thing, to be reckoned neither as a good nor as the opposite. And since those things which are neither to be counted among virtues nor vices nevertheless contain a factor which can be useful, their element of utility is worth preserving. Again, this neutral class also includes action of a certain kind, viz. such that reason calls upon us to do or to produce some one of these neutral things; but an action reasonably performed we call an appropriate act; appropriate action therefore is included in the class which is reckoned neither as good nor the opposite. 3.59.  "It is also clear that some actions are performed by the Wise Man in the sphere of these neutral things. Well then, when he does such an action he judges it to be an appropriate act. And as his judgment on this point never errs, therefore appropriate action will exist in the sphere of these neutral things. The same thing is also proved by the following argument: We observe that something exists which we call right action; but this is an appropriate act perfectly performed; therefore there will also be such a thing as an imperfect appropriate act; so that, if to restore a trust as a matter of principle is a right act, to restore a trust must be counted as an appropriate act; the addition of the qualification 'on principle' makes it a right action: the mere restitution in itself is counted an appropriate act. Again, since there can be no question but that class of things we call neutral includes some things worthy to be chosen and others to be rejected; therefore whatever is done or described in this manner is entirely included under the term appropriate action. This shows that since love of self is implanted by nature in all men, both the foolish and the wise alike will choose what is in accordance with nature and reject the contrary. Thus there is a region of appropriate action which is common to the wise and the unwise; and this proves that appropriate action deals with the things we call neutral. 3.60.  But since these neutral things form the basis of all appropriate acts, there is good ground for the dictum that it is with these things that all our practical deliberations deal, including the will to live and the will to quit this life. When a man's circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life. This makes it plain that it is on occasion appropriate for the Wise Man to quit life although he is happy, and also of the Foolish Man to remain in life although he is miserable. 3.61.  For with the Stoics good and evil, as has repeatedly been said already, are a subsequent outgrowth; whereas the primary things of nature, whether favourable or the reverse, fall under the judgment and choice of the Wise Man, and form so to speak the subject-matter, the given material with which wisdom deals. Therefore the reasons both for remaining in life and for departing from it are to be measured entirely by the primary things of nature aforesaid. For the virtuous man is not necessarily retained in life by virtue, and also those who are devoid of virtue need not necessarily seek death. And very often it is appropriate for the Wise Man to abandon life at a moment when he is enjoying supreme happiness, if an opportunity offers for making a timely exit. For the Stoic view is that happiness, which means life in harmony with nature, is a matter of seizing the right moment. So that Wisdom her very self upon occasion bids the Wise Man to leave her. Hence, as vice does not possess the power of furnishing a reason for suicide, it is clear that even for the foolish, who are also miserable, it is appropriate to remain alive if they possess a predomice of those things which we pronounce to be in accordance with nature. And since the fool is equally miserable when departing from life and when remaining in it, and the undesirability of his life is not increased by its prolongation, there is good ground for saying that those who are in a position to enjoy a preponderance of things that are natural ought to remain in life.
3. Philo of Alexandria, On Planting, 148, 151, 162, 167-169, 142 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

4. Philo of Alexandria, That The Worse Attacks The Better, 63 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

63. And it has not fallen to the lot of all the suppliants to become guardians of the holy things, but to those only who have arrived at the number fifty, which proclaims remission of offences and perfect liberty and a return to their ancient possessions. "For this," says the Scripture, "is the law concerning the Levites: from twenty-five years old and upwards, they shall go in to wait upon the service of the tabernacle of the congregation: and from the age of fifty years they shall cease waiting upon the service thereof, and shall serve no more; but shall minister with their brethren in the tabernacle of the congregation, and they shall keep what is to be kept, and shall do no Service.
5. Epictetus, Discourses, 3.2.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

6. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 3.14-3.15 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

7. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 82.10, 83.10, 83.12-83.14, 83.17, 83.23-83.25, 108.15-108.16 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

8. Aelius Aristides, Orations, 45.26-45.27 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

9. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.91 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

10. Calcidius (Chalcidius), Platonis Timaeus Commentaria, 220 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

11. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 2.109-2.110, 7.127, 7.163, 10.119 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

2.109. Eubulides kept up a controversy with Aristotle and said much to discredit him.Among other members the school of Eubulides included Alexinus of Elis, a man very fond of controversy, for which reason he was called Elenxinus. In particular he kept up a controversy with Zeno. Hermippus says of him that he left Elis and removed to Olympia, where he studied philosophy. His pupils inquired why he took up his abode here, and were told that it was his intention to found a school which should be called the Olympian school. But as their provisions ran short and they found the place unhealthy, they left it, and for the rest of his days Alexinus lived in solitude with a single servant. And some time afterwards, as he was swimming in the Alpheus, the point of a reed ran into him, and of this injury he died. 2.110. I have composed the following lines upon him:It was not then a vain tale that once an unfortunate man, while diving, pierced his foot somehow with a nail; since that great man Alexinus, before he could cross the Alpheus, was pricked by a reed and met his death.He has written not only a reply to Zeno but other works, including one against Ephorus the historian.To the school of Eubulides also belonged Euphantus of Olynthus, who wrote a history of his own times. He was besides a poet and wrote several tragedies, with which he made a great reputation at the festivals. He taught King Antigonus and dedicated to him a work On Kingship which was very popular. He died of old age. 7.127. It is a tenet of theirs that between virtue and vice there is nothing intermediate, whereas according to the Peripatetics there is, namely, the state of moral improvement. For, say the Stoics, just as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust. Nor again are there degrees of justice and injustice; and the same rule applies to the other virtues. Further, while Chrysippus holds that virtue can be lost, Cleanthes maintains that it cannot. According to the former it may be lost in consequence of drunkenness or melancholy; the latter takes it to be inalienable owing to the certainty of our mental apprehension. And virtue in itself they hold to be worthy of choice for its own sake. At all events we are ashamed of bad conduct as if we knew that nothing is really good but the morally beautiful. Moreover, they hold that it is in itself sufficient to ensure well-being: thus Zeno, and Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Virtues, and Hecato in the second book of his treatise On Goods: 7.163. When some Academic alleged that he had no certainty of anything, Ariston said, Do you not even see your neighbour sitting by you? and when the other answered No, he rejoined,Who can have blinded you? who robbed you of luminous eyesight?The books attributed to him are as follows:Exhortations, two books.of Zeno's Doctrines.Dialogues.Lectures, six books.Dissertations on Philosophy, seven books.Dissertations on Love.Commonplaces on Vainglory.Notebooks, twenty-five volumes.Memorabilia, three books.Anecdotes, eleven books.Against the Rhetoricians.An Answer to the Counter-pleas of Alexinus.Against the Dialecticians, three books.Letters to Cleanthes, four books.Panaetius and Sosicrates consider the Letters to be alone genuine; all the other works named they attribute to Ariston the Peripatetic. 10.119. Nor, again, will the wise man marry and rear a family: so Epicurus says in the Problems and in the De Natura. Occasionally he may marry owing to special circumstances in his life. Some too will turn aside from their purpose. Nor will he drivel, when drunken: so Epicurus says in the Symposium. Nor will he take part in politics, as is stated in the first book On Life; nor will he make himself a tyrant; nor will he turn Cynic (so the second book On Life tells us); nor will he be a mendicant. But even when he has lost his sight, he will not withdraw himself from life: this is stated in the same book. The wise man will also feel grief, according to Diogenes in the fifth book of his Epilecta.
12. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.111, 1.138, 1.229, 3.104



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
alexandria Taylor and Hay, Philo of Alexandria: On the Contemplative Life: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2020) 20
alexinus, his parallel argument against zeno Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 124
aristides, aelius Taylor and Hay, Philo of Alexandria: On the Contemplative Life: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2020) 20
aristo Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 124
arius didymus Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256
awakening Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
chaeremon the stoic Taylor and Hay, Philo of Alexandria: On the Contemplative Life: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2020) 20
chamaelion Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256
chrysippus Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256, 263
cleanthes Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256, 263
clement of alexandria Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 263
cognitive aspect Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
conversion, philosophical Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
conversion, psychological aspects Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
diogenes laertius Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 124; Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256, 263
disposition Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
drunkenness Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256
epicureans Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256
epicurus Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256
hermogenes Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 263
hieronymus of rhodes Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256
inebriation Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256
irrational Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
metaphorical language, use of Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 263
mind Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
nature, according to Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
non-sages (non-philosophers) Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
parallel argument, formulated by alexinus against zeno Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 124
passions Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256, 263
peripatos/peripatetic Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256
philodemus Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256
plutarch Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 263
posidonius Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256, 295
proposition Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 263
protreptic Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
psychic Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
rational Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
related fabulously about, of the stoics' Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 124
related fabulously about, of zeno Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 124
right action Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 263
right reason Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 263
seneca Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256, 263, 295
sextus empiricus Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 124
soberness Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
soul Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
stoa/stoic/stoicism, on drunkenness Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256, 263, 295
stobaeus Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256, 263
syllogism Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256, 295
vice Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
virtue Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
way of life Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
wine Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
wisdom (sophia), parallelled by alexinus Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 124
wisdom (sophia), sagehood of Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 124
zeno Geljon and Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On Planting: Introduction, Translation and Commentary (2019) 256, 263, 295