1. Homer, Iliad, 4.1-4.36 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)
| 4.1. /Now the gods, seated by the side of Zeus, were holding assembly on the golden floor, and in their midst the queenly Hebe poured them nectar, and they with golden goblets pledged one the other as they looked forth upon the city of the Trojans. 4.2. /Now the gods, seated by the side of Zeus, were holding assembly on the golden floor, and in their midst the queenly Hebe poured them nectar, and they with golden goblets pledged one the other as they looked forth upon the city of the Trojans. 4.3. /Now the gods, seated by the side of Zeus, were holding assembly on the golden floor, and in their midst the queenly Hebe poured them nectar, and they with golden goblets pledged one the other as they looked forth upon the city of the Trojans. 4.4. /Now the gods, seated by the side of Zeus, were holding assembly on the golden floor, and in their midst the queenly Hebe poured them nectar, and they with golden goblets pledged one the other as they looked forth upon the city of the Trojans. 4.5. /Now the gods, seated by the side of Zeus, were holding assembly on the golden floor, and in their midst the queenly Hebe poured them nectar, and they with golden goblets pledged one the other as they looked forth upon the city of the Trojans. 4.5. /And forthwith the son of Cronos made essay to provoke Hera with mocking words, and said with malice:Twain of the goddesses hath Menelaus for helpers, even Argive Hera, and Alalcomenean Athene. Howbeit these verily sit apart and take their pleasure in beholding 4.6. /And forthwith the son of Cronos made essay to provoke Hera with mocking words, and said with malice:Twain of the goddesses hath Menelaus for helpers, even Argive Hera, and Alalcomenean Athene. Howbeit these verily sit apart and take their pleasure in beholding 4.7. /And forthwith the son of Cronos made essay to provoke Hera with mocking words, and said with malice:Twain of the goddesses hath Menelaus for helpers, even Argive Hera, and Alalcomenean Athene. Howbeit these verily sit apart and take their pleasure in beholding 4.8. /And forthwith the son of Cronos made essay to provoke Hera with mocking words, and said with malice:Twain of the goddesses hath Menelaus for helpers, even Argive Hera, and Alalcomenean Athene. Howbeit these verily sit apart and take their pleasure in beholding 4.9. /And forthwith the son of Cronos made essay to provoke Hera with mocking words, and said with malice:Twain of the goddesses hath Menelaus for helpers, even Argive Hera, and Alalcomenean Athene. Howbeit these verily sit apart and take their pleasure in beholding 4.10. /whereas by the side of that other laughter-loving Aphrodite ever standeth, and wardeth from him fate, and but now she saved him, when he thought to perish. But of a surety victory rests with Menelaus, dear to Ares; let us therefore take thought how these things are to be; 4.11. /whereas by the side of that other laughter-loving Aphrodite ever standeth, and wardeth from him fate, and but now she saved him, when he thought to perish. But of a surety victory rests with Menelaus, dear to Ares; let us therefore take thought how these things are to be; 4.12. /whereas by the side of that other laughter-loving Aphrodite ever standeth, and wardeth from him fate, and but now she saved him, when he thought to perish. But of a surety victory rests with Menelaus, dear to Ares; let us therefore take thought how these things are to be; 4.13. /whereas by the side of that other laughter-loving Aphrodite ever standeth, and wardeth from him fate, and but now she saved him, when he thought to perish. But of a surety victory rests with Menelaus, dear to Ares; let us therefore take thought how these things are to be; 4.14. /whereas by the side of that other laughter-loving Aphrodite ever standeth, and wardeth from him fate, and but now she saved him, when he thought to perish. But of a surety victory rests with Menelaus, dear to Ares; let us therefore take thought how these things are to be; 4.15. /whether we shall again rouse evil war and the dread din of battle, or put friendship between the hosts. If this might in any wise be welcome to all and their good pleasure, then might the city of king Priam still be an habitation, and Menelaus take back Argive Helen. 4.16. /whether we shall again rouse evil war and the dread din of battle, or put friendship between the hosts. If this might in any wise be welcome to all and their good pleasure, then might the city of king Priam still be an habitation, and Menelaus take back Argive Helen. 4.17. /whether we shall again rouse evil war and the dread din of battle, or put friendship between the hosts. If this might in any wise be welcome to all and their good pleasure, then might the city of king Priam still be an habitation, and Menelaus take back Argive Helen. 4.18. /whether we shall again rouse evil war and the dread din of battle, or put friendship between the hosts. If this might in any wise be welcome to all and their good pleasure, then might the city of king Priam still be an habitation, and Menelaus take back Argive Helen. 4.19. /whether we shall again rouse evil war and the dread din of battle, or put friendship between the hosts. If this might in any wise be welcome to all and their good pleasure, then might the city of king Priam still be an habitation, and Menelaus take back Argive Helen. 4.20. /So spake he, and thereat Athene and Hera murmured, who sat side by side, and were devising ills for the Trojans. Athene verily held her peace and said naught, wroth though she was at father Zeus, and fierce anger gat hold of her; howbeit Hera's breast contained not her anger, but she spake to him, saying: 4.21. /So spake he, and thereat Athene and Hera murmured, who sat side by side, and were devising ills for the Trojans. Athene verily held her peace and said naught, wroth though she was at father Zeus, and fierce anger gat hold of her; howbeit Hera's breast contained not her anger, but she spake to him, saying: 4.22. /So spake he, and thereat Athene and Hera murmured, who sat side by side, and were devising ills for the Trojans. Athene verily held her peace and said naught, wroth though she was at father Zeus, and fierce anger gat hold of her; howbeit Hera's breast contained not her anger, but she spake to him, saying: 4.23. /So spake he, and thereat Athene and Hera murmured, who sat side by side, and were devising ills for the Trojans. Athene verily held her peace and said naught, wroth though she was at father Zeus, and fierce anger gat hold of her; howbeit Hera's breast contained not her anger, but she spake to him, saying: 4.24. /So spake he, and thereat Athene and Hera murmured, who sat side by side, and were devising ills for the Trojans. Athene verily held her peace and said naught, wroth though she was at father Zeus, and fierce anger gat hold of her; howbeit Hera's breast contained not her anger, but she spake to him, saying: 4.25. / Most dread son of Cronos, what a word hast thou said! How art thou minded to render my labour vain and of none effect, and the sweat that I sweated in my toil,—aye, and my horses twain waxed weary with my summoning the host for the bane of Priam and his sons? Do thou as thou wilt; but be sure we other gods assent not all thereto. 4.26. / Most dread son of Cronos, what a word hast thou said! How art thou minded to render my labour vain and of none effect, and the sweat that I sweated in my toil,—aye, and my horses twain waxed weary with my summoning the host for the bane of Priam and his sons? Do thou as thou wilt; but be sure we other gods assent not all thereto. 4.27. / Most dread son of Cronos, what a word hast thou said! How art thou minded to render my labour vain and of none effect, and the sweat that I sweated in my toil,—aye, and my horses twain waxed weary with my summoning the host for the bane of Priam and his sons? Do thou as thou wilt; but be sure we other gods assent not all thereto. 4.28. / Most dread son of Cronos, what a word hast thou said! How art thou minded to render my labour vain and of none effect, and the sweat that I sweated in my toil,—aye, and my horses twain waxed weary with my summoning the host for the bane of Priam and his sons? Do thou as thou wilt; but be sure we other gods assent not all thereto. 4.29. / Most dread son of Cronos, what a word hast thou said! How art thou minded to render my labour vain and of none effect, and the sweat that I sweated in my toil,—aye, and my horses twain waxed weary with my summoning the host for the bane of Priam and his sons? Do thou as thou wilt; but be sure we other gods assent not all thereto. 4.30. /Then, stirred to hot anger, spake to her Zeus, the cloud-gatherer:Strange queen, wherein do Priam and the sons of Priam work thee ills so many, that thou ragest unceasingly to lay waste the well-built citadel of Ilios? If thou wert to enter within the gates and the high walls 4.31. /Then, stirred to hot anger, spake to her Zeus, the cloud-gatherer:Strange queen, wherein do Priam and the sons of Priam work thee ills so many, that thou ragest unceasingly to lay waste the well-built citadel of Ilios? If thou wert to enter within the gates and the high walls 4.32. /Then, stirred to hot anger, spake to her Zeus, the cloud-gatherer:Strange queen, wherein do Priam and the sons of Priam work thee ills so many, that thou ragest unceasingly to lay waste the well-built citadel of Ilios? If thou wert to enter within the gates and the high walls 4.33. /Then, stirred to hot anger, spake to her Zeus, the cloud-gatherer:Strange queen, wherein do Priam and the sons of Priam work thee ills so many, that thou ragest unceasingly to lay waste the well-built citadel of Ilios? If thou wert to enter within the gates and the high walls 4.34. /Then, stirred to hot anger, spake to her Zeus, the cloud-gatherer:Strange queen, wherein do Priam and the sons of Priam work thee ills so many, that thou ragest unceasingly to lay waste the well-built citadel of Ilios? If thou wert to enter within the gates and the high walls 4.35. /and to devour Priam raw and the sons of Priam and all the Trojans besides, then perchance mightest thou heal thine anger. Do as thy pleasure is; let not this quarrel in time to come be to thee and me a grievous cause of strife between us twain. And another thing will I tell thee, and do thou lay it to heart. 4.36. /and to devour Priam raw and the sons of Priam and all the Trojans besides, then perchance mightest thou heal thine anger. Do as thy pleasure is; let not this quarrel in time to come be to thee and me a grievous cause of strife between us twain. And another thing will I tell thee, and do thou lay it to heart. |
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2. Cicero, On Fate, 7-10 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
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3. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.48 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 3.48. itaque consentaneum est his, quae dicta sunt, ratione illorum, qui illum bonorum finem, quod appellamus extremum, quod ultimum, crescere putent posse—isdem placere esse alium alio et et ABERV ( sequitur itemque; cf. p.188, 15 sq. et eos ... nosque), et (= etiam, ab alt. m., ut vid. ) N sapientiorem itemque alium magis alio vel peccare vel recte facere, quod nobis non licet dicere, qui crescere bonorum finem non putamus. ut enim qui demersi sunt in aqua nihilo magis respirare possunt, si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiam tum essent in profundo, nec catulus ille, qui iam adpropinquat adpropinquat (appr.) edd. ut propinquat ABER apropin- quat N 2 propinquat N 1 V ut videat, plus cernit quam is, qui modo est natus, item qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis habitum habitum dett. aditum (additum R) nihilo minus in miseria est quam ille, qui nihil processit. Haec mirabilia videri intellego, sed cum certe superiora firma ac vera sint, his autem ea consentanea et consequentia, ne de horum de eorum R quidem est veritate dubitandum. sed quamquam negant nec virtutes nec vitia crescere, tamen tamen N 2 et tamen utrumque eorum fundi quodam modo et quasi dilatari putant. Divitias autem Diogenes censet eam eam non eam dett. modo vim habere, ut quasi duces sint ad voluptatem et ad valitudinem bonam; | 3.48. So it would be consistent with the principles already stated that on the theory of those who deem the End of Goods, that which we term the extreme or ultimate Good, to be capable of degree, they should also hold that one man can be wiser than another, and similarly that one can commit a more sinful or more righteous action than another; which it is not open for us to say, who do not think that the end of Goods can vary in degree. For just as a drowning man is no more able to breathe if he be not far from the surface of the water, so that he might at any moment emerge, than if he were actually at the bottom already, and just as a puppy on the point of opening its eyes is no less blind than one just born, similarly a man that has made some progress towards the state of virtue is none the less in misery than he that has made no progress at all."I am aware that all this seems paradoxical; but as our previous conclusions are undoubtedly true and well established, and as these are the logical inferences from them, the truth of these inferences also cannot be called in question. Yet although the Stoics deny that either virtues or vices can be increased in degree, they nevertheless believe that each of them can be in a sense expanded and widened in scope. |
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4. Cicero, On Duties, 1.107-1.114 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 1.107. Intellegendum etiam cst duabus quasi nos a natura indutos esse personis; quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus rationis praestantiaeque eius, qua antecellimus bestiis, a qua omne honestum decorumque trahitur, et ex qua ratio inveniendi officii exquiritur, altera autem, quae proprie singulis est tributa. Ut enim in corporibus magnae dissimilitudines sunt (alios videmus velocitate ad cursum, alios viribus ad luctandum valere, itemque in formis aliis dignitatem inesse, aliis venustatem), sic in animis exsistunt maiores etiam varietates. 1.108. Erat in L. Crasso, in L. Philippo multus lepos, maior etiam magisque de industria in C. Caesare L. filio; at isdem temporibus in M. Scauro et in M. Druso adulescente singularis severitas, in C. Laelio multa hilaritas, in eius familiari Scipione ambitio maior, vita tristior. De Graecis autem dulcem et facetum festivique sermonis atque in omni oratione simulatorem, quem ei)/rwna Graeci nominarunt, Socratem accepimus, contra Pythagoram et Periclem summam auctoritatem consecutos sine ulla hilaritate. Callidum Hannibalem ex Poenorum, ex nostris ducibus Q. Maximum accepimus, facile celare, tacere, dissimulare, insidiari, praeripere hostium consilia. In quo genere Graeci Themistoclem et Pheraeum Iasonem ceteris anteponunt; in primisque versutum et callidum factum Solonis, qui, quo et tutior eius vita esset et plus aliquanto rei publicae prodesset, furere se simulavit. 1.109. Sunt his alii multum dispares, simplices et aperti. qui nihil ex occulto, nihil de insidiis agendum putant, veritatis cultores, fraudis inimici, itemque alii, qui quidvis perpetiantur, cuivis deserviant, dum, quod velint, consequantur, ut Sullam et M. Crassum videbamus. Quo in genere versutissimum et patientissimum Lacedaemonium Lysandrum accepimus, contraque Callicratidam, qui praefectus classis proximus post Lysandrum fuit; itemque in sermonibus alium quemque, quamvis praepotens sit, efficere, ut unus de multis esse videatur; quod in Catulo, et in patre et in filio, itemque in Q. Mucio ° Mancia vidimus. Audivi ex maioribus natu hoc idem fuisse in P. Scipione Nasica, contraque patrem eius, illum qui Ti. Gracchi conatus perditos vindicavit, nullam comitatem habuisse sermonis ne Xenocratem quidem, severissimum philosophorum, ob eamque rem ipsam magnum et clarum fuisse. Innumerabiles aliae dissimilitudines sunt naturae morumque, minime tamen vituperandorum. 1.110. Admodum autem tenenda sunt sua cuique non vitiosa, sed tamen propria, quo facilius decorum illud, quod quaerimus, retineatur. Sic enim est faciendum, ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata propriam nostram sequamur, ut, etiamsi sint alia graviora atque meliora, tamen nos studia nostra nostrae naturae regula metiamur; neque enim attinet naturae repugnare nec quicquam sequi, quod assequi non queas. Ex quo magis emergit, quale sit decorum illud, ideo quia nihil decet invita Minerva, ut aiunt, id est adversante et repugte natura. 1.111. Omnino si quicquam est decorum, nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas cum universae vitae, tum singularum actionum, quam conservare non possis, si aliorum naturam imitans omittas tuam. Ut enim sermone eo debemus uti, qui innatus est nobis, ne, ut quidam, Graeca verba inculcantes iure optimo rideamur, sic in actiones omnemque vitam nullam discrepantiam conferre debemus. 1.112. Atque haec differentia naturarum tantam habet vim, ut non numquam mortem sibi ipse consciscere alius debeat, alius in eadem causa non debeat. Num enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri, qui se in Africa Caesari tradiderunt? Atqui ceteris forsitan vitio datum esset, si se interemissent, propterea quod lenior eorum vita et mores fuerant faciliores, Catoni cum incredibilem tribuisset natura gravitatem eamque ipse perpetua constantia roboravisset semperque in proposito susceptoque consilio permansisset, moriendum potius quam tyranni vultus aspiciendus fuit. 1.113. Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore diuturno, cum et mulieribus, si Circe et Calypso mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et in omni sermone omnibus affabilem et iucundum esse se vellet! domi vero etiam contumelias servorun ancillarumque pertulit, ut ad id aliquando, quod cupiebat, veniret. At Aiax, quo animo traditur, milies oppetere mortem quam illa perpeti maluisset. Quae contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid quisque habeat sui, eaque moderari nee velle experiri, quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime quemque decet, quod est cuiusque maxime suum. 1.114. Suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos videantur habere prudentiae. Illi enim non optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt; qui voce freti sunt, Epigonos Medumque, qui gestu, Melanippam, Clytemnestram, semper Rupilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam, non saepe Aesopus Aiacem. Ergo histrio hoc videbit in scaena, non videbit sapiens vir in vita? Ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus; sin aliquando necessitas nos ad ea detruserit, quae nostri ingenii non erunt, omnis adhibenda erit cura, meditatio, diligentia, ut ea si non decore, at quam minime indecore facere possimus; nec tam est enitendum, ut bona, quae nobis data non sint, sequamur, quam ut vitia fugiamus. | 1.107. We must realize also that we are invested by Nature with two characters, as it were: one of these is universal, arising from the fact of our being all alike endowed with reason and with that superiority which lifts us above the brute. From this all morality and propriety are derived, and upon it depends the rational method of ascertaining our duty. The other character is the one that is assigned to individuals in particular. In the matter of physical endowment there are great differences: some, we see, excel in speed for the race, others in strength for wrestling; so in point of personal appearance, some have stateliness, others comeliness. 1.108. Diversities of character are greater still. Lucius Crassus and Lucius Philippus had a large fund of wit; Gaius Caesar, Lucius's son, had a still richer fund and employed it with more studied purpose. Contemporary with them, Marcus Scaurus and Marcus Drusus, the younger, were examples of unusual seriousness; Gaius Laelius, of unbounded jollity; while his intimate friend, Scipio, cherished more serious ideals and lived a more austere life. Among the Greeks, history tells us, Socrates was fascinating and witty, a genial conversationalist; he was what the Greeks call εἴÏÏν in every conversation, pretending to need information and professing admiration for the wisdom of his companion. Pythagoras and Pericles, on the other hand, reached the heights of influence and power without any seasoning of mirthfulness. We read that Hannibal, among the Carthaginian generals, and Quintus Maximus, among our own, were shrewd and ready at concealing their plans, covering up their tracks, disguising their movements, laying stratagems, forestalling the enemy's designs. In these qualities the Greeks rank Themistocles and Jason of Pherae above all others. Especially crafty and shrewd was the device of Solon, who, to make his own life safer and at the same time to do a considerably larger service for his country, feigned insanity. 1.109. Then there are others, quite different from these, straightforward and open, who think that nothing should be done by underhand means or treachery. They are lovers of truth, haters of fraud. There are others still who will stoop to anything, truckle to anybody, if only they may gain their ends. Such, we saw, were Sulla and Marcus Crassus. The most crafty and most persevering man of this type was Lysander of Sparta, we are told; of the opposite type was Callicratidas, who succeeded Lysander as admiral of the fleet. So we find that another, no matter how eminent he may be, will condescend in social intercourse to make himself appear but a very ordinary person. Such graciousness of manner we have seen in the case of Catulus â both father and son â and also of Quintus Mucius Mancia. I have heard from my elders that Publius Scipio Nasica was another master of this art; but his father, on the other hand â the man who punished Tiberius Gracchus for his nefarious undertakings â had no such gracious manner in social intercourse [. . .], and because of that very fact he rose to greatness and fame. Countless other dissimilarities exist in natures and characters, and they are not in the least to be criticized. 1.110. Everybody, however, must resolutely hold fast to his own peculiar gifts, in so far as they are peculiar only and not vicious, in order that propriety, which is the object of our inquiry, may the more easily be secured. For we must so act as not to oppose the universal laws of human nature, but, while safeguarding those, to follow the bent of our own particular nature; and even if other careers should be better and nobler, we may still regulate our own pursuits by the standard of our own nature. For it is of no avail to fight against one's nature or to aim at what is impossible of attainment. From this fact the nature of that propriety defined above comes into still clearer light, inasmuch as nothing is proper that "goes against the grain," as the saying is â that is, if it is in direct opposition to one's natural genius. 1.111. If there is any such thing as propriety at all, it can be nothing more than uniform consistency in the course of our life as a whole and all its individual actions. And this uniform consistency one could not maintain by copying the personal traits of others and eliminating one's own. For as we ought to employ our mother-tongue, lest, like certain people who are continually dragging in Greek words, we draw well-deserved ridicule upon ourselves, so we ought not to introduce anything foreign into our actions or our life in general. 1.112. Indeed, such diversity of character carries with it so great significance that suicide may be for one man a duty, for another [under the same circumstances] a crime. Did Marcus Cato find himself in one predicament, and were the others, who surrendered to Caesar in Africa, in another? And yet, perhaps, they would have been condemned, if they had taken their lives; for their mode of life had been less austere and their characters more pliable. But Cato had been endowed by nature with an austerity beyond belief, and he himself had strengthened it by unswerving consistency and had remained ever true to his purpose and fixed resolve; and it was for him to die rather than to look upon the face of a tyrant. 1.113. How much Ulysses endured on those long wanderings, when he submitted to the service even of women (if Circe and Calypso may be called women) and strove in every word to be courteous and complaisant to all! And, arrived at home, he brooked even the insults of his men-servants and maidservants, in order to attain in the end the object of his desire. But Ajax, with the temper he is represented as having, would have chosen to meet death a thousand times rather than suffer such indignities! If we take this into consideration, we shall see that it is each man's duty to weigh well what are his own peculiar traits of character, to regulate these properly, and not to wish to try how another man's would suit him. For the more peculiarly his own a man's character is, the better it fits him. 1.114. Everyone, therefore, should make a proper estimate of his own natural ability and show himself a critical judge of his own merits and defects; in this respect we should not let actors display more practical wisdom than we have. They select, not the best plays, but the ones best suited to their talents. Those who rely most upon the quality of their voice take the Epigoni and the Medus; those who place more stress upon the action choose the Melanippa and the Clytaemnestra; Rupilius, whom I remember, always played in the Antiope, Aesopus rarely in the Ajax. Shall a player have regard to this in choosing his rôle upon the stage, and a wise man fail to do so in selecting his part in life? We shall, therefore, work to the best advantage in that rôle to which we are best adapted. But if at some time stress of circumstances shall thrust us aside into some uncongenial part, we must devote to it all possible thought, practice, and pains, that we may be able to perform it, if not with propriety, at least with as little impropriety as possible; and we need not strive so hard to attain to points of excellence that have not been vouchsafed to us as to correct the faults we have. |
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5. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.7, 3.23, 4.23-4.26, 4.29-4.32, 4.34, 4.80-4.81 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 3.7. ut enim in Academiam nostram descendimus inclinato iam in postmeridianum tempus die, poposci eorum aliquem, qui aderant, aliquid quid adherant G 1 causam disserendi. tum res acta sic est: Videtur mihi cadere in sapientem aegritudo. Num reliquae quoque perturbationes animi, formidines libidines libidines add. G 2 iracundiae? haec enim fere sunt eius modi, eiusmodi V ( ss. c ) quae Graeci pa/qh pathe X appellant; ego poteram morbos, et id verbum esset e verbo, sed in consuetudinem nostram non caderet. nam misereri, invidere, gestire, laetari, haec omnia morbos Graeci appellant, motus animi rationi non obtemperantis, nos autem hos eosdem motus concitati animi recte, ut opinor, perturbationes dixerimus, morbos autem non satis usitate, relique ... 29 usitate ( libere ) H uisit. G 1 ( sic etiam 322, 10; 325,16 ) nisi quid aliud tibi videtur. Mihi vero isto modo. 3.23. hoc propemodum verbo Graeci omnem animi perturbationem appellant; vocant enim pa/qos, Pa OOC G 1 patos H id est morbum, quicumque est motus in animo turbidus. nos melius: aegris enim corporibus simillima animi est aegritudo, at at ex aut G 2 aegrotationes X non similis aegrotationis est libido, non inmoderata laetitia, quae est voluptas animi elata et gestiens. genstiens hic et 331, 21 G 1 ipse etiam metus non est morbi admodum similis, quamquam aegritudini aegritudine X corr. V 1? B 1 est finitimus, sed proprie, ut aegrotatio in corpore, sic aegritudo in animo nomen habet sed... 329,1 nomen habet (nominavet L 1 ) Non, 443,23 non seiunctum a dolore. doloris huius igitur origo nobis explicanda est, id est causa efficiens aegritudinem in animo tamquam aegrotationem in corpore. nam ut medici causa morbi morbi verborum Non. inventa om. Non. del. R c inventa curationem esse inventam putant, nam ... 5 putant Non. 493,20 sic nos causa aegritudinis reperta medendi repertãedendi G 1 corr. 2 repertā medendi R ( - postea add. ) reperiemur V facultatem reperiemus. 4.23. ex perturbationibus autem primum morbi conficiuntur, quae vocant illi nosh/mata, eaque quae sunt eis morbis contraria, nosemiata X ( nos emata V) quae habent ad res certas vitiosam offensionem vitiosam offensionem s vitiosa offensione X (-sas -es V rec ) atque fastidium, deinde aegrotationes, quae appellantur a Stoicis a)rrwsth/mata, a pp w CTHM L T L GV ac fere KR (o pro w, a pro L ) idem appositae G 1 isque item oppositae contrariae contraria V 1 offensiones. hoc loco nimium operae opere GKV consumitur a Stoicis, maxime a Chrysippo, crys. G 1 dum morbis corporum comparatur morborum animi similitudo; qua oratione ratione V 1 praetermissa minime necessaria ea, quae rem continent, pertractemus. 4.24. intellegatur igitur perturbationem iactantibus se opinionibus inconstanter et turbide in motu in motu immotus GRV (s del. rec ) H immot os K ( ss. c ) esse semper; cum autem hic fervor concitatioque animi inveteraverit et tamquam in venis medullisque insederit, tum existet existit X (exs. G) existet Küh. ( de fut. cf. p. 378, 14 comm. ad 1, 29 Sen. epist. 85, 9 al. ) inveteravit ... insedit ... existit Sey. et morbus et aegrotatio et offensiones eae, quae sunt eis morbis aegrotationibusque contrariae. Haec, quae dico, cogitatione inter se differunt, re quidem copulata sunt, eaque eaque GRV (eaq K 1 sed; add. 2 ) oriuntur ex libidine et ex laetitia. nam cum est concupita pecunia nec adhibita continuo ratio quasi quaedam Socratica medicina, quae sanaret sanet Bentl. permanet K 1 eam cupiditatem, permanat in venas et inhaeret in visceribus illud malum, existitque existit (exs. KR) qui m. X (que V rec s ) morbus et aegrotatio, quae evelli evelli Wopkens avelli inveterata non possunt, eique morbo nomen est avaritia; 4.25. similiterque similiter quae GKV ceteri morbi, ut gloriae cupiditas, ut mulierositas, ut ita appellem eam eam s ea X Non. L quae Graece filoguni/a f l L O Gg NlA fere X ( fgL KH -m a GV) dicitur, similiterque ... 7 dicitur Non. 142, 20 ceterique similiter morbi aegrotationesque nascuntur. quae autem sunt his contraria, ea nasci putantur a metu, ut odium mulierum, quale in misogu/nw| Atili est, inmisso gyno X (imm. K guno V 2 immissum K 2 ) Atil. fr. 1 ut in hominum universum genus, quod accepimus de Timone de Timone de ti in r. V 2 qui misa/nqrwpos appellatur, quale... 12 appellatur om. H misane p wit oc a appellantur X (misanep wp oc app. V, p fort. ex it ) ut inhospitalitas est: quae omnes aegrotationes animi ex quodam metu nascuntur earum rerum quas fugiunt et oderunt. 4.26. definiunt autem animi aegrotationem opinationem St. fr. 3, 427 vehementem de re non expetenda, tamquam valde expetenda sit, inhaerentem et penitus insitam. quod autem nascitur ex offensione, ita definiunt: opinionem vehementem de re non fugienda inhaerentem et penitus insitam tamquam fugienda; fugienda expetenda KRH haec autem opinatio est iudicatio iuditio K 1 ( add. 2 ) se scire, quod nesciat. aegrotationi autem talia quaedam subiecta sunt: avaritia, ambitio, mulierositas, pervicacia, pervicatia KV ligurritio, vinulentia, vinulentia Non. vinol. X cf. Mue. cuppedia, ambitio ... 23 cuppedia Non. 85, 10 cu pedia G et si qua similia. est autem avaritia opinatio vehemens de pecunia, quasi valde expetenda sit, inhaerens et penitus insita, similisque est eiusdem generis definitio reliquarum. 4.29. itaque illa duo, morbus et aegrotatio, ex totius valetudinis corporis conquassatione et perturbatione gignuntur, vitium autem integra valetudine ipsum ex se cernitur. sed in animo tantum modo cogitatione possumus morbum ab aegrotatione seiungere, vitiositas autem est habitus aut adfectio in tota vita inconstans et a se ipsa dissentiens. ita fit, ut in altera corruptione opinionum morbus efficiatur et aegrotatio, in altera inconstantia et repugtia. non enim omne vitium paris habet dissensiones, paris h. dissensiones Bentl. partis h. dissentientis X (-ent V c, ent in r. ). ceterum totus locus negle- genter a Cic. scriptus ut eorum, qui non longe a sapientia absunt, adfectio est illa quidem discrepans sibi ipsa, dum est insipiens, sed non distorta nec prava. morbi autem et aegrotationes aegrotationis X ( corr. K 2 ) partes sunt vitiositatis, sed perturbationes sintne eiusdem partes, quaestio est. 4.30. vitia enim adfectiones sunt manentes, perturbationes autem moventes, ut non possint adfectionum manentium partes esse. Atque ut in malis attingit animi naturam corporis St. fr. 3. 279 similitudo, sic in bonis. sunt enim in corpore praecipua, pulchritudo, valetudo vires pulchritudo Sey. val. pulchr. vires Ursin. sed cf. Sextus 11, 142 ai(reta/ e0n toi=s peri\ sw=ma ka/llos i0sxu\s eu)eci/a al. ac de variato ordine fin. 5, 80 vires, valetudo, valitudo KH firmitas, velocitas, intellegatur... 375, 29 velocitas H sunt item in animo. ut enim corporis temperatio, add. Camerarius (est add. V rec ) cum ea congruunt inter se e quibus constamus, sanitas, sic animi dicitur, cum eius iudicia opinionesque concordant, eaque animi est virtus, quam alii ipsam temperantiam dicunt esse, alii alii ( priore loco )] aliam GRV 1 ( corr. c ) obtemperantem temperantiae praeceptis et eam ea K subsequentem nec habentem ullam speciem suam, sed sive hoc sive illud sit, in solo esse sapiente. est autem quaedam animi sanitas, quae in insipientem in insipientem insipientem in in sapientem mut. V 1 aut 2 (insanitas quae in sapientem Turn. ) etiam cadat, cum curatione et purgatione purgatione Lb. perturbatione ( gubernatione V rec ) W et perturbatione del. Victorius medicorum conturbatio mentis aufertur. 4.31. et ut corporis est quaedam apta figura membrorum cum coloris quadam suavitate eaque ea quae X dicitur dicuntur G 1 pulchritudo, sic in animo opinionum iudiciorumque aequabilitas et constantia cum firmitate quadam et stabilitate virtutem subsequens aut virtutis vim ipsam continens pulchritudo vocatur. itemque viribus corporis et nervis et efficacitati similes similibus quoque similibus quoque Man. similibusque verbis animi vires nomitur. velocitas autem corporis celeritas appellatur, quae eadem ingenii etiam laus habetur propter animi multarum rerum brevi tempore percursionem. propter ... percursiones Non. 161, 20 ( s. l. percursionem) percussionem X ( corr. V rec periussionem K 1 ) Illud animorum corporumque dissimile, St. fr. 3, 426 quod animi valentes morbo temptari non possunt, temptari non possunt ut c. Bentl. sed cf. Galen de Hipp. et Pl. 409, 1 M. al. corpora corpora autem p. G ( exp. 2 ) possunt; sed corporum offensiones sine culpa accidere possunt, animorum non item, quorum omnes morbi et perturbationes ex aspernatione rationis eveniunt. veniunt H itaque in in om. H hominibus solum existunt; nam bestiae simile quiddam quidam GR 1 V 1 ( corr. R 2 V c ) faciunt, sed in perturbationes non incidunt. 4.32. inter acutos autem et inter hebetes hebetes non item est K 1 ( corr. 1 etc ) interest, quod ingeniosi, ut aes Corinthium in aeruginem, aerugine GRV sic illi in morbum et incidunt tardius et recreantur ocius, hebetes non item. nec vero in omnem morbum ac perturbationem animus ingeniosi cadit; †non enim non enim in ulla Bentl. sunt enim multa Mdv. non enim ad omnia vitia aeque propensa est natura humana: sunt enim multa fere desiderat Po. ( cf. p. 402, 8 ) multa ecferata eff. KV c? et immania; quaedam autem humanitatis quoque habent primam speciem, ut misericordia aegritudo metus. Aegrotationes autem morbique animorum St. fr. 3, 430 difficilius evelli posse putantur quam summa illa vitia, quae virtutibus sunt contraria. morbis enim manentibus vitia sublata esse non possunt, quia del. Lb. quia] qui Dav. non tam celeriter satur quam illa tolluntur. sed ut. .. 377, 12 tolluntur ( sine 377, 1 inter 377, 6 immania) H 4.80. Et si fidentia, id est firma animi confisio, scientia quaedam est et opinio gravis non temere adsentientis, metus quoque est diffidentia loco desperato sententia tole- rabilis efficiatur, si scribas : metus quoque qui est diffidentia inbecilla est adsensio ( cf. p. 368, 26 ) expectati et impendentis mali. propter haec ultima autem verba proximum enuntiatum et si spes — metum ante et si fidentia — imp. mali ponen- dum videtur. ut igitur metus — in malo = w(/ste e)n tw=| fau/lw| ( gen. masc. cf. St. fr. 3, 548 p. 147, 9 to sofo ou)k a)pistei=n th ga\r a)pisti/an ei/(nai Yeu/dous u(po/lhYin, th de/ pi/stin a)stei=on u(pa/rxein, ei/)nai ga\r kata/lhWin i)sxura/n ktl. ) ei/)nai to fo/bon, a(sau/tws de\ kai\ ta\ loipa\ pa/qh pa/nta ? sed quid Cicero peccauerit quid librarii, incertum. difidentia KV 3 (itiae V 1 ) defidentia GR expectati et impendentis inp. V mali, et si spes est expectatio boni, mali expectationem esse necesse est metum. ut igitur metus, metum mecum G 1 V 1 sic reliquae reliqui K 1 perturbationes sunt in malo. ergo ut constantia scientiae, sic perturbatio erroris est. Qui autem natura dicuntur iracundi aut misericordes aut invidi aut tale quid, ei sunt constituti quasi mala valetudine valitudini V animi, sanabiles sanabiles s sanabile est tamen, ut Socrates dicitur: cum multa in conventu vitia conlegisset in eum Zopyrus, zopirus GK qui se naturam cuiusque ex forma perspicere profitebatur, derisus est a ceteris, qui illa in Socrate vitia non agnoscerent, ab ipso autem Socrate sublevatus, cum illa sibi sic nata, sic nata Po signa (insita vel innata Bentl. Dav. quod potius de eis rebus dicitur quas etiamnunc habe- mus ) cf. fin. 2, 33 ut bacillum aliud est inflexum de industria, aliud ita natum fat. 9 al. sed ratione a se adse R 1 deiecta deiec ta di ceret K valitudine R diceret. 4.81. ergo ut optuma quisque valetudine adfectus aff. KR potest videri ut natura ad aliquem morbum del. Tr. proclivior, sic animus alius ad alia vitia propensior. qui autem non natura, sed culpa vitiosi esse dicuntur, eorum vitia constant e falsis opinionibus rerum bonarum et malarum, ut sit alius ad alios motus perturbationesque proclivior. inveteratio autem, ut in corporibus, aegrius depellitur quam perturbatio, perturbatione K 1 citiusque repentinus oculorum tumor tumor add. V c mg. tuorum K 1 sanatur quam diuturna lippitudo depellitur. depellitur del. Dav. sed cf. Mue. | |
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6. Andronicus of Rhodes, On Emotions, 4 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
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7. Cicero, Academica Posteriora, 1.38 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
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8. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.1, 2.18.7-2.18.10 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
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9. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
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10. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
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11. Plutarch, Placita Philosophorum (874D-911C), 5.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
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12. Seneca The Younger, De Beneficiis, 4.27.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
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13. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 75.8-75.9, 75.11-75.13 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
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14. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.86, 7.90-7.91, 7.98, 7.108, 7.111, 7.115, 7.158-7.159, 7.173 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
| 7.86. As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal's existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically. 7.90. Virtue, in the first place, is in one sense the perfection of anything in general, say of a statue; again, it may be non-intellectual, like health, or intellectual, like prudence. For Hecato says in his first book On the Virtues that some are scientific and based upon theory, namely, those which have a structure of theoretical principles, such as prudence and justice; others are non-intellectual, those that are regarded as co-extensive and parallel with the former, like health and strength. For health is found to attend upon and be co-extensive with the intellectual virtue of temperance, just as strength is a result of the building of an arch. 7.91. These are called non-intellectual, because they do not require the mind's assent; they supervene and they occur even in bad men: for instance, health, courage. The proof, says Posidonius in the first book of his treatise on Ethics, that virtue really exists is the fact that Socrates, Diogenes, and Antisthenes and their followers made moral progress. And for the existence of vice as a fundamental fact the proof is that it is the opposite of virtue. That it, virtue, can be taught is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his work On the End, by Cleanthes, by Posidonius in his Protreptica, and by Hecato; that it can be taught is clear from the case of bad men becoming good. 7.98. of mental goods some are habits, others are dispositions, while others again are neither the one nor the other. The virtues are dispositions, while accomplishments or avocations are matters of habit, and activities as such or exercise of faculty neither the one nor the other. And in general there are some mixed goods: e.g. to be happy in one's children or in one's old age. But knowledge is a pure good. Again, some goods are permanent like the virtues, others transitory like joy and walking-exercise. 7.108. Zeno was the first to use this term καθῆκον of conduct. Etymologically it is derived from κατά τινας ἥκειν, i.e. reaching as far as, being up to, or incumbent on so and so. And it is an action in itself adapted to nature's arrangements. For of the acts done at the prompting of impulse some, they observe, are fit and meet, others the reverse, while there is a third class which is neither the one nor the other.Befitting acts are all those which reason prevails with us to do; and this is the case with honouring one's parents, brothers and country, and intercourse with friends. Unbefitting, or contrary to duty, are all acts that reason deprecates, e.g. to neglect one's parents, to be indifferent to one's brothers, not to agree with friends, to disregard the interests of one's country, and so forth. 7.111. They hold the emotions to be judgements, as is stated by Chrysippus in his treatise On the Passions: avarice being a supposition that money is a good, while the case is similar with drunkenness and profligacy and all the other emotions.And grief or pain they hold to be an irrational mental contraction. Its species are pity, envy, jealousy, rivalry, heaviness, annoyance, distress, anguish, distraction. Pity is grief felt at undeserved suffering; envy, grief at others' prosperity; jealousy, grief at the possession by another of that which one desires for oneself; rivalry, pain at the possession by another of what one has oneself. 7.115. And as there are said to be certain infirmities in the body, as for instance gout and arthritic disorders, so too there is in the soul love of fame, love of pleasure, and the like. By infirmity is meant disease accompanied by weakness; and by disease is meant a fond imagining of something that seems desirable. And as in the body there are tendencies to certain maladies such as colds and diarrhoea, so it is with the soul, there are tendencies like enviousness, pitifulness, quarrelsomeness, and the like. 7.158. We hear when the air between the sot body and the organ of hearing suffers concussion, a vibration which spreads spherically and then forms waves and strikes upon the ears, just as the water in a reservoir forms wavy circles when a stone is thrown into it. Sleep is caused, they say, by the slackening of the tension in our senses, which affects the ruling part of the soul. They consider that the passions are caused by the variations of the vital breath.Semen is by them defined as that which is capable of generating offspring like the parent. And the human semen which is emitted by a human parent in a moist vehicle is mingled with parts of the soul, blended in the same ratio in which they are present in the parent. 7.159. Chrysippus in the second book of his Physics declares it to be in substance identical with vital breath or spirit. This, he thinks, can be seen from the seeds cast into the earth, which, if kept till they are old, do not germinate, plainly because their fertility has evaporated. Sphaerus and his followers also maintain that semen derives its origin from the whole of the body; at all events every part of the body can be reproduced from it. That of the female is according to them sterile, being, as Sphaerus says, without tension, scanty, and watery. By ruling part of the soul is meant that which is most truly soul proper, in which arise presentations and impulses and from which issues rational speech. And it has its seat in the heart.Such is the summary of their Physics which I have deemed adequate, my aim being to preserve a due proportion in my work. But the points on which certain of the Stoics differed from the rest are the following. 7.173. He was present in the theatre when the poet Sositheus uttered the verse –Driven by Cleanthes' folly like dumb herds,and he remained unmoved in the same attitude. At which the audience were so astonished that they applauded him and drove Sositheus off the stage. Afterwards when the poet apologized for the insult, he accepted the apology, saying that, when Dionysus and Heracles were ridiculed by the poets without getting angry, it would be absurd for him to be annoyed at casual abuse. He used to say that the Peripatetics were in the same case as lyres which, although they give forth sweet sounds, never hear themselves. It is said that when he laid it down as Zeno's opinion that a man's character could be known from his looks, certain witty young men brought before him a rake with hands horny from toil in the country and requested him to state what the man's character was. Cleanthes was perplexed and ordered the man to go away; but when, as he was making off, he sneezed, I have it, cried Cleanthes, he is effeminate. |
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15. Stobaeus, Anthology, 5.906.18-907.5 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)
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16. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None
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17. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 3.510
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