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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



10243
Seneca The Younger, Letters, 120.14


nanHe possessed perfection of soul, developed to its highest capabilities, inferior only to the mind of God – from whom a part flows down even into this heart of a mortal. But this heart is never more divine than when it reflects upon its mortality, and understands that man was born for the purpose of fulfilling his life, and that the body is not a permanent dwelling, but a sort of inn (with a brief sojourn at that) which is to be left behind when one perceives that one is a burden to the host.


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11 results
1. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.75 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.75. quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis! qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus vereque omnia ista nomina possideat, quae irrideri ab inperitis solent. rectius enim appellabitur rex quam Tarquinius, qui nec se nec suos regere potuit, rectius magister populi—is enim est dictator dictator est BE —quam Sulla, qui trium pestiferorum vitiorum, luxuriae, avaritiae, crudelitatis, magister fuit, rectius dives quam Crassus, qui nisi eguisset, numquam Euphraten nulla belli causa transire voluisset. recte eius omnia dicentur, qui scit uti solus omnibus, recte etiam pulcher appellabitur— animi enim liniamenta sunt pulchriora quam corporis quam corporis NV quam corporibus ABE corporibus ( om. quam) R —, recte solus liber nec dominationi cuiusquam parens nec oboediens cupiditati, recte invictus, cuius etiamsi corpus constringatur, animo tamen vincula inici nulla possint, nec expectet ullum tempus aetatis, uti tum uti tum Se. ut tum (ut in ras., sequente ras. 2 vel 3 litt. ) N virtutum ABE ututū R ubi tum V denique iudicetur beatusne fuerit, cum extremum vitae diem morte confecerit, quod ille unus e septem sapientibus non sapienter Croesum monuit; 3.75.  "Then, how dignified, how lofty, how consistent is the character of the Wise Man as they depict it! Since reason has proved that moral worth is the sole good, it follows that he must always be happy, and that all those titles which the ignorant are so fond of deriding do in very truth belong to him. For he will have a better claim to the title of King than Tarquin, who could not rule either himself or his subjects; a better right to the name of 'Master of the People' (for that is what a dictator is) than Sulla, who was a master of three pestilential vices, licentiousness, avarice and cruelty; a better right to be called rich than Crassus, who had he lacked nothing could never have been induced to cross the Euphrates with no pretext for war. Rightly will he be said to own all things, who alone knows how to use all things; rightly also will he be styled beautiful, for the features of the soul are fairer than those of the body; rightly the one and only free man, as subject to no man's authority, and slave of no appetite; rightly unconquerable, for though his body be thrown into fetters, no bondage can enchain his soul.
2. Cicero, On Duties, 1.22, 3.75 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.22. Sed quoniam, ut praeclare scriptum est a Platone, non nobis solum nati sumus ortusque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem amici, atque, ut placet Stoicis, quae in terris gigtur, ad usum hominum omnia creari, homines autem hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se aliis alii prodesse possent, in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi, communes utilitates in medium afferre mutatione officiorum, dando accipiendo, tum artibus, tum opera, tum facultatibus devincire hominum inter homines societatem. 3.75. Falso; nam eadem utilitatis, quae honestatis, est regula. Qui hoc non perviderit, ab hoc nulla fraus aberit, nullum facinus. Sic enim cogitans: Est istuc quidem honestum, verum hoc expedit, res a natura copulatas audebit errore divellere, qui fons est fraudium, maleficiorum, scelerum omnium. Itaque, si vir bonus habeat hanc vim, ut, si digitis concrepuerit, possit in locupletium testamenta nomen eius inrepere, hac vi non utatur, ne si exploratum quidem habeat id omnino neminem umquam suspicaturum. At dares hanc vim M. Crasso, ut digitorum percussione heres posset scriptus esse, qui re vera non esset heres, in foro, mihi crede, saltaret. Homo autem iustus isque, quem sentimus virum bonum, nihil cuiquam, quod in se transferat, detrahet. Hoc qui admiratur, is se, quid sit vir bonus, nescire fateatur. 1.22.  But since, as Plato has admirably expressed it, we are not born for ourselves alone, but our country claims a share of our being, and our friends a share; and since, as the Stoics hold, everything that the earth produces is created for man's use; and as men, too, are born for the sake of men, that they may be able mutually to help one another; in this direction we ought to follow Nature as our guide, to contribute to the general good by an interchange of acts of kindness, by giving and receiving, and thus by our skill, our industry, and our talents to cement human society more closely together, man to man. 3.75.  The appearance is deceptive; for our standard is the same for expediency and for moral rectitude. And the man who does not accept the truth of this will be capable of any sort of dishonesty, any sort of crime. For if he reasons, "That is, to be sure, the right course, but this course brings advantage," he will not hesitate in his mistaken judgment to divorce two conceptions that Nature has made one; and that spirit opens the door to all sorts of dishonesty, wrong-doing, and crime. Suppose, then, that a good man had such power that at a snap of his fingers his name could steal into rich men's wills, he would not avail himself of that power — no, not even though he could be perfectly sure that no one would ever suspect it. Suppose, on the other hand, that one were to offer a Marcus Crassus the power, by the mere snapping, of his fingers, to get himself named as heir, when he was not really an heir, he would, I warrant you, dance in the forum. But the righteous man, the one whom we feel to be a good man, would never rob anyone of anything to enrich himself. If anybody is astonished at this doctrine, let him confess that he does not know what a good man is.
3. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.10-3.21 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.10. nec minus illud acute, quod animi adfectionem lumine mentis carentem nominaverunt amentiam eandemque dementiam. omnis... 25 dementiam H ex quo intellegendum est eos qui haec rebus nomina posuerunt sensisse senisse GR 1 V 1 hoc idem, quod a Socrate acceptum diligenter Stoici retinuerunt, omnis insipientes esse non sanos. qui est quis X (qus G 1 ) sed s in R fort. postea additum enim animus in aliquo morbo—morbos autem hos perturbatos motus, morbos ... 4 motus ( sine hos) ut modo dixi, philosophi appellant—, non magis est sanus quam id corpus quod corpus quod punctis not. G 2 in morbo est. ita fit ut sapientia sanitas sit animi, insipientia autem quasi insanitas quaedam, quae est insania eademque dementia; insipientia... 7 dementia ( sine quaedam) Non. 122,24 multoque melius haec notata sunt verbis Latinis quam Graecis. 3.11. quod aliis quoque multis locis reperietur; reperitur G 1 sed id alias, nunc, quod instat. totum igitur id alt. id om. H s quod quaerimus quid et quale sit, sit fit V verbi vis ipsa declarat. eos enim sanos quoniam intellegi necesse est, quorum mens motu quasi morbo perturbata nullo nulla X corr. V 1? sit, qui quia K 1 contra adfecti affecti GR 2 insani G 1 sint, hos insanos appellari necesse est. itaque nihil melius, quam quod est in consuetudine sermonis Latini, cum exisse ex potestate dicimus eos, qui ecfrenati hecfrenati G (h del. 2 ) hęc fr. V effr. R rec V rec feruntur aut libidine aut iracundia— quamquam ipsa iracundia libidinis est pars; sic enim definitur: iracundia ulciscendi libido ulciscendi libido cf. Aug. civ. 14,15 quis V 1 —; qui igitur exisse ex potestate dicimus ... 20 ex potestate om. H dicuntur, idcirco dicuntur, quia non sint in potestate mentis, cui regnum totius animi a natura tributum est. Graeci autem mani/an manian X (man in r. V 1 ) appellant X unde appellent, non facile dixerim; eam tamen ipsam ipsa KGH (ipsāR, sed vix m. 1 ) distinguimus nos melius quam illi. hanc enim insaniam, quae iuncta stultitiae stultitiae K 2 V c BGr.(?) stultitia X patet latius, nos post latius add. V c a furore disiungimus. distinguimus R Graeci volunt illi quidem, sed parum valent verbo: quem nos furorem, melagxoli/an melancholian GV -iam KRH illi vocant; quasi vero atra bili atribili V 1 K (-bi li) atra- bili GR solum mens ac non non add. R c saepe vel iracundia graviore vel timore vel timore add. G 2 vel dolore moveatur; totum . . 322, 3 moveatur H quo genere Athamantem Alcmaeonem alomeonem K 1 alc meonem V (on in r. V c ) Aiacem Orestem furere dicimus. qui ita sit adfectus, eum dominum esse rerum suarum vetant duodecim duodecem R 1 V tab. 5, 7. Ciceronis locus obversatur Horatio s. 2, 3, 217 tabulae; itaque non est scriptum si insanus, sed si furiosus insanus et fur. Non. escit Bouhier esse incipit W esset Non. escit . stultitiam stultiam V ( ss rec ) stultia K (- 2 ) stultitia GR 1 (-ă 2 ) H enim censuerunt constantia, inconstantiam KR ( etiam m a m. 1 ut. v. ) V 1 ( sed in et m exp. 1 ) H inconstantia G insaniam enim censuerunt constantiam, id est sanitatem, tamen posse tueri Non. id est sanitate, vacantem posse tamen tueri mediocritatem officiorum et vitae communem cultum atque usitatum; furorem autem autem om. Non. esse rati sunt mentis ad omnia caecitatem. quod cum maius magis R 1 esse videatur quam insania, tamen eius modi est, ut furor in sapientem cadere possit, non possit insania. itaque stultitia censuerunt ... 13 insania itaque ... 13 cadere possit, insania non Non. 443, 2 sed haec alia quaestio est; nos ad propositum revertamur. 3.12. Cadere, opinor, in sapientem aegritudinem tibi dixisti videri. Et vero ita existimo. Humanum id quidem, quod ita existumas. non enim silice nati sumus, sed est naturale in animis tenerum e ante silice add. V c non male naturabile X sed bi exp. V 1 ( cf. animabili codd. nat. deor. 2,91 ) natura Lb. quiddam quidam R 1 V 1 ( corr. 1 ) -ddā in r. G 2 atque molle, quod quod quā G 1 aegritudine quasi tempestate quatiatur, sed humanum... 22 quatiatur H nec absurde Crantor ille, qui in in om. X add. s V rec nostra Academia vel in primis fuit nobilis, minime inquit inquid G 1 adsentior is qui istam nescio quam indolentiam magno opere laudant, quae quae V 2 B qui X nec potest ulla ulle G 1 esse nec debet. ne aegrotus sim; sim s si inquit (inquid G 1 P cf. 2 ) fuerat X ( fuat V 2 si exp. et ss. V rec ) corr. Sey. cf. Ps. Plut. Cons. ad Ap. 102c, qui primum ou) ga\r sumfe/romai — e)/cw kai\ tou= dunatou= kai\ tou= sumfe/rontos ou)=san ut sua profert, paulo post addit : ' mh\ ga\r nosoi=men ', fhsi o( a)kadhmaiko\s Kra/ntwr, ' nosh/sasi de\ parei/h tis ai)/sqhsis ' ktl . inquit ut 303, 21 ergo, inquit al. si debet nec aegrotassem. Si X (a apertum post t in V) c exp. V 2? ne aegrotus inquit fuero, sin quid fuerit Vict. sensus adsit, adsit d in r. G 2 absit V c sive secetur quid sive avellatur a corpore. nam istuc nihil dolere dolere ex dolore K 1 R 1 ex dobere (b= lo) V 1 contigit G 1 non sine magna mercede contingit inmanitatis in animo, stuporis in corpore. non sine... 7 corpore Aug. civ. 14, 9 3.13. sed videamus ne haec oratio sit hominum adsentantium nostrae inbecillitati et indulgentium mollitudini; nos autem audeamus non solum ramos amputare miseriarum, sed omnis radicum fibras fybras X evellere. tamen aliquid relinquetur fortasse; ita sunt altae alta GKV ( corr. 2? ) H stirpes stultitiae; sed relinquetur id solum quod erit necessarium. Illud quidem sic habeto, nisi sanatus animus sit, quod sine philosophia fieri non potest, finem miseriarum nullum fore. sed... 15 fore quam ob rem, quoniam coepimus, tradamus nos ei curandos: sanabimur, si volemus. et progrediar quidem longius: non enim de aegritudine solum, quamquam id quidem quidem in mg. add. R c primum, sed de omni animi, ut ego posui, perturbatione, morbo, ut Graeci volunt, explicabo. et primo, si placet, Stoicorum more agamus, qui breviter astringere solent argumenta; deinde nostro instituto vagabimur. 3.14. Qui fortis est, idem est fidens (quoniam confidens sqq. St. fr. 3, 570 mala consuetudine loquendi loquendum Non. L 1 in vitio ponitur, ductum verbum a a add. V 2 confidendo, quod laudis in ante laudis add. V 2 est). qui autem est fidens, is profecto non extimescit; discrepat enim a timendo qui... 4 a timendo fidens (fidere Quich. ) Non. 443, 9 confidere. confidens Non. atqui, atqui R 2 ( cf. We. ) atque in quem cadit aegritudo, in eundem timor; quarum enim rerum praesentia sumus in aegritudine, easdem inpendentes et venientes inpendentis..venientis e corr. V aut 2 timemus. ita fit ut fortitudini aegritudo repugnet. ita. ... repugnet del. Hei. veri simile est igitur, in quem cadat cadit G aegritudo, cadere in eundem eundem eum Non. timorem et infractionem infractionem V ( exp. rec ) quidem quidem quandam ut v. in mg. R rec animi in quem... 10 animi Non. 122,28 et demissionem. demisionem GKR 1 dimis ionem V 1 quae in quem cadunt, in eundem cadit, ut serviat, ut victum, si quando, si quando aliquando (ali in r. 2 ) V se esse fateatur. quae qui recipit, recipiat idem necesse est timiditatem et ignaviam. non cadunt autem haec in virum fortem: igitur ne aegritudo quidem. at nemo sapiens nisi fortis: non cadet cadit V 2 H cadat K ergo in sapientem aegritudo. 3.15. Praeterea necesse est, qui fortis sit, eundem esse magni animi; qui magni animi BK 2 om. X qui autem magni animi V c ( ft. rec- tius cf. 326,11 Str. Phil. 49 p. 60 ) qui magni animi sit, invictum; qui invictus sit, eum eum om. H res humanas despicere atque infra se positas arbitrari. despicere autem nemo potest eas res, eas res nemo potest H propter quas aegritudine adfici potest; post potest add. nisi fortis V c ex quo efficitur fortem virum aegritudine numquam adfici. omnes autem sapientes fortes: non cadit igitur in sapientem aegritudo. Et quem ad modum oculus conturbatus turbatus H non est probe adfectus ad suum munus fungendum, fugendum K 1 V 1 et reliquae partes totumve corpus statu cum est motum, deest officio suo et muneri, sic conturbatus siconturbatus G 1 K 1 adxequendum V 1 animus non est aptus ad exequendum ad ex seq. G munus suum. munus autem animi est ratione bene uti; et sapientis animus ita semper adfectus est, ut ratione optime utatur; numquam igitur est perturbatus. at ad G 1 (14 G 1 K 1 ) aegritudo perturbatio est animi: semper igitur ea sapiens vacabit. primo iam si 325, 6 vacabit H 3.16. Veri etiam simile illud illi G 1 est, qui sit temperans— quem Graeci sw/frona appellant eamque virtutem swfrosu/nhn vocant, quam soleo equidem tum temperantiam, tum moderationem appellare, non numquam etiam modestiam; sed haud -d haut in r. K 1 scio an recte ea virtus frugalitas appellari possit, quod angustius apud Graecos valet, qui frugi homines xrhsi/mous appellant, id est tantum modo utilis; at illud est latius; omnis enim abstinentia, omnis innocentia (quae apud Graecos usitatum nomen nullum habet, sed habere potest potest om. H a)bla/beian ; a B La BEl in r. V 1 AB D AB e lAN fere K 1 RG 2 ( in litt. evan. aut eras. ) abdabeian H a B La BEl a N V 1 nam est innocentia adfectio affectio KRH talis animi sed praeter a N in r. quae noceat nemini)—reliquas etiam etiam om. H virtutes frugalitas continet. omnis abst.... 19 continet quae nisi tanta esset, et si is angustiis, quibus plerique putant, teneretur, numquam esset L. Pisonis cognomen tanto opere laudatum. 3.17. sed quia, nec qui propter metum praesidium reliquit, relinquit (-id G 1 ) X corr. V 1 aut 2 quod est ignaviae, nec qui propter avaritiam clam depositum depositi G non reddidit, quod est iniustitiae, nec qui propter temeritatem male rem gessit, quod est stultitiae, frugi appellari solet, eo tris virtutes, fortitudinem iustitiam prudentiam, frugalitas complexa est (etsi hoc quidem commune est virtutum; omnes omnis X enim inter se nexae et iugatae sunt hoc quidem est commu- ne ... 326, 1 sunt ( sine nexae et) Non. 47, 7 ): reliqua igitur et quarta virtus sit sit ut sit X sed ut exp. V 2 reliqua igitur est, quarta v. ut sit, ipsa fr. Mdv. ipsa frugalitas. eius enim videtur esse proprium motus animi adpetentis regere et sedare semperque semper quae X corr. R c adversantem aversantem X corr. VCR 2 libidini moderatam in omni re servare constantiam. cui contrarium vitium nequitia dicitur. 3.18. frugalitas, ut opinor, a fruge, qua nihil melius e est e We. terra, nequitia ab eo (etsi erit hoc fortasse durius, sed temptemus: lusisse lu sisse V (l m. 2? ) iusisse R 1 iussisse GKR 2 H putemur, putatos V (ato in r. 2 ut v.; voluitne putato ?) nil GR c ( totum verbum del. R 2 ) si nihil sit) ab eo, quod nequicquam est in tali homine, ex quo idem nihili St. fr. 3, 570 nihili V 2 nihil dic. G ( 2 litt. erasae ) nihil KRV 1 dicitur.—qui sit frugi igitur vel, si mavis, moderatus et temperans, eum necesse est esse esse add. G 2 constantem; qui autem constans, quietum; qui quietus, perturbatione omni vacuum, ergo etiam aegritudine. et sunt illa sapientis: sed ... 326, 13 sapientis H aberit igitur a sapiente aegritudo. Itaque non inscite Heracleotes Dionysius St. fr. 1, 434 dyonisius KR dioni ius V ad ea disputat, quae apud Homerum Achilles queritur hoc, ut opinor, modo: Corque meum penitus turgescit tristibus iris, I 646 Cum decore atque omni me orbatum laude recordor. num manus adfecta recte est, cum in tumore est, aut num aliud quodpiam aliud quodpiam Turn. ex s aliquod ( ex aliquid K 1 ) quippiam X alia quippiam H membrum tumidum ac turgidum non vitiose se habet? 3.19. sic igitur inflatus et tumens animus in vitio est. sapientis autem animus semper vacat vitio, numquam turgescit, numquam tumet; at irati irati V e corr. iratus X cf. 23 sapientis animus eius modi est: numquam igitur sapiens irascitur. nam si irascitur, etiam concupiscit; proprium est enim irati cupere, a quo laesus videatur, ei quam maxumum dolorem inurere. qui autem id concupierit, eum necesse est, si id si id sit G 1 consecutus sit, magno opere magnopere K H (magno opere R) laetari. ex quo fit, ut alieno malo gaudeat; quod quoniam non cadit in sapientem, ne ut irascatur quidem cadit. sapientis... 24 timet ( pro tumet) 21 num ... 23 est 24 at... 327, 6 cadit ( hoc ordine ) H sin sin, non si ( ut dicit Ha. ) R autem caderet in sapientem aegritudo, caderet etiam iracundia; qua quoniam vacat, aegritudine etiam vacabit. 3.20. Etenim si sapiens in aegritudinem aegritudinem -ne G incidere posset, posset semel R 1 posset etiam in misericordiam, posset in invidentiam (non dixi invidiam, quae tum tum (cum G) etiam Bouh., alii aliter, Ciceronem corrigentes est, cum invidetur; ab invidendo autem invidentia recte dici potest, ut effugiamus ut et fug. Non. ambiguum nomen invidiae. posset (posse codd. ) etiam... 12 invidiae Non. 443,15 (10 in invidiam. non dixi in invidentia 11 invidia) quod verbum ductum dictum G 1 K 1 ( cf. Isidor. 10,134 ) est a nimis intuendo fortunam alterius, ut est in Melanippo: quisnam florem Acc. fr. 424 (unde aut quis mortalis fl. Non. 500, 13 num quis non mortalis fl. Ri. num quisnam poetae sit, dubium ) quasnam G 1 liberum invidit meum? male Latine videtur, sed praeclare Accius; ut enim videre, sic invidere florem flore X florē K 2 R c? rectius quam flori . nos consuetudine prohibemur; 3.21. poëta ius suum tenuit et dixit audacius)—cadit igitur in eundem et misereri et invidere. non cadit ... 19 invidere nam qui dolet rebus alicuius adversis, idem alicuius etiam secundis dolet, olet V add. 1 aut 2 solet GK 1 ( corr. 2 ) R 1 ( dolet m. ant. ) ut Theophrastus interitum deplorans Callisthenis sodalis sui, rebus Alexandri prosperis angitur, itaque dicit Callisthenem incidisse in hominem summa potentia summaque fortuna, sed ignarum quem ad modum rebus secundis uti conveniret. atqui, quem ad modum misericordia aegritudo est ex alterius rebus adversis, sic invidentia aegritudo est ex alterius rebus secundis. in quem igitur cadit misereri, in eundem etiam invidere; atqui . . 328, 3 invidere non non nunc K 1 cadit autem invidere in sapientem: ergo ne misereri quidem. quodsi aegre ferre aegre ferre s V rec haec referre X sapiens soleret, misereri etiam soleret. abest ergo a a add. V c sapiente aegritudo.
4. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.29.36-1.29.37, 1.29.41-1.29.49, 2.1.38-2.1.39 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

5. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 120.10-120.11 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

6. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 2.4, 2.9, 2.13, 3.5-3.6, 3.12, 5.27, 12.2, 12.26 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

7. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.3, 7.127 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.3. As he went on reading the second book of Xenophon's Memorabilia, he was so pleased that he inquired where men like Socrates were to be found. Crates passed by in the nick of time, so the bookseller pointed to him and said, Follow yonder man. From that day he became Crates's pupil, showing in other respects a strong bent for philosophy, though with too much native modesty to assimilate Cynic shamelessness. Hence Crates, desirous of curing this defect in him, gave him a potful of lentil-soup to carry through the Ceramicus; and when he saw that he was ashamed and tried to keep it out of sight, with a blow of his staff he broke the pot. As Zeno took to flight with the lentil-soup flowing down his legs, Why run away, my little Phoenician? quoth Crates, nothing terrible has befallen you. 7.127. It is a tenet of theirs that between virtue and vice there is nothing intermediate, whereas according to the Peripatetics there is, namely, the state of moral improvement. For, say the Stoics, just as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust. Nor again are there degrees of justice and injustice; and the same rule applies to the other virtues. Further, while Chrysippus holds that virtue can be lost, Cleanthes maintains that it cannot. According to the former it may be lost in consequence of drunkenness or melancholy; the latter takes it to be inalienable owing to the certainty of our mental apprehension. And virtue in itself they hold to be worthy of choice for its own sake. At all events we are ashamed of bad conduct as if we knew that nothing is really good but the morally beautiful. Moreover, they hold that it is in itself sufficient to ensure well-being: thus Zeno, and Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Virtues, and Hecato in the second book of his treatise On Goods:
8. Nag Hammadi, Marsanes, 9.21-9.22 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

9. Nag Hammadi, Zostrianos, 44.17-44.22 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

10. Plotinus, Enneads, 1.6 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

11. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 3.238



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
(prokoptōn) vii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
apologists, generally Esler, The Early Christian World (2000) 548
ascent literature, visionary/mystical Corrigan and Rasimus, Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World (2013) 336
body / bodies (corporeal, material, matter, physical) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
brain (head, skull) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
character (diathesis, hexis, disposition, stable state) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
chrysippus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
cicero Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
cleanthes Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
contemplation Corrigan and Rasimus, Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World (2013) 336
descent, of soul, partial Corrigan and Rasimus, Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World (2013) 336
epictetus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
fall, of the soul Corrigan and Rasimus, Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World (2013) 336
freedom (eleutheria) / free (eleutheros) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
genuine humanness, expressed in source texts Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 131
gnostic, gnosticism Corrigan and Rasimus, Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World (2013) 336
god Corrigan and Rasimus, Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World (2013) 336
health (hugieia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
heinemann, isaak, human vocation, language for Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 131
heinemann, isaak Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 131
human beings, place and role in cosmos Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 131
human vocation, and isaak heinemann Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 131
human vocation, language for Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 131
human vocation Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 131
hypostasis Corrigan and Rasimus, Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World (2013) 336
instantaneous change (metabolē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
intellect, triad Corrigan and Rasimus, Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World (2013) 336
language, for human vocation Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 131
marcus aurelius Corrigan and Rasimus, Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World (2013) 336
middle platonism Corrigan and Rasimus, Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World (2013) 336
minucius felix Esler, The Early Christian World (2000) 548
perfect (teleios) / perfection (teleiōsis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
platonizing sethians Corrigan and Rasimus, Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World (2013) 336
plotinus Corrigan and Rasimus, Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World (2013) 336
plutarch Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
reason (human) / rational faculty (logos, logistikon) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
religion / myth Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
reversion, return, mystical self-reversion Corrigan and Rasimus, Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World (2013) 336
sage (wise person) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
seed Corrigan and Rasimus, Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World (2013) 336
seneca Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
sethians Corrigan and Rasimus, Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World (2013) 336
soul / mind (psuchē, animus) vii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
stoic, stoicism Corrigan and Rasimus, Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World (2013) 336
stoicism / stoic / stoa, neostoicism (greco-roman) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
stoicism / stoic / stoa Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
virtue / moral virtue (aretē)' Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 242
withdrawal (contemplative) Corrigan and Rasimus, Gnosticism, Platonism and the Late Ancient World (2013) 336
θεωρία, vocation of human beings Dürr, Paul on the Human Vocation: Reason Language in Romans and Ancient Philosophical Tradition (2022) 131