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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database

Seneca The Younger, Letters, 118.15-118.16

nanSome reply: "But that which becomes greater does not necessarily become different. It matters not at all whether you pour wine into a flask or into a vat; the wine keeps its peculiar quality in both vessels. Small and large quantities of honey are not distinct in taste." But these are different cases which you mention; for wine and honey have a uniform quality; no matter how much the quantity is enlarged, the quality is the same.

nanFor some things endure according to their kind and their peculiar qualities, even when they are enlarged. There are others, however, which, after many increments, are altered by the last addition; there is stamped upon them a new character, different from that of yore. One stone makes an archway – the stone which wedges the leaning sides and holds the arch together by its position in the middle. And why does the last addition, although very slight, make a great deal of difference? Because it does not increase; it fills up.

Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

13 results
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 8.1-8.3, 8.5 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.62-3.63, 3.68 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.62. Pertinere autem ad rem arbitrantur intellegi natura fieri ut liberi a parentibus amentur. a quo initio profectam communem humani generis societatem persequimur. quod primum intellegi debet figura membrisque corporum, quae ipsa declarant procreandi a natura habitam esse rationem. neque vero haec inter se congruere possent, possent N 2 possint ut natura et procreari vellet et diligi procreatos non curaret. atque etiam in bestiis vis naturae perspici potest; quarum in fetu et in educatione laborem cum cernimus, naturae ipsius vocem videmur audire. quare ut perspicuum est natura nos a dolore add. P. Man. abhorrere, sic apparet a natura ipsa, ut eos, quos genuerimus, amemus, inpelli. 3.63. ex hoc nascitur ut etiam etiam ut BE communis hominum inter homines naturalis sit commendatio, ut oporteat hominem ab homine ob id ipsum, quod homo sit, non alienum videri. ut enim in membris alia sunt sunt N 2 sint tamquam sibi nata, ut oculi, ut aures, alia alia Marsus aliqua ARN aliaque BE reliqua V etiam ceterorum membrorum usum adiuvant, ut crura, ut manus, sic inmanes quaedam bestiae bestie quedam BE sibi solum natae sunt, at illa, quae in concha patula pina dicitur, isque, qui enat e concha, qui, quod eam custodit, pinoteres vocatur in eandemque in eandemque BE in eamque cum se recepit recepit cod. Glogav. recipit includitur, ut videatur monuisse ut caveret, itemque formicae, apes, ciconiae aliorum etiam causa quaedam faciunt. multo haec coniunctius homines. coniunctius homines Mdv. coniunctio est hominis itaque natura sumus apti ad coetus, concilia, consilia Non. civitatis Non. RV civitates. itaque ... civitatis ( v. 18 ) Non. p. 234 3.68. Cum autem ad tuendos conservandosque homines hominem natum esse videamus, consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rem publicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos. ne amores quidem sanctos a sapiente alienos esse arbitrantur. arbitramur BE Cynicorum autem rationem atque vitam alii cadere in sapientem dicunt, si qui qui ARN 1 V quis BEN 2 eius modi forte casus inciderit, ut id faciendum sit, alii nullo modo. 3.62.  "Again, it is held by the Stoics to be important to understand that nature creates in parents an affection for their children; and parental affection is the source to which we trace the origin of the association of the human race in communities. This cannot but be clear in the first place from the conformation of the body and its members, which by themselves are enough to show that nature's scheme included the procreation of offspring. Yet it could not be consistent that nature should at once intend offspring to be born and make no provision for that offspring when born to be loved and cherished. Even in the lower animals nature's operation can be clearly discerned; when we observe the labour that they spend on bearing and rearing their young, we seem to be listening to the actual voice of nature. Hence as it is manifest that it is natural for us to shrink from pain, so it is clear that we derive from nature herself the impulse to love those to whom we have given birth. 3.63.  From this impulse is developed the sense of mutual attraction which unites human beings as such; this also is bestowed by nature. The mere fact of their common humanity requires that one man should feel another man to be akin to him. For just as some of the parts of the body, such as the eyes and the ears, are created as it were for their own sakes, while others like the legs or the hands also subserve the utility of the rest of the members, so some very large animals are born for themselves alone; whereas the sea‑pen, as it is called, in its roomy shell, and the creature named the 'pinoteres' because it keeps watch over the sea‑pen, which swims out of the sea‑pen's shell, then retires back into it and is shut up inside, thus appearing to have warned its host to be on its guard — these creatures, and also the ant, the bee, the stork, do certain actions for the sake of others besides themselves. With human beings this bond of mutual aid is far more intimate. It follows that we are by nature fitted to form unions, societies and states. 3.68.  Again, since we see that man is designed by nature to safeguard and protect his fellows, it follows from this natural disposition, that the Wise Man should desire to engage in politics and government, and also to live in accordance with nature by taking to himself a wife and desiring to have children by her. Even the passion of love when pure is not thought incompatible with the character of the Stoic sage. As for the principles and habits of the Cynics, some say that these befit the Wise Man, if circumstances should happen to indicate this course of action; but other Stoics reject the Cynic rule unconditionally.
3. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 2.40-2.41 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.40. That the stars consist entirely of fire Cleanthes holds to be established by the evidence of two of the senses, those of touch and sight. For the radiance of the sun is more brilliant than that of any fire, inasmuch as it casts its light so far and wide over the boundless universe; and the contact of its rays is so powerful that it not merely warms but often actually burns, neither of which things could it do if it were not made of fire. 'Therefore,' Cleanthes proceeds, 'since the sun is made of fire, and is nourished by the vapours exhaled from the ocean because no fire could continue to exist without sustece of some sort, it follows that it resembles either that fire which we employ in ordinary life or that which is contained in the bodies of living creatures. 2.41. Now our ordinary fire that serves the needs of daily life is a destructive agency, consuming everything, and also wherever it spreads it routs and scatters everything. On the other hand the fire of the body is the glow of life and health; it is the universal preservative, giving nourishment, fostering growth, sustaining, bestowing sensation.' He therefore maintains that there can be no doubt which of the two kinds of fire the sun resembles, for the sun also causes all things to flourish and to bring forth increase each after its kind. Hence since the sun resembles those fires which are contained in the bodies of living creatures, the sun also must be alive; and so too the other heavenly bodies, since they have their origin in the fiery heat of heaven that is entitled the aether or sky.
4. Dio Chrysostom, Orations, 36.20 (1st cent. CE

5. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.11, 3.24-3.26, 3.28, 3.30, 3.37 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

6. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

7. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

8. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 9.18, 42.1, 66.11, 118.16 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

9. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Fate, 28.199 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

10. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.33, 7.85, 7.90-7.91, 7.120, 7.123 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.33. Again, in the Republic, making an invidious contrast, he declares the good alone to be true citizens or friends or kindred or free men; and accordingly in the view of the Stoics parents and children are enemies, not being wise. Again, it is objected, in the Republic he lays down community of wives, and at line 200 prohibits the building of sanctuaries, law-courts and gymnasia in cities; while as regards a currency he writes that we should not think it need be introduced either for purposes of exchange or for travelling abroad. Further, he bids men and women wear the same dress and keep no part of the body entirely covered. 7.85. An animal's first impulse, say the Stoics, is to self-preservation, because nature from the outset endears it to itself, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his work On Ends: his words are, The dearest thing to every animal is its own constitution and its consciousness thereof; for it was not likely that nature should estrange the living thing from itself or that she should leave the creature she has made without either estrangement from or affection for its own constitution. We are forced then to conclude that nature in constituting the animal made it near and dear to itself; for so it comes to repel all that is injurious and give free access to all that is serviceable or akin to it. 7.90. Virtue, in the first place, is in one sense the perfection of anything in general, say of a statue; again, it may be non-intellectual, like health, or intellectual, like prudence. For Hecato says in his first book On the Virtues that some are scientific and based upon theory, namely, those which have a structure of theoretical principles, such as prudence and justice; others are non-intellectual, those that are regarded as co-extensive and parallel with the former, like health and strength. For health is found to attend upon and be co-extensive with the intellectual virtue of temperance, just as strength is a result of the building of an arch. 7.91. These are called non-intellectual, because they do not require the mind's assent; they supervene and they occur even in bad men: for instance, health, courage. The proof, says Posidonius in the first book of his treatise on Ethics, that virtue really exists is the fact that Socrates, Diogenes, and Antisthenes and their followers made moral progress. And for the existence of vice as a fundamental fact the proof is that it is the opposite of virtue. That it, virtue, can be taught is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his work On the End, by Cleanthes, by Posidonius in his Protreptica, and by Hecato; that it can be taught is clear from the case of bad men becoming good. 7.120. The Stoics approve also of honouring parents and brothers in the second place next after the gods. They further maintain that parental affection for children is natural to the good, but not to the bad. It is one of their tenets that sins are all equal: so Chrysippus in the fourth book of his Ethical Questions, as well as Persaeus and Zeno. For if one truth is not more true than another, neither is one falsehood more false than another, and in the same way one deceit is not more so than another, nor sin than sin. For he who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus and he who is only one furlong away are equally not in Canopus, and so too he who commits the greater sin and he who commits the less are equally not in the path of right conduct. 7.123. Furthermore, the wise are infallible, not being liable to error. They are also without offence; for they do no hurt to others or to themselves. At the same time they are not pitiful and make no allowance for anyone; they never relax the penalties fixed by the laws, since indulgence and pity and even equitable consideration are marks of a weak mind, which affects kindness in place of chastizing. Nor do they deem punishments too severe. Again, they say that the wise man never wonders at any of the things which appear extraordinary, such as Charon's mephitic caverns, ebbings of the tide, hot springs or fiery eruptions. Nor yet, they go on to say, will the wise man live in solitude; for he is naturally made for society and action.
11. Long And Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, None

12. Stobaeus, Eclogues, None

13. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 1.537, 1.563, 2.1027

Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
appropriateness, arch analogy Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 173, 250
aristotle, on friendship Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 250
becker, lawrence Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 250
brutishness Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 250
change (metabolē) to wisdom, as a change to fire Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 77
change (metabolē) to wisdom, as a qualitative change Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 77
change (metabolē) to wisdom Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 77
chrysippus, on moral development Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 250
chrysippus, treatises of, on ends Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 250
chrysippus, treatises of, on justice Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 250
cleanthes, commanding-faculty (hēgemonikon) Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 77
cleanthes, on fire Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 77
cleanthes, on the change to virtue in physical terms Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 77
cleanthes, physical treatises Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 77
community, cosmic Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 250
comparison with plato, in physics Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 77
comparison with plato, radical Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 77
emotions, as contumacious Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 250
emotions, modern theories Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 250
fire, change to wisdom and' Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 77
fire, cleanthes on Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 77
friendship, aristotle on Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 250
hierocles, on social instinct Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 250
human nature, and capacity or wisdom Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 173
neo-stoicism Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 250
plutarch Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 77
reaching (orexis) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 250
rhome (strength) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 173
seneca Brouwer, The Stoic Sage: The Early Stoics on Wisdom, Sagehood and Socrates (2013) 77
strength Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 173
virtue, starting points toward (aphormai) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 250
wise person, arch analogy Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 173, 250
wise person, scarcity of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 173, 250
wise person Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 173