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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



10009
Quintilian, Institutes Of Oratory, 6.2.27


nan Consequently, if we wish to give our words the appearance of sincerity, we must assimilate ourselves to the emotions of those who are genuinely so affected, and our eloquence must spring from the same feeling that we desire to produce in the mind of the judge. Will he grieve who can find no trace of grief in the words with which I seek to move him to grief? Will he be angry, if the orator who seeks to kindle his anger shows no sign of labouring under the emotion which he demands from his audience? Will he shed tears if the pleader's eye are dry? It is utterly impossible.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

6 results
1. Isocrates, Orations, 13.17 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 3.11.1-3.11.2 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

3. Cicero, De Oratore, 2.45.189, 2.188, 2.194 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.188. Haec sunt illa, quae me ludens Crassus modo flagitabat, cum a me divinitus tractari solere diceret et in causa M'. Aquili Gaique Norbani non nullisque aliis quasi praeclare acta laudaret, quae me hercule ego, Crasse, cum a te tractantur in causis, horrere soleo: tanta vis animi, tantus impetus, tantus dolor oculis, vultu, gestu, digito denique isto tuo significari solet; tantum est flumen gravissimorum optimorumque verborum, tam integrae sententiae, tum verae, tam novae, tam sine pigmentis fucoque puerili, ut mihi non solum tu incendere iudicem, sed ipse ardere videaris. 2.194. Fieri nullo modo potuit. Saepe enim audivi poetam bonum neminem—id quod a Democrito et Platone in scriptis relictum esse dicunt—sine inflammatione animorum exsistere posse et sine quodam adflatu quasi furoris. Qua re nolite existimare me ipsum, qui non heroum veteres casus fictosque luctus velim imitari atque adumbrare dicendo neque actor sim alienae personae, sed auctor meae, cum mihi M'. Aquilius in civitate retinendus esset, quae in illa causa peroranda fecerim, sine magno dolore fecisse:
4. Cicero, Letters To His Friends, 5.12.5 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5. Cicero, Topica, 97 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

97. nec solum perpetuae actiones sed etiam partes orationis isdem locis adiuvantur, partim propriis partim communibus; ut in principiis, quibus quibus secl. Friedrich ut benevoli, ut dociles, ut attenti sint qui audiant, efficiendum est propriis locis; itemque narrationes ut ad suos fines spectent, id est ut planae sint, ut breves, ut evidentes, ut credibiles, ut moderatae moderatae codd. : moratae edd. vett. , ut cum dignitate. Quae quamquam in tota oratione esse debent, magis tamen sunt propria narrandi.
6. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 4.2.31, 4.2.64-4.2.65, 6.1.26, 6.1.44, 6.2.19-6.2.20, 6.2.24-6.2.26, 6.2.29-6.2.36, 8.3.61-8.3.72, 9.2.40, 12.10.61 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

4.2.31.  I will now proceed to the method to be adopted in making our statement of facts. The statement of facts consists in the persuasive exposition of that which either has been done, or is supposed to have been done, or, to quote the definition given by Apollodorus, is a speech instructing the audience as to the nature of the case in dispute. Most writers, more especially those of the Isocratean school, hold that it should be lucid, brief and plausible (for it is of no importance if we substitute clear for lucid, or credible or probable for plausible). 4.2.64.  And I will not conceal the fact that Cicero himself holds that more qualities are required. For in addition to demanding that it should be plain, brief and credible, he would have it clear, characteristic and worthy of the occasion. But everything in a speech should be characteristic and worthy of the occasion as far as possible. Palpability, as far as I understand the term, is no doubt a great virtue, when a truth requires not merely to be told, but to some extent obtruded, still it may be included under lucidity. Some, however, regard this quality as actually being injurious at times, on the ground that in certain cases it is desirable to obscure truth. 4.2.65.  This contention is, however, absurd. For he who desires to obscure the situation, will state what is false in lieu of the truth, but must still strive to secure an appearance of palpability for the facts which he narrates. 6.1.26.  For then the judge seems no longer to be listening to a voice bewailing another's ills, but to hear the voice and feelings of the unhappy victims, men whose appearance alone would call forth his tears even though they uttered never a word. And as their plea would awaken yet greater pity if they urged it with their own lips, so it is rendered to some extent all the more effective when it is, as it were, put into their mouth by their advocate: we may draw a parallel from the stage, where the actor's voice and delivery produce greater emotional effect when he is speaking in an assumed role than when he speaks in his own character. 6.1.44.  There is one point which it is specially important to remember, that we should never attempt to move our audience to tears without drawing on all the resources of our eloquence. For while this form of emotional appeal is the most effective of all, when successful, its failure results in anti-climax, and if the pleader is a feeble speaker he would have been wiser to leave the pathos of the situation to the imagination of the judges. 6.2.19.  Consequently the style of oratory employed in such cases should be calm and mild with no trace of pride, elevation or sublimity, all of which would be out of place. It is enough to speak appropriately, pleasantly and persuasively, and therefore the intermediate style of oratory is most suitable. 6.2.20.  The pathos of the Greeks, which we correctly translate by emotion, is of a different character, and I cannot better indicate the nature of the difference than by saying that ethos rather resembles comedy and pathos tragedy. For pathos is almost entirely concerned with anger, dislike, fear, hatred and pity. It will be obvious to all what topics are appropriate to such appeals and I have already spoken on the subject in discussing the exordium and the peroration. 6.2.24.  For the force of eloquence is such that it not merely compels the judge to the conclusion toward which the nature of the facts leads him, but awakens emotions which either do not naturally arise from the case or are stronger than the case would suggest. This is known as deinosis, that is to say, language giving additional force to things unjust, cruel or hateful, an accomplishment in which Demosthenes created immense and special effect. 6.2.25.  If I thought it sufficient to follow traditional rules, I should regard it as adequate treatment for this topic to omit nothing that I have read or been taught, provided that it be reasonably sound. But my design is to bring to light the secret principles of this art, and to open up the inmost recesses of the subject, giving the result not of teaching received from others, but of my own experience and the guidance of nature herself. 6.2.26.  The prime essential for stirring the emotions of others is, in my opinion, first to feel those emotions oneself. It is sometimes positively ridiculous to counterfeit grief, anger and indignation, if we content ourselves with accommodating our words and looks and make no attempt to adapt our own feelings to the emotions to be expressed. What other reason is there for the eloquence with which mourners express their grief, or for the fluency which anger lends even to the uneducated, save the fact that their minds are stirred to power by the depth and sincerity of their feelings? 6.2.29.  But how are we to generate these emotions in ourselves, since emotion is not in our own power? I will try to explain as best I may. There are certain experiences which the Greeks call φαντασίαι, and the Romans visions, whereby things absent are presented to our imagination with such extreme vividness that they seem actually to be before our very eyes. 6.2.30.  It is the man who is really sensitive to such impressions who will have the greatest power over the emotions. Some writers describe the possessor of this power of vivid imagination, whereby things, words and actions are presented in the most realistic manner, by the Greek word εὐφαντασίωτος; and it is a power which all may readily acquire if they will. When the mind is unoccupied or is absorbed by fantastic hopes or day-dreams, we are haunted by these visions of which I am speaking to such an extent that we imagine that we are travelling abroad, crossing the sea, fighting, addressing the people, or enjoying the use of wealth that we do not actually possess, and seem to ourselves not to be dreaming but acting. Surely, then, it may be possible to turn this form of hallucination to some profit. 6.2.31.  I am complaining that a man has been murdered. Shall I not bring before my eyes all the circumstances which it is reasonable to imagine must have occurred in such a connexion? Shall I not see the assassin burst suddenly from his hiding-place, the victim tremble, cry for help, beg for mercy, or turn to run? Shall I not see the fatal blow delivered and the stricken body fall? Will not the blood, the deathly pallor, the groan of agony, the death-rattle, be indelibly impressed upon my mind? 6.2.32.  From such impressions arises that ἐνάργεια which Cicero calls illumination and actuality, which makes us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual scene, while our emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were present at the actual occurrence. Is it not from visions such as these that Vergil was inspired to write â€” "Sudden her fingers let the shuttle fall And all the thread was spilled 6.2.33.  Or, "In his smooth breast the gaping wound," or the description of the horse at the funeral of Pallas, "his trappings laid aside"? And how vivid was the image of death conceived by the poet when he wrote â€” "And dying sees his own dear Argive home"? 6.2.34.  Again, when we desire to awaken pity, we must actually believe that the ills of which we complain have befallen our own selves, and must persuade our minds that this is really the case. We must identify ourselves with the persons of whom we complain that they have suffered grievous, unmerited and bitter misfortune, and must plead their case and for a brief space feel their suffering as though it were our own, while our words must be such as we should use if we stood in their shoes. 6.2.35.  I have often seen actors, both in tragedy and comedy, leave the theatre still drowned in tears after concluding the performance of some moving role. But if the mere delivery of words written by another has the power to set our souls on fire with fictitious emotions, what will the orator do whose duty it is to picture to himself the facts and who has it in his power to feel the same emotion as his client whose interests are at stake? 6.2.36.  Even in the schools it is desirable that the student should be moved by his theme, and should imagine it to be true; indeed, it is all the more desirable then, since, as a rule in scholastic declamations, the speaker more often appears as the actual litigant than as his advocate. Suppose we are impersonating an orphan, a shipwrecked man, or one in grave peril. What profit is there in assuming such a rôle unless we also assume the emotions which it involves? I have thought it necessary not to conceal these considerations from my reader, since they have contributed to the acquisition of such reputation for talent as I possess or once possessed. I have frequently been so much moved while speaking, that I have not merely been wrought upon to tears, but have turned pale and shown all the symptoms of genuine grief. 8.3.61. The ornate is something that goes beyond what is merely lucid and acceptable. It consists firstly in forming a clear conception of what we wish to say, secondly in giving this adequate expression, and thirdly in lending it additional brilliance, a process which may correctly be termed embellishment. Consequently we must place among ornaments that ἐνάργεια which I mentioned in the rules which I laid down for the statement of facts, because vivid illustration, or, as some prefer to call it, representation, is something more than mere clearness, since the latter merely lets itself be seen, whereas the former thrusts itself upon our notice. 8.3.62.  It is a great gift to be able to set forth the facts on which we are speaking clearly and vividly. For oratory fails of its full effect, and does not assert itself as it should, if its appeal is merely to the hearing, and if the judge merely feels that the facts on which he has to give his decision are being narrated to him, and not displayed in their living truth to the eyes of the mind. 8.3.63.  But since different views have been held with regard to this art of representation, I shall not attempt to divide it into all its different departments, whose number is ostentatiously multiplied by certain writers, but shall content myself with touching on those which appear to me to be absolutely necessary. There is, then, to begin with, one form of vividness which consists in giving an actual word-picture of a scene, as in the passage beginning, "Forthwith each hero tiptoe stood erect." Other details follow which give us such a picture of the two boxers confronting each other for the fight, that it could not have been clearer had we been actual spectators. 8.3.64.  Cicero is supreme in this department, as in others. Is there anybody so incapable of forming a mental picture of a scene that, when he reads the following passage from the Verrines, he does not seem not merely to see the actors in the scene, the place itself and their very dress, but even to imagine to himself other details that the orator does not describe? "There on the shore stood the praetor, the representative of the Roman people, with slippered feet, robed in a purple cloak, a tunic streaming to his heels, and leaning on the arm of this worthless woman. 8.3.65.  For my own part, I seem to see before my eyes his face, his eyes, the unseemly blandishments of himself and his paramour, the silent loathing and frightened shame of those who viewed this scene. 8.3.66.  At times, again, the picture which we endeavour to present is fuller in detail, as, for example, in the following description of a luxurious banquet, which is also from Cicero, since he by himself is capable of supplying admirable examples of every kind of oratorical ornament: "I seemed to see some entering, some leaving the room, some reeling under the influence of the wine, others yawning with yesterday's potations. The floor was foul with wine-smears, covered with wreaths half-withered and littered with fishbones. 8.3.67.  What more would any man have seen who had actually entered the room? So, too, we may move our hearers to tears by the picture of a captured town. For the mere statement that the town was stormed, while no doubt it embraces all that such a calamity involves, has all the curtness of a dispatch, and fails to penetrate to the emotions of the hearer. 8.3.68.  But if we expand all that the one word "stormed" includes, we shall see the flames pouring from house and temple, and hear the crash of falling roofs and one confused clamour blent of many cries: we shall behold some in doubt whither to fly, others clinging to their nearest and dearest in one last embrace, while the wailing of women and children and the laments of old men that the cruelty of fate should have spared them to see that day will strike upon our ears. 8.3.69.  Then will come the pillage of treasure sacred and profane, the hurrying to and fro of the plunderers as they carry off their booty or return to seek for more, the prisoners driven each before his own inhuman captor, the mother struggling to keep her child, and the victors fighting over the richest of the spoil. For though, as I have already said, the sack of a city includes all these things, it is less effective to tell the whole news at once than to recount it detail by detail. 8.3.70.  And we shall secure the vividness we seek, if only our descriptions give the impression of truth, nay, we may even add fictitious incidents of the type which commonly occur. The same vivid impression may be produced also by the mention of the accidents of each situation: "Chill shudderings shake my limbs And all my blood is curdled cold with fear;" or "And trembling mothers clasped Their children to their breast. 8.3.71. Though the attainment of such effects is, in my opinion, the highest of all oratorical gifts, it is far from difficult of attainment. Fix your eyes on nature and follow her. All eloquence is concerned with the activities of life, while every man applies to himself what he hears from others, and the mind is always readiest to accept what it recognises to be true to nature. 8.3.72. The invention of similes has also provided an admirable means of illuminating our descriptions. Some of these are designed for insertion among our arguments to help our proof, while others are devised to make our pictures yet more vivid; it is with this latter class of simile that I am now specially concerned. The following are good examples:— "Thence like fierce wolves beneath the cloud of night," or "Like the bird that flies Around the shore and the fish-haunted reef, Skimming the deep. 9.2.40.  With regard to the figure which Cicero calls ocular demonstration, this comes into play when we do not restrict ourselves to mentioning that something was done, but proceed to show how it was done, and do so not merely on broad general lines, but in full detail. In the last book I classified this figure under the head of vivid illustration, while Celsus actually terms it by this name. Others give the name of ὑποτύποσις to any representation of facts which is made in such vivid language that they appeal to the eye rather than the ear. The following will show what I mean: "He came into the forum on fire with criminal madness: his eyes blazed and cruelty was written in every feature of his countece. 12.10.61.  But he whose eloquence is like to some great torrent that rolls down rocks and "disdains a bridge" and carves out its own banks for itself, will sweep the judge from his feet, struggle as he may, and force him to go whither he bears him. This is the orator that will call the dead to life (as, for example, Cicero calls upon Appius Caecus); it is in his pages that his native land itself will cry aloud and at times address the orator himself, as it addresses Cicero in the speech delivered against Catiline in the senate.


Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
aelius theon Baumann and Liotsakis, Reading History in the Roman Empire (2022) 158
africa Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 104
ambrose Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 104
amplification Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117, 142
augustine, st, city of god Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 6
brevity Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 142
chronicle Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 104
cicero Baumann and Liotsakis, Reading History in the Roman Empire (2022) 158
comedy Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
comparison Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
conmiseratio Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 142
deinosis Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
dionysius of halicarnassus Baumann and Liotsakis, Reading History in the Roman Empire (2022) 158
emotion, ancient rhetorical theory of Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 94
emotion, contextualisation of Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 94
emotion, physiological aspects of Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 94
emotional scenarios, (proto)typical Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 94
emotions Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117, 142
enargeia Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117, 142
ethos Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
grandeur Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 142
jerome Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 104
john, monk Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 104
lucidity Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 142
mascezil Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 104
metaphor Robbins et al., The Art of Visual Exegesis (2017) 59
nero Baumann and Liotsakis, Reading History in the Roman Empire (2022) 158
object-directedness Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 94
oratio gravis Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
orosius, and augustine Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 6
orosius, audience Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
orosius, theology of history Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 6
pathos/path?, and judgement/appraisal Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 94
pathos/path?, and rhetorical style Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 94
pathos Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117, 142
paulinus of milan Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 104
peterson, erik Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 6
plutarch Baumann and Liotsakis, Reading History in the Roman Empire (2022) 158
quintilian Baumann and Liotsakis, Reading History in the Roman Empire (2022) 158; Robbins et al., The Art of Visual Exegesis (2017) 59; Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117, 142
tacitus Baumann and Liotsakis, Reading History in the Roman Empire (2022) 158
theodosius i Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 104
tiberius Baumann and Liotsakis, Reading History in the Roman Empire (2022) 158
tragedy Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
verisimilitude' Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
verisimilitude Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 142