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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



10009
Quintilian, Institutes Of Oratory, 6.2.19


nan Consequently the style of oratory employed in such cases should be calm and mild with no trace of pride, elevation or sublimity, all of which would be out of place. It is enough to speak appropriately, pleasantly and persuasively, and therefore the intermediate style of oratory is most suitable.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

6 results
1. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1.2.4-1.2.5 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Cicero, De Oratore, 2.188, 2.194 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.188. Haec sunt illa, quae me ludens Crassus modo flagitabat, cum a me divinitus tractari solere diceret et in causa M'. Aquili Gaique Norbani non nullisque aliis quasi praeclare acta laudaret, quae me hercule ego, Crasse, cum a te tractantur in causis, horrere soleo: tanta vis animi, tantus impetus, tantus dolor oculis, vultu, gestu, digito denique isto tuo significari solet; tantum est flumen gravissimorum optimorumque verborum, tam integrae sententiae, tum verae, tam novae, tam sine pigmentis fucoque puerili, ut mihi non solum tu incendere iudicem, sed ipse ardere videaris. 2.194. Fieri nullo modo potuit. Saepe enim audivi poetam bonum neminem—id quod a Democrito et Platone in scriptis relictum esse dicunt—sine inflammatione animorum exsistere posse et sine quodam adflatu quasi furoris. Qua re nolite existimare me ipsum, qui non heroum veteres casus fictosque luctus velim imitari atque adumbrare dicendo neque actor sim alienae personae, sed auctor meae, cum mihi M'. Aquilius in civitate retinendus esset, quae in illa causa peroranda fecerim, sine magno dolore fecisse:
3. Cicero, Letters To His Friends, 5.12.5 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4. Vergil, Aeneis, 1.203 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.203. (rage never lacks for arms)—if haply then
5. Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 6.1.1, 6.1.13-6.1.14, 6.1.51-6.1.52, 6.2.9-6.2.10, 6.2.13-6.2.17, 6.2.20, 6.2.24, 6.2.27, 6.2.32, 6.2.36, 12.10.61 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

6.1.1.  The next subject which I was going to discuss was the peroration which some call the completion and others the conclusion. There are two kinds of peroration, for it may deal either with facts or with the emotional aspect of the case. The repetition and grouping of the facts, which the Greeks call ἀνακεφαλαίωσις and some of our own writers call the enumeration, serves both to refresh the memory of the judge and to place the whole of the case before his eyes, and, even although the facts may have made little impression on him in detail, their cumulative effect is considerable. 6.1.13.  Calvus for example in his speech against Vatinius makes an admirable remark: "You know, gentlemen, that bribery has been committed and everybody knows that you know it." Cicero again in the Verrines says that the ill-name acquired by the courts may be effaced by the condemnation of Verres, a statement that comes under the head of the conciliatory methods mentioned above. The appeal to fear also, if it is necessary to employ it to produce a like effect, occupies a more prominent place in the peroration than in the exordium, but I have expressed my views on this subject in an earlier book. 6.1.14.  The peroration also provides freer opportunities for exciting the passions of jealousy, hatred or anger. As regards the circumstances likely to excite such feelings in the judge, jealousy will be produced by the influence of the accused, hatred by the disgraceful nature of his conduct, and anger by his disrespectful attitude to the court, if, for instance, he be contumacious, arrogant or studiously indifferent: such anger may be aroused not merely by specific acts or words, but by his looks, bearing and manner. In this connexion the remark made by the accuser of Cossutianus Capito in my young days was regarded with great approval: the words used were Greek, but may be translated thus:— "You blush to fear even Caesar. 6.1.51.  All these appeals to emotion, although some hold that they should be confined to the exordium and the peroration, which are, I admit, the places where they are most often used, may be employed in other portions of the speech as well, but more briefly, since most of them must be reserved for the opening or the close. But it is in the peroration, if anywhere, that we must let loose the whole torrent of our eloquence. 6.1.52.  For, if we have spoken well in the rest of our speech, we shall now have the judges on our side, and shall be in a position, now that we have emerged from the reefs and shoals, to spread all our canvas, while since the chief task of the peroration consists of amplification, we may legitimately make free use of words and reflexions that are magnificent and ornate. It is at the close of our drama that we must really stir the theatre, when we have reached the place for the phrase with which the old tragedies and comedies used to end, "Friends, give us your applause. 6.2.9.  But close consideration of the nature of the subject leads me to think that in this connexion it is not so much morals in general that is meant as certain peculiar aspects; for the term morals includes every attitude of the mind. The more cautious writers have preferred to give the sense of the term rather than to translate it into Latin. They therefore explain pathos as describing the more violent emotions and ethos as designating those which are calm and gentle: in the one case the passions are violent, in the other subdued, the former command and disturb, the latter persuade and induce a feeling of goodwill. 6.2.10.  Some add that ethos is continuous, while pathos is momentary. While admitting that this is usually the case, I still hold that there are some subjects which demand that the more violent emotion should be continuous. But, although the gentler emotions require less force and impetus, they call for no less art and experience than the more vehement, and are demanded in a greater number of cases, indeed in a certain sense they are required in all. 6.2.13.  The ethos which I have in my mind and which I desiderate in an orator is commended to our approval by goodness more than aught else and is not merely calm and mild, but in most cases ingratiating and courteous and such as to excite pleasure and affection in our hearers, while the chief merit in its expression lies in making it seem that all that we say derives directly from the nature of the facts and persons concerned and in the revelation of the character of the orator in such a way that all may recognise it. 6.2.14.  This kind of ethos should be especially displayed in cases where the persons concerned are intimately connected, whenever we tolerate or pardon any act or offer satisfaction or admonition, in all of which cases there should be no trace of anger or hatred. On the other hand the moderation shown by a father to his son, a guardian to his ward or a husband to his wife will differ from that which is shown by an old man to a youthful stranger who has insulted him or by a man of high rank to his inferior, since in the former cases they emphasise their affection for the wrongdoer and there is no desire to do anything that will excite dislike against them save by the manifestation of the fact that they still love them; while in the one case the offended party should be no more than provoked, in the other he should be really deeply moved. 6.2.15.  of the same character, though less violent, is the emotion to be shown when we ask pardon for the errors of the young, or apologise for some youthful amour. Sometimes again gentle raillery of another's passion may derive its tone from ethos, though only to a partial extent. More closely dependent on ethos are the skilful exercise of feigned emotion or the employment of irony in making apologies or asking questions, irony being the term which is applied to words which mean something other than they seem to express. 6.2.16.  From the same source springs also that more powerful method of exciting hatred, when by a feigned submission to our opponents we pass silent censure on their violence. For the very fact of our yielding serves to demonstrate their insupportable arrogance, while orators who have a passion for abuse or are given to affect freedom of speech fail to realise that it is a far more effective course to make your antagonist unpopular than to abuse him. For the former course makes our antagonists disliked, the latter ourselves. 6.2.17.  The emotion of love and longing for our friends and connexions is perhaps of an intermediate character, being stronger than ethos and weaker than pathos. There is also good reason for giving the name of ethos to those scholastic exercises in which we portray rustics, misers, cowards and superstitious persons according as our theme may require. For if ethos denotes moral character, our speech must necessarily be based on ethos when it is engaged in portraying such character. 6.2.20.  The pathos of the Greeks, which we correctly translate by emotion, is of a different character, and I cannot better indicate the nature of the difference than by saying that ethos rather resembles comedy and pathos tragedy. For pathos is almost entirely concerned with anger, dislike, fear, hatred and pity. It will be obvious to all what topics are appropriate to such appeals and I have already spoken on the subject in discussing the exordium and the peroration. 6.2.24.  For the force of eloquence is such that it not merely compels the judge to the conclusion toward which the nature of the facts leads him, but awakens emotions which either do not naturally arise from the case or are stronger than the case would suggest. This is known as deinosis, that is to say, language giving additional force to things unjust, cruel or hateful, an accomplishment in which Demosthenes created immense and special effect. 6.2.27.  Consequently, if we wish to give our words the appearance of sincerity, we must assimilate ourselves to the emotions of those who are genuinely so affected, and our eloquence must spring from the same feeling that we desire to produce in the mind of the judge. Will he grieve who can find no trace of grief in the words with which I seek to move him to grief? Will he be angry, if the orator who seeks to kindle his anger shows no sign of labouring under the emotion which he demands from his audience? Will he shed tears if the pleader's eye are dry? It is utterly impossible. 6.2.32.  From such impressions arises that ἐνάργεια which Cicero calls illumination and actuality, which makes us seem not so much to narrate as to exhibit the actual scene, while our emotions will be no less actively stirred than if we were present at the actual occurrence. Is it not from visions such as these that Vergil was inspired to write â€” "Sudden her fingers let the shuttle fall And all the thread was spilled 6.2.36.  Even in the schools it is desirable that the student should be moved by his theme, and should imagine it to be true; indeed, it is all the more desirable then, since, as a rule in scholastic declamations, the speaker more often appears as the actual litigant than as his advocate. Suppose we are impersonating an orphan, a shipwrecked man, or one in grave peril. What profit is there in assuming such a rôle unless we also assume the emotions which it involves? I have thought it necessary not to conceal these considerations from my reader, since they have contributed to the acquisition of such reputation for talent as I possess or once possessed. I have frequently been so much moved while speaking, that I have not merely been wrought upon to tears, but have turned pale and shown all the symptoms of genuine grief. 12.10.61.  But he whose eloquence is like to some great torrent that rolls down rocks and "disdains a bridge" and carves out its own banks for itself, will sweep the judge from his feet, struggle as he may, and force him to go whither he bears him. This is the orator that will call the dead to life (as, for example, Cicero calls upon Appius Caecus); it is in his pages that his native land itself will cry aloud and at times address the orator himself, as it addresses Cicero in the speech delivered against Catiline in the senate.
6. Augustine, The City of God, 18.21 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

18.21. After Æneas, whom they deified, Latium had eleven kings, none of whom was deified. But Aventinus, who was the twelfth after Æneas, having been laid low in war, and buried in that hill still called by his name, was added to the number of such gods as they made for themselves. Some, indeed, were unwilling to write that he was slain in battle, but said he was nowhere to be found, and that it was not from his name, but from the alighting of birds, that hill was called Aventinus. After this no god was made in Latium except Romulus the founder of Rome. But two kings are found between these two, the first of whom I shall describe in the Virgilian verse: Next came that Procas, glory of the Trojan race. That greatest of all kingdoms, the Assyrian, had its long duration brought to a close in his time, the time of Rome's birth drawing near. For the Assyrian empire was transferred to the Medes after nearly thirteen hundred and five years, if we include the reign of Belus, who begot Ninus, and, content with a small kingdom, was the first king there. Now Procas reigned before Amulius. And Amulius had made his brother Numitor's daughter, Rhea by name, who was also called Ilia, a vestal virgin, who conceived twin sons by Mars, as they will have it, in that way honoring or excusing her adultery, adding as a proof that a she-wolf nursed the infants when exposed. For they think this kind of beast belongs to Mars so that the she-wolf is believed to have given her teats to the infants, because she knew they were the sons of Mars her lord; although there are not wanting persons who say that when the crying babes lay exposed, they were first of all picked up by I know not what harlot, and sucked her breasts first (now harlots were called lup, she-wolves, from which their vile abodes are even yet called lupanaria), and that afterwards they came into the hands of the shepherd Faustulus, and were nursed by Acca his wife. Yet what wonder is it, if, to rebuke the king who had cruelly ordered them to be thrown into the water, God was pleased, after divinely delivering them from the water, to succor, by means of a wild beast giving milk, these infants by whom so great a city was to be founded? Amulius was succeeded in the Latian kingdom by his brother Numitor, the grandfather of Romulus; and Rome was founded in the first year of this Numitor, who from that time reigned along with his grandson Romulus.


Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
amplification Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
augustus Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 10
bible Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 10
breviaria Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 10
comedy Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
comparison Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
declamations Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 10
deinosis Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
emotion, ancient rhetorical theory of Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 90
emotions Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
enargeia Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
ethos Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 90; Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
exempla Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 10
florus, historian Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 10
impulse Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 90
justin Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 10
logos Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 90
oratio gravis Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
orosius, audience Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
pathos/path?, as pistis Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 90
pathos/path? Hockey, The Role of Emotion in 1 Peter (2019) 90
pathos Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
quintilian Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
remus, rhetoric, school of Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 10
tragedy Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117
troy Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 10
vergil Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 10
verisimilitude' Van Nuffelen, Orosius and the Rhetoric of History (2012) 117