Home About Network of subjects Linked subjects heatmap Book indices included Search by subject Search by reference Browse subjects Browse texts

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



9722
Posidonius Apamensis Et Rhodius, Fragments, 164
NaN


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

12 results
1. Plato, Alcibiades I, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.68-3.70, 3.74-3.75, 3.77-3.78, 4.25-4.26 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.68. Philosophi summi nequedum neque nondum X corr. V 3 tamen sapientiam consecuti nonne intellegunt in summo se malo esse? sunt enim insipientes, neque insipientia ullum maius malum est. neque tamen lugent. quid ita? quia huic generi malorum non adfingitur non affingitur V (non af in r. V c n ante g del. idem ) nodfingitur R 1 illa opinio, rectum esse et aequum et ad officium pertinere aegre ferre, quod sapiens non sis, quod idem adfingimus huic aegritudini, in qua luctus inest, quae omnium maxuma est. 3.69. itaque Aristoteles veteres philosophos Arist. fr. 53 accusans, qui existumavissent philosophiam suis ingeniis esse perfectam, ait eos aut stultissimos aut gloriosissimos fuisse; sed sed si V se videre, quod paucis annis magna accessio facta esset, brevi tempore philosophiam plane absolutam fore. Aristoteles . .. 352, 3 fore libere redd. Lact. inst. 3, 28, 20 Theophrastus autem moriens accusasse naturam dicitur, quod cervis et cornicibus vitam diuturnam, quorum id nihil interesset, hominibus, quorum maxime interfuisset, tam tamen KR 1 exiguam vitam dedisset; quorum si aetas potuisset esse longinquior, futurum fuisse ut omnibus perfectis artibus omni doctrina hominum vita erudiretur. querebatur quaerebatur VK 2 quaerebat GK 1 (quer-) R igitur se tum, cum illa videre coepisset, extingui. quid? ex ceteris philosophis nonne optumus et gravissumus quisque confitetur multa se ignorare et multa multa V 2 s multi sibi etiam atque etiam esse discenda? 3.70. neque tamen, cum se in media stultitia, qua nihil quia n. G 1 est peius, haerere intellegant, aegritudine premuntur; nulla enim admiscetur opinio officiosi doloris. Quid, qui non putant lugendum lungendum GV 1 ( prius n eras. ) iungen- dum KR viris? sqq. cf. Hier. epist. 60, 5 qualis fuit Q. Maxumus fuitque maxumus G 2 (quae G 1 ) KV ( ss. m. 3 ) ac fortasse R 1 (Q post fuit in r. m. al. ) efferens efferrens GR 1 V filium consularem, qualis L. Paulus paullus RG 1 e corr. V 1 (l eras. ) cf.p. 263, 17; 274, 19; 457, 7 duobus paucis lucius et marcus X diebus amissis amisis G 1 R 1 V 1 filiis, qualis M. Cato praetore designato mortuo filio, quales reliqui, quos in Consolatione consolationem G -ne V conlegimus. 3.74. Sed nimirum hoc maxume maxumum X me ss. B est exprimendum, exprimendum X ( con- fessio adversariis exprimenda est cf. Verr. 4, 112 Liv. 21, 18, 5 Lucan. 6, 599 manibus exprime verum ) experimentum ( et antea maxumum) edd. ( sed hoc uerbum Tullianum non est, illudque hanc—diuturna ratione conclusum, non ex experientia sumptum ) cum constet aegritudinem aegritudinem V -ne GKR vetustate tolli, tollit X sed ult. t eras. V hanc vim non esse in die diē V positam, sed in cogitatione diuturna. diurna X corr. B 1 s nam si et eadem res est et idem est homo, qui potest quicquam de dolore mutari, si neque de eo, propter quod dolet, quicquam est mutatum neque de eo, qui qui quod G 1 dolet? cogitatio igitur diuturna diurna X corr. B 1 s nihil esse in re mali dolori medetur, non ipsa diuturnitas. Hic mihi adferunt mediocritates. mediocritas X -tates V c Non. quae si naturales sunt, quid opus est consolatione? at hae mihi afferentur med.... 24 consolatione Non. 29, 27 natura enim ipsa terminabit modum; sin opinabiles, opinio tota tollatur. Satis dictum esse arbitror aegritudinem esse opinionem mali praesentis, satis arbitror dictum esse ... 355, 1 praesentis H in qua opinione illud insit, ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat. 3.75. additur ad hanc definitionem a Zenone recte, ut illa opinio praesentis mali sit recens. hoc autem verbum sic interpretantur, ut non tantum illud recens esse velint, quod paulo ante acciderit, sed quam diu in illo opinato malo vis quaedam insit, ut ut s et X vigeat et habeat quandam viriditatem, tam diu appelletur appellatur K recens. ut Artemisia illa, Mausoli Cariae regis uxor, quae nobile illud Halicarnasi alicarnasi X fecit sepulcrum, quam diu vixit, vixit in luctu eodemque etiam confecta contabuit. huic erat illa opinio cotidie recens; quae tum denique non appellatur appellabatur X corr. V 2 recens, cum vetustate exaruit. Haec igitur officia sunt consolantium, tollere aegritudinem funditus aut sedare aut detrahere aut detr. V ( ss. 2 ) quam plurumum aut supprimere nec pati manare longius aut ad alia traducere. 3.77. Erit igitur in consolationibus prima medicina docere aut nullum malum esse aut admodum parvum, altera et prius et om. G 1 de communi condicione vitae et proprie, propriae G 1 KVH ( sim. 358, 6 ) si quid sit de ipsius qui maereat disputandum, tertia tertiam H summam esse stultitiam frustra confici maerore, cum intellegas nihil nil G posse profici. nam Cleanthes cleantes X (24 GK 1 ) Cl. fr. 577 quidem sapientem consolatur, qui consolatione non eget. nihil enim enim om. G 1 esse malum, quod turpe non sit, si lugenti persuaseris, non tu illi luctum, sed stultitiam detraxeris; erit... 21 detraxeris ( sine 18 nam... 19 eget) H alienum autem tempus docendi. et tamen non satis mihi videtur vidisse hoc Cleanthes, suscipi aliquando aegritudinem posse ex eo ipso, quod esse summum malum Cleanthes suscipi... 24 Cleanthes om. K Cleanthes del. Ba. sed cf. Va. Op. 2, 130. 409 ipse fateatur. quid enim dicemus, cum Socrates Aisch. Socr. fr. 10 D. Aug. civ. 14, 8 Alcibiadi persuasisset, ut accepimus, eum nihil hominis esse nec quicquam inter Alcibiadem summo loco natum et quemvis baiolum interesse, cum se Alcibiades adflictaret lacrimansque Socrati supplex esset, ut sibi virtutem traderet turpitudinemque depelleret, illam ante dep. add. V 2 —quid dicemus, Cleanthe? acleanthe V (356, 23 cl. in r. V 2 ) o cleanthe Str. p. 58 tum tum ( cf. 356, 23 aliquando)] num edd. aegritudinem X corr. K 1 R c V 1 in illa re, quae aegritudine Alcibiadem adficiebat, mali nihil fuisse? 3.78. quid? illa Lyconis qualia quia GRV 1 (a eras. ) sunt? qui aegritudinem extenuans parvis ait eam rebus moveri, fortunae et corporis incommodis, non animi malis. mali X corr. V 2 quid ergo? illud, quod Alcibiades dolebat, non ex animi malis vitiisque constabat? ad Epicuri consolationem satis est ante dictum. 4.25. similiterque similiter quae GKV ceteri morbi, ut gloriae cupiditas, ut mulierositas, ut ita appellem eam eam s ea X Non. L quae Graece filoguni/a f l L O Gg NlA fere X ( fgL KH -m a GV) dicitur, similiterque ... 7 dicitur Non. 142, 20 ceterique similiter morbi aegrotationesque nascuntur. quae autem sunt his contraria, ea nasci putantur a metu, ut odium mulierum, quale in misogu/nw| Atili est, inmisso gyno X (imm. K guno V 2 immissum K 2 ) Atil. fr. 1 ut in hominum universum genus, quod accepimus de Timone de Timone de ti in r. V 2 qui misa/nqrwpos appellatur, quale... 12 appellatur om. H misane p wit oc a appellantur X (misanep wp oc app. V, p fort. ex it ) ut inhospitalitas est: quae omnes aegrotationes animi ex quodam metu nascuntur earum rerum quas fugiunt et oderunt. 4.26. definiunt autem animi aegrotationem opinationem St. fr. 3, 427 vehementem de re non expetenda, tamquam valde expetenda sit, inhaerentem et penitus insitam. quod autem nascitur ex offensione, ita definiunt: opinionem vehementem de re non fugienda inhaerentem et penitus insitam tamquam fugienda; fugienda expetenda KRH haec autem opinatio est iudicatio iuditio K 1 ( add. 2 ) se scire, quod nesciat. aegrotationi autem talia quaedam subiecta sunt: avaritia, ambitio, mulierositas, pervicacia, pervicatia KV ligurritio, vinulentia, vinulentia Non. vinol. X cf. Mue. cuppedia, ambitio ... 23 cuppedia Non. 85, 10 cu pedia G et si qua similia. est autem avaritia opinatio vehemens de pecunia, quasi valde expetenda sit, inhaerens et penitus insita, similisque est eiusdem generis definitio reliquarum.
3. Plutarch, Alcibiades, 4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

4. Plutarch, On Common Conceptions Against The Stoics, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

5. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 123.15 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

6. Clement of Alexandria, Christ The Educator, 3.11.74 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.5.26-4.5.44, 4.7.28, 4.7.37 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

8. Gellius, Attic Nights, 19.1 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

9. Posidonius Olbiopolitanus, Fragments, 164 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

10. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 7.151 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

11. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 3.62, 7.46, 7.129-7.130, 7.173 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

3.62. In the first trilogy they place the Republic, Timaeus and Critias; in the second the Sophist, the Statesman and Cratylus; in the third the Laws, Minos and Epinomis; in the fourth Theaetetus, Euthyphro and the Apology; in the fifth Crito, Phaedo and the Epistles. The rest follow as separate compositions in no regular order. Some critics, as has already been stated, put the Republic first, while others start with the greater Alcibiades, and others again with the Theages; some begin with the Euthyphro, others with the Clitophon; some with the Timaeus, others with the Phaedrus; others again with the Theaetetus, while many begin with the Apology. The following dialogues are acknowledged to be spurious: the Midon or Horse-breeder, the Eryxias or Erasistratus, the Alcyon, the Acephali or Sisyphus, the Axiochus, the Phaeacians, the Demodocus, the Chelidon, the Seventh Day, the Epimenides. of these the Alcyon is thought to be the work of a certain Leon, according to Favorinus in the fifth book of his Memorabilia. 7.46. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it. Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind's assent to impressions. 7.129. Neither do they think that the divergence of opinion between philosophers is any reason for abandoning the study of philosophy, since at that rate we should have to give up life altogether: so Posidonius in his Exhortations. Chrysippus allows that the ordinary Greek education is serviceable.It is their doctrine that there can be no question of right as between man and the lower animals, because of their unlikeness. Thus Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On Justice, and Posidonius in the first book of his De officio. Further, they say that the wise man will feel affection for the youths who by their countece show a natural endowment for virtue. So Zeno in his Republic, Chrysippus in book i. of his work On Modes of Life, and Apollodorus in his Ethics. 7.130. Their definition of love is an effort toward friendliness due to visible beauty appearing, its sole end being friendship, not bodily enjoyment. At all events, they allege that Thrasonides, although he had his mistress in his power, abstained from her because she hated him. By which it is shown, they think, that love depends upon regard, as Chrysippus says in his treatise of Love, and is not sent by the gods. And beauty they describe as the bloom or flower of virtue.of the three kinds of life, the contemplative, the practical, and the rational, they declare that we ought to choose the last, for that a rational being is expressly produced by nature for contemplation and for action. They tell us that the wise man will for reasonable cause make his own exit from life, on his country's behalf or for the sake of his friends, or if he suffer intolerable pain, mutilation, or incurable disease. 7.173. He was present in the theatre when the poet Sositheus uttered the verse –Driven by Cleanthes' folly like dumb herds,and he remained unmoved in the same attitude. At which the audience were so astonished that they applauded him and drove Sositheus off the stage. Afterwards when the poet apologized for the insult, he accepted the apology, saying that, when Dionysus and Heracles were ridiculed by the poets without getting angry, it would be absurd for him to be annoyed at casual abuse. He used to say that the Peripatetics were in the same case as lyres which, although they give forth sweet sounds, never hear themselves. It is said that when he laid it down as Zeno's opinion that a man's character could be known from his looks, certain witty young men brought before him a rake with hands horny from toil in the country and requested him to state what the man's character was. Cleanthes was perplexed and ordered the man to go away; but when, as he was making off, he sneezed, I have it, cried Cleanthes, he is effeminate.
12. Augustine, The City of God, 14.8 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

14.8. Those emotions which the Greeks call εὐπαθείαι, and which Cicero calls constantiœ, the Stoics would restrict to three; and, instead of three perturbations in the soul of the wise man, they substituted severally, in place of desire, will; in place of joy, contentment; and for fear, caution; and as to sickness or pain, which we, to avoid ambiguity, preferred to call sorrow, they denied that it could exist in the mind of a wise man. Will, they say, seeks the good, for this the wise man does. Contentment has its object in good that is possessed, and this the wise man continually possesses. Caution avoids evil, and this the wise man ought to avoid. But sorrow arises from evil that has already happened; and as they suppose that no evil can happen to the wise man, there can be no representative of sorrow in his mind. According to them, therefore, none but the wise man wills, is contented, uses caution; and that the fool can do no more than desire, rejoice, fear, be sad. The former three affections Cicero calls constantiœ, the last four perturbationes. Many, however, calls these last passions; and, as I have said, the Greeks call the former εὐπαθείαι, and the latter πάθη . And when I made a careful examination of Scripture to find whether this terminology was sanctioned by it, I came upon this saying of the prophet: There is no contentment to the wicked, says the Lord; Isaiah 57:21 as if the wicked might more properly rejoice than be contented regarding evils, for contentment is the property of the good and godly. I found also that verse in the Gospel: Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them? Matthew 7:12 which seems to imply that evil or shameful things may be the object of desire, but not of will. Indeed, some interpreters have added good things, to make the expression more in conformity with customary usage, and have given this meaning, Whatsoever good deeds that you would that men should do unto you. For they thought that this would prevent any one from wishing other men to provide him with unseemly, not to say shameful gratifications - luxurious banquets, for example - on the supposition that if he returned the like to them he would be fulfilling this precept. In the Greek Gospel, however, from which the Latin is translated, good does not occur, but only, All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them, and, as I believe, because good is already included in the word would; for He does not say desire. Yet though we may sometimes avail ourselves of these precise proprieties of language, we are not to be always bridled by them; and when we read those writers against whose authority it is unlawful to reclaim, we must accept the meanings above mentioned in passages where a right sense can be educed by no other interpretation, as in those instances we adduced partly from the prophet, partly from the Gospel. For who does not know that the wicked exult with joy? Yet there is no contentment for the wicked, says the Lord. And how so, unless because contentment, when the word is used in its proper and distinctive significance, means something different from joy? In like manner, who would deny that it were wrong to enjoin upon men that whatever they desire others to do to them they should themselves do to others, lest they should mutually please one another by shameful and illicit pleasure? And yet the precept, Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so to them, is very wholesome and just. And how is this, unless because the will is in this place used strictly, and signifies that will which cannot have evil for its object? But ordinary phraseology would not have allowed the saying, Be unwilling to make any manner of lie, Sirach 7:13 had there not been also an evil will, whose wickedness separates if from that which the angels celebrated, Peace on earth, of good will to men. Luke 2:14 For good is superfluous if there is no other kind of will but good will. And why should the apostle have mentioned it among the praises of charity as a great thing, that it rejoices not in iniquity, unless because wickedness does so rejoice? For even with secular writers these words are used indifferently. For Cicero, that most fertile of orators, says, I desire, conscript fathers, to be merciful. And who would be so pedantic as to say that he should have said I will rather than I desire, because the word is used in a good connection? Again, in Terence, the profligate youth, burning with wild lust, says, I will nothing else than Philumena. That this will was lust is sufficiently indicated by the answer of his old servant which is there introduced: How much better were it to try and banish that love from your heart, than to speak so as uselessly to inflame your passion still more! And that contentment was used by secular writers in a bad sense that verse of Virgil testifies, in which he most succinctly comprehends these four perturbations - Hence they fear and desire, grieve and are content The same author had also used the expression, the evil contentments of the mind. So that good and bad men alike will, are cautious, and contented; or, to say the same thing in other words, good and bad men alike desire, fear, rejoice, but the former in a good, the latter in a bad fashion, according as the will is right or wrong. Sorrow itself, too, which the Stoics would not allow to be represented in the mind of the wise man, is used in a good sense, and especially in our writings. For the apostle praises the Corinthians because they had a godly sorrow. But possibly some one may say that the apostle congratulated them because they were penitently sorry, and that such sorrow can exist only in those who have sinned. For these are his words: For I perceive that the same epistle has made you sorry, though it were but for a season. Now I rejoice, not that you were made sorry, but that you sorrowed to repentance; for you were made sorry after a godly manner, that you might receive damage by us in nothing. For godly sorrow works repentance to salvation not to be repented of, but the sorrow of the world works death. For, behold, this selfsame thing that you sorrowed after a godly sort, what carefulness it wrought in you! 2 Corinthians 7:8-11 Consequently the Stoics may defend themselves by replying, that sorrow is indeed useful for repentance of sin, but that this can have no place in the mind of the wise man, inasmuch as no sin attaches to him of which he could sorrowfully repent, nor any other evil the endurance or experience of which could make him sorrowful. For they say that Alcibiades (if my memory does not deceive me), who believed himself happy, shed tears when Socrates argued with him, and demonstrated that he was miserable because he was foolish. In his case, therefore, folly was the cause of this useful and desirable sorrow, wherewith a man mourns that he is what he ought not to be. But the Stoics maintain not that the fool, but that the wise man, cannot be sorrowful.


Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
aeschines Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
alcibiades Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
apollodorus Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
aristotle, on impressions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
aristotle, on involuntary feelings Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
arius didymus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 341
becker, lawrence Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236, 252
ben-zeev, aaron Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
brutishness Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
choice (hairesis) / choosing (haireisthai) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 341
chrysippus, on moral development Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
chrysippus, treatises of, on erotic love Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
chrysippus, treatises of, on lives Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
chrysippus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 341
cicero, on remorse Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
cicero, on species-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
cicero Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 341
desire (epithumia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 341
disease (nosos, nosēma) / illness Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 341
emotions, as contumacious Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
emotions, examples of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
emotions, modern theories Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236, 252
emotions, moral emotions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
epibole (effort or resolve) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
epictetus, on unassented feelings Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
eupatheiai, and being carried away Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
eupatheiai, classified by species Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
eupatheiai, include erotic love Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
faults, as source of distress Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
feelings, involuntary, in aristotle Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
galen of pergamum Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 341
gellius, aulus Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
genus-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
grief, weeping griffiths, paul Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
habit / habituate / habitude (ethos, ethizesthai, hexis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 341
imagination Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
impressions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
indifferents (adiaphora) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 341
judgment (krisis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 341
love, erotic or sexual, eupathic Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
love (amorous) / lust (philia, erōs) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 341
love of various things (philomatheia, philomousia, ktl.) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 341
opinion (doxa) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 341
physiognomics Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
posidonius, on causes of emotion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
posidonius, on remorse Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
posidonius Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 341
progressors, pain of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
reaching (orexis) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
schofield, malcolm Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
seneca, on involuntary feelings Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
sex, and erotic love Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
sickness (arrōstēma) / infirmity Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 341
socrates, and alcibiades Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
stobaeus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 341
strength (ischus) / strengthen Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 341
virtue, in erotic love Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
weakness (astheneia)' Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 341
zajonc, r. b. Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
zeno of citium, on erotic love Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252
zeno of citium, republic Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 252