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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



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Posidonius Apamensis Et Rhodius, Fragments, 154
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21 results
1. Euripides, Orestes, 256-259, 255 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)

255. Mother, I implore you! Do not shake at me those maidens with their bloodshot eyes and snaky hair. Here they are, close by, to leap on me! Electra
2. Hippocrates, On Airs, Waters, And Places, 10 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

3. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 7.1, 7.5, 7.7, 7.10 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

4. Aristotle, Problems, 30.1 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

5. Cicero, On Invention, 2.51, 2.89-2.91 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

2.51. scentur, in contrarias partes diducuntur. certus autem locus est accusatoris, per quem auget facti atrocitatem, et alter, per quem negat malorum misereri oportere: defensoris, per quem calumnia accusatorum cum in- dignatione ostenditur et per quem cum conquestione misericordia captatur. hi et ceteri loci omnes com- munes ex iisdem praeceptis sumuntur, quibus ceterae argumentationes; sed illae tenuius et subtilius et acu- tius tractantur, hi autem gravius et ornatius et cum verbis tum etiam sententiis excellentibus. in illis enim finis est, ut id, quod dicitur, verum esse videatur, in his, tametsi hoc quoque videri oportet, tamen finis est amplitudo. Nunc ad aliam constitutionem transeamus. 2.89. gumentabitur: primum, cuius acciderit culpa, demon- strabit; deinde, cum id aliena culpa accidisset, ostendet se aut non potuisse aut non debuisse id facere, quod accusator dicat oportuisse; quid potuerit, ex utilitatis partibus, in quibus est necessitudinis vis implicata, demonstrabit quid debuerit, ex honestate considera- bitur. de utroque distinctius in deliberativo genere dicetur. deinde omnia facta esse ab reo, quae in ipsius fuerint potestate; 2.90. quod minus, quam convenerit, fac- tum sit, culpa id alterius accidisse. deinde alterius culpa exponenda demonstrandum est, quantum volun- tatis et studii fuerit in ipso, et id signis confirman- dum huiusmodi: ex cetera diligentia, ex ante factis aut dictis; atque hoc ipsi utile fuisse facere, inutile autem non facere, et cum cetera vita fuisse hoc magis consentaneum, quam quod propter alterius culpam non fecerit. si autem non in hominem certum, sed in rem aliquam causa demovebitur, ut in hac eadem re, si quaestor mortuus esset et idcirco legatis pe- cunia data non esset, accusatione alterius et culpae depulsione dempta ceteris similiter uti locis oportebit et ex concessionis partibus, quae convenient, assumere; de quibus nobis dicendum erit. 2.91. Loci autem communes idem utrisque fere, qui in superioribus assumptivis, incident; hi tamen certissi- me: accusatoris, facti indignatio; defensoris, cum in alio culpa sit, aut in ipso non sit, supplicio se affici non oportere. Ipsius autem rei fit remotio, cum id, quod datur crimini, negat neque ad se neque ad officium suum reus pertinuisse; nec, si quid in eo sit delictum, sibi adtribui oportere. id causae genus est huiusmodi: in eo foedere, quod factum est quondam cum Samnitibus, quidam adulescens nobilis porcum sustinuit iussu im- peratoris. foedere autem ab senatu inprobato et im- peratore Samnitibus dedito quidam in senatu eum quoque dicit, qui porcum tenuerit, dedi oportere.
6. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.82-3.83, 4.31 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.82. et tamen, ut medici uti medici K ( er. n) toto corpore curando minimae etiam parti, si condoluit, medentur, sic philosophia cum universam aegritudinem sustulit, sustulit aegritudinem sustulit tamen si X (sustullit G 1 V 1 condoluit tamen si K 1 medenturaegr. sustulit add. c ) corr. Keil, Quaest. Tull. p. XVIII etiam, si quis error alicunde alicunde Ern. aliunde extitit, si paupertas momordit, si ignominia pupugit, pupigit G 1 R 1 V 1 si quid tenebrarum obfudit exilium, exsilium GV 1 aut eorum quae quaeque (quaeque G) modo X corr. s modo dixi si quid si quid sicut K extitit. etsi singularum rerum sunt propriae consolationes, de quibus audies tu quidem, cum voles. sed ad eundem fontem revertendum est, aegritudinem omnem procul abesse a sapiente, quod iis sit, quod frustra suscipiatur, quod non natura exoriatur, sed iudicio, sed opinione, sed quadam invitatione ad dolendum, cum id decreverimus ita fieri oportere. 3.83. Hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata illa ilia ita G 1 maerens, morsus tamen tamen tantum Bentl. sed cf. p. 323, 11 quo Cic. hic respicit et contractiuncula quaedam contractiuncuculae quaedam (quadam G quandam V 1 ) relinquentur W Non. (relincuntur) corr. Bentl. cf. 9 hanc et Sen. ad Marc. 7, 1 animi relinquetur. hoc... 9 relinquentur Non. 92, 24 hanc dicant sane naturalem, dum aegritudinis nomen absit grave taetrum funestum, quod cum sapientia esse atque, ut ita dicam, habitare nullo modo possit. At quae at quae Bentl. atque stirpes sunt aegritudinis, quam multae, quam amarae! quae ipso ipso om. V trunco everso omnes eligendae elidendae R 2 sunt et, si necesse erit, singulis disputationibus. superest enim nobis hoc, cuicuimodi cuicuimodi cuiusmodi V 3 est, otium. sed ratio una omnium est aegritudinum, plura sed plura H nomina. nam et invidere aegritudinis est et aemulari et obtrectare et misereri et angi, lugere, maerere, aerumna adfici, lamentari, sollicitari, sollicitari add. G 2 dolere, dolore V in molestia esse, adflictari, desperare. 4.31. et ut corporis est quaedam apta figura membrorum cum coloris quadam suavitate eaque ea quae X dicitur dicuntur G 1 pulchritudo, sic in animo opinionum iudiciorumque aequabilitas et constantia cum firmitate quadam et stabilitate virtutem subsequens aut virtutis vim ipsam continens pulchritudo vocatur. itemque viribus corporis et nervis et efficacitati similes similibus quoque similibus quoque Man. similibusque verbis animi vires nomitur. velocitas autem corporis celeritas appellatur, quae eadem ingenii etiam laus habetur propter animi multarum rerum brevi tempore percursionem. propter ... percursiones Non. 161, 20 ( s. l. percursionem) percussionem X ( corr. V rec periussionem K 1 ) Illud animorum corporumque dissimile, St. fr. 3, 426 quod animi valentes morbo temptari non possunt, temptari non possunt ut c. Bentl. sed cf. Galen de Hipp. et Pl. 409, 1 M. al. corpora corpora autem p. G ( exp. 2 ) possunt; sed corporum offensiones sine culpa accidere possunt, animorum non item, quorum omnes morbi et perturbationes ex aspernatione rationis eveniunt. veniunt H itaque in in om. H hominibus solum existunt; nam bestiae simile quiddam quidam GR 1 V 1 ( corr. R 2 V c ) faciunt, sed in perturbationes non incidunt.
7. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.28.33, 3.7.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

8. Plutarch, Against Colotes, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

9. Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

10. Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

11. Plutarch, Placita Philosophorum (874D-911C), 4.12 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

12. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 1.3.6, 2.3.2, 2.3.4-2.3.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

13. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 71.29-71.30, 92.3, 92.8, 92.10, 113.18 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

14. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.5.4, 4.7.16-4.7.17, 4.7.37, 5.1.10, 5.5.16-5.5.21, 5.5.26-5.5.29, 5.6.24-5.6.26 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

15. Posidonius Olbiopolitanus, Fragments, 154 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

16. Sextus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.69 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

17. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 7.192, 7.249 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

18. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.158 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.158. We hear when the air between the sot body and the organ of hearing suffers concussion, a vibration which spreads spherically and then forms waves and strikes upon the ears, just as the water in a reservoir forms wavy circles when a stone is thrown into it. Sleep is caused, they say, by the slackening of the tension in our senses, which affects the ruling part of the soul. They consider that the passions are caused by the variations of the vital breath.Semen is by them defined as that which is capable of generating offspring like the parent. And the human semen which is emitted by a human parent in a moist vehicle is mingled with parts of the soul, blended in the same ratio in which they are present in the parent.
19. Origen, On First Principles, 3.1.2 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

3.1.2. of all things which move, some have the cause of their motion within themselves, others receive it from without: and all those things only are moved from without which are without life, as stones, and pieces of wood, and whatever things are of such a nature as to be held together by the constitution of their matter alone, or of their bodily substance. That view must indeed be dismissed which would regard the dissolution of bodies by corruption as motion, for it has no bearing upon our present purpose. Others, again, have the cause of motion in themselves, as animals, or trees, and all things which are held together by natural life or soul; among which some think ought to be classed the veins of metals. Fire, also, is supposed to be the cause of its own motion, and perhaps also springs of water. And of those things which have the causes of their motion in themselves, some are said to be moved out of themselves, others by themselves. And they so distinguish them, because those things are moved out of themselves which are alive indeed, but have no soul; whereas those things which have a soul are moved by themselves, when a phantasy, i.e., a desire or incitement, is presented to them, which excites them to move towards something. Finally, in certain things endowed with a soul, there is such a phantasy, i.e., a will or feeling, as by a kind of natural instinct calls them forth, and arouses them to orderly and regular motion; as we see to be the case with spiders, which are stirred up in a most orderly manner by a phantasy, i.e., a sort of wish and desire for weaving, to undertake the production of a web, some natural movement undoubtedly calling forth the effort to work of this kind. Nor is this very insect found to possess any other feeling than the natural desire of weaving; as in like manner bees also exhibit a desire to form honeycombs, and to collect, as they say, aerial honey. 3.1.2. But with respect to the declaration of the apostle, Therefore has He mercy on whom He will have mercy, and whom He will He hardens. You will say then unto me, Why does He yet find fault? For who has resisted His will? Nay but, O man, who are you that replies against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why have you made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? Some one will perhaps say, that as the potter out of the same lump makes some vessels to honour, and others to dishonour, so God creates some men for perdition, and others for salvation; and that it is not therefore in our own power either to be saved or to perish; by which reasoning we appear not to be possessed of free-will. We must answer those who are of this opinion with the question, Whether it is possible for the apostle to contradict himself? And if this cannot be imagined of an apostle, how shall he appear, according to them, to be just in blaming those who committed fornication in Corinth, or those who sinned, and did not repent of their unchastity, and fornication, and uncleanness, which they had committed? How, also, does he greatly praise those who acted rightly, like the house of Onesiphorus, saying, The Lord give mercy to the house of Onesiphorus; for he oft refreshed me, and was not ashamed of my chain: but, when he had come to Rome, he sought me out very diligently, and found me. The Lord grant unto him that he may find mercy of the Lord in that day. Now it is not consistent with apostolic gravity to blame him who is worthy of blame, i.e., who has sinned, and greatly to praise him who is deserving of praise for his good works; and again, as if it were in no one's power to do any good or evil, to say that it was the Creator's doing that every one should act virtuously or wickedly, seeing He makes one vessel to honour, and another to dishonour. And how can he add that statement, We must all stand before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one of us may receive in his body, according to what he has done, whether it be good or bad? For what reward of good will be conferred on him who could not commit evil, being formed by the Creator to that very end? Or what punishment will deservedly be inflicted on him who was unable to do good in consequence of the creative act of his Maker? Then, again, how is not this opposed to that other declaration elsewhere, that in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth, and some to honour, and some to dishonour. If a man therefore purge himself from these, he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified, and meet for the Master's use, prepared unto every good work. He, accordingly, who purges himself, is made a vessel unto honour, while he who has disdained to cleanse himself from his impurity is made a vessel unto dishonour. From such declarations, in my opinion, the cause of our actions can in no degree be referred to the Creator. For God the Creator makes a certain vessel unto honour, and other vessels to dishonour; but that vessel which has cleansed itself from all impurity He makes a vessel unto honour, while that which has stained itself with the filth of vice He makes a vessel unto dishonour. The conclusion from which, accordingly, is this, that the cause of each one's actions is a pre-existing one; and then every one, according to his deserts, is made by God either a vessel unto honour or dishonour. Therefore every individual vessel has furnished to its Creator out of itself the causes and occasions of its being formed by Him to be either a vessel unto honour or one unto dishonour. And if the assertion appear correct, as it certainly is, and in harmony with all piety, that it is due to previous causes that every vessel be prepared by God either to honour or to dishonour, it does not appear absurd that, in discussing remoter causes in the same order, and in the same method, we should come to the same conclusion respecting the nature of souls, and (believe) that this was the reason why Jacob was beloved before he was born into this world, and Esau hated, while he still was contained in the womb of his mother. 3.1.2. Nay, that very declaration, that from the same lump a vessel is formed both to honour and to dishonour, will not push us hard; for we assert that the nature of all rational souls is the same, as one lump of clay is described as being under the treatment of the potter. Seeing, then, the nature of rational creatures is one, God, according to the previous grounds of merit, created and formed out of it, as the potter out of the one lump, some persons to honour and others to dishonour. Now, as regards the language of the apostle, which he utters as if in a tone of censure, Nay but, O man, who are you that replies against God? he means, I think, to point out that such a censure does not refer to any believer who lives rightly and justly, and who has confidence in God, i.e., to such an one as Moses was, of whom Scripture says that Moses spoke, and God answered him by a voice; and as God answered Moses, so also does every saint answer God. But he who is an unbeliever, and loses confidence in answering before God owing to the unworthiness of his life and conversation, and who, in relation to these matters, does not seek to learn and make progress, but to oppose and resist, and who, to speak more plainly, is such an one as to be able to say those words which the apostle indicates, when he says, Why, then, does He yet find fault? For who will resist His will?— to such an one may the censure of the apostle rightly be directed, Nay but, O man, who are you that replies against God? This censure accordingly applies not to believers and saints, but to unbelievers and wicked men. 3.1.2. But since the words of the apostle, in what he says regarding vessels of honour or dishonour, that if a man therefore purge himself, he will be a vessel unto honour, sanctified and meet for the Master's service, and prepared unto every good work, appear to place nothing in the power of God, but all in ourselves; while in those in which he declares that the potter has power over the clay, to make of the same lump one vessel to honour, another to dishonour, he seems to refer the whole to God — it is not to be understood that those statements are contradictory, but the two meanings are to be reduced to agreement, and one signification must be drawn from both, viz., that we are not to suppose either that those things which are in our own power can be done without the help of God, or that those which are in God's hand can be brought to completion without the intervention of our acts, and desires, and intention; because we have it not in our own power so to will or do anything, as not to know that this very faculty, by which we are able to will or to do, was bestowed on us by God, according to the distinction which we indicated above. Or again, when God forms vessels, some to honour and others to dishonour, we are to suppose that He does not regard either our wills, or our purposes, or our deserts, to be the causes of the honour or dishonour, as if they were a sort of matter from which He may form the vessel of each one of us either to honour or to dishonour; whereas the very movement of the soul itself, or the purpose of the understanding, may of itself suggest to him, who is not unaware of his heart and the thoughts of his mind, whether his vessel ought to be formed to honour or to dishonour. But let these points suffice, which we have discussed as we best could, regarding the questions connected with the freedom of the will. 3.1.2. of things that move, some have the cause of their motion within themselves; others, again, are moved only from without. Now only portable things are moved from without, such as pieces of wood, and stones, and all matter that is held together by their constitution alone. And let that view be removed from consideration which calls the flux of bodies motion, since it is not needed for our present purpose. But animals and plants have the cause of their motion within themselves, and in general whatever is held together by nature and a soul, to which class of things they say that metals also belong. And besides these, fire too is self-moved, and perhaps also fountains of water. Now, of those things which have the cause of their movement within themselves, some, they say, are moved out of themselves, others from themselves: things without life, out of themselves; animate things, from themselves. For animate things are moved from themselves, a phantasy springing up in them which incites to effort. And again, in certain animals phantasies are formed which call forth an effort, the nature of the phantasy stirring up the effort in an orderly manner, as in the spider is formed the phantasy of weaving; and the attempt to weave follows, the nature of its phantasy inciting the insect in an orderly manner to this alone. And besides its phantasial nature, nothing else is believed to belong to the insect. And in the bee there is formed the phantasy to produce wax. 3.1.2. But since the apostle in one place does not pretend that the becoming of a vessel unto honour or dishonour depends upon God, but refers back the whole to ourselves, saying, If, then, a man purge himself, he will be a vessel unto honour, sanctified, meet for the Master's use, and prepared unto every good work; and elsewhere does not even pretend that it is dependent upon ourselves, but appears to attribute the whole to God, saying, The potter has power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour and another to dishonour; and as his statements are not contradictory, we must reconcile them, and extract one complete statement from both. Neither does our own power, apart from the knowledge of God, compel us to make progress; nor does the knowledge of God (do so), unless we ourselves also contribute something to the good result; nor does our own power, apart from the knowledge of God, and the use of the power that worthily belongs to us, make a man become (a vessel) unto honour or dishonour; nor does the will of God alone form a man to honour or to dishonour, unless He hold our will to be a kind of matter that admits of variation, and that inclines to a better or worse course of conduct. And these observations are sufficient to have been made by us on the subject of free-will.
20. Augustine, The City of God, 9.4 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

9.4. Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental emotions, which the Greeks call παθη, while some of our own writers, as Cicero, call them perturbations, some affections, and some, to render the Greek word more accurately, passions. Some say that even the wise man is subject to these perturbations, though moderated and controlled by reason, which imposes laws upon them, and so restrains them within necessary bounds. This is the opinion of the Platonists and Aristotelians; for Aristotle was Plato's disciple, and the founder of the Peripatetic school. But others, as the Stoics, are of opinion that the wise man is not subject to these perturbations. But Cicero, in his book De Finibus, shows that the Stoics are here at variance with the Platonists and Peripatetics rather in words than in reality; for the Stoics decline to apply the term goods to external and bodily advantages, because they reckon that the only good is virtue, the art of living well, and this exists only in the mind. The other philosophers, again, use the simple and customary phraseology, and do not scruple to call these things goods, though in comparison of virtue, which guides our life, they are little and of small esteem. And thus it is obvious that, whether these outward things are called goods or advantages, they are held in the same estimation by both parties, and that in this matter the Stoics are pleasing themselves merely with a novel phraseology. It seems, then, to me that in this question, whether the wise man is subject to mental passions, or wholly free from them, the controversy is one of words rather than of things; for I think that, if the reality and not the mere sound of the words is considered, the Stoics hold precisely the same opinion as the Platonists and Peripatetics. For, omitting for brevity's sake other proofs which I might adduce in support of this opinion, I will state but one which I consider conclusive. Aulus Gellius, a man of extensive erudition, and gifted with an eloquent and graceful style, relates, in his work entitled Noctes Attic that he once made a voyage with an eminent Stoic philosopher; and he goes on to relate fully and with gusto what I shall barely state, that when the ship was tossed and in danger from a violent storm, the philosopher grew pale with terror. This was noticed by those on board, who, though themselves threatened with death, were curious to see whether a philosopher would be agitated like other men. When the tempest had passed over, and as soon as their security gave them freedom to resume their talk, one of the passengers, a rich and luxurious Asiatic, begins to banter the philosopher, and rally him because he had even become pale with fear, while he himself had been unmoved by the impending destruction. But the philosopher availed himself of the reply of Aristippus the Socratic, who, on finding himself similarly bantered by a man of the same character, answered, You had no cause for anxiety for the soul of a profligate debauchee, but I had reason to be alarmed for the soul of Aristippus. The rich man being thus disposed of, Aulus Gellius asked the philosopher, in the interests of science and not to annoy him, what was the reason of his fear? And he willing to instruct a man so zealous in the pursuit of knowledge, at once took from his wallet a book of Epictetus the Stoic, in which doctrines were advanced which precisely harmonized with those of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the Stoical school. Aulus Gellius says that he read in this book that the Stoics maintain that there are certain impressions made on the soul by external objects which they call phantasi, and that it is not in the power of the soul to determine whether or when it shall be invaded by these. When these impressions are made by alarming and formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the soul even of the wise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear, or is depressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work of reason and self-control; but this does not imply that the mind accepts these evil impressions, or approves or consents to them. For this consent is, they think, in a man's power; there being this difference between the mind of the wise man and that of the fool, that the fool's mind yields to these passions and consents to them, while that of the wise man, though it cannot help being invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken firmness a true and steady persuasion of those things which it ought rationally to desire or avoid. This account of what Aulus Gellius relates that he read in the book of Epictetus about the sentiments and doctrines of the Stoics I have given as well as I could, not, perhaps, with his choice language, but with greater brevity, and, I think, with greater clearness. And if this be true, then there is no difference, or next to none, between the opinion of the Stoics and that of the other philosophers regarding mental passions and perturbations, for both parties agree in maintaining that the mind and reason of the wise man are not subject to these. And perhaps what the Stoics mean by asserting this, is that the wisdom which characterizes the wise man is clouded by no error and sullied by no taint, but, with this reservation that his wisdom remains undisturbed, he is exposed to the impressions which the goods and ills of this life (or, as they prefer to call them, the advantages or disadvantages) make upon them. For we need not say that if that philosopher had thought nothing of those things which he thought he was immediately to lose, life and bodily safety, he would not have been so terrified by his danger as to betray his fear by the pallor of his cheek. Nevertheless, he might suffer this mental disturbance, and yet maintain the fixed persuasion that life and bodily safety, which the violence of the tempest threatened to destroy, are not those good things which make their possessors good, as the possession of righteousness does. But in so far as they persist that we must call them not goods but advantages, they quarrel about words and neglect things. For what difference does it make whether goods or advantages be the better name, while the Stoic no less than the Peripatetic is alarmed at the prospect of losing them, and while, though they name them differently, they hold them in like esteem? Both parties assure us that, if urged to the commission of some immorality or crime by the threatened loss of these goods or advantages, they would prefer to lose such things as preserve bodily comfort and security rather than commit such things as violate righteousness. And thus the mind in which this resolution is well grounded suffers no perturbations to prevail with it in opposition to reason, even though they assail the weaker parts of the soul; and not only so, but it rules over them, and, while it refuses its consent and resists them, administers a reign of virtue. Such a character is ascribed to Æneas by Virgil when he says, He stands immovable by tears, Nor tenderest words with pity hears.
21. Stobaeus, Eclogues, 3.18.24



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
affective movements (pathētikai kinēseis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305, 314
alcmaeon Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
anger (orgē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305
animals, complex behavior in Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
animals, impressions of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
animals (general) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305
appearance (phantasia, impression) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305, 314
appropriation (oikeiōsis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305
aristotle, on brutishness Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
aristotle, on melancholy Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
assent (sunkatathesis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 314
augustine Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
bad (evil) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305
becker, lawrence Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237, 240
body / bodies (corporeal, material, matter, physical) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305, 314
brutishness Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
cannibalism Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
chrysippus, on drunkenness Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
chrysippus, on involuntary feelings Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
chrysippus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 314
cicero, on species-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237, 240
cognitive / cognition Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305
componential Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 314
cooper, john Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
distress (lupē, grief, pain) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305
dualism Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 314
emotions, causation of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
emotions, examples of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237, 240
emotions, modern theories Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237, 240
emotions / passions (pathē, pathēmata) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305, 314
epictetus, on insanity Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
epictetus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 314
eupatheiai, classified by species Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237, 240
false belief / false judgment / false opinion Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305
fear (phobos) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305
feelings, physical alterations underlying Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
galen of pergamum Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305
genus-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
good (moral) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305
habit / habituate / habitude (ethos, ethizesthai, hexis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305
hallucinations Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
heracles Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
holler, ernst Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
imagination Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
impressions, disordered, in the insane Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
impressions, in aristotle Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
impressions, of animals Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
impressions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
impulse (hormē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305, 314
insanity, as derangement Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
insanity, in aristotle Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
irrational (alogos) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 314
medical writers, greek, on insanity Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
melancholia Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
monism Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 314
nature (phusis) / natural, human Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305
non-cognitive Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305, 314
non-rational Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305
opinion (doxa) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305
orestes Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
origins of error, value as source Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
orthodoxy Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 314
panaetius Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 314
pentheus Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
pigeaud, j. Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
platonism (middle / imperial) vi–viii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 314
pleasure (hēdonē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305
plutarch, as source Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
plutarch Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305, 314
posidonius, on causes of emotion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
posidonius Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305, 314
pre-emotions, criticism Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
pre-emotions, origins of stoic concept Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
pre-passions (propatheiai) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 314
pre-rational Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305
reaching (orexis) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237, 240
reason (human) / rational faculty (logos, logistikon) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305, 314
self-mastery (enkrateia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 314
self / selfhood (identity) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305
seneca, on anger Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237, 240
seneca Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 314
sorabji, richard Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
soul / mind (psuchē, animus) vii' Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 305
soul / mind (psuchē, animus) vii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 314
stoicism / stoic / stoa Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 314
tieleman, teun Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240
weeping, involuntary Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 237
yielding (eixis) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 240