1. Polybius, Histories, 1.7.1-1.7.5, 1.43, 2.7, 2.7.5-2.7.6, 2.15.7, 2.17.3, 2.17.9-2.17.12, 2.19.3-2.19.4, 2.29.5, 2.31.7, 2.32.7-2.32.8, 2.33.2-2.33.3, 2.35.2-2.35.3, 2.35.6, 3.49.2, 3.70.4, 3.78.1, 3.78.5, 3.90.6, 3.98.3-3.98.4, 4.21.1, 4.21.3-4.21.4, 5.78, 14.1.5, 18.41.7 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
| 2.7. 1. For we are but men, and to meet with some unexpected blow is not the sufferer's fault, but that of Fortune and those who inflict it on him;,2. but when we involve ourselves by sheer lack of judgement and with our eyes open in the depth of misfortune, everyone acknowledges that we have none to blame but ourselves.,3. It is for this reason that those whom Fortune leads astray meet with pity, pardon and help, but if their failures are due to their own indiscretion, all right-thinking men blame and reproach them.,4. And in this case the Greeks would have been amply justified in their censure of the Epirots.,5. To begin with would not anyone who is aware of the general reputation of the Gauls, think twice before entrusting to them a wealthy city, the betrayal of which was easy and profitable?,6. In the second place who would not have been cautious in the case of a company with such a bad name? First of all they had been expelled from their own country by a general movement of their fellow-countrymen owing to their having betrayed their own friends and kinsmen.,7. Again, when the Carthaginians, hard pressed by the war, received them, they first availed themselves of a dispute about pay between the soldiers and the generals to pillage the city of Agrigentum of which they formed the garrison, being then above three thousand strong.,8. Afterwards, when the Carthaginians sent them on the same service to Eryx, then besieged by the Romans, they attempted to betray the city and those who were suffering siege in their company,,9. and when this plan fell through, they deserted to the Romans. The Romans entrusted them with the guard of the temple of Venus Erycina, which again they pillaged.,10. Therefore, no sooner was the war with Carthage over, than the Romans, having clear evidence of their infamous character, took the very first opportunity of disarming them, putting them on board ship and banishing them from the whole of Italy.,11. These were the men whom the Epirots employed to guard their most flourishing city. How then can they be acquitted of the charge of causing their own misfortunes?,12. I thought it necessary to speak at some length on this subject in order to show how foolish the Epirots were, and that no people, if wise, should ever admit a garrison stronger than their own forces, especially if composed of barbarians. 2.7.5. To begin with would not anyone who is aware of the general reputation of the Gauls, think twice before entrusting to them a wealthy city, the betrayal of which was easy and profitable? 2.7.6. In the second place who would not have been cautious in the case of a company with such a bad name? First of all they had been expelled from their own country by a general movement of their fellow-countrymen owing to their having betrayed their own friends and kinsmen. 2.15.7. As for the numbers of the inhabitants, their stature and beauty and their courage in war, the facts of their history will speak. 2.17.3. The Celts, being close neighbours of the Etruscans and associating much with them, cast covetous eyes on their beautiful country, and on a small pretext, suddenly attacked them with a large army and, expelling them from the plain of the Po, occupied it themselves. 2.17.9. They lived in unwalled villages, without any superfluous furniture; 2.17.10. for as they slept on beds of leaves and fed on meat and were exclusively occupied with war and agriculture, their lives were very simple, and they had no knowledge whatever of any art or science. 2.17.11. Their possessions consisted of cattle and gold, because these were the only things they could carry about with them everywhere according to circumstances and shift where they chose. 2.17.12. They treated comradeship as of the greatest importance, those among them being the most feared and most powerful who were thought to have the largest number of attendants and associates. 2.19.3. but, on reaching home, fell out with each other about division of the spoil and succeeded in destroying the greater part of their own forces and of the booty itself. 2.19.4. This is quite a common event among the Gauls, when they have appropriated their neighbour's property, chiefly owing to their inordinate drinking and surfeiting. 2.29.5. The Romans, however, were on the one hand encouraged by having caught the enemy between their two armies, but on the other they were terrified by the fine order of the Celtic host 2.31.7. Thus were destroyed these Celts during whose invasion, the most serious that had ever occurred, all the Italians and especially the Romans had been exposed to great and terrible peril. 2.32.7. The Romans, on the one hand, as they saw that the enemy were much more numerous than themselves, were desirous of employing also the forces of their Celtic allies 2.32.8. but on the other hand, taking into consideration Gaulish fickleness and the fact that they were going to fight against those of the same nation as these allies, they were wary of asking such men to participate in an action of such vital importance. 2.33.2. For they had observed from former battles that Gauls in general are most formidable and spirited in their first onslaught 2.33.3. while still fresh, and that, from the way their swords are made, as has been already explained, only the first cut takes effect; after this they at once assume the shape of a strigil, being so much bent both length-wise and side-wise that unless the men are given leisure to rest them on the ground and set them straight with the foot, the second blow is quite ineffectual. 2.35.2. Such was the end of the war against the Celts, a war which, if we look to the desperation and daring of the combatants and the numbers who took part and perished in the battles, is second to no war in history 2.35.3. but is quite contemptible as regards the plan of the campaigns, and the judgement shown in executing it, not most steps but every single step that the Gauls took being commended to them rather by the heat of passion than by cool calculation. 2.35.6. but that, having a fair comprehension of how short-lived and perishable is the might of such peoples, they may confront the invaders and put every hope of safety to the test, before yielding a jot of anything they value. 3.49.2. as he had been convinced that they would never venture to march on Italy by this route owing to the number and unruly character of the native inhabitants. 3.70.4. He considered that their legions would be all the better for a winter's drilling, and that the notoriously fickle Celts would not remain loyal to the Carthaginians if the latter were kept in forced inaction, but would throw them over in their turn. 3.78.1. During this winter he also adopted a truly Punic artifice. 3.78.5. Observing that the Celts were dissatisfied at the prosecution of the war in their own territory, but were eagerly looking forward to an invasion of that of the enemy, professedly owing to their hatred of the Romans, but as a fact chiefly in hope of booty, he decided to be on the move as soon as possible and satisfy the desire of his troops. 3.90.6. But all this much displeased his colleague Marcus, who, echoing the popular verdict, ran down Fabius to all for his craven and slow conduct of the campaign, while he himself was most eager to risk a battle. 4.21.1. Now all these practices I believe to have been introduced by the men of old time, not as luxuries and superfluities but because they had before their eyes the universal practice of personal manual labour in Arcadia, and in general the toilsomeness and hardship of the men's lives, as well as the harshness of character resulting from the cold and gloomy atmospheric conditions usually prevailing in these parts â conditions to which all men by their very nature must perforce assimilate themselves; 4.21.3. The primitive Arcadians, therefore, with the view of softening and tempering the stubbornness and harshness of nature, introduced all the practices I mentioned, and in addition accustomed the people, both men and women, to frequent festivals and general sacrifices, and dances of young men and maidens, and in fact resorted to every contrivance to render more gentle and mild, by the influence of the customs they instituted, the extreme hardness of the natural character. The Cynaetheans, by entirely neglecting these institutions, though in special need of such influences, as their country is the most rugged and their climate the most inclement in Arcadia, and by devoting themselves exclusively to their local affairs and political rivalries, finally became so savage that in no city of Greece were greater and more constant crimes committed. As an indication of the deplorable condition of the Cynaetheans in this respect and the detestation of the other Arcadians for such practices I may mention the following: at the time when, after the great massacre, the Cynaetheans sent an embassy to Sparta, the other Arcadian cities which they entered on their journey gave them instant notice to depart by cry of herald 5.78. 1. While he was here, an eclipse of the moon took place, and the Gauls, who had all along been aggrieved by the hardships of the march â since they made the campaign accompanied by their wives and children, who followed them in wagons â,2. considering this a bad omen, refused to advance further.,3. King Attalus, to whom they rendered no service of vital importance, and who noticed that they detached themselves from the column on the march and encamped by themselves and were altogether most insubordinate and self-assertive, found himself in no little perplexity.,4. On the one hand he feared lest they should desert to Achaeus and join him in attacking himself, and on the other he was apprehensive of the reputation he would gain if he ordered his soldiers to surround and destroy all these men who were thought to have crossed to Asia relying on pledges he had given them.,5. Accordingly, availing himself of the pretext of this refusal, he promised for the present to take them back to the place where they had crossed and give them suitable land in which to settle and afterwards to attend as far as lay in his power to all reasonable requests they made.,6. Attalus, then, after taking the Aegosagae back to the Hellespont and entering into friendly negotiations with the people of Lampsacus, Alexander Troas, and Ilium, who had all remained loyal to him, returned with his army to Pergamum. 14.1.5. At present his mind was much distracted and agitated by various apprehensions, as he feared an attack owing to the enemy's superiority in numbers, and he gladly availed himself of the following occasion when it offered itself. 18.41.7. For having conquered the Gauls, then the most formidable and warlike nation in Asia Minor, he built upon this foundation, and then first showed he was really a king. |
|
