1. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.59 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 3.59. Atque Atque dett. Atqui (At qui) perspicuum etiam illud est, in istis rebus mediis aliquid agere sapientem. iudicat igitur, cum agit, officium illud esse. quod quoniam numquam fallitur in iudicando, erit in mediis rebus officium. quod efficitur hac etiam conclusione rationis: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit autem etiam del. Lamb. inchoatum, ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito iuste fit fit Lamb. facit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. quoniamque quoniamque quandoque RV non dubium est quin in iis, iis V his quae media dicimus, dicamus A sit aliud sumendum, aliud reiciendum, quicquid ita fit aut aut autem A ut BE dicitur, omne omne Grut. omni officio continetur. ex quo intellegitur, quoniam se ipsi ipsi BE ipsos omnes natura diligant, tam insipientem quam sapientem sumpturum, quae secundum naturam sint, reiecturumque contraria. ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis, ex quo efficitur versari in iis, iis edd. his quae media dicamus. | 3.59. "It is also clear that some actions are performed by the Wise Man in the sphere of these neutral things. Well then, when he does such an action he judges it to be an appropriate act. And as his judgment on this point never errs, therefore appropriate action will exist in the sphere of these neutral things. The same thing is also proved by the following argument: We observe that something exists which we call right action; but this is an appropriate act perfectly performed; therefore there will also be such a thing as an imperfect appropriate act; so that, if to restore a trust as a matter of principle is a right act, to restore a trust must be counted as an appropriate act; the addition of the qualification 'on principle' makes it a right action: the mere restitution in itself is counted an appropriate act. Again, since there can be no question but that class of things we call neutral includes some things worthy to be chosen and others to be rejected; therefore whatever is done or described in this manner is entirely included under the term appropriate action. This shows that since love of self is implanted by nature in all men, both the foolish and the wise alike will choose what is in accordance with nature and reject the contrary. Thus there is a region of appropriate action which is common to the wise and the unwise; and this proves that appropriate action deals with the things we call neutral. |
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2. Cicero, On Laws, 1.42, 1.44, 2.11 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
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3. Cicero, On Duties, 1.6-1.7, 1.9, 3.95 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 1.6. Quae quamquam ita sunt in promptu, ut res disputatione non egeat, tamen sunt a nobis alio loco disputata. Hae disciplinae igitur si sibi consentaneae velint esse, de officio nihil queant dicere, neque ulla officii praecepta firma, stabilia, coniuncta naturae tradi possunt nisi aut ab iis, qui solam, aut ab iis, qui maxime honestatem propter se dicant expetendam. Ita propria est ea praeceptio Stoicorum, Academicorum, Peripateticorum, quoniam Aristonis, Pyrrhonis, Erilli iam pridem explosa sententia est; qui tamen haberent ius suum disputandi de officio, si rerum aliquem dilectum reliquissent, ut ad officii inventionem aditus esset. Sequemur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo videbitur, hauriemus. 1.7. Placet igitur, quoniam omnis disputatio de officio futura est, ante definire, quid sit officium; quod a Panaetio praetermissum esse miror. Omnis enim, quae a ratione suscipitur de aliqua re institutio, debet a definitione proficisci, ut intellegatur, quid sit id, de quo disputetur Omnis de officio duplex est quaestio: unum genus est, quod pertinet ad finem bonorum, alterum, quod positum est in praeceptis, quibus in omnis partis usus vitae conformari possit. Superioris generis huius modi sunt exempla: omniane officia perfecta sint, num quod officium aliud alio maius sit, et quae sunt generis eiusdem. Quorum autem officiorum praecepta traduntur, ea quamquam pertinent ad finem bonorum, tamen minus id apparet, quia magis ad institutionem vitae communis spectare videntur; de quibus est nobis his libris explicandum. Atque etiam alia divisio est officii. 1.9. Triplex igitur est, ut Panaetio videtur, consilii capiendi deliberatio. Nam aut honestumne factu sit an turpe dubitant id, quod in deliberationem cadit; in quo considerando saepe animi in contraries sententias distrahuntur. Tum autem aut anquirunt aut consultant, ad vitae commoditatem iucunditatemque, ad facultates rerum atque copias, ad opes, ad potentiam, quibus et se possint iuvare et suos, conducat id necne, de quo deliberant; quae deliberatio omnis in rationem utilitatis cadit. Tertium dubitandi genus est, cum pugnare videtur cum honesto id, quod videtur esse utile; cum enim utilitas ad se rapere, honestas contra revocare ad se videtur, fit ut distrahatur in deliberando animus afferatque ancipitem curam cogitandi. 3.95. Quid, quod Agamemnon cum devovisset Dianae, quod in suo regno pulcherrimum natum esset illo anno, immolavit Iphigeniam, qua nihil erat eo quidem anno natum pulchrius? Promissum potius non faciendum quam tam taetrum facinus admittendum fuit. Ergo et promissa non facienda non numquam, neque semper deposita reddenda. Si gladium quis apud te sana mente deposuerit, repetat insaniens, reddere peccatum sit, officium non reddere. Quid? si is, qui apud te pecuniam deposuerit, bellum inferat patriae, reddasne depositum? Non credo; facias enim contra rem publicam, quae debet esse carissima. Sic multa, quae honesta natura videntur esse, temporibus fiunt non honesta; facere promissa, stare conventis, reddere deposita commutata utilitate fiunt non honesta. Ac de iis quidem, quae videntur esse utilitates contra iustitiam simulatione prudentiae, satis arbitror dictum. | 3.95. And once more; when Agamemnon had vowed to Diana the most beautiful creature born that year within his realm, he was brought to sacrifice Iphigenia; for in that year nothing was born more beautiful than she. He ought to have broken his vow rather than commit so horrible a crime. Promises are, therefore, sometimes not to be kept; and trusts are not always to be restored. Suppose that a person leaves his sword with you when he is in his right mind, and demands it back in a fit of insanity; it would be criminal to restore it to him; it would be your duty not to do so. Again, suppose that a man who has entrusted money to you proposes to make war upon your common country, should you restore the trust? I believe you should not; for you would be acting against the state, which ought to be the dearest thing in the world to you. Thus there are many things which in and of themselves seem morally right, but which under certain circumstances prove to be not morally right: to keep a promise, to abide by an agreement, to restore a trust may, with a change of expediency, cease to be morally right. With this I think I have said enough about those actions which masquerade as expedient under the guise of prudence, while they are really contrary to justice. |
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4. Philo of Alexandria, On Husbandry, 24 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
| 24. For as fishermen let down their nets at times to the most extraordinary depths, comprehending a vast surface of the sea in their circle, in order to catch the greatest possible number of fish enclosed within their nets, like people shut up within the walls of a besieged city; so in the same manner the greatest part of men having extended their universal nets to take everything, as the poets somewhere say, not only over the parts of the sea, but also over the whole nature of earth, and air, and water, seek to catch everything from every quarter for the enjoyment and attainment of pleasure. |
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5. Philo of Alexandria, On The Cherubim, 13, 15, 17, 19-20, 12 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
| 12. Now the first example of an enemy placed directly in front of one is derived from what is said in the case of Cain, that "he went out from the face of God, and dwelt in the land of Nod, in the front of Eden." Now Nod being interpreted means commotion, and Eden means delight. The one therefore is a symbol of wickedness agitating the soul, and the other of virtue which creates for the soul a state of tranquillity and happiness, not meaning by happiness that effeminate luxury which is derived from the indulgence of the irrational passion of pleasure, but a joy free from toil and free from hardship, which is enjoyed with great tranquillity. 12. in this manner those who are skilful in the art of medicine, save their patients; for they do not think it advisable to give food before they have removed the causes of their diseases; for while the diseases remain, food is useless, being the pernicious materials of their sufferings. III. |
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6. Philo of Alexandria, On The Preliminary Studies, 171, 173, 170 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
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7. Philo of Alexandria, On The Creation of The World, 146, 21-22, 74, 145 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
| 145. We have now then set forth the beauty of the first created man in both respects, in body and soul, if in a way much inferior to the reality, still to the extent of our power, and the best of our ability. And it cannot be but that his descendants, who all partake of his original character, must preserve some traces of their relationship to their father, though they may be but faint. And what is this relationship? |
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8. Philo of Alexandria, On Curses, 32-35, 31 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
| 31. And this, too, I do through the pity which exists in rational nature, in order that it may be raised from the hell of the passions to the heavenly region of virtue; I being the guide, who also have made the road which leads to heaven, so that it may be a plain road for suppliant souls, and have shown it to them all, in order that they may not foolishly wander out of the way. X. |
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9. Philo of Alexandria, On The Sacrifices of Cain And Abel, 20, 43, 19 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
| 19. And concerning this doctrine Moses also records a law, which he makes with great beauty and suitableness. And it runs thus, "If a man have two wives, the one of them beloved and the other hated; and if both the one who is beloved and the one who is hated have borne him children, and if the child of her who is hated is the firstborn, then it shall be in the day in which he divides the inheritance of his possessions among his sons that he shall not be able to give the inheritance of the first-born to the son of the wife that is beloved, overlooking his first-born son, the son of her who is hated; but he shall recognise the son of her who is hated as his first-born, to give him a double share of all the property that he has acquired; because he is the beginning of his children, and the right of the first-born is His. |
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10. Philo of Alexandria, On The Special Laws, 4.35 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
| 4.35. And deposits consist not only of iimate things but also of animals: the danger of which last is twofold; first, that while they share in common with iimate things in being liable to be stolen, and also one which is distinct and peculiar to themselves, that they are liable to die. We have hitherto been speaking only of the first kind of deposit, but we must now also explain the law about the second. |
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11. Philo of Alexandria, Allegorical Interpretation, 1.56, 2.17, 3.126, 3.165 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
| 1.56. And God caused to rise out of the earth every tree which is pleasant to the sight and good for food, and the tree of life he raised in the middle of the Paradise, and also the tree of the knowledge of good and evil." He here gives a sketch of the trees of virtue which he plants in the soul. And these are the particular virtues, and the energies in accordance with them, and the good and successful actions, and the things which by the philosophers are called fitting; |
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12. Philo of Alexandria, That The Worse Attacks The Better, 122 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
| 122. for it is the nature of justice in the first place to cause rest instead of labour, being utterly indifferent to the things that are in the confines between wickedness and virtue, riches and glory, and power and honour, and all other things which are akin to these, which are the chief objects of the energies of the human race. And, in the second place, to destroy those pains which exist in accordance with our own energies; for Moses does not (as some wicked men do) say, that God is the cause of evils, but our own hands; indicating, by a figurative expression, the works of our hand, and the voluntary inclinations of our mind to the worser part. XXXIII. Last of all, Noah is said "to comfort us concerning our work, because of the ground which the Lord God hath Cursed. |
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13. Philo of Alexandria, Plant., 100 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)
| 100. These duties which are as it were in the middle, appear to me to be properly looked upon in the same light as those trees, which admit of being cultivated and used for food; for each of them bears most useful fruits, the one for the body, and the other for the soul. But in the middle there must necessarily be many injurious plants springing up with and growing along-side of them, which must be removed in order that the better sorts may not be injured. |
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14. Epictetus, Discourses, 2.5.20, 4.1.159 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
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15. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.121-7.122 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
| 7.121. But Heraclides of Tarsus, who was the disciple of Antipater of Tarsus, and Athenodorus both assert that sins are not equal.Again, the Stoics say that the wise man will take part in politics, if nothing hinders him – so, for instance, Chrysippus in the first book of his work On Various Types of Life – since thus he will restrain vice and promote virtue. Also (they maintain) he will marry, as Zeno says in his Republic, and beget children. Moreover, they say that the wise man will never form mere opinions, that is to say, he will never give assent to anything that is false; that he will also play the Cynic, Cynicism being a short cut to virtue, as Apollodorus calls it in his Ethics; that he will even turn cannibal under stress of circumstances. They declare that he alone is free and bad men are slaves, freedom being power of independent action, whereas slavery is privation of the same; 7.122. though indeed there is also a second form of slavery consisting in subordination, and a third which implies possession of the slave as well as his subordination; the correlative of such servitude being lordship; and this too is evil. Moreover, according to them not only are the wise free, they are also kings; kingship being irresponsible rule, which none but the wise can maintain: so Chrysippus in his treatise vindicating Zeno's use of terminology. For he holds that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary attribute of the ruler, and that no bad man is acquainted with this science. Similarly the wise and good alone are fit to be magistrates, judges, or orators, whereas among the bad there is not one so qualified. |
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