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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



9231
Philo Of Alexandria, On Planting, 148
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Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

11 results
1. Aeschylus, Seven Against Thebes, 498, 497 (6th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)

497. αὐτὸς δʼ ἐπηλάλαξεν, ἔνθεος δʼ Ἄρει
2. Euripides, Bacchae, 1019-1023, 260-262, 288-289, 50-51, 686-687, 704-711, 915, 1018 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)

1018. φάνηθι ταῦρος ἢ πολύκρανος ἰδεῖν
3. Herodotus, Histories, 4.79 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)

4.79. But when things had to turn out badly for him, they did so for this reason: he conceived a desire to be initiated into the rites of the Bacchic Dionysus; and when he was about to begin the sacred mysteries, he saw the greatest vision. ,He had in the city of the Borysthenites a spacious house, grand and costly (the same house I just mentioned), all surrounded by sphinxes and griffins worked in white marble; this house was struck by a thunderbolt. And though the house burnt to the ground, Scyles none the less performed the rite to the end. ,Now the Scythians reproach the Greeks for this Bacchic revelling, saying that it is not reasonable to set up a god who leads men to madness. ,So when Scyles had been initiated into the Bacchic rite, some one of the Borysthenites scoffed at the Scythians: “You laugh at us, Scythians, because we play the Bacchant and the god possesses us; but now this deity has possessed your own king, so that he plays the Bacchant and is maddened by the god. If you will not believe me, follow me now and I will show him to you.” ,The leading men among the Scythians followed him, and the Borysthenite brought them up secretly onto a tower; from which, when Scyles passed by with his company of worshippers, they saw him playing the Bacchant; thinking it a great misfortune, they left the city and told the whole army what they had seen.
4. Plato, Symposium, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

218b. a Pausanias, an Aristodemus, and an Aristophanes—I need not mention Socrates himself—and all the rest of them; every one of you has had his share of philosophic frenzy and transport, so all of you shall hear. You shall stand up alike for what then was done and for what now is spoken. But the domestics, and all else profane and clownish, must clap the heaviest of doors upon their ears.
5. Sophocles, Antigone, 136, 963-964, 135 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)

6. Sophocles, Oedipus The King, 210-215, 209 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)

7. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.20, 3.22, 3.58-3.61 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.20. Progrediamur igitur, quoniam, quoniam qui ideo BE (discerpto, ut vid., q uo in qi io cf. ad p. 104,24 et ad p. 31, 25) inquit, ab his principiis naturae discessimus, quibus congruere debent quae sequuntur. sequitur autem haec prima divisio: Aestimabile esse dicunt—sic enim, ut opinor, appellemus appellemus Bentl. appellamus — id, quod aut ipsum secundum naturam sit aut tale quid efficiat, ut selectione dignum propterea sit, quod aliquod pondus habeat dignum aestimatione, quam illi a)ci/an vocant, illi ... vocant Pearc. ille ... vocat contraque inaestimabile, quod sit superiori contrarium. initiis igitur ita constitutis, ut ea, quae secundum naturam sunt, ipsa propter se sumenda sint contrariaque item reicienda, primum primum primum enim BE ('suspicari aliquis possit enim ortum esse ex hominis' Mdv.) est officium—id enim appello kaqh=kon —, ut se conservet in naturae statu, deinceps ut ea teneat, quae secundum naturam sint, pellatque contraria. qua qua AVN 2 que BN 1 q (= quae) ER inventa selectione et item reiectione sequitur deinceps cum officio selectio, deinde ea perpetua, tum ad extremum constans consentaneaque naturae, in qua primum inesse incipit et intellegi, intelligi BE intellegit A intelligit RNV quid sit, quod vere bonum possit dici. 3.22. cum vero illa, quae officia esse dixi, proficiscantur ab initiis naturae, necesse est ea ad haec ad ea hec R referri, ut recte dici possit omnia officia eo referri, ut adipiscamur principia naturae, nec tamen ut hoc sit bonorum ultimum, propterea quod non inest in primis naturae conciliationibus honesta actio; consequens enim est est enim BE et post oritur, ut dixi. est tamen ea secundum naturam multoque nos ad se expetendam magis hortatur quam superiora omnia. Sed ex hoc primum error tollendus est, ne quis sequi existimet, ut duo sint ultima bonorum. etenim, etenim ( cf. p. 106,4 etenim si; contra p. 107, 5 ut si; p. 110, 17 ut enim) Se. ut enim si cui propositum sit conliniare hastam aliquo hastam aliquo N astam aliquo A aliquo hastam BE hastam aliquā V hastam ( om. aliquo) R aut sagittam, sicut nos ultimum in bonis dicimus, sic illi facere omnia, quae possit, ut conliniet secl. Mdv. huic in eius modi similitudine omnia sint sint sunt R facienda, ut conliniet, et tamen, ut omnia faciat, quo propositum adsequatur, sit sit Ern. sed (Sed RNV) hoc quasi ultimum, quale nos summum in vita bonum dicimus, illud autem, ut feriat, quasi seligendum, non expetendum. 3.58. Sed cum, quod honestum sit, id solum bonum esse dicamus, consentaneum tamen est fungi officio, cum id officium nec in bonis ponamus nec in malis. est enim aliquid in his rebus probabile, et quidem ita, ut eius ratio reddi possit, ergo ut etiam probabiliter acti ratio reddi possit. est autem officium, quod ita factum est, ut eius facti probabilis ratio reddi possit. ex quo intellegitur officium medium quiddam quiddam Mdv. quoddam esse, quod neque in bonis ponatur neque in contrariis. quoniamque in iis iis edd. his rebus, quae neque in virtutibus sunt neque in vitiis, est tamen quiddam, quod usui possit esse, tollendum id non est. est autem eius generis actio quoque quaedam, et quidem talis, ut ratio postulet agere aliquid et facere eorum. quod autem ratione actum est, actum est Mdv. actum sit ABEN fit V id officium appellamus. est igitur officium eius generis, quod nec in bonis ponatur nec in ratione ... ponatur nec in om. R contrariis. 3.59. Atque Atque dett. Atqui (At qui) perspicuum etiam illud est, in istis rebus mediis aliquid agere sapientem. iudicat igitur, cum agit, officium illud esse. quod quoniam numquam fallitur in iudicando, erit in mediis rebus officium. quod efficitur hac etiam conclusione rationis: Quoniam enim videmus esse quiddam, quod recte factum appellemus, id autem est perfectum officium, erit autem etiam del. Lamb. inchoatum, ut, si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere; illo enim addito iuste fit fit Lamb. facit recte factum, per se autem hoc ipsum reddere in officio ponitur. quoniamque quoniamque quandoque RV non dubium est quin in iis, iis V his quae media dicimus, dicamus A sit aliud sumendum, aliud reiciendum, quicquid ita fit aut aut autem A ut BE dicitur, omne omne Grut. omni officio continetur. ex quo intellegitur, quoniam se ipsi ipsi BE ipsos omnes natura diligant, tam insipientem quam sapientem sumpturum, quae secundum naturam sint, reiecturumque contraria. ita est quoddam commune officium sapientis et insipientis, ex quo efficitur versari in iis, iis edd. his quae media dicamus. 3.60. Sed cum ab his omnia proficiscantur officia, non sine causa dicitur ad ea referri omnes nostras cogitationes, in his et excessum e vita et in vita mansionem. in quo enim plura sunt quae secundum naturam sunt, huius officium est in vita manere; in quo autem aut sunt plura contraria aut fore videntur, huius officium est de vita excedere. ex quo ex quo RV e quo (equo) apparet et sapientis esse aliquando officium excedere e vita, cum beatus sit, et stulti manere in vita, cum sit miser. 3.61. nam bonum illud et malum, quod saepe iam dictum est, postea consequitur, prima autem illa naturae sive secunda sive contraria sub iudicium sapientis et dilectum cadunt, estque illa subiecta quasi materia materie BE sapientiae. itaque et manendi in vita et migrandi ratio omnis iis iis edd. in V his rebus, quas supra dixi, metienda. nam neque virtute retinetur ille in add. Se. vita, nec iis, qui qui que BER sine virtute sunt, mors est oppetenda. et et Urs. ut saepe officium est sapientis desciscere a vita, cum sit beatissimus, si id oportune facere possit, quod est convenienter naturae. sic naturae sic B naturae vivere sic ( etiam E) enim censent, oportunitatis esse beate vivere. itaque a sapientia praecipitur se ipsam, si usus sit, sapiens ut relinquat. quam ob rem cum vitiorum ista vis non sit, ut causam afferant mortis voluntariae, perspicuum est etiam stultorum, qui idem miseri sint, officium esse manere in vita, si sint in maiore parte rerum earum, earum rerum BE quas secundum naturam esse dicimus. et quoniam excedens e vita et manens aeque miser est nec diuturnitas magis ei magis ei ei (et E) magis BE vitam fugiendam facit, non sine causa dicitur iis, qui pluribus naturalibus frui possint, esse in vita manendum. 3.20.  "To proceed then," he continued, "for we have been digressing from the primary impulses of nature; and with these the later stages must be in harmony. The next step is the following fundamental classification: That which is in itself in accordance with nature, or which produces something else that is so, and which therefore is deserving of choice as possessing a certain amount of positive value — axia as the Stoics call it — this they pronounce to be 'valuable' (for so I suppose we may translate it); and on the other hand that which is the contrary of the former they term 'valueless.' The initial principle being thus established that things in accordance with nature are 'things to be taken' for their own sake, and their opposites similarly 'things to be rejected,' the first 'appropriate act' (for so I render the Greek kathēkon) is to preserve oneself in one's natural constitution; the next is to retain those things which are in accordance with nature and to repel those that are the contrary; then when this principle of choice and also of rejection has been discovered, there follows next in order choice conditioned by 'appropriate action'; then, such choice become a fixed habit; and finally, choice fully rationalized and in harmony with nature. It is at this final stage that the Good properly so called first emerges and comes to be understood in its true nature. 3.22.  But since those actions which I have termed 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary natural objects, it follows that the former are means to the latter. Hence it may correctly be said that all 'appropriate acts' are means to the end of attaining the primary needs of nature. Yet it must not be inferred that their attainment is the ultimate Good, inasmuch as moral action is not one of the primary natural attractions, but is an outgrowth of these, a later development, as I have said. At the same time moral action is in accordance with nature, and stimulates our desire far more strongly than all the objects that attracted us earlier. But at this point a caution is necessary at the outset. It will be an error to infer that this view implies two Ultimate Goods. For though if a man were to make it his purpose to take a true aim with a spear or arrow at some mark, his ultimate end, corresponding to the ultimate good as we pronounce it, would be to do all he could to aim straight: the man in this illustration would have to do everything to aim straight, and yet, although he did everything to attain his purpose, his 'ultimate End,' so to speak, would be what corresponded to what we call the Chief Good in the conduct of life, whereas the actual hitting of the mark would be in our phrase 'to be chosen' but not 'to be desired.' 3.58.  "But although we pronounce Moral Worth to be the sole good, it is nevertheless consistent to perform an appropriate act, in spite of the fact that we count appropriate action neither a good nor an evil. For in the sphere of these neutral things there is an element of reasonableness, in the sense that an account can be rendered of it, and therefore in the sense that an account can also be rendered of its performance; and this proves that an appropriate act is an intermediate thing, to be reckoned neither as a good nor as the opposite. And since those things which are neither to be counted among virtues nor vices nevertheless contain a factor which can be useful, their element of utility is worth preserving. Again, this neutral class also includes action of a certain kind, viz. such that reason calls upon us to do or to produce some one of these neutral things; but an action reasonably performed we call an appropriate act; appropriate action therefore is included in the class which is reckoned neither as good nor the opposite. 3.59.  "It is also clear that some actions are performed by the Wise Man in the sphere of these neutral things. Well then, when he does such an action he judges it to be an appropriate act. And as his judgment on this point never errs, therefore appropriate action will exist in the sphere of these neutral things. The same thing is also proved by the following argument: We observe that something exists which we call right action; but this is an appropriate act perfectly performed; therefore there will also be such a thing as an imperfect appropriate act; so that, if to restore a trust as a matter of principle is a right act, to restore a trust must be counted as an appropriate act; the addition of the qualification 'on principle' makes it a right action: the mere restitution in itself is counted an appropriate act. Again, since there can be no question but that class of things we call neutral includes some things worthy to be chosen and others to be rejected; therefore whatever is done or described in this manner is entirely included under the term appropriate action. This shows that since love of self is implanted by nature in all men, both the foolish and the wise alike will choose what is in accordance with nature and reject the contrary. Thus there is a region of appropriate action which is common to the wise and the unwise; and this proves that appropriate action deals with the things we call neutral. 3.60.  But since these neutral things form the basis of all appropriate acts, there is good ground for the dictum that it is with these things that all our practical deliberations deal, including the will to live and the will to quit this life. When a man's circumstances contain a preponderance of things in accordance with nature, it is appropriate for him to remain alive; when he possesses or sees in prospect a majority of the contrary things, it is appropriate for him to depart from life. This makes it plain that it is on occasion appropriate for the Wise Man to quit life although he is happy, and also of the Foolish Man to remain in life although he is miserable. 3.61.  For with the Stoics good and evil, as has repeatedly been said already, are a subsequent outgrowth; whereas the primary things of nature, whether favourable or the reverse, fall under the judgment and choice of the Wise Man, and form so to speak the subject-matter, the given material with which wisdom deals. Therefore the reasons both for remaining in life and for departing from it are to be measured entirely by the primary things of nature aforesaid. For the virtuous man is not necessarily retained in life by virtue, and also those who are devoid of virtue need not necessarily seek death. And very often it is appropriate for the Wise Man to abandon life at a moment when he is enjoying supreme happiness, if an opportunity offers for making a timely exit. For the Stoic view is that happiness, which means life in harmony with nature, is a matter of seizing the right moment. So that Wisdom her very self upon occasion bids the Wise Man to leave her. Hence, as vice does not possess the power of furnishing a reason for suicide, it is clear that even for the foolish, who are also miserable, it is appropriate to remain alive if they possess a predomice of those things which we pronounce to be in accordance with nature. And since the fool is equally miserable when departing from life and when remaining in it, and the undesirability of his life is not increased by its prolongation, there is good ground for saying that those who are in a position to enjoy a preponderance of things that are natural ought to remain in life.
8. Philo of Alexandria, On Planting, 151, 162, 167-169, 142 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

9. Apollodorus, Bibliotheca, 3.5.2 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

3.5.2. διελθὼν δὲ Θρᾴκην καὶ τὴν Ἰνδικὴν ἅπασαν, στήλας ἐκεῖ στήσας 1 -- ἧκεν εἰς Θήβας, καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἠνάγκασε καταλιπούσας τὰς οἰκίας βακχεύειν ἐν τῷ Κιθαιρῶνι. Πενθεὺς δὲ γεννηθεὶς ἐξ Ἀγαυῆς Ἐχίονι, παρὰ Κάδμου εἰληφὼς τὴν βασιλείαν, διεκώλυε ταῦτα γίνεσθαι, καὶ παραγενόμενος εἰς Κιθαιρῶνα τῶν Βακχῶν κατάσκοπος ὑπὸ τῆς μητρὸς Ἀγαυῆς κατὰ μανίαν ἐμελίσθη· ἐνόμισε γὰρ αὐτὸν θηρίον εἶναι. δείξας δὲ Θηβαίοις ὅτι θεός ἐστιν, ἧκεν εἰς Ἄργος, κἀκεῖ 2 -- πάλιν οὐ τιμώντων αὐτὸν ἐξέμηνε τὰς γυναῖκας. αἱ δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι τοὺς ἐπιμαστιδίους ἔχουσαι 3 -- παῖδας τὰς σάρκας αὐτῶν ἐσιτοῦντο.
10. Epictetus, Discourses, 3.2.5 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

11. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 83.9 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
aphrodite Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 173
apollo, apollonian, apolline Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
argos, argive Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49
awakening Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
bacchants, bacchae, bacchai Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49, 173
baccheia βακχεία Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49
bacchus, βάκχος Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49
chios Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
chorus χορός, choral Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47, 49
cognitive aspect Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
conversion, philosophical Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
conversion, psychological aspects Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
cry, ritual Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
cult, cultic acts for specific cults, the corresponding god or place Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
dance, dancing Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47, 49
delirium Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49
delphi, delphian, delphic Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
dionysos, dionysos baccheus Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49
dionysos, dionysos bacchios Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47, 49
dionysos, dionysos bacchos Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49
dionysos, dionysos bromios Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
dionysos, dionysos choragos/choreutas/philochoreutas Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
dionysos, dionysos dithyrambos Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
dionysos, dionysos eriboas Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
dionysos, dionysos eribremetas Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
dionysos, dionysos eribromos Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
dionysos, dionysos euios Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
dionysos, dionysos liberator Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
dionysos, dionysos liknites Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
dionysos, dionysos lyaios Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
dionysos, dionysos lyseus Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
dionysos, dionysos lysios Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
dionysos, dionysos mainomenos Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49
dionysos, dionysos nyktelios Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
dionysos, dionysos omadios Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
dionysos, dionysos omestes Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
dionysos, dionysos thriambos Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
dionysos, epiphany Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49
dionysos, gift Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49
dionysos Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47, 49, 173
dismemberment Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 173
disposition Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
donysos manikos, mainoles, mainolios Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
ecstasy ἔκστασις, ecstatic Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 173
entheos ἔνθεος Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49, 173
enthusiasm ἐνθουσιασμός, enthusiastic Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49
euphoria Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49, 173
evohé εὐαί, εὐαἵ, εὐοἷ Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
festival, festivity, festive Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
gift Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49
iacchos ἴακχος Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
irrational Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
liberation Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
liknon λίκνον Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
madness Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
maenads, maenadic, maenadism, rites/cults Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49, 173
maenads, maenadic, maenadism Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49, 173
mania μανία, maniacal Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49
mantinea Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
milk Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 173
mind Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
mountains Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 173
music, musical Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49
mysteries, mystery cults, bacchic, dionysiac Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 173
myth, mythical Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 173
nature, according to Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
night, nocturnal Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
non-sages (non-philosophers) Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
nyktelia Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
omophagia ὠμοφαγία Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
parnassus, parnassian Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
pentheus Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 173
pipe Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 173
possession, possessed Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49
procession Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
protreptic Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
psychic Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
rational Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
rite, ritual, maenadic Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49, 173
rite, ritual Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47, 49, 173
scylas Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49
scythia, scythian Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49
skin, animal Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
soberness Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
soul Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
thebes, theban Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49
thiasos θίασος Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49
thriambos θρίαμβος Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
thyrsus θύρσος Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47
vases Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 173
vice Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
virtue Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
water Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 173
way of life Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
wine Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49, 173; Despotis and Lohr, Religious and Philosophical Conversion in the Ancient Mediterranean Traditions (2022) 177
woman Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 49, 173
worship' Bernabe et al., Redefining Dionysos (2013) 47