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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



8644
Palestinian Talmud, Sanhedrin, 1.1
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Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

11 results
1. Hebrew Bible, Daniel, 10.1 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)

10.1. וְהִנֵּה־יָד נָגְעָה בִּי וַתְּנִיעֵנִי עַל־בִּרְכַּי וְכַפּוֹת יָדָי׃ 10.1. בִּשְׁנַת שָׁלוֹשׁ לְכוֹרֶשׁ מֶלֶךְ פָּרַס דָּבָר נִגְלָה לְדָנִיֵּאל אֲשֶׁר־נִקְרָא שְׁמוֹ בֵּלְטְשַׁאצַּר וֶאֱמֶת הַדָּבָר וְצָבָא גָדוֹל וּבִין אֶת־הַדָּבָר וּבִינָה לוֹ בַּמַּרְאֶה׃ 10.1. In the third year of Cyrus king of Persia a word was revealed unto Daniel, whose name was called Belteshazzar; and the word was true, even a great warfare; and he gave heed to the word, and had understanding of the vision."
2. Mishnah, Avodah Zarah, 2.6 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

2.6. The following articles of non-Jews are prohibited but the prohibition does not extend to deriving benefit from them: 1. milk which a non-Jew milked without an israelite watching him, 2. their bread and oil (Rabbi and his court permitted the oil) 3. stewed and pickled things into which they are accustomed to put wine or vinegar, 4. pickled herring which had been minced, 5. brine in which there is no kalbith-fish floating, 6. helek, 7. pieces of asa foetida 8. and sal-conditum. Behold these are prohibited but the prohibition does not extend to deriving benefit from them."
3. Mishnah, Bekhorot, 4.4 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

4.4. If one who is not an expert sees a first born and it was slaughtered by his instructions, in such a case it shall be buried and he shall make reparation from his own pocket. If a [non-expert] judge gave a judgment and declared innocent a person who was really liable or made liable a person who was really innocent, declared unclean a thing which was clean or declared clean a thing which was really unclean, his decision stands but he has to make reparation from his own pocket. If the judge was an expert [sanctioned by the] court, he is exempt from making reparation. It happened once that a cow's womb was removed and Rabbi Tarfon gave it [the cow] to the dogs to eat. The matter came before the sages at Yavneh and they permitted the animal. Todos the physician said: no cow or pig leaves Alexandria of Egypt before its womb is removed in order that it may not breed. Rabbi Tarfon said: “There goes your donkey, Tarfon.” Rabbi Akiva said to him: you are exempt, for you are an expert and whoever is an expert sanctioned by the court is exempt from reparation."
4. Mishnah, Oholot, 18.9 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

18.9. Colonnades are not [subject to the laws] of non-Jewish dwelling places. Rabban Shimon ben Gamaliel says: a non-Jewish city that has been destroyed is not [subject to the laws] of non-Jewish dwelling-places. The east [side] of Caesaron and the west [side] of Caesaron are graveyards. The east [side] of Acre was doubtful, but the sages declared it clean. Rabbi and his law court voted [to decide] about Keni and declared it clean."
5. Tosefta, Avodah Zarah, 4.11 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

6. Tosefta, Bava Qamma, 8.14 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

7. Tosefta, Shevi It, 4.17 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

8. Anon., Genesis Rabba, 96 (2nd cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

9. Anon., Sifre Deuteronomy, 355 (2nd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

10. Palestinian Talmud, Demai, 2.1 (2nd cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

11. Babylonian Talmud, Sanhedrin, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)

6a. וכי תימא פליגי רבנן עליה דרשב"ג והאמר רבי אבהו שנים שדנו לדברי הכל אין דיניהם דין גברא אגברא קא רמית,גופא א"ר אבהו שנים שדנו דיני ממונות לדברי הכל אין דיניהם דין איתיביה רבי אבא לרבי אבהו דן את הדין וזיכה את החייב וחייב את הזכאי טימא את הטהור טיהר את הטמא מה שעשה עשוי ומשלם מביתו,הכא במאי עסקינן דקיבלוהו עלייהו אי הכי אמאי משלם מביתו דאמרו ליה דיינת לן דין תורה,א"ל רב ספרא לרבי אבא דטעה במאי אילימא דטעה בדבר משנה והאמר רב ששת א"ר (אמי) טעה בדבר משנה חוזר אלא דטעה בשיקול הדעת,היכי דמי בשיקול הדעת אמר רב פפא כגון תרי תנאי ותרי אמוראי דפליגי אהדדי ולא איתמר הלכתא לא כמר ולא כמר וסוגיין דעלמא אליבא דחד מינייהו ואזל איהו ועבד כאידך היינו שיקול הדעת,לימא כתנאי ביצוע בשלשה דברי ר"מ וחכ"א פשרה ביחיד סברוה לכ"ע מקשינן פשרה לדין,מאי לאו בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר דין בשלשה ומר סבר דין בשנים לא דכ"ע דין בשלשה והכא בהא קמיפלגי דמר סבר מקשינן פשרה לדין ומר סבר לא מקשינן פשרה לדין,לימא תלתא תנאי בפשרה דמר סבר בשלשה ומר סבר בשנים ומר סבר ביחיד אמר רב אחא בריה דרב איקא ואיתימא רבי יימר בר שלמיא מאן דאמר תרי אפילו חד נמי והאי דקאמר תרי כי היכי דליהוו עליה סהדי,אמר רב אשי ש"מ פשרה אינה צריכה קנין דאי סלקא דעתך צריכה קנין למ"ד צריכה תלתא ל"ל תסגי בתרי וליקני מיניה והלכתא פשרה צריכה קנין,תנו רבנן כשם שהדין בשלשה כך ביצוע בשלשה 6a. bAnd if you would say the Rabbis disagree with Rabban Shimon ben Gamlielwith regard to the minimum number of judges necessary to adjudicate, bbut doesn’t Rabbi Abbahu say:With regard to a court of btwojudges bthat adjudicatedcases of bmonetary lawof any type, which would include cases of admissions and loans, beveryone agreesthat btheir judgment is nota valid bjudgment,as a court with fewer than three judges is invalid? The Gemara rejects this question: bAre you settingthe statement of one bman againstthe statement of another bman?Although Rabbi Abbahu asserts that all agree that two judges cannot issue a binding judgment, Shmuel differs. According to Shmuel, the Rabbis hold that the judgment of two judges is considered binding.,§ Since it was mentioned incidentally, the Gemara discusses bthematter bitself: Rabbi Abbahu says:With regard to a court of btwojudges bthat adjudicatedcases of bmonetary lawof any type, which would include cases of admissions and loans, beveryone agreesthat btheir judgment is nota valid bjudgment. Rabbi Abba raised an objection to Rabbi Abbahufrom a mishna ( iBekhorot28b): If a single judge badjudicateda case of monetary blaw anderroneously bexonerated thelitigant who should have been deemed bliable, or deemed liable thelitigant who should have been deemed bexempt,or if one issued a halakhic ruling whereby he bdeemedritually bimpure that which isactually bpure,or bdeemed pure that which is impure, what he did is done,i.e., his ruling is binding. bAndthe judge nevertheless bpays from his house,i.e., from his own pocket, for the loss he has caused. Evidently, the ruling of even a single judge constitutes a valid judgment.,The Gemara responds: bHere we are dealing witha case in bwhichthe litigants bacceptedthe singular judge bupon themselves,and it is for that reason that his ruling is binding. Otherwise, it would not be binding, as a halakhic court must contain a minimum of three judges. The Gemara asks: bIf so,that the litigants agreed to accept whatever ruling the judge issued, bwhymust the judge bpay from hisown bhouse?The Gemara answers: The judge is liable bbecausethe case is where bthey said to him: Adjudicatethe case bfor usaccording to bTorah law.Since he did not issue a halakhically proper judgment, he is liable., bRav Safra said to Rabbi Abba:This ruling applies bwhenhe berred in whatrespect? bIf we say thathe berred in a matterthat appears in the bMishna,and he mistakenly ruled against an explicitly stated ihalakha /i, that is difficult. bBut doesn’t Rav Sheshet saythat bRabbi Ami says:If the judge berred in a matterthat appears in the bMishna,the decision is brevokedand the case retried? bRather,the case is bwherehe berred inhis bdeliberation. /b,The Gemara asks: bWhat are the circumstancesof an error bin deliberation? Rav Pappa said:The circumstances of an error in deliberation are where, bfor example,there are btwo itanna’imor two iamora’imwho disagree with one another, and the ihalakhawas not statedin accordance bwiththe opinion of one bSage or withthe opinion of the other bSage; and the standard practiceis bin accordance withthe opinion of bone of them, and he went and executedthe judgment bin accordance with the otheropinion; bthis isan error in bdeliberation. /b,§ The Gemara suggests: bLet us saythat the dispute between Shmuel and Rabbi Abbahu about a court composed of two judges bis parallel toa dispute between itanna’im /i,as detailed in the following ibaraita /i: bMediationcan be performed bbya panel of bthreejudges; this is bthe statement of Rabbi Meir. And the Rabbis say: Compromisecan be performed bbyeven ba singlejudge. The Sages bassumedthat beveryoneagrees that bwe compare compromise to judgment,and require the same amount of judges for each process., bWhat, is it notthat bthey disagree in thismatter, bthatone bSage,Rabbi Meir, bholdsthat bjudgmentand compromise can be performed bbya minimum of bthreejudges, bandone bSage,the Rabbis, bholdsthat bjudgmentand compromise can be performed even bby twojudges? The Gemara rejects this analysis: bNo,it is bthat everyoneholds that bjudgmentmust be performed bbya minimum of bthreejudges, band here, they disagree with regard to thismatter: One bSage,Rabbi Meir, bholdsthat bwe compare compromise to judgment, andone bSage,the Rabbis, bholdsthat bwe do not compare compromise to judgment. /b,The Gemara suggests: bLetus bsaythat there are bthreeopinions of itanna’imwith regard tomediation leading to bcompromise, asone bSage,Rabbi Meir, bholdsthat mediation must be performed bbya panel of bthreejudges; bandone bSage,Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, bholdsthat it can be performed bby twojudges; bandone bSage,the Rabbis, bholdsthat it can be performed bby a singlejudge. The Gemara rejects this suggestion. bRav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, and some say Rabbi Yeimar bar Shelamya, said: The one who saysmediation must be performed by btwojudges would say that it may bevenbe performed by bone. Andthe reason bthat he says twois merely bthat there would betwo bwitnesses tothe proceedings, who could testify about them if necessary. In that way, neither side could later deny the terms of the compromise., bRav Ashi says: Learn fromthat discussion that bcompromise does not requirea formal act of bacquisition,which would legally transfer rights to the settlement payment to the other party. bAs if it enters your mindthat compromise brequiresan act of bacquisitionto finalize its terms, baccording to the one who saysit brequiresan act of acquisition, bwhy do Ineed a formal court of bthreejudges? bLet it suffice with twojudges, band letone litigant bperform an act of acquisition withthe other litigant to signify their commitment to abide by the compromise. If a formal act is required to grant halakhic force to the compromise, there is no advantage to having a panel of three judges with the status of a formal court. The Gemara concludes: bButnevertheless, bthe ihalakha /iis that ba compromise requiresan act of bacquisitionto finalize its terms.,§ bThe Sages taughtin a ibaraita( iTosefta1:2–8): bJust as judgmentis performed bby threejudges, bsotoo, bmediationis performed bby threejudges.


Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
bavli interpretation of mishnah sanhedrin, opposing individual justice Flatto, The Crown and the Courts (2021) 145, 147
bavli interpretation of mishnah sanhedrin, opposing royal justice Flatto, The Crown and the Courts (2021) 145
court of tiberias Cohen, The Significance of Yavneh and other Essays in Jewish Hellenism (2010) 287
court procedures in rabbinic literature enforcement of, liability for errors Flatto, The Crown and the Courts (2021) 147
faur, josé Hidary, Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash (2017) 27
hayes, christine, x Hidary, Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash (2017) 27
hellenism, summary of rabbinic interaction with Hidary, Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash (2017) 27
individual justice, opposition to Flatto, The Crown and the Courts (2021) 145, 147
institutional justice, rabbinic jurisprudence and Flatto, The Crown and the Courts (2021) 145
judges of sepphoris Cohen, The Significance of Yavneh and other Essays in Jewish Hellenism (2010) 287
judicial administration, criticism of alternative models Flatto, The Crown and the Courts (2021) 145, 147
judicial administration, opposition to individual justice Flatto, The Crown and the Courts (2021) 145, 147
judicial administration, opposition to royal justice Flatto, The Crown and the Courts (2021) 145
kutscher, yechezkel, language, conception of Hidary, Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash (2017) 27
mishnah sanhedrin, polemic surrounding individual justice Flatto, The Crown and the Courts (2021) 147
rabbi ismael, royal justice Flatto, The Crown and the Courts (2021) 145
rabbinic courts, enforcement of decisions Cohen, The Significance of Yavneh and other Essays in Jewish Hellenism (2010) 287
rabbis, tannaitic literature cases presenting rabbis as authority figures, range of authority Cohen, The Significance of Yavneh and other Essays in Jewish Hellenism (2010) 287
royal justice (judiciary), opposition to Flatto, The Crown and the Courts (2021) 145
sanhedrin Flatto, The Crown and the Courts (2021) 145
sepphoris, judges of Cohen, The Significance of Yavneh and other Essays in Jewish Hellenism (2010) 287
syllogism Hidary, Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash (2017) 27
tannaitic literature alternative juridical models, criticism of alternative models Flatto, The Crown and the Courts (2021) 145, 147
tannaitic literature alternative juridical models, individual justice Flatto, The Crown and the Courts (2021) 145, 147
tannaitic literature alternative juridical models, juridical models in Flatto, The Crown and the Courts (2021) 145, 147
truth (אלטיכסייה, ἀλήθεια) Hidary, Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash (2017) 27
yoḥa, r.' Hidary, Rabbis and Classical Rhetoric: Sophistic Education and Oratory in the Talmud and Midrash (2017) 27