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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



8097
Musonius Rufus, Fragments, 40
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Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

10 results
1. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 3.23-3.25 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.23. Cum autem omnia officia a principiis naturae proficiscantur, ab isdem necesse est proficisci ipsam sapientiam. sed quem ad modum saepe fit, ut is, qui commendatus alicui pluris eum faciat cui commendatus sit om. BEN 1 sit alicui, pluris eum faciat, cui commendatus sit, quam illum, a quo, sic sic sit BR minime mirum est primo nos sapientiae commendari ab initiis naturae, post autem ipsam ipsam autem BE sapientiam nobis cariorem fieri, quam illa sint, a quibus ad hanc venerimus. atque ut membra nobis ita data sunt, ut ad quandam rationem vivendi data esse appareant, sic appetitio animi, quae o(rmh/ Graece vocatur, non ad quodvis genus vitae, sed ad quandam formam vivendi videtur data, itemque et ratio et perfecta ratio. 3.24. ut enim histrioni actio, saltatori motus non quivis, sed certus quidam est datus, sic vita agenda est certo genere quodam, non quolibet; quod genus conveniens consentaneumque dicimus. nec enim gubernationi aut medicinae similem sapientiam esse arbitramur, sed actioni illi potius, quam modo dixi, et saltationi, ut ut arte N arte ut V in ipsa insit, insit ut sit N 1 ut insit N 2 non foris petatur extremum, id est artis effectio. et tamen est etiam aliqua aliqua Brem. alia (est alia etiam N) cum his ipsis artibus sapientiae dissimilitudo, propterea quod in illis quae recte facta sunt non continent tamen omnes partes, e quibus constant; quae autem nos aut recta aut recte facta dicamus, si placet, illi autem appellant katorqw/mata, omnes numeros virtutis continent. sola enim sapientia in se tota conversa est, quod idem in ceteris artibus non fit. 3.25. Inscite autem medicinae et gubernationis ultimum cum ultimo sapientiae comparatur. sapientia enim et animi magnitudinem complectitur et iustitiam, et ut omnia, quae homini accidant, accidunt BE infra se esse iudicet, quod idem ceteris artibus non contingit. contigit A tenere autem virtutes eas ipsas, quarum modo feci mentionem, nemo poterit, nisi statuerit nihil esse, quod intersit aut differat aliud ab alio, praeter praeter nisi BE honesta et turpia. 3.23.  "Again, as all 'appropriate acts' are based on the primary impulses of nature, it follows that Wisdom itself is based on them also. But as it often happens that a man who is introduced to another values this new friend more highly than he does the person who gave him the introduction, so in like manner it is by no means surprising that though we are first commended to Wisdom by the primary natural instincts, afterwards Wisdom itself becomes dearer to us than are the instincts from which we came to her. And just as our limbs are so fashioned that it is clear that they were bestowed upon us with a view to a certain mode of life, so our faculty of appetition, in Greek hormē, was obviously designed not for any kind of life one may choose, but for a particular mode of living; and the same is true of Reason and of perfected Reason. 3.24.  For just as an actor or dancer has assigned to him not any but a certain particular part or dance, so life has to be conducted in a certain fixed way, and not in any way we like. This fixed way we speak of as 'conformable' and suitable. In fact we do not consider Wisdom to be like seamanship or medicine, but rather like the arts of acting and of dancing just mentioned; its End, being the actual exercise of the art, is contained within the art itself, and is not something extraneous to it. At the same time there is also another point which marks a dissimilarity between Wisdom and these arts as well. In the latter a movement perfectly executed nevertheless does not involve all the various motions which together constitute the subject matter of the art; whereas in the sphere of conduct, what we may call, if you approve, 'right actions,' or 'rightly performed actions,' in Stoic phraseology katorthōmata, contain all the factors of virtue. For Wisdom alone is entirely self-contained, which is not the case with the other arts. 3.25.  It is erroneous, however, to place the End of medicine or of navigation exactly on a par with the End of Wisdom. For Wisdom includes also magimity and justice and a sense of superiority to all the accidents of man's estate, but this is not the case with the other arts. Again, even the very virtues I have just mentioned cannot be attained by anyone unless he has realized that all things are indifferent and indistinguishable except moral worth and baseness.
2. Cicero, On Duties, 3.23-3.25 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.23. Neque vero hoc solum natura, id est iure gentium, sed etiam legibus populorum, quibus in singulis civitatibus res publica continetur, eodem modo constitutum est, ut non liceat sui commodi causa nocere alteri; hoc enim spectant leges, hoc volunt, incolumem esse civium coniunctionem; quam qui dirimunt, eos morte, exsilio, vinclis, damno coërcent. Atque hoc multo magis efficit ipsa naturae ratio, quae est lex divina et humana; cui parere qui velit (omnes autem parebunt, qui secundum naturam volent vivere), numquam committet, ut alienum appetat et id, quod alteri detraxerit, sibi adsumat. 3.24. Etenim multo magis est secundum naturam excelsitas animi et magnitudo itemque comitas, iustitia, liberalitas quam voluptas, quam vita, quam divitiae; quae quidem contemnere et pro nihilo ducere comparantem cum utilitate communi magni animi et excelsi est. Detrahere autem de altero sui commodi causa magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam dolor, quam cetera generis eiusdem. 3.25. Itemque magis est secundum naturam pro omnibus gentibus, si fieri possit, conservandis aut iuvandis maximos labores molestiasque suscipere imitantem Herculem illum, quem hominum fama beneficiorum memor in concilio caelestium collocavit, quam vivere in solitudine non modo sine ullis molestiis, sed etiam in maximis voluptatibus abundantem omnibus copiis, ut excellas etiam pulchritudine et viribus. Quocirca optimo quisque et splendidissimo ingenio longe illam vitam huic anteponit. Ex quo efficitur hominem naturae oboedientem homini nocere non posse. 3.23.  But this principle is established not by Nature's laws alone (that is, by the common rules of equity), but also by the statutes of particular communities, in accordance with which in individual states the public interests are maintained. In all these it is with one accord ordained that no man shall be allowed for the sake of his own advantage to injure his neighbour. For it is to this that the laws have regard; this is their intent, that the bonds of union between citizens should not be impaired; and any attempt to destroy these bonds is repressed by the penalty of death, exile, imprisonment, or fine. Again, this principle follows much more effectually directly from the Reason which is in Nature, which is the law of gods and men. If anyone will hearken to that voice (and all will hearken to it who wish to live in accord with Nature's laws), he will never be guilty of coveting anything that is his neighbour's or of appropriating to himself what he has taken from his neighbour. 3.24.  Then, too, loftiness and greatness of spirit, and courtesy, justice, and generosity are much more in harmony with Nature than are selfish pleasure, riches, and life itself; but it requires a great and lofty spirit to despise these latter and count them as naught, when one weighs them over against the common weal. [But for anyone to rob his neighbour for his own profit is more contrary to Nature than death, pain, and the like.] 3.25.  In like manner it is more in accord with Nature to emulate the great Hercules and undergo the greatest toil and trouble for the sake of aiding or saving the world, if possible, than to live in seclusion, not only free from all care, but revelling in pleasures and abounding in wealth, while excelling others also in beauty and strength. Thus Hercules denied himself and underwent toil and tribulation for the world, and, out of gratitude for his services, popular belief has given him a place in the council of the gods. The better and more noble, therefore, the character with which a man is endowed, the more does he prefer the life of service to the life of pleasure. Whence it follows that man, if he is obedient to Nature, cannot do harm to his fellow-man.
3. Epictetus, Discourses, 1.1, 1.4.18, 1.4.28-1.4.29, 1.6.12-1.6.22, 1.7.1-1.7.4, 1.7.29-1.7.31, 1.8.7, 1.9.4, 1.15, 1.20.11, 1.22.9-1.22.11, 1.27.6-1.27.7, 2.1.39, 2.2.21, 2.2.25-2.2.26, 2.5.4-2.5.8, 2.10.5, 2.14.7, 2.16.33, 2.18.8-2.18.9, 2.23.42, 3.3.1, 3.3.10, 3.8.1-3.8.2, 3.15.13, 3.24.22-3.24.24, 4.7.7-4.7.11, 4.10.3 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

4. Epictetus, Enchiridion, 6, 4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

5. Musonius Rufus, Fragments, 38, 42, 8, 17 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

6. New Testament, 1 Corinthians, 2.1 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

2.1. When I came to you, brothers, I didn't come with excellence ofspeech or of wisdom, proclaiming to you the testimony of God.
7. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.6.1-4.6.3, 4.6.5 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

8. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.86-7.87, 7.108-7.109 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.86. As for the assertion made by some people that pleasure is the object to which the first impulse of animals is directed, it is shown by the Stoics to be false. For pleasure, if it is really felt, they declare to be a by-product, which never comes until nature by itself has sought and found the means suitable to the animal's existence or constitution; it is an aftermath comparable to the condition of animals thriving and plants in full bloom. And nature, they say, made no difference originally between plants and animals, for she regulates the life of plants too, in their case without impulse and sensation, just as also certain processes go on of a vegetative kind in us. But when in the case of animals impulse has been superadded, whereby they are enabled to go in quest of their proper aliment, for them, say the Stoics, Nature's rule is to follow the direction of impulse. But when reason by way of a more perfect leadership has been bestowed on the beings we call rational, for them life according to reason rightly becomes the natural life. For reason supervenes to shape impulse scientifically. 7.87. This is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as the end life in agreement with nature (or living agreeably to nature), which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue being the goal towards which nature guides us. So too Cleanthes in his treatise On Pleasure, as also Posidonius, and Hecato in his work On Ends. Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living in accordance with experience of the actual course of nature, as Chrysippus says in the first book of his De finibus; for our individual natures are parts of the nature of the whole universe. 7.108. Zeno was the first to use this term καθῆκον of conduct. Etymologically it is derived from κατά τινας ἥκειν, i.e. reaching as far as, being up to, or incumbent on so and so. And it is an action in itself adapted to nature's arrangements. For of the acts done at the prompting of impulse some, they observe, are fit and meet, others the reverse, while there is a third class which is neither the one nor the other.Befitting acts are all those which reason prevails with us to do; and this is the case with honouring one's parents, brothers and country, and intercourse with friends. Unbefitting, or contrary to duty, are all acts that reason deprecates, e.g. to neglect one's parents, to be indifferent to one's brothers, not to agree with friends, to disregard the interests of one's country, and so forth. 7.109. Acts which fall under neither of the foregoing classes are those which reason neither urges us to do nor forbids, such as picking up a twig, holding a style or a scraper, and the like.Again, some duties are incumbent unconditionally, others in certain circumstances. Unconditional duties are the following: to take proper care of health and one's organs of sense, and things of that sort. Duties imposed by circumstances are such as maiming oneself and sacrifice of property. And so likewise with acts which are violations of duty. Another division is into duties which are always incumbent and those which are not. To live in accordance with virtue is always a duty, whereas dialectic by question and answer or walking-exercise and the like are not at all times incumbent. The same may be said of the violations of duty.
9. Stobaeus, Anthology, 2.65.8 (5th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

10. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 2.988, 3.144, 3.391



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
appearance (phantasia, impression) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 292
appearances (kataleptic) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 292
body / bodies (corporeal, material, matter, physical) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196
chrysippus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196
cicero Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196
desire (epithumia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 292
doctrines (dogma, decreta) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 292
emotions / passions (pathē, pathēmata) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196
epictetus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196, 292
epiktetos Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 148, 149
ethics / ethical theory Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196
false belief / false judgment / false opinion Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 292
galen of pergamum Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196
god (theos) ix Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 292
good (moral) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196
harmony / symphony / orchestration Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 292
harmony with nature Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 148, 149
health (hugieia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196
impulse (hormē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196, 292
judgment (krisis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196
justice (dikaiosunē) / just (dikaios) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 292
kathēkon), right (katorthōmata) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196
khrysippos Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 148, 149
law Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 292
marcus aurelius Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 292; Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 149
musonius rufus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196, 292; Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 148, 149
nature (phusis) / natural, human Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196, 292
paul (apostle) / pauline Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 292
perfect (teleios) / perfection (teleiōsis) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 292
plutarch Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196
power (in nostra potestate) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 292
reason (human) / rational faculty (logos, logistikon) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196, 292
soul / mind (psuchē, animus) vii Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196
stobaeus Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196
stoicism / stoic / stoa Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196, 292
temperance (sōphrosunē) / temperate Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 292
tenor / tension / tone (tonos), good tension (eutonia) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196
tenor / tension / tone (tonos) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196
virtue / moral virtue (aretē) Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196, 292
weakness (astheneia)' Lee, Moral Transformation in Greco-Roman Philosophy of Mind: Mapping the Moral Milieu of the Apostle Paul and His Diaspora Jewish Contemporaries (2020) 196
zeus Stanton, Unity and Disunity in Greek and Christian Thought under the Roman Peace (2021) 149