1. Isocrates, Nicocles, 4 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
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2. Demosthenes, Orations, 35.40-35.41 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)
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3. Cicero, Academica, 2.136 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
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4. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 4.7 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 4.7. Totum genus hoc Zeno et qui ab eo sunt aut non potuerunt tueri aut noluerunt, certe reliquerunt. add. Cobet Mnemosyn. nov. ser. III p. 99 quamquam scripsit artem rhetoricam Cleanthes, Chrysippus etiam, sed sic, ut, si quis obmutescere concupierit, nihil aliud legere debeat. itaque vides, quo modo loquantur. nova verba fingunt, deserunt usitata. At quanta cotur! mundum hunc omnem oppidum esse nostrum! incendi incendi ABERN 1 incendit N 2 V igitur igitur ergo BE eos, qui audiunt, vides. quantam rem agas, quantam rem agas = quid efficere quis possit, quod (ut illi Stoicorum conatus) tantum sit, ut Circeiis qui habitet cet. agat (t ab alt. m. in ras. ) N ut Circeiis qui habitet totum hunc mundum suum municipium esse existimet? Quid? ille incendat? restinguet citius, si ardentem acceperit. Ista ipsa, ista ipsa p. 118, 29 sqq. quae tu breviter: regem, dictatorem, divitem solum esse sapientem, a te quidem apte ac rotunde; quippe; habes enim a rhetoribus; illorum vero ista ipsa quam exilia de virtutis vi! quam tantam volunt esse, ut beatum per se efficere possit. pungunt quasi pungunt enim quasi BE aculeis interrogatiunculis angustis, quibus etiam qui assentiuntur nihil commutantur animo et idem abeunt, qui venerant. res enim fortasse verae, certe graves, non ita tractantur, ut debent, sed aliquanto minutius. | 4.7. This whole field Zeno and his successors were either unable or unwilling to discover; at all events they left it untouched. Cleanthes it is true wrote a treatise on rhetoric, and Chrysippus wrote one too, but what are they like? why, they furnish a complete manual for anyone whose ambition is to hold his tongue; you can judge then of their style, coining new words, discarding those approved by use. 'But,' you will say, 'think how vast are the themes that they essay! for example, that this entire universe is our own town.' You see the magnitude of a Stoic's task, to convince an inhabitant of Circeii that the whole vast world is his own borough! 'If so, he must rouse his audience to enthusiasm.' What? a Stoic rouse enthusiasm? He is much more likely to extinguish any enthusiasm the student may have had to begin with. Even those brief maxims that you propounded, that the Wise Man alone is king, dictator, millionaire, â neatly rounded off no doubt as you put them: of course, for you learnt them from professors of rhetoric; â but how bald those very maxims, on the lips of the Stoics, when they talk about the potency of virtue, â virtue which they rate so highly that it can of itself, they say, confer happiness! Their meagre little syllogisms are mere pinâpricks; they may convince the intellect, but they cannot convert the heart, and the hearer goes away no better than he came. What they say is possibly true, and certainly important; but the way in which they say it is wrong; it is far too petty. |
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5. Cicero, On Duties, 1.64, 4.7 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)
| 1.64. Sed illud odiosum est, quod in hac elatione et magnitudine animi facillime pertinacia et nimia cupiditas principatus innascitur. Ut enim apud Platonem est, omnem morem Lacedaemoniorum inflammatum esse cupiditate vincendi, sic, ut quisque animi magnitudine maxime excellet, ita maxime vult princeps omnium vel potius solus esse. Difficile autem est, cum praestare omnibus concupieris, servare aequitatem, quae est iustitiae maxime propria. Ex quo fit, ut neque disceptatione vinci se nec ullo publico ac legitimo iure patiantur, exsistuntque in re publica plerumque largitores et factiosi, ut opes quam maximas consequantur et sint vi potius superiores quam iustitia pares. Sed quo difficilius, hoc praeclarius; nullum enim est tempus, quod iustitia vacare debeat. | 1.64. But the mischief is that from this exaltation and greatness of spirit spring all too readily self-will and excessive lust for power. For just as Plato tells us that the whole national character of the Spartans was on fire with passion for victory, so, in the same way, the more notable a man is for his greatness of spirit, the more ambitious he is to be the foremost citizen, or, I should say rather, to be sole ruler. But when one begins to aspire to pre-eminence, it is difficult to preserve that spirit of fairness which is absolutely essential to justice. The result is that such men do not allow themselves to be constrained either by argument or by any public and lawful authority; but they only too often prove to be bribers and agitators in public life, seeking to obtain supreme power and to be superiors through force rather than equals through justice. But the greater the difficulty, the greater the glory; for no occasion arises that can excuse a man for being guilty of injustice. |
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6. Septuagint, 2 Maccabees, 7.11 (2nd cent. BCE - 2nd cent. BCE)
| 7.11. and said nobly, 'I got these from Heaven, and because of his laws I disdain them, and from him I hope to get them back again.' |
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7. Dio Chrysostom, Orations, 4.35-4.37 (1st cent. CE
| 4.35. and of this pack those which make no outcry and keep silent are merely deceived themselves, but the most impetuous and foolish dogs, imitating the first ones, raise a din and strive to deceive others. Around the soâcalled sophists, likewise, you will sometimes find such a great accompanying throng of simpletons, and you will discover that your sophist does not differ one whit from a lecherous eunuch. 4.36. On hearing this, Alexander wondered what his reason was for likening the sophist to a eunuch and asked him. "Because," came the reply, "the most wanton eunuchs, protesting their virility and their passion for women, lie with them and annoy them, and yet nothing comes of it, not even if they stay with them night and day. 4.37. So too in the schools the sophists you will find many growing old in their ignorance, wandering about in their discussions far more helplessly than Homer says Odysseus ever did upon the deep, and any one of them might sooner find his way to Hades as that hero did than become a good man by talking and listening. |
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8. New Testament, Romans, 12.3-12.8 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
| 12.3. For I say, through the grace that was given me, to every man who is among you, not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think; but to think reasonably, as God has apportioned to each person a measure of faith. 12.4. For even as we have many members in one body, and all the members don't have the same function 12.5. so we, who are many, are one body in Christ, and individually members one of another. 12.6. Having gifts differing according to the grace that was given to us, if prophecy, let us prophesy according to the proportion of our faith; 12.7. or service, let us give ourselves to service; or he who teaches, to his teaching; 12.8. or he who exhorts, to his exhorting: he who gives, let him do it with liberality; he who rules, with diligence; he who shows mercy, with cheerfulness. |
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9. Plutarch, Moralia, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
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10. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 108.13 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)
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11. Lucian, Hermotimus, Or Sects, 85 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
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12. Marcus Aurelius Emperor of Rome, Meditations, 1.7, 9.29 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)
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13. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.122 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)
| 7.122. though indeed there is also a second form of slavery consisting in subordination, and a third which implies possession of the slave as well as his subordination; the correlative of such servitude being lordship; and this too is evil. Moreover, according to them not only are the wise free, they are also kings; kingship being irresponsible rule, which none but the wise can maintain: so Chrysippus in his treatise vindicating Zeno's use of terminology. For he holds that knowledge of good and evil is a necessary attribute of the ruler, and that no bad man is acquainted with this science. Similarly the wise and good alone are fit to be magistrates, judges, or orators, whereas among the bad there is not one so qualified. |
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14. Arius Didymus, Fragments, None
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