Home About Network of subjects Linked subjects heatmap Book indices included Search by subject Search by reference Browse subjects Browse texts

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



8047
Mishnah, Zevahim, 2.3


זֶה הַכְּלָל, כָּל הַשּׁוֹחֵט וְהַמְקַבֵּל וְהַמְהַלֵּךְ וְהַזּוֹרֵק, לֶאֱכֹל דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לֶאֱכֹל, לְהַקְטִיר דָּבָר שֶׁדַּרְכּוֹ לְהַקְטִיר, חוּץ לִמְקוֹמוֹ, פָּסוּל וְאֵין בּוֹ כָרֵת. חוּץ לִזְמַנּוֹ, פִּגּוּל וְחַיָּבִין עָלָיו כָּרֵת, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁיִּקְרַב הַמַּתִּיר כְּמִצְוָתוֹ:This is the general rule: anyone who slaughters or receives [the blood], or carries [it] or sprinkles [it] [intending] to eat as much as an olive of that which is normally eaten or to burn [on the altar] as much as an olive of that which is normally burned outside its prescribed place, [the sacrifice] is invalid, but it does not involve karet; [Intending to eat or burn] after its designated time, it is piggul and it involves karet. Provided that the mattir is offered in accordance with the law.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

12 results
1. Mishnah, Bava Qamma, 8.1 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

8.1. He who wounds his fellow is liable to compensate him on five counts: for injury, for pain, for healing, for loss of income and for indignity. ‘For injury’: How so? If he blinded his fellow’s eye, cut off his hand or broke his foot, [his fellow] is looked upon as if he was a slave to be sold in the market and they assess how much he was worth and how much he is worth. ‘For pain’? If he burned him with a spit or a nail, even though it was on his fingernail, a place where it leaves no wound, they estimate how much money such a man would be willing to take to suffer so. ‘Healing’? If he struck him he is liable to pay the cost of his healing. If sores arise on him on account of the blow, he is liable [for the cost of their healing]. If not on account of the blow, he is not liable. If the wound healed and then opened and healed and then opened, he is liable for the cost of the healing. If it healed completely, he is no longer liable to pay the cost of the healing. ‘Loss of income’: He is looked upon as a watchman of a cucumber field, since he already gave him compensation for the loss of his hand or foot. ‘Indignity’: All is according to the status of the one that inflicts indignity and the status of the one that suffers indignity. If a man inflicted indignity on a naked man, or a blind man, or a sleeping man, he is [still] liable. If a man fell from the roof and caused injury and inflicted indignity, he is liable for the injury but not for the indignity, as it says, “And she puts forth her hand and grabs him by the private parts”, a man is liable only when he intended [to inflict indignity]."
2. Mishnah, Bikkurim, 3.3 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

3.3. Those who lived near [Jerusalem] would bring fresh figs and grapes, while those who lived far away would bring dried figs and raisins. An ox would go in front of them, his horns bedecked with gold and with an olive-crown on its head. The flute would play before them until they would draw close to Jerusalem. When they drew close to Jerusalem they would send messengers in advance, and they would adorn their bikkurim. The governors and chiefs and treasurers [of the Temple] would go out to greet them, and according to the rank of the entrants they would go forth. All the skilled artisans of Jerusalem would stand up before them and greet them saying, “Our brothers, men of such and such a place, we welcome you in peace.”"
3. Mishnah, Kelim, 25.9 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

25.9. Holy vessels do not have outer and inner sides or a part by which they are held. One may not immerse vessels within one another for sacred use. All vessels become susceptible to uncleanness by intention, but they cannot be rendered insusceptible except by a change-effecting act, for an act annuls an earlier act as well as an earlier intention, but an intention annuls neither an earlier act nor an earlier intention."
4. Mishnah, Kilayim, 9.5 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

9.5. Sellers of clothes may sell [clothes made of kilayim] in accordance with their custom, as long as they do have not the intention in the sun, [to protect themselves] from the sun, or in the rain [to protect themselves] from the rain. The scrupulous hang [such materials or garments] on a stick over their backs."
5. Mishnah, Peah, 6.11 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

6.11. One who harvests by night and binds sheaves [by night] or one who is blind [that which he leaves] is subject to the law of the “forgotten.” If he intends to remove large leaves first, then the law of “forgotten” does not apply. If he said: “Behold, I am reaping on the condition that I take afterwards that which I have forgotten,” the law of “forgotten” still applies."
6. Mishnah, Shevuot, 4.10 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

4.10. [If] he stood in the synagogue and said, “I adjure you that if you know any testimony for me you should come and bear testimony for me”, they are exempt unless he directs himself to them."
7. Mishnah, Yevamot, 16.5 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

16.5. Even if he only heard from women saying, “so-and-so is dead”, this is enough. Rabbi Judah says: even if he only heard children saying, “behold we are going to mourn for a man named so-and-so and to bury him” [it is enough]. Whether [such statement was made] with the intention [of providing evidence] or was made with no such intention [it is valid]. Rabbi Judah ben Bava says: with an Israelite [the evidence is valid] only if the man had the intention [of acting as witness]. In the case of a non-Jew the evidence is invalid if his intention was [to act as witness]."
8. Mishnah, Zevahim, 1.1, 1.4, 2.1-2.2, 4.6, 9.1 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

1.1. All sacrifices slaughtered not in their own name are valid, except that they do not count in fulfilling their owners’ obligation, with the exception of the pesah and the hatat (sin-offering). [This is true for] a pesah in its proper time and a hatat at all times. Rabbi Eliezer says: also the asham (guilt-offering). [This is true for] a pesah in its proper time and a hatat and an asham at all times. Rabbi Eliezer said: the hatat comes on account of sin, and the asham comes on account of sin: just as a hatat [slaughtered] not in its own name is invalid, so the asham is invalid if [slaughtered] not in its own name." 1.4. A pesah and a hatat which were slaughtered not in their own name, or he received [the blood], and carried it [to the altar] and sprinkled [it] not in their own name, Or in their own name and not in their own name, or not in their own name and in their own name, they are disqualified. What is the case of ‘in their own name and not in their own name’? In the name of it being a pesah [first] and [then] in the name of it being a shelamim. ‘Not in their own name and in their own name:’ in the name of a shelamim [first] and [then] in the name of a pesah. For a sacrifice can be disqualified in [any one of] the four elements: slaughtering, receiving, carrying and sprinkling. Rabbi Shimon declares it valid if carried [with the wrong intent], for Rabbi Shimon said: it is impossible [to have a valid sacrifice] without slaughtering, without receiving and without sprinkling, but it is possible without carrying. [How so]? One slaughters it at the side of the altar and sprinkles. Rabbi Elazar says: if one goes where he needs to go, an [illegitimate] intention disqualifies [it]; where he doesn’t need to go, an [illegitimate] intention does not disqualify [it]." 2.1. All sacrifices whose blood was caught by a: non-priest, an onen, a tebul yom, one lacking [priestly] vestments, one lacking sacrificial atonement, one who had not washed his hands and feet, an uncircumcised [priest]; an unclean [priest]; one who was sitting, one who was standing on utensils or on an animal or on another’s feet, are disqualified. If [the priest] caught [the blood] with his left hand, it is disqualified. Rabbi Shimon declares it valid. If the blood was poured out on to the pavement and [the priest] collected it, it is disqualified. If [the priest] put it [the blood] on the ramp [to the altar], [or on the altar, but] not against its base; if he applied [the blood] which should be applied below [the scarlet line] above [it] or that which should be applied above, below, or that which should be applied within [he applied] without, or that which should be applied without [he applied] within, it is invalid, but does not involve karet." 2.2. One who slaughters a sacrifice [intending]: To sprinkle its blood outside [the Temple] or part of its blood outside; To burn its innards or part of its innards outside; To eat its flesh or as much as an olive of its flesh outside, Or to eat as much as an olive of the skin of the fat-tail outside, It is invalid, but it does not involve karet. [One he slaughters a sacrifice intending]: To sprinkle its blood or part of its blood the next day, To burn its innards or part of its innards on the next day; To eat its flesh or as much as an olive of its flesh on the next day; Or to eat as much as an olive of the skin of its fat-tail on the next day, It is piggul, and involves kareth." 4.6. The sacrifice is slaughtered for the sake of six things:For the sake of the sacrifice, For the sake of the sacrificer, For the sake of the [Divine] Name, For the sake of fire-offerings, For the sake of fragrance, For the sake of pleasing; And a hatat and an asham for the sake of sin. Rabbi Yose said: even if one did not have any of these purposes in his heart, it is valid, because it is a regulation of the court. Since the intention is determined only by the worshipper." 9.1. The altar sanctifies whatever is eligible for it. Rabbi Joshua says: whatever is eligible for the altar fire does not descend once it has ascended, as it is said, “The olah itself shall remain where it is burned upon the altar [all night until morning, while the fire of the altar is kept going on it]” (Leviticus 6:: just as the olah, which is eligible for the altar fire, does not descend once it has ascended, so whatever is eligible for the altar fire does not descend once it ascended. Rabbi Gamaliel said: whatever is eligible for the altar does not descend once it ascended, as it is said: “The olah itself shall remain where it is burned upon the altar [all night until morning, while the fire of the altar is kept going on it]” (Leviticus 6:2): just as the olah, which is eligible for the altar, does not descend once it ascended, so whatever is eligible for the altar does not descend once it ascended. The only difference between Rabban Gamaliel and Rabbi Joshua is in respect of the blood and libations, for Rabban Gamaliel says that they cannot descend, while Rabbi Joshua says that they can descend. Rabbi Shimon says: if the sacrifice is fit while the libations [which accompanied it] are unfit; or if the libations are fit while the sacrifice is unfit; or even if both are unfit, the sacrifice does not descend, while the libations do descend."
9. Mishnah, Shekalim, 3.3 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

3.3. [The members] of Rabban Gamaliel’s household used to enter [the chamber] with their shekel between their fingers, and throw it in front of him who made the appropriation, while he who made the appropriation purposely pressed it into the basket. He who made the appropriation did not make it until he first said to them: “Should I make the appropriation?” And they say to him three times: “Make the appropriation! Make the appropriation! Make the appropriation!”"
10. Mishnah, Makhshirin, 3.5-3.8 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

3.5. If one moistened [produce] with drying clay: Rabbi Shimon says: if there was still in it dripping liquid, it comes under the law of ‘if water be put’; But if there was not, it does not come under the law of ‘if water be put’. If one sprinkled his threshing-floor with water, he need not be concerned lest wheat be put there and it become moist. If one gathered grass with the dew still on it in order to moisten wheat with it, it does not come under the law of ‘if water be put’, But if his intention was for this purpose, it does come under the law of ‘if water be put’. If one carried wheat to be milled and rain came down upon it and he was glad of it, it comes under the law of ‘if water be put’. Rabbi Judah said: one cannot help being glad of it. Rather, [it comes under the law] only if he stopped [on his way]." 3.6. If his olives were put on the roof and rain came down upon them and he was glad of it, it comes under the law of ‘if water be put’. Rabbi Judah said: one cannot help being glad of it. Rather, [it comes under the law] only if he plugged up the gutter or if he shook the water [onto the olives]." 3.7. If donkey-drivers were crossing a river and their sacks [filled with produce] fell into the water and they were happy about it, it comes under the law of ‘if water be put’. Rabbi Judah says: one cannot help being happy about it. Rather, [it comes under the law] only if they turned over [the sacks]. If one's feet were full of clay, similarly, the feet of his beast, and he crossed a river and he was happy about it, this comes under the law of ‘if water be put’. Rabbi Judah says: one cannot help being happy about it. Rather, [it comes under the law] only if he stopped and rinsed off his [feet] or those of his [domesticated] beast. But with an unclean [beast] it always causes susceptibility to uncleanness." 3.8. If one lowered wheels or the gear of oxen into water at the time of the hot east wind in order that they might become tightened, this comes under the law of ‘if water be put’. If one took down a beast to drink, the water which came up on its mouth comes under the law of ‘if water be put’, but that which came up on its feet does not come under the law of ‘if water be put’. If he intended that its feet should be washed, even the water that came up on its feet comes under the law of ‘if water be put’. At the time of footsoreness or of threshing it always causes susceptibility to uncleanness. If a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor took it down, even though his intention was that its feet should be washed, it does not come under the law of ‘if water be put’, because with these the act alone counts, but not the intention."
11. New Testament, Hebrews, 5.1-5.10, 7.1-7.28 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

5.1. For every high priest, being taken from among men, is appointed for men in things pertaining to God, that he may offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins. 5.2. The high priest can deal gently with those who are ignorant and going astray, because he himself is also surrounded with weakness. 5.3. Because of this, he must offer sacrifices for sins for the people, as well as for himself. 5.4. Nobody takes this honor on himself, but he is called by God, just like Aaron was. 5.5. So also Christ didn't glorify himself to be made a high priest, but it was he who said to him, "You are my Son. Today I have become your father. 5.6. As he says also in another place, "You are a priest forever, After the order of Melchizedek. 5.7. He, in the days of his flesh, having offered up prayers and petitions with strong crying and tears to him who was able to save him from death, and having been heard for his godly fear 5.8. though he was a Son, yet learned obedience by the things which he suffered. 5.9. Having been made perfect, he became to all of those who obey him the author of eternal salvation 5.10. named by God a high priest after the order of Melchizedek. 7.1. For this Melchizedek, king of Salem, priest of God Most High, who met Abraham returning from the slaughter of the kings and blessed him 7.2. to whom also Abraham divided a tenth part of all (being first, by interpretation, king of righteousness, and then also king of Salem, which is king of peace; 7.3. without father, without mother, without genealogy, having neither beginning of days nor end of life, but made like the Son of God), remains a priest continually. 7.4. Now consider how great this man was, to whom even Abraham, the patriarch, gave a tenth out of the best spoils. 7.5. They indeed of the sons of Levi who receive the priest's office have a commandment to take tithes of the people according to the law, that is, of their brothers, though these have come out of the loins of Abraham 7.6. but he whose genealogy is not counted from them has taken tithes of Abraham, and has blessed him who has the promises. 7.7. But without any dispute the less is blessed by the better. 7.8. Here people who die receive tithes, but there one receives tithes of whom it is testified that he lives. 7.9. So to say, through Abraham even Levi, who receives tithes, has paid tithes 7.10. for he was yet in the loins of his father when Melchizedek met him. 7.11. Now if there was perfection through the Levitical priesthood (for under it the people have received the law), what further need was there for another priest to arise after the order of Melchizedek, and not be called after the order of Aaron? 7.12. For the priesthood being changed, there is of necessity a change made also in the law. 7.13. For he of whom these things are said belongs to another tribe, from which no one has officiated at the altar. 7.14. For it is evident that our Lord has sprung out of Judah, about which tribe Moses spoke nothing concerning priesthood. 7.15. This is yet more abundantly evident, if after the likeness of Melchizedek there arises another priest 7.16. who has been made, not after the law of a fleshly commandment, but after the power of an endless life: 7.17. for it is testified, "You are a priest forever, According to the order of Melchizedek. 7.18. For there is an annulling of a foregoing commandment because of its weakness and uselessness 7.19. (for the law made nothing perfect), and a bringing in thereupon of a better hope, through which we draw near to God. 7.20. Inasmuch as he was not made priest without the taking of an oath 7.21. (for they indeed have been made priests without an oath), but he with an oath by him that says of him, "The Lord swore and will not change his mind, 'You are a priest forever, According to the order of Melchizedek'". 7.22. By so much has Jesus become the collateral of a better covet. 7.23. Many, indeed, have been made priests, because they are hindered from continuing by death. 7.24. But he, because he lives forever, has his priesthood unchangeable. 7.25. Therefore he is also able to save to the uttermost those who draw near to God through him, seeing he ever lives to make intercession for them. 7.26. For such a high priest was fitting for us: holy, guiltless, undefiled, separated from sinners, and made higher than the heavens; 7.27. who doesn't need, like those high priests, to daily offer up sacrifices, first for his own sins, and then for the sins of the people. For this he did once for all, when he offered up himself. 7.28. For the law appoints men as high priests who have weakness, but the word of the oath which came after the law appoints a Son forever who has been perfected.
12. Tosefta, Zevahim, 2.17 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
action, versus substances Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 100
albeck Eilberg-Schwartz, The Human Will in Judaism: The Mishnah's Philosophy of Intention (1986) 222
altar (mizbeah)̣, and burning/ashes Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 80
bertinoro Eilberg-Schwartz, The Human Will in Judaism: The Mishnah's Philosophy of Intention (1986) 222
bird offerings Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 97
blood, manipulation of Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 71
blood, taboo on, treatment of Petropoulou, Animal Sacrifice in Ancient Greek Religion, Judaism, and Christianity, 100 BC to AD 200 (2012) 193
burning (haqtara), marginalization of Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 71
burning (haqtara) Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 80
burnt offering (olah), distribution of Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 97
dedication Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 100
distribution Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 80, 97
eating (akhilah) Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 80
extirpation (karet) Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 100
fiction, legal Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 212
fuller, lon Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 212
grain offerings Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 100
hide Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 97
idolatry, in the mishnah Schick, Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed (2021) 18
intention, versus action Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 48
intention Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 212; Libson, Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud (2018) 40
karet Libson, Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud (2018) 40
legislation, rabbinic, performance as focus of Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 71
meat, versus suet Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 80
mediterranean, sacrifice Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 48
mishnah, and sacrifice Petropoulou, Animal Sacrifice in Ancient Greek Religion, Judaism, and Christianity, 100 BC to AD 200 (2012) 193
nominalism, legal, in rabbinic sources Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 212
omer offering Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 100
ordinance Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 97, 100
owner, intention of Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 48
permission (hatarah) Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 97, 100
permitter (matir) Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 97
piggul Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 80, 97; Libson, Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud (2018) 40
place, of sacrifice Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 80
pollution Petropoulou, Animal Sacrifice in Ancient Greek Religion, Judaism, and Christianity, 100 BC to AD 200 (2012) 193
presentation (of offering) Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 48
priest Libson, Law and self-knowledge in the Talmud (2018) 40
priestly code (p), on grain offerings Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 100
realism, legal, in rabbinic sources' Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 212
reception (qabalah) Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 71
remainders of the commandment (sheyare mitzvah) Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 71
ritual narrative Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 48, 71, 80
roman empire, sacrifice in Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 48
sacrifice, animal, in judaism v, vi Petropoulou, Animal Sacrifice in Ancient Greek Religion, Judaism, and Christianity, 100 BC to AD 200 (2012) 193
slaughter, time and place of Petropoulou, Animal Sacrifice in Ancient Greek Religion, Judaism, and Christianity, 100 BC to AD 200 (2012) 193
slaughter (shekhitah), as stage of sacrifice Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 71
substances, sacrificial Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 100
torahs deviation from Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 212
tort law, in tannaitic sources Schick, Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed (2021) 18
tort law, strict liability Schick, Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed (2021) 18
tossing of blood (zeriqah) Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 48, 71
unbinding Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 97
walking (holakhah) Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 71
work of blood (avodat ha-dam) Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 71