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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



8013
Mishnah, Kelim, 25.9


כְּלֵי הַקֹּדֶשׁ אֵין לָהֶם אֲחוֹרַיִם וָתוֹךְ, וְאֵין לָהֶם בֵּית צְבִיעָה. וְאֵין מַטְבִּילִים כֵּלִים בְתוֹךְ כֵּלִים לְקֹדֶשׁ. כָּל הַכֵּלִים יוֹרְדִין לִידֵי טֻמְאָתָן בְּמַחֲשָׁבָה, וְאֵינָן עוֹלִים מִידֵי טֻמְאָתָן אֶלָּא בְשִׁנּוּי מַעֲשֶׂה, שֶׁהַמַּעֲשֶׂה מְבַטֵּל מִיַּד הַמַּעֲשֶׂה וּמִיַּד מַחֲשָׁבָה, וּמַחֲשָׁבָה אֵינָהּ מְבַטֶּלֶת לֹא מִיַּד מַעֲשֶׂה וְלֹא מִיַּד מַחֲשָׁבָה:Holy vessels do not have outer and inner sides or a part by which they are held. One may not immerse vessels within one another for sacred use. All vessels become susceptible to uncleanness by intention, but they cannot be rendered insusceptible except by a change-effecting act, for an act annuls an earlier act as well as an earlier intention, but an intention annuls neither an earlier act nor an earlier intention.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

12 results
1. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 21.12-21.14 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

21.12. מַכֵּה אִישׁ וָמֵת מוֹת יוּמָת׃ 21.13. וַאֲשֶׁר לֹא צָדָה וְהָאֱלֹהִים אִנָּה לְיָדוֹ וְשַׂמְתִּי לְךָ מָקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יָנוּס שָׁמָּה׃ 21.14. וְכִי־יָזִד אִישׁ עַל־רֵעֵהוּ לְהָרְגוֹ בְעָרְמָה מֵעִם מִזְבְּחִי תִּקָּחֶנּוּ לָמוּת׃ 21.12. He that smiteth a man, so that he dieth, shall surely be put to death." 21.13. And if a man lie not in wait, but God cause it to come to hand; then I will appoint thee a place whither he may flee." 21.14. And if a man come presumptuously upon his neighbour, to slay him with guile; thou shalt take him from Mine altar, that he may die."
2. Mishnah, Bava Qamma, 8.1 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

8.1. He who wounds his fellow is liable to compensate him on five counts: for injury, for pain, for healing, for loss of income and for indignity. ‘For injury’: How so? If he blinded his fellow’s eye, cut off his hand or broke his foot, [his fellow] is looked upon as if he was a slave to be sold in the market and they assess how much he was worth and how much he is worth. ‘For pain’? If he burned him with a spit or a nail, even though it was on his fingernail, a place where it leaves no wound, they estimate how much money such a man would be willing to take to suffer so. ‘Healing’? If he struck him he is liable to pay the cost of his healing. If sores arise on him on account of the blow, he is liable [for the cost of their healing]. If not on account of the blow, he is not liable. If the wound healed and then opened and healed and then opened, he is liable for the cost of the healing. If it healed completely, he is no longer liable to pay the cost of the healing. ‘Loss of income’: He is looked upon as a watchman of a cucumber field, since he already gave him compensation for the loss of his hand or foot. ‘Indignity’: All is according to the status of the one that inflicts indignity and the status of the one that suffers indignity. If a man inflicted indignity on a naked man, or a blind man, or a sleeping man, he is [still] liable. If a man fell from the roof and caused injury and inflicted indignity, he is liable for the injury but not for the indignity, as it says, “And she puts forth her hand and grabs him by the private parts”, a man is liable only when he intended [to inflict indignity]."
3. Mishnah, Berachot, 2.1 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

2.1. If one was reading in the Torah [the section of the Shema] and the time for its recital arrived, if he directed his heart [to fulfill the mitzvah] he has fulfilled his obligation. In the breaks [between sections] one may give greeting out of respect and return greeting; in the middle [of a section] one may give greeting out of fear and return it, the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Judah says: in the middle one may give greeting out of fear and return it out of respect, in the breaks one may give greeting out of respect and return greeting to anyone."
4. Mishnah, Kilayim, 9.5 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

9.5. Sellers of clothes may sell [clothes made of kilayim] in accordance with their custom, as long as they do have not the intention in the sun, [to protect themselves] from the sun, or in the rain [to protect themselves] from the rain. The scrupulous hang [such materials or garments] on a stick over their backs."
5. Mishnah, Peah, 6.11 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

6.11. One who harvests by night and binds sheaves [by night] or one who is blind [that which he leaves] is subject to the law of the “forgotten.” If he intends to remove large leaves first, then the law of “forgotten” does not apply. If he said: “Behold, I am reaping on the condition that I take afterwards that which I have forgotten,” the law of “forgotten” still applies."
6. Mishnah, Rosh Hashanah, 3.7 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

3.7. One who blows into a pit or a cistern or a jug, if he heard the sound of the shofar, he has fulfilled his obligation, but if he hears the echo [also], he has not fulfilled his obligation. And also one who was passing behind a synagogue or if his house was next to the synagogue and he heard the sound of the shofar or of the megillah [being read], if he directed his heart (had intention), then he has fulfilled his obligation, but if not he has not fulfilled his obligation. Even though this one heard and this one heard, this one directed his heart and this one did not."
7. Mishnah, Sanhedrin, 9.2 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

9.2. If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable."
8. Mishnah, Shevuot, 4.10 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

4.10. [If] he stood in the synagogue and said, “I adjure you that if you know any testimony for me you should come and bear testimony for me”, they are exempt unless he directs himself to them."
9. Mishnah, Yevamot, 16.5 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

16.5. Even if he only heard from women saying, “so-and-so is dead”, this is enough. Rabbi Judah says: even if he only heard children saying, “behold we are going to mourn for a man named so-and-so and to bury him” [it is enough]. Whether [such statement was made] with the intention [of providing evidence] or was made with no such intention [it is valid]. Rabbi Judah ben Bava says: with an Israelite [the evidence is valid] only if the man had the intention [of acting as witness]. In the case of a non-Jew the evidence is invalid if his intention was [to act as witness]."
10. Mishnah, Zevahim, 1.1, 2.2-2.3 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

1.1. All sacrifices slaughtered not in their own name are valid, except that they do not count in fulfilling their owners’ obligation, with the exception of the pesah and the hatat (sin-offering). [This is true for] a pesah in its proper time and a hatat at all times. Rabbi Eliezer says: also the asham (guilt-offering). [This is true for] a pesah in its proper time and a hatat and an asham at all times. Rabbi Eliezer said: the hatat comes on account of sin, and the asham comes on account of sin: just as a hatat [slaughtered] not in its own name is invalid, so the asham is invalid if [slaughtered] not in its own name." 2.2. One who slaughters a sacrifice [intending]: To sprinkle its blood outside [the Temple] or part of its blood outside; To burn its innards or part of its innards outside; To eat its flesh or as much as an olive of its flesh outside, Or to eat as much as an olive of the skin of the fat-tail outside, It is invalid, but it does not involve karet. [One he slaughters a sacrifice intending]: To sprinkle its blood or part of its blood the next day, To burn its innards or part of its innards on the next day; To eat its flesh or as much as an olive of its flesh on the next day; Or to eat as much as an olive of the skin of its fat-tail on the next day, It is piggul, and involves kareth." 2.3. This is the general rule: anyone who slaughters or receives [the blood], or carries [it] or sprinkles [it] [intending] to eat as much as an olive of that which is normally eaten or to burn [on the altar] as much as an olive of that which is normally burned outside its prescribed place, [the sacrifice] is invalid, but it does not involve karet; [Intending to eat or burn] after its designated time, it is piggul and it involves karet. Provided that the mattir is offered in accordance with the law."
11. Mishnah, Shekalim, 3.3 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

3.3. [The members] of Rabban Gamaliel’s household used to enter [the chamber] with their shekel between their fingers, and throw it in front of him who made the appropriation, while he who made the appropriation purposely pressed it into the basket. He who made the appropriation did not make it until he first said to them: “Should I make the appropriation?” And they say to him three times: “Make the appropriation! Make the appropriation! Make the appropriation!”"
12. Mishnah, Makhshirin, 3.5-3.8 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

3.5. If one moistened [produce] with drying clay: Rabbi Shimon says: if there was still in it dripping liquid, it comes under the law of ‘if water be put’; But if there was not, it does not come under the law of ‘if water be put’. If one sprinkled his threshing-floor with water, he need not be concerned lest wheat be put there and it become moist. If one gathered grass with the dew still on it in order to moisten wheat with it, it does not come under the law of ‘if water be put’, But if his intention was for this purpose, it does come under the law of ‘if water be put’. If one carried wheat to be milled and rain came down upon it and he was glad of it, it comes under the law of ‘if water be put’. Rabbi Judah said: one cannot help being glad of it. Rather, [it comes under the law] only if he stopped [on his way]." 3.6. If his olives were put on the roof and rain came down upon them and he was glad of it, it comes under the law of ‘if water be put’. Rabbi Judah said: one cannot help being glad of it. Rather, [it comes under the law] only if he plugged up the gutter or if he shook the water [onto the olives]." 3.7. If donkey-drivers were crossing a river and their sacks [filled with produce] fell into the water and they were happy about it, it comes under the law of ‘if water be put’. Rabbi Judah says: one cannot help being happy about it. Rather, [it comes under the law] only if they turned over [the sacks]. If one's feet were full of clay, similarly, the feet of his beast, and he crossed a river and he was happy about it, this comes under the law of ‘if water be put’. Rabbi Judah says: one cannot help being happy about it. Rather, [it comes under the law] only if he stopped and rinsed off his [feet] or those of his [domesticated] beast. But with an unclean [beast] it always causes susceptibility to uncleanness." 3.8. If one lowered wheels or the gear of oxen into water at the time of the hot east wind in order that they might become tightened, this comes under the law of ‘if water be put’. If one took down a beast to drink, the water which came up on its mouth comes under the law of ‘if water be put’, but that which came up on its feet does not come under the law of ‘if water be put’. If he intended that its feet should be washed, even the water that came up on its feet comes under the law of ‘if water be put’. At the time of footsoreness or of threshing it always causes susceptibility to uncleanness. If a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor took it down, even though his intention was that its feet should be washed, it does not come under the law of ‘if water be put’, because with these the act alone counts, but not the intention."


Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
artifacts (kelim), im/purity of, as extensions of the body Balberg, Purity, Body, and Self in Early Rabbinic Literature (2014) 84
artifacts (kelim), usability, role of in purity system Balberg, Purity, Body, and Self in Early Rabbinic Literature (2014) 84
biblical purity laws, derivation of rabbinic purity system from Balberg, Purity, Body, and Self in Early Rabbinic Literature (2014) 84
body Balberg, Purity, Body, and Self in Early Rabbinic Literature (2014) 85
god Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 32
idolatry, in the mishnah Schick, Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed (2021) 18
intention Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 32; Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 204, 207
legislation, rabbinic, intention in Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 32
nominalism, legal, in rabbinic sources Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 204, 207
performance Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 32
prayer Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 32
priestly code Balberg, Purity, Body, and Self in Early Rabbinic Literature (2014) 84
rabbis, on sacrifice Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 32
realism, legal, in rabbinic sources' Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 207
realism, legal, in rabbinic sources Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 204
ritual narrative Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 32
rosen-zvi, ishay Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 204
subjective investment Balberg, Purity, Body, and Self in Early Rabbinic Literature (2014) 84, 85
thought (mahshava), role of in purity system Balberg, Purity, Body, and Self in Early Rabbinic Literature (2014) 84, 85, 213
torahs deviation from Hayes, What's Divine about Divine Law?: Early Perspectives (2015) 204, 207
tort law, in tannaitic sources Schick, Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed (2021) 18
tort law, strict liability Schick, Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed (2021) 18
validity Balberg, Blood for Thought: The Reinvention of Sacrifice in Early Rabbinic Literature (2017) 32
visibility, implications of for im/purity Balberg, Purity, Body, and Self in Early Rabbinic Literature (2014) 213