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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



8000
Mishnah, Bava Qamma, 8.1


הַחוֹבֵל בַּחֲבֵרוֹ חַיָּב עָלָיו מִשּׁוּם חֲמִשָּׁה דְבָרִים, בְּנֶזֶק, בְּצַעַר, בְּרִפּוּי, בְּשֶׁבֶת, וּבְבֹשֶׁת. בְּנֶזֶק כֵּיצַד. סִמָּא אֶת עֵינוֹ, קָטַע אֶת יָדוֹ, שִׁבֵּר אֶת רַגְלוֹ, רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ כְּאִלּוּ הוּא עֶבֶד נִמְכָּר בַּשּׁוּק וְשָׁמִין כַּמָּה הָיָה יָפֶה וְכַמָּה הוּא יָפֶה. צַעַר, כְּוָאוֹ בְשַׁפּוּד אוֹ בְמַסְמֵר, וַאֲפִלּוּ עַל צִפָּרְנוֹ, מְקוֹם שֶׁאֵינוֹ עוֹשֶׂה חַבּוּרָה, אוֹמְדִין כַּמָּה אָדָם כַּיּוֹצֵא בָזֶה רוֹצֶה לִטֹּל לִהְיוֹת מִצְטַעֵר כָּךְ. רִפּוּי, הִכָּהוּ חַיָּב לְרַפְּאֹתוֹ. עָלוּ בוֹ צְמָחִים, אִם מֵחֲמַת הַמַּכָּה, חַיָּב. שֶׁלֹּא מֵחֲמַת הַמַּכָּה, פָּטוּר. חָיְתָה וְנִסְתְּרָה, חָיְתָה וְנִסְתְּרָה, חַיָּב לְרַפְּאֹתוֹ. חָיְתָה כָל צָרְכָּהּ, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב לְרַפְּאֹתוֹ. שֶׁבֶת, רוֹאִין אוֹתוֹ כְּאִלוּ הוּא שׁוֹמֵר קִשּׁוּאִין, שֶׁכְּבָר נָתַן לוֹ דְמֵי יָדוֹ וּדְמֵי רַגְלוֹ. בֹּשֶׁת, הַכֹּל לְפִי הַמְבַיֵּשׁ וְהַמִּתְבַּיֵּשׁ. הַמְבַיֵּשׁ אֶת הֶעָרֹם, הַמְבַיֵּשׁ אֶת הַסּוּמָא, וְהַמְבַיֵּשׁ אֶת הַיָּשֵׁן, חַיָּב. וְיָשֵׁן שֶׁבִּיֵּשׁ, פָּטוּר. נָפַל מִן הַגָּג, וְהִזִּיק וּבִיֵּשׁ, חַיָּב עַל הַנֶּזֶק וּפָטוּר עַל הַבֹּשֶׁת, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (דברים כה) וְשָׁלְחָה יָדָהּ וְהֶחֱזִיקָה בִּמְבֻשָׁיו, אֵינוֹ חַיָּב עַל הַבֹּשֶׁת עַד שֶׁיְהֵא מִתְכַּוֵּן:He who wounds his fellow is liable to compensate him on five counts: for injury, for pain, for healing, for loss of income and for indignity. ‘For injury’: How so? If he blinded his fellow’s eye, cut off his hand or broke his foot, [his fellow] is looked upon as if he was a slave to be sold in the market and they assess how much he was worth and how much he is worth. ‘For pain’? If he burned him with a spit or a nail, even though it was on his fingernail, a place where it leaves no wound, they estimate how much money such a man would be willing to take to suffer so. ‘Healing’? If he struck him he is liable to pay the cost of his healing. If sores arise on him on account of the blow, he is liable [for the cost of their healing]. If not on account of the blow, he is not liable. If the wound healed and then opened and healed and then opened, he is liable for the cost of the healing. If it healed completely, he is no longer liable to pay the cost of the healing. ‘Loss of income’: He is looked upon as a watchman of a cucumber field, since he already gave him compensation for the loss of his hand or foot. ‘Indignity’: All is according to the status of the one that inflicts indignity and the status of the one that suffers indignity. If a man inflicted indignity on a naked man, or a blind man, or a sleeping man, he is [still] liable. If a man fell from the roof and caused injury and inflicted indignity, he is liable for the injury but not for the indignity, as it says, “And she puts forth her hand and grabs him by the private parts”, a man is liable only when he intended [to inflict indignity].


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

16 results
1. Hebrew Bible, Deuteronomy, 25.11 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

25.11. כִּי־יִנָּצוּ אֲנָשִׁים יַחְדָּו אִישׁ וְאָחִיו וְקָרְבָה אֵשֶׁת הָאֶחָד לְהַצִּיל אֶת־אִישָׁהּ מִיַּד מַכֵּהוּ וְשָׁלְחָה יָדָהּ וְהֶחֱזִיקָה בִּמְבֻשָׁיו׃ 25.11. When men strive together one with another, and the wife of the one draweth near to deliver her husband out of the hand of him that smiteth him, and putteth forth her hand, and taketh him by the secrets;"
2. Hebrew Bible, Exodus, 21.12-21.14 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

21.12. מַכֵּה אִישׁ וָמֵת מוֹת יוּמָת׃ 21.13. וַאֲשֶׁר לֹא צָדָה וְהָאֱלֹהִים אִנָּה לְיָדוֹ וְשַׂמְתִּי לְךָ מָקוֹם אֲשֶׁר יָנוּס שָׁמָּה׃ 21.14. וְכִי־יָזִד אִישׁ עַל־רֵעֵהוּ לְהָרְגוֹ בְעָרְמָה מֵעִם מִזְבְּחִי תִּקָּחֶנּוּ לָמוּת׃ 21.12. He that smiteth a man, so that he dieth, shall surely be put to death." 21.13. And if a man lie not in wait, but God cause it to come to hand; then I will appoint thee a place whither he may flee." 21.14. And if a man come presumptuously upon his neighbour, to slay him with guile; thou shalt take him from Mine altar, that he may die."
3. Hebrew Bible, Numbers, 35.16-35.27, 35.30, 35.33-35.34 (9th cent. BCE - 3rd cent. BCE)

35.16. וְאִם־בִּכְלִי בַרְזֶל הִכָּהוּ וַיָּמֹת רֹצֵחַ הוּא מוֹת יוּמַת הָרֹצֵחַ׃ 35.17. וְאִם בְּאֶבֶן יָד אֲשֶׁר־יָמוּת בָּהּ הִכָּהוּ וַיָּמֹת רֹצֵחַ הוּא מוֹת יוּמַת הָרֹצֵחַ׃ 35.18. אוֹ בִּכְלִי עֵץ־יָד אֲשֶׁר־יָמוּת בּוֹ הִכָּהוּ וַיָּמֹת רֹצֵחַ הוּא מוֹת יוּמַת הָרֹצֵחַ׃ 35.19. גֹּאֵל הַדָּם הוּא יָמִית אֶת־הָרֹצֵחַ בְּפִגְעוֹ־בוֹ הוּא יְמִיתֶנּוּ׃ 35.21. אוֹ בְאֵיבָה הִכָּהוּ בְיָדוֹ וַיָּמֹת מוֹת־יוּמַת הַמַּכֶּה רֹצֵחַ הוּא גֹּאֵל הַדָּם יָמִית אֶת־הָרֹצֵחַ בְּפִגְעוֹ־בוֹ׃ 35.22. וְאִם־בְּפֶתַע בְּלֹא־אֵיבָה הֲדָפוֹ אוֹ־הִשְׁלִיךְ עָלָיו כָּל־כְּלִי בְּלֹא צְדִיָּה׃ 35.23. אוֹ בְכָל־אֶבֶן אֲשֶׁר־יָמוּת בָּהּ בְּלֹא רְאוֹת וַיַּפֵּל עָלָיו וַיָּמֹת וְהוּא לֹא־אוֹיֵב לוֹ וְלֹא מְבַקֵּשׁ רָעָתוֹ׃ 35.24. וְשָׁפְטוּ הָעֵדָה בֵּין הַמַּכֶּה וּבֵין גֹּאֵל הַדָּם עַל הַמִּשְׁפָּטִים הָאֵלֶּה׃ 35.25. וְהִצִּילוּ הָעֵדָה אֶת־הָרֹצֵחַ מִיַּד גֹּאֵל הַדָּם וְהֵשִׁיבוּ אֹתוֹ הָעֵדָה אֶל־עִיר מִקְלָטוֹ אֲשֶׁר־נָס שָׁמָּה וְיָשַׁב בָּהּ עַד־מוֹת הַכֹּהֵן הַגָּדֹל אֲשֶׁר־מָשַׁח אֹתוֹ בְּשֶׁמֶן הַקֹּדֶשׁ׃ 35.26. וְאִם־יָצֹא יֵצֵא הָרֹצֵחַ אֶת־גְּבוּל עִיר מִקְלָטוֹ אֲשֶׁר יָנוּס שָׁמָּה׃ 35.27. וּמָצָא אֹתוֹ גֹּאֵל הַדָּם מִחוּץ לִגְבוּל עִיר מִקְלָטוֹ וְרָצַח גֹּאֵל הַדָּם אֶת־הָרֹצֵחַ אֵין לוֹ דָּם׃ 35.33. וְלֹא־תַחֲנִיפוּ אֶת־הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר אַתֶּם בָּהּ כִּי הַדָּם הוּא יַחֲנִיף אֶת־הָאָרֶץ וְלָאָרֶץ לֹא־יְכֻפַּר לַדָּם אֲשֶׁר שֻׁפַּךְ־בָּהּ כִּי־אִם בְּדַם שֹׁפְכוֹ׃ 35.34. וְלֹא תְטַמֵּא אֶת־הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר אַתֶּם יֹשְׁבִים בָּהּ אֲשֶׁר אֲנִי שֹׁכֵן בְּתוֹכָהּ כִּי אֲנִי יְהוָה שֹׁכֵן בְּתוֹךְ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל׃ 35.16. But if he smote him with an instrument of iron, so that he died, he is a murderer; the murderer shall surely be put to death." 35.17. And if he smote him with a stone in the hand, whereby a man may die, and he died, he is a murderer; the murderer shall surely be put to death." 35.18. Or if he smote him with a weapon of wood in the hand, whereby a man may die, and he died, he is a murderer; the murderer shall surely be put to death." 35.19. The avenger of blood shall himself put the murderer to death; when he meeteth him, he shall put him to death." 35.20. And if he thrust him of hatred, or hurled at him any thing, lying in wait, so that he died;" 35.21. or in enmity smote him with his hand, that he died; he that smote him shall surely be put to death: he is a murderer; the avenger of blood shall put the murderer to death when he meeteth him." 35.22. But if he thrust him suddenly without enmity, or hurled upon him any thing without lying in wait," 35.23. or with any stone, whereby a man may die, seeing him not, and cast it upon him, so that he died, and he was not his enemy, neither sought his harm;" 35.24. then the congregation shall judge between the smiter and the avenger of blood according to these ordices;" 35.25. and the congregation shall deliver the manslayer out of the hand of the avenger of blood, and the congregation shall restore him to his city of refuge, whither he was fled; and he shall dwell therein until the death of the high priest, who was anointed with the holy oil." 35.26. But if the manslayer shall at any time go beyond the border of his city of refuge, whither he fleeth;" 35.27. and the avenger of blood find him without the border of his city of refuge, and the avenger of blood slay the manslayer; there shall be no bloodguiltiness for him;" 35.30. Whoso killeth any person, the murderer shall be slain at the mouth of witnesses; but one witness shall not testify against any person that he die." 35.33. So ye shall not pollute the land wherein ye are; for blood, it polluteth the land; and no expiation can be made for the land for the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it." 35.34. And thou shalt not defile the land which ye inhabit, in the midst of which I dwell; for I the LORD dwell in the midst of the children of Israel.’"
4. Mishnah, Kelim, 25.9 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

25.9. Holy vessels do not have outer and inner sides or a part by which they are held. One may not immerse vessels within one another for sacred use. All vessels become susceptible to uncleanness by intention, but they cannot be rendered insusceptible except by a change-effecting act, for an act annuls an earlier act as well as an earlier intention, but an intention annuls neither an earlier act nor an earlier intention."
5. Mishnah, Kilayim, 9.5 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

9.5. Sellers of clothes may sell [clothes made of kilayim] in accordance with their custom, as long as they do have not the intention in the sun, [to protect themselves] from the sun, or in the rain [to protect themselves] from the rain. The scrupulous hang [such materials or garments] on a stick over their backs."
6. Mishnah, Makkot, 2.3 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

2.3. The father goes into banishment for [the death of] his son, and the son goes into banishment for [that of] his father. All go into banishment for [the death of] an Israelite, and Israelites go into banishment on their account, except for a resident alien. And a resident alien does not go into banishment except for [the death of another] resident alien. A blind person does not go into banishment, the words of Rabbi Judah. Rabbi Meir says: “He goes into banishment.” An enemy does not go into banishment. Rabbi Yose bar Judah says: “An enemy is executed, for it is as if he has been warned.” Rabbi Shimon says: “There is an enemy that goes into banishment and there is an enemy that does not go into banishment: wherever it can be said that he had killed [his victim] wittingly, he goes not into banishment, and where he had slain unwittingly, he goes into banishment."
7. Mishnah, Peah, 6.11 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

6.11. One who harvests by night and binds sheaves [by night] or one who is blind [that which he leaves] is subject to the law of the “forgotten.” If he intends to remove large leaves first, then the law of “forgotten” does not apply. If he said: “Behold, I am reaping on the condition that I take afterwards that which I have forgotten,” the law of “forgotten” still applies."
8. Mishnah, Sanhedrin, 9.2 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

9.2. If he intended to kill an animal but killed a man, or [he intended to kill] a non-Jew and he killed an Israelite, or [if he intended to kill] a prematurely born child [who was bound to die in any case] and he killed a viable child, he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on his loins, and the blow was insufficient to kill [when struck] on his loins, but struck the heart instead, where it was sufficient to kill, and he died he is not liable. If he intended to strike him on the heart, where it was sufficient to kill but struck him on the loins, where it was not sufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike an adult, and the blow was insufficient to kill [an adult], but the blow landed on a child, whom it was enough to kill, and he died, he is not liable. If he intended to strike a child with a blow sufficient to kill a child, but struck an adult, for whom it was insufficient to kill, and yet he died, he is not liable. But if he intended to strike his loins with sufficient force to kill, but struck the heart instead, he is liable. If he intended to strike an adult with a blow sufficient to kill an adult, but struck a child instead, and he died, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: “Even if he intended to kill one but killed another, he is not liable."
9. Mishnah, Shevuot, 4.10 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

4.10. [If] he stood in the synagogue and said, “I adjure you that if you know any testimony for me you should come and bear testimony for me”, they are exempt unless he directs himself to them."
10. Mishnah, Yevamot, 16.5 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

16.5. Even if he only heard from women saying, “so-and-so is dead”, this is enough. Rabbi Judah says: even if he only heard children saying, “behold we are going to mourn for a man named so-and-so and to bury him” [it is enough]. Whether [such statement was made] with the intention [of providing evidence] or was made with no such intention [it is valid]. Rabbi Judah ben Bava says: with an Israelite [the evidence is valid] only if the man had the intention [of acting as witness]. In the case of a non-Jew the evidence is invalid if his intention was [to act as witness]."
11. Mishnah, Zevahim, 2.2-2.3 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

2.2. One who slaughters a sacrifice [intending]: To sprinkle its blood outside [the Temple] or part of its blood outside; To burn its innards or part of its innards outside; To eat its flesh or as much as an olive of its flesh outside, Or to eat as much as an olive of the skin of the fat-tail outside, It is invalid, but it does not involve karet. [One he slaughters a sacrifice intending]: To sprinkle its blood or part of its blood the next day, To burn its innards or part of its innards on the next day; To eat its flesh or as much as an olive of its flesh on the next day; Or to eat as much as an olive of the skin of its fat-tail on the next day, It is piggul, and involves kareth." 2.3. This is the general rule: anyone who slaughters or receives [the blood], or carries [it] or sprinkles [it] [intending] to eat as much as an olive of that which is normally eaten or to burn [on the altar] as much as an olive of that which is normally burned outside its prescribed place, [the sacrifice] is invalid, but it does not involve karet; [Intending to eat or burn] after its designated time, it is piggul and it involves karet. Provided that the mattir is offered in accordance with the law."
12. Mishnah, Shekalim, 3.3 (1st cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

3.3. [The members] of Rabban Gamaliel’s household used to enter [the chamber] with their shekel between their fingers, and throw it in front of him who made the appropriation, while he who made the appropriation purposely pressed it into the basket. He who made the appropriation did not make it until he first said to them: “Should I make the appropriation?” And they say to him three times: “Make the appropriation! Make the appropriation! Make the appropriation!”"
13. Mishnah, Makhshirin, 3.5-3.8 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

3.5. If one moistened [produce] with drying clay: Rabbi Shimon says: if there was still in it dripping liquid, it comes under the law of ‘if water be put’; But if there was not, it does not come under the law of ‘if water be put’. If one sprinkled his threshing-floor with water, he need not be concerned lest wheat be put there and it become moist. If one gathered grass with the dew still on it in order to moisten wheat with it, it does not come under the law of ‘if water be put’, But if his intention was for this purpose, it does come under the law of ‘if water be put’. If one carried wheat to be milled and rain came down upon it and he was glad of it, it comes under the law of ‘if water be put’. Rabbi Judah said: one cannot help being glad of it. Rather, [it comes under the law] only if he stopped [on his way]." 3.6. If his olives were put on the roof and rain came down upon them and he was glad of it, it comes under the law of ‘if water be put’. Rabbi Judah said: one cannot help being glad of it. Rather, [it comes under the law] only if he plugged up the gutter or if he shook the water [onto the olives]." 3.7. If donkey-drivers were crossing a river and their sacks [filled with produce] fell into the water and they were happy about it, it comes under the law of ‘if water be put’. Rabbi Judah says: one cannot help being happy about it. Rather, [it comes under the law] only if they turned over [the sacks]. If one's feet were full of clay, similarly, the feet of his beast, and he crossed a river and he was happy about it, this comes under the law of ‘if water be put’. Rabbi Judah says: one cannot help being happy about it. Rather, [it comes under the law] only if he stopped and rinsed off his [feet] or those of his [domesticated] beast. But with an unclean [beast] it always causes susceptibility to uncleanness." 3.8. If one lowered wheels or the gear of oxen into water at the time of the hot east wind in order that they might become tightened, this comes under the law of ‘if water be put’. If one took down a beast to drink, the water which came up on its mouth comes under the law of ‘if water be put’, but that which came up on its feet does not come under the law of ‘if water be put’. If he intended that its feet should be washed, even the water that came up on its feet comes under the law of ‘if water be put’. At the time of footsoreness or of threshing it always causes susceptibility to uncleanness. If a deaf-mute, an imbecile or a minor took it down, even though his intention was that its feet should be washed, it does not come under the law of ‘if water be put’, because with these the act alone counts, but not the intention."
14. Tosefta, Gittin, 1.4 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

15. Tosefta, Sotah, 15.8, 15.11-15.13 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

16. Babylonian Talmud, Bava Qamma, None (3rd cent. CE - 6th cent. CE)

56a. בכותל רעוע,אמר מר הכופף קמתו של חבירו בפני הדליקה היכי דמי אילימא דמטיא ליה ברוח מצויה בדיני אדם נמי נחייב אלא דמטיא ברוח שאינה מצויה,ורב אשי אמר טמון אתמר משום דשויה טמון באש:,אמר מר השוכר עדי שקר ה"ד אילימא לנפשיה ממונא בעי שלומי ובדיני אדם נמי ניחייב אלא לחבריה,והיודע עדות לחבירו ואינו מעיד לו במאי עסקינן אילימא בבי תרי פשיטא דאורייתא הוא (ויקרא ה, א) אם לא יגיד ונשא עונו,אלא בחד,ותו ליכא והאיכא (סימן העושה בסם ושליח חבירו נשבר) העושה מלאכה במי חטאת ובפרת חטאת פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים,והאיכא הנותן סם המות בפני בהמת חבירו פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים,והאיכא השולח את הבערה ביד חרש שוטה וקטן פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים,והאיכא המבעית את חבירו פטור מדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים,והאיכא נשברה כדו ברה"ר ולא סלקה נפלה גמלו ולא העמידה ר"מ מחייב בהזיקן וחכ"א פטור בדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים,אין מיהא איכא טובא והני אצטריכא ליה מהו דתימא בדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל,הפורץ גדר בפני בהמת חבירו מהו דתימא כיון דלמסתריה קאי מה עביד בדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל,הכופף קמתו של חבירו נמי מהו דתימא לימא מי הוה ידענא דאתיא רוח שאינה מצויה ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל,ולרב אשי דאמר נמי טמון איתמר מהו דתימא אנא כסויי כסיתיה ניהלך ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל,והשוכר עדי שקר נמי מהו דתימא לימא דברי הרב ודברי התלמיד דברי מי שומעין ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל,והיודע עדות לחבירו ואינו מעיד לו נמי מהו דתימא מי יימר דכי הוה (אתינא) מסהדינא ליה הוה מודה דלמא הוה משתבע לשקרא ובדיני שמים נמי לא ליחייב קמ"ל:,נפרצה בלילה או שפרצוה לסטים כו': אמר רבה והוא שחתרה,אבל לא חתרה מאי חייב היכי דמי אילימא בכותל בריא כי לא חתרה אמאי חייב מאי ה"ל למעבד אלא בכותל רעוע כי חתרה אמאי פטור תחלתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס הוא,הניחא למ"ד תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס פטור אלא למ"ד תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס חייב מאי איכא למימר,אלא מתני' בכותל בריא ואפילו לא חתרה וכי איתמר דרבה אסיפא איתמר הניחה בחמה או שמסרה לחרש שוטה וקטן ויצתה והזיקה חייב אמר רבה ואפי' חתרה,לא מבעיא היכא דלא חתרה דכולה בפשיעה הוא אלא אפי' חתרה נמי מהו דתימא הויא לה תחילתו בפשיעה וסופו באונס קמ"ל דכולה פשיעה היא,מ"ט דאמר ליה מידע ידעת דכיון דשבקתה בחמה כל טצדקא דאית לה למיעבד עבדא ונפקא:,הוציאוה לסטים לסטים חייבין: 56a. the ibaraitais speaking bof an unstable wallthat was about to fall and break in any event, and so his action did not actually cause any loss to the owner., bThe Master says:With regard to the case mentioned in the ibaraitaof bone who bends another’s standinggrain bbefore a fire, what are the circumstances? If we saythat the ibaraitais referring to a case bwherethe fire would breachthe bent grain bin a typical wind, let himalso bbe liablefor the damage according to bhuman laws. Rather,it must be a case bwherethe fire could breachthe bent grain only bin an atypical wind.Therefore, he is exempt according to human laws, and, since the grain was destroyed due to his action, he is liable according to the laws of Heaven., bAnd Rav Ashioffered an alternative explanation and bsaid:The ibaraita bwas statedin the case of ba concealeditem; in other words, this person did not bend the grain toward the fire but bent it over another item in order to conceal it. One is not liable to pay restitution for concealed items damaged by fire. Therefore, when this person bent the grain over an item, he caused indirect damage to the owner of that item bbecause he made it into a concealeditem that was subsequently damaged by bfire,and the owner cannot reclaim his loss., bThe Master says:With regard to the case mentioned in the ibaraitaof bone who hires false witnesses, what are the circumstances? If we saythat he hired them bfor his ownbenefit, in order to extract payment from another, bhe is required to reimbursethat person with bmoney, and he is liable according to human lawsfor receiving money under false circumstances. bRather,the case is one where he hired false witnesses bforthe benefit of banother.In such a case the injured party cannot sue the other litigant, since the latter did not hire the witnesses, nor can he sue the person who hired them, since that person received no personal benefit.,The ibaraitateaches: bAnd one who knows testimony in support of another but does not testify on his behalfis exempt from liability according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. bWith whatcircumstances bare we dealing? If we saythat the case binvolves twopeople who could testify, and their evidence would render the other party liable to pay, it bis obviousthat each of them is liable according to the laws of Heaven; he has committed a transgression bby Torah law: “If he does not utter it, then he shall bear his iniquity”(Leviticus 5:1). Therefore, it is unnecessary for the ibaraitato mention this case., bRather,the case of the ibaraita bconcerns a singlewitness, whose testimony is not sufficient to render another liable, and to which the transgression of Torah law consequently does not apply. Nevertheless, a litigant can be forced to take an oath based on the testimony of a single witness, and refusal to take this oath would obligate the litigant to pay. Therefore, the witness has caused an indirect loss and is liable according to the laws of Heaven.,The Gemara asks: bAnd is there nothing else,i.e., is there no other case in which one is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven? bBut there issuch a case. And before citing several cases that are not written in the ibaraitathe Gemara presents ba mnemonicdevice: bOne who performs; with poison; and an agent; another; is broken.The Gemara returns to the first case: One bwho performs labor with water of purification,which was meant to be used to purify one rendered ritually impure by a corpse, thereby rendering the water unfit for use, borwho performs labor bwith thered bheifer of purification,invalidating the animal for use as an element of the purification ritual, is bexempt according to human laws,since the damage he caused is not evident, bbut liable according to the laws of Heaven,as he caused a ficial loss.,The Gemara adds: bBut there isthe following ihalakha /i: With regard to bone who places poison before another’s animal,and the animal eats it and dies, he is bexempt according to human laws,since the animal caused its own death, bbut liable according to the laws of Heaven. /b,The Gemara adds: bBut there isthe case of bone who sendsan exposed bflame in the hand of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor,and the fire spreads, causing damage; he is bexempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. /b,The Gemara adds: bBut there isthe case of bone who frightens anotherwithout touching him, but causes him injury; he is bexempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven. /b,The Gemara adds: bBut there isthe case of one bwhose jug broke in the public domain and he did not removethe broken pieces, or one bwhose camel fell and he did not stand it upagain. bRabbi Meir deemsthe owner of jug or of the camel bliablefor the damage thereby caused to others, band the Rabbis say thathe is bexempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven.Since there are so many other cases, why did Rabbi Yehoshua claim in the ibaraitathat there are only four cases when one is exempt according to human laws but liable according to the laws of Heaven?,The Gemara answers: bYes, there are, in any event, manyother cases, bbutRabbi Yehoshua held that it bwas necessary for himto state the ihalakhaof bthesefour cases. The reason he stated them is blest you saythat in these cases bone should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven.Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua bteaches usthat in these cases one is liable according to the laws of Heaven.,The Gemara explains why one might have thought that there is no liability at all for each case in the ibaraita /i: Rabbi Yehoshua taught that bone who breaches a fencethat stood bbefore another’s animal,thereby allowing the animal to escape, is liable according to the laws of Heaven, blest you say: Sincethe fence bis about to collapseeven without this person’s intervention, bwhat didhe really bdo?Based on that logic, one might have thought that bhe should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven.Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua bteaches usthat in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.,Rabbi Yehoshua taught that bone who bends another’s standinggrain is liable according to the laws of Heaven, blest you say: Letthe one who bent the grain bsayto the owner: bDid I know that an atypical wind would comeand cause the fire to spread? Based on that logic, one might have thought that bhe should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven.Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua bteaches usthat in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven., bAnd according to Rav Ashi, who saidthat Rabbi Yehoshua’s ruling bwas statedwith regard to the case of ba concealeditem, Rabbi Yehoshua mentioned liability according to the laws of Heaven blest you saythat the one who concealed the item could say: bI covered it for youin order to protect it from the fire. Based on that logic, one might have thought that bhe should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven.Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua bteaches usthat in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven., bAndRabbi Yehoshua taught that there is liability balsoin the case of bone who hires false witnesses, lest you say: Letthe one who hired them bsay:If the witnesses hear bthe statement of the teacher,i.e., God, Who prohibited giving false testimony, band the statement of the student,i.e., the one who hired them, bto whose statementshould they blisten?Although the one who hired them encouraged these witnesses to sin, ultimately it was they who transgressed by not adhering to the instructions of God. bAndbased on this logic one might have thought that bhe should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven.Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua bteaches usthat in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.,Finally, Rabbi Yehoshua taught that bone who knows testimonyin support bof another but does not testify on his behalfis liable according to the laws of Heaven, blest you saythat the witness could claim: bWho says that had I come forwardand btestified on behalf ofone litigant, the other litigant bwould admitliability? bPerhaps he would havechosen to btake a false oathand absolve himself. Based on that logic one might have thought that bhe should not be liable even according to the laws of Heaven.Therefore, Rabbi Yehoshua bteaches usthat in such a case he is liable according to the laws of Heaven.,§ The mishna teaches: If the pen bwas breached at night, or bandits breached it,and sheep subsequently went out and caused damage, the owner of the sheep is exempt. bRabba says: And thisfirst instance of a pen that was breached is referring specifically to a case bwherethe animal btunneledunder the wall of the pen and by doing so caused the wall to collapse. In that case, the owner is completely blameless and therefore exempt from liability for any damage that ensues.,The Gemara asks: bButif the animal bdid not tunnelunder the wall, bwhatis the ihalakha /i? Would the owner be bliable? What are the circumstances? If we saythat the pen had ba stable wall,then even bifthe animal bdid not tunnel, whyis the owner bliable? What should he have done?Clearly, he cannot be held liable for the damage. bRather,the pen had ban unstable wall.The Gemara asks: Even bifthe animal btunneledunder the wall and knocked it down, bwhyis he bexempt?The damage in this case is binitially through negligence and ultimately by accident. /b, bThis works out well according to the one who saidthat in any case of damage that is binitially through negligence and ultimately by accident,he is bexemptfrom liability, since the ultimate cause of the damage was not his fault. bBut according to the one who saysthat in any case of damage that is binitially through negligence and ultimately by accidenthe is bliable,as even without the accident his negligence could have caused damage, bwhat is there to say? /b, bRather,the case of bthe mishna concerns a stable wall, and evenif the animal bdid not tunnelunder the wall the owner is exempt. bAnd whenthe statement bof Rabba was stated, it was stated with regard to the latter clauseof the mishna that says: If the owner bleftthe animal bin the sun or conveyed it to a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor, andthe animal bwent out and caused damage,the owner is bliable.Concerning this bRabba stated: Andthe owner is liable beven ifthe animal btunneledits way out under the wall of the pen.,The Gemara explains: bIt is not necessaryfor the mishna to mention the case bwhere the animal did not tunnelits way out. In that case the owner is clearly liable, since bthe entireincident occurred due to his bnegligenceof leaving the animal in the sun, thereby causing it distress and leading it to attempt escape by any possible means. bBut even ifthe animal btunneledits way out, the owner is liable, and this is the novelty in this ruling: bLest you saythat bthis isa case of damage that is binitially through negligence and ultimately by accident,because animals do not typically tunnel their way out of a pen, the mishna bteaches us thatit is considered as though bthe entiredamage resulted from the owner’s bnegligence. /b, bWhat is the reasonthat the owner is liable? It is bthatthe one who suffered the damage bcan say tothe owner of the sheep: bYou should have known that since you left it in the sun, it would utilize any means [ itatzdeka /i] available for it to use andit would bescape,so you are ultimately responsible for the damage.,§ The mishna teaches: If the bbanditsthemselves btookthe sheep bout, the bandits are liable. /b


Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
albeck Eilberg-Schwartz, The Human Will in Judaism: The Mishnah's Philosophy of Intention (1986) 213
aqiba Porton, Gentiles and Israelites in Mishnah-Tosefta (1988) 76
bertinoro Eilberg-Schwartz, The Human Will in Judaism: The Mishnah's Philosophy of Intention (1986) 213
betz, hans dieter Klawans, Heresy, Forgery, Novelty: Condemning, Denying, and Asserting Innovation in Ancient Judaism (2019) 134
bondmen/women Porton, Gentiles and Israelites in Mishnah-Tosefta (1988) 224
canaanite slaves Porton, Gentiles and Israelites in Mishnah-Tosefta (1988) 58, 76, 224
city/town Porton, Gentiles and Israelites in Mishnah-Tosefta (1988) 76
damages (injury) Porton, Gentiles and Israelites in Mishnah-Tosefta (1988) 58, 76, 224
divorce document Porton, Gentiles and Israelites in Mishnah-Tosefta (1988) 76
eleazar b. yosi Porton, Gentiles and Israelites in Mishnah-Tosefta (1988) 76
eliezer, r., and r. simon Rubenstein, The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud (2003) 184
emancipation-(writs) Porton, Gentiles and Israelites in Mishnah-Tosefta (1988) 76, 224
exile (to city of refuge) Schick, Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed (2021) 53
festivals, non-christian, in early christian literature Bar Asher Siegal, Jewish-Christian Dialogues on Scripture in Late Antiquity: Heretic Narratives of the Babylonian Talmud (2018) 47
halivni, david weiss Klawans, Heresy, Forgery, Novelty: Condemning, Denying, and Asserting Innovation in Ancient Judaism (2019) 134
heschel, abraham joshua Klawans, Heresy, Forgery, Novelty: Condemning, Denying, and Asserting Innovation in Ancient Judaism (2019) 134
hiyya, r., and lineage Rubenstein, The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud (2003) 184
hiyya b. abba, r. Rubenstein, The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud (2003) 184
idolatry, in the mishnah Schick, Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed (2021) 18
insults, in rabbinic law Bar Asher Siegal, Jewish-Christian Dialogues on Scripture in Late Antiquity: Heretic Narratives of the Babylonian Talmud (2018) 47
insults, in the ancient world' Bar Asher Siegal, Jewish-Christian Dialogues on Scripture in Late Antiquity: Heretic Narratives of the Babylonian Talmud (2018) 47
intention, forbidden labor on the sabbath Schick, Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed (2021) 53, 57
intention, homicide Schick, Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed (2021) 53
milgrom, jacob Klawans, Heresy, Forgery, Novelty: Condemning, Denying, and Asserting Innovation in Ancient Judaism (2019) 134
nesia, r. yudan Rubenstein, The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud (2003) 184
panken, aaron d. Klawans, Heresy, Forgery, Novelty: Condemning, Denying, and Asserting Innovation in Ancient Judaism (2019) 134
rabbi (yehuda hanasi) Rubenstein, The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud (2003) 184
sages, livelihood of Rubenstein, The Culture of the Babylonian Talmud (2003) 184
sanhedrin Bar Asher Siegal, Jewish-Christian Dialogues on Scripture in Late Antiquity: Heretic Narratives of the Babylonian Talmud (2018) 47
tort law, gross negligence Schick, Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed (2021) 53, 54
tort law, in tannaitic sources Schick, Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed (2021) 18
tort law, intent to harm Schick, Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed (2021) 53
tort law, negligence Schick, Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed (2021) 54, 57
tort law, strict liability Schick, Intention in Talmudic Law: Between Thought and Deed (2021) 18, 54