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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



7574
Lucretius Carus, On The Nature Of Things, 5.1-5.2


nanBOOK V: PROEM O who can build with puissant breast a song Worthy the majesty of these great finds? Or who in words so strong that he can frame The fit laudations for deserts of him Who left us heritors of such vast prizes, By his own breast discovered and sought out?- There shall be none, methinks, of mortal stock. For if must needs be named for him the name Demanded by the now known majesty Of these high matters, then a god was he,- Hear me, illustrious Memmius- a god; Who first and chief found out that plan of life Which now is called philosophy, and who By cunning craft, out of such mighty waves, Out of such mighty darkness, moored life In havens so serene, in light so clear. Compare those old discoveries divine Of others: lo, according to the tale, Ceres established for mortality The grain, and Bacchus juice of vine-born grape, Though life might yet without these things abide, Even as report saith now some peoples live. But man's well-being was impossible Without a breast all free. Wherefore the more That man doth justly seem to us a god, From whom sweet solaces of life, afar Distributed o'er populous domains, Now soothe the minds of men. But if thou thinkest Labours of Hercules excel the same, Much farther from true reasoning thou farest. For what could hurt us now that mighty maw Of Nemeaean Lion, or what the Boar Who bristled in Arcadia? Or, again, O what could Cretan Bull, or Hydra, pest Of Lerna, fenced with vipers venomous? Or what the triple-breasted power of her The three-fold Geryon... The sojourners in the Stymphalian fens So dreadfully offend us, or the Steeds Of Thracian Diomedes breathing fire From out their nostrils off along the zones Bistonian and Ismarian? And the Snake, The dread fierce gazer, guardian of the golden And gleaming apples of the Hesperides, Coiled round the tree-trunk with tremendous bulk, O what, again, could he inflict on us Along the Atlantic shore and wastes of sea?- Where neither one of us approacheth nigh Nor no barbarian ventures. And the rest Of all those monsters slain, even if alive, Unconquered still, what injury could they do? None, as I guess. For so the glutted earth Swarms even now with savage beasts, even now Is filled with anxious terrors through the woods And mighty mountains and the forest deeps- Quarters 'tis ours in general to avoid. But lest the breast be purged, what conflicts then, What perils, must bosom, in our own despite! O then how great and keen the cares of lust That split the man distraught! How great the fears! And lo, the pride, grim greed, and wantonness- How great the slaughters in their train! and lo, Debaucheries and every breed of sloth! Therefore that man who subjugated these, And from the mind expelled, by words indeed, Not arms, O shall it not be seemly him To dignify by ranking with the gods?- And all the more since he was wont to give, Concerning the immortal gods themselves, Many pronouncements with a tongue divine, And to unfold by his pronouncements all The nature of the world.


Quis potis est dignum pollenti pectore carmenBOOK V: PROEM O who can build with puissant breast a song Worthy the majesty of these great finds? Or who in words so strong that he can frame The fit laudations for deserts of him Who left us heritors of such vast prizes, By his own breast discovered and sought out?- There shall be none, methinks, of mortal stock. For if must needs be named for him the name Demanded by the now known majesty Of these high matters, then a god was he,- Hear me, illustrious Memmius- a god; Who first and chief found out that plan of life Which now is called philosophy, and who By cunning craft, out of such mighty waves, Out of such mighty darkness, moored life In havens so serene, in light so clear. Compare those old discoveries divine Of others: lo, according to the tale, Ceres established for mortality The grain, and Bacchus juice of vine-born grape, Though life might yet without these things abide, Even as report saith now some peoples live. But man's well-being was impossible Without a breast all free. Wherefore the more That man doth justly seem to us a god, From whom sweet solaces of life, afar Distributed o'er populous domains, Now soothe the minds of men. But if thou thinkest Labours of Hercules excel the same, Much farther from true reasoning thou farest. For what could hurt us now that mighty maw Of Nemeaean Lion, or what the Boar Who bristled in Arcadia? Or, again, O what could Cretan Bull, or Hydra, pest Of Lerna, fenced with vipers venomous? Or what the triple-breasted power of her The three-fold Geryon... The sojourners in the Stymphalian fens So dreadfully offend us, or the Steeds Of Thracian Diomedes breathing fire From out their nostrils off along the zones Bistonian and Ismarian? And the Snake, The dread fierce gazer, guardian of the golden And gleaming apples of the Hesperides, Coiled round the tree-trunk with tremendous bulk, O what, again, could he inflict on us Along the Atlantic shore and wastes of sea?- Where neither one of us approacheth nigh Nor no barbarian ventures. And the rest Of all those monsters slain, even if alive, Unconquered still, what injury could they do? None, as I guess. For so the glutted earth Swarms even now with savage beasts, even now Is filled with anxious terrors through the woods And mighty mountains and the forest deeps- Quarters 'tis ours in general to avoid. But lest the breast be purged, what conflicts then, What perils, must bosom, in our own despite! O then how great and keen the cares of lust That split the man distraught! How great the fears! And lo, the pride, grim greed, and wantonness- How great the slaughters in their train! and lo, Debaucheries and every breed of sloth! Therefore that man who subjugated these, And from the mind expelled, by words indeed, Not arms, O shall it not be seemly him To dignify by ranking with the gods?- And all the more since he was wont to give, Concerning the immortal gods themselves, Many pronouncements with a tongue divine, And to unfold by his pronouncements all The nature of the world.
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Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

15 results
1. Hesiod, Theogony, 28, 27 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)

27. Those daughters of Lord Zeus proclaimed to me:
2. Cicero, Academica, 2.121 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3. Cicero, On The Nature of The Gods, 1.43, 2.21-2.28, 2.62, 2.75, 2.77, 2.82, 2.93-2.94 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.43. With the errors of the poets may be classed the monstrous doctrines of the magi and the insane mythology of Egypt, and also the popular beliefs, which are a mere mass of inconsistencies sprung from ignorance. "Anyone pondering on the baseless and irrational character of these doctrines ought to regard Epicurus with reverence, and to rank him as one of the very gods about whom we are inquiring. For he alone perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature herself has imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For what nation or what tribe is there but possesses untaught some 'preconception' of the gods? Such notions Epicurus designates by the word prolepsis, that is, a sort of preconceived mental picture of a thing, without which nothing can be understood or investigated or discussed. The force and value of this argument we learn in that work of genius, Epicurus's Rule or Standard of Judgement. 2.21. 'That which has the faculty of reason is superior to that which has not the faculty of reason; but nothing is superior to the world; therefore the world has the faculty of reason.' A similar argument can be used to prove that the world is wise, and happy, and eternal; for things possessed of each of these attributes are superior to things devoid of them, and nothing is superior to the world. From this it will follow that the world is god. Zeno also argued thus: 2.22. 'Nothing devoid of sensation can have a part of itself that is sentient; but the world has parts that are sentient; therefore the world has parts that are sentient; therefore the world is not devoid of sensation.' He also proceeds to press the argument more closely: 'Nothing,' he says, 'that is iimate and irrational can give birth to an animate and rational being; but the world gives birth to animate and rational beings; therefore the world is animate and rational.' Furthermore he proved his argument by means of one of his favourite comparisons, as follows: 'If flutes playing musical tunes grew on an olive-tree, surely you would not question that the olive-tree possessed some knowledge of the art of flute-playing; or if plane-trees bore well-tuned lutes, doubtless you would likewise infer that the plane-trees possessed the art of music; why then should we not judge the world to be animate and endowed with wisdom, when it produces animate and wise offspring? 2.23. However, having begun to treat the subject in a different way from that which I proposed at the beginning (for I said that this part required no discussion, since the existence of god was manifest to everybody), in spite of this I should like to prove even this point by means of arguments drawn from Physics or Natural Philosophy. It is a law of Nature that all things capable of nurture and growth contain within them a supply of heat, without which their nurture and growth would not be possible; for everything of a hot, fiery nature supplies its own source of motion and activity; but that which is nourished and grows possesses a definite and uniform motion; and as long as this motion remains within us, so long sensation and life remain, whereas so soon as our heat is cooled and quenched we ourselves perish and are extinguished. 2.24. This doctrine Cleanthes enforces by these further arguments, to show how great is the supply of heat in every living body: he states that there is no food so heavy that it is not digested in twenty-four hours; and even the residue of our food which nature rejects contains heat. Again, the veins and arteries never cease throbbing with a flame-like pulse, and frequent cases have been observed when the heart of an animal on being torn out of its body has continued to beat with a rapid motion resembling the flickering of fire. Every living thing therefore, whether animal or vegetable, owes its vitality to the heat contained within it. From this it must be inferred that this element of heat possesses in itself a vital force that pervades the whole world. 2.25. We shall discern the truth of this more readily from a more detailed account of this all‑permeating fiery element as a whole. All the parts of the world (I will however only specify the most important) are supported and sustained by heat. This can be perceived first of all in the element of earth. We see fire produced by striking or rubbing stones together; and when newly dug, 'the earth doth steam with warmth'; and also warm water is drawn from running springs, and this occurs most of all in the winter-time, because a great store of heat is confined in the caverns of the earth, which in winter is denser and therefore confines more closely the heat stored in the soil. 2.26. It would require a long discourse and a great many arguments to enable me to show that all the seeds that earth receives in her womb, and all the plants which she spontaneously generates and holds fixed by their roots in the ground, owe both their origin and growth to this warm temperature of the soil. That water also contains an admixture of heat is shown first of all by its liquid nature; water would neither be frozen into ice by cold nor congealed into snow and hoar-frost unless it could also become fluid when liquefied and thawed by the admixture of heat; this is why moisture both hardens when exposed to a north wind or a frost from some other quarter, and also in turn softens when warmed, and evaporates with heat. Also the sea when violently stirred by the wind becomes warm, so that it can readily be realized that this great body of fluid contains heat; for we must not suppose the warmth in question to be derived from some external source, but stirred up from the lowest depths of the sea by violent motion, just as happens to our bodies when they are restored to warmth by movement and exercise. Indeed the air itself, though by nature the coldest of the elements, is by no means entirely devoid of heat; 2.27. indeed it contains even a considerable admixture of heat, for it is itself generated by exhalation from water, since air must be deemed to be a sort of vaporized water, and this vaporization is caused by the motion of the heat contained in the water. We may see an example of the same process when water is made to boil by placing fire beneath it. — There remains the fourth element: this is itself by nature glowing hot throughout and also imparts the warmth of health and life to all other substances. 2.28. Hence from the fact that all the parts of the world are sustained by heat the inference follows that the world itself also owes its continued preservation for so long a time to the same or a similar substance, and all the more so because it must be understood that this hot and fiery principle is interfused with the whole of nature in such a way as to constitute the male and female generative principles, and so to be the necessary cause of both the birth and the growth of all living creatures, whether animals or those whose roots are planted in the earth. 2.62. Those gods therefore who were the authors of various benefits owned their deification to the value of the benefits which they bestowed, and indeed the names that I just now enumerated express the various powers of the gods that bear them. "Human experience moreover and general custom have made it a practice to confer the deification of renown and gratitude upon of distinguished benefactors. This is the origin of Hercules, of Castor and Pollux, of Aesculapius, and also of Liber (I mean Liber the son of Semele, not the Liber whom our ancestors solemnly and devoutly consecrated with Ceres and Libera, the import of which joint consecration may be gathered from the mysteries; but Liber and Libera were so named as Ceres' offspring, that being the meaning of our Latin word liberi — a use which has survived in the case of Libera but not of Liber) — and this is also the origin of Romulus, who is believed to be the same as Quirinus. And these benefactors were duly deemed divine, as being both supremely good and immortal, because their souls survived and enjoyed eternal life. 2.75. I therefore declare that the world and all its parts were set in order at the beginning and have been governed for all time by converse providence: a thesis which our school usually divides into three sections. The first is based on the argument proving that the gods exist; if this be granted, it must be admitted that the world is governed by their wisdom. The second proves that all things are under the sway of sentient nature, and that by it the universe is carried on in the most beautiful manner; and this proved, it follows that the universe was generated from living first causes. The third topic is the argument from the wonder that we feel at the marvel of creation, celestial and terrestrial. 2.77. in that case the nature of the gods is not superior to all else in power, inasmuch as it is subject to a necessity or nature that rules the sky, sea and land. But as a matter of fact nothing exists that is superior to god; it follows therefore that the world is ruled by him; therefore god is not obedient or subject to any form of nature, and therefore he himself rules all nature. In fact if we concede divine intelligence, we concede also divine providence, and providence exercised in things of the highest moment. Are then the gods ignorant what things are of the highest moment and how these are to be directed and upheld, or do they lack the strength to undertake and to perform duties so vast? But ignorance is foreign the time of divine nature, and weakness, with a consequent incapacity to perform one's office, in no way suits with the divine majesty. This proves our thesis that the world is governed by divine providence. 2.82. Some thinkers again denote by the term 'nature' the whole of existence — for example Epicurus, who divides the nature of all existing things into atoms, void, and the attributes of these. When we on the other hand speak of nature as the sustaining and governing principle of the world, we do not mean that the world is like a clod of earth or lump of stone or something else of that sort, which possesses only the natural principle of cohesion, but like a tree or an animal, displaying no haphazard structure, to be order and a certain semblance of design. 2.93. At this point must I not marvel that there should be anyone who can persuade himself that there are certain solid and indivisible particles of matter borne along by the force of gravity, and that the fortuitous collision of those particles produces this elaborate and beautiful world? I cannot understand why he who considers it possible for this to have occurred should not all think that, if a counts number of copies of the one-and‑twenty letters of alphabet, made of gold or what you will, were thrown together into some receptacle and then shaken out on the ground, it would be possible that they should produce the Annals of Ennius, all ready for the reader. I doubt whether chance could possibly succeed in producing even a single verse! 2.94. Yet according to the assertion of your friends, that out of particles of matter not endowed with heat, nor with any 'quality' (the Greek term poiotes), nor with sense, but colliding together at haphazard and by chance, the world has emerged complete, or rather a countless number of worlds are some of them being born and some perishing at every moment of time — yet if the clash of atoms can create a world, why can it not produce a colonnade, a temple, a house, a city, which are less and indeed much less difficult things to make? The fact is, they indulge in such random babbling about the world that for my part I cannot think that they have ever looked up at this marvellously beautiful sky — which is my next topic.
4. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.48 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.48. quae quidem quidem culidem R 1 cogitans soleo solo R 1 saepe mirari non nullorum insolentiam philosophorum, qui naturae cognitionem admirantur eiusque inventori et principi gratias exultantes insultantes K 1 agunt eumque venerantur ut deum; liberatos enim se per eum dicunt gravissimis dominis, terrore sempiterno et diurno ac nocturno anoct. ( pro ac noct.)R metu. quo terrore? quo metu? quae est anus tam delira quae timeat ista, quae vos videlicet, si physica phisica KR Enn. Andr. aechm. 107 non didicissetis, timeretis, Acherunsia acheru sia V templa alta Orci, pallida leti, nubila letio nubila GK 1 (b post o add. K c )R let o nubila V (leto n. B) tenebris loca ? non pudet philosophum in eo gloriari, quod haec non timeat et quod falsa esse cognoverit? e quo intellegi potest, quam acuti natura sint, quoniam haec sine doctrina credituri fuerunt.
5. Horace, Odes, 3.30 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

6. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 1.1-1.43, 1.62-1.79, 1.102-1.135, 2.45-2.46, 3.1-3.30, 3.322, 3.420, 3.830-3.1094, 5.2-5.54, 5.405-5.406, 5.1161-5.1240, 6.4-6.6, 6.92-6.95, 6.660, 6.1208-6.1212 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

7. Ovid, Metamorphoses, 5.308-5.309, 5.319-5.331, 5.341-5.355, 15.871-15.879 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. CE)

8. Lucan, Pharsalia, 2.9-2.10 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

9. New Testament, Luke, 2.32 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

2.32. A light for revelation to the Gentiles, And the glory of your people Israel.
10. Plutarch, Against Colotes, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

11. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 98.9 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

12. Tertullian, Apology, 2.3 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

13. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 1.16, 10.122-10.135 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

10.122. Let no one be slow to seek wisdom when he is young nor weary in the search thereof when he is grown old. For no age is too early or too late for the health of the soul. And to say that the season for studying philosophy has not yet come, or that it is past and gone, is like saying that the season for happiness is not yet or that it is now no more. Therefore, both old and young ought to seek wisdom, the former in order that, as age comes over him, he may be young in good things because of the grace of what has been, and the latter in order that, while he is young, he may at the same time be old, because he has no fear of the things which are to come. So we must exercise ourselves in the things which bring happiness, since, if that be present, we have everything, and, if that be absent, all our actions are directed toward attaining it. 10.123. Those things which without ceasing I have declared unto thee, those do, and exercise thyself therein, holding them to be the elements of right life. First believe that God is a living being immortal and blessed, according to the notion of a god indicated by the common sense of mankind; and so believing, thou shalt not affirm of him aught that is foreign to his immortality or that agrees not with blessedness, but shalt believe about him whatever may uphold both his blessedness and his immortality. For verily there are gods, and the knowledge of them is manifest; but they are not such as the multitude believe, seeing that men do not steadfastly maintain the notions they form respecting them. Not the man who denies the gods worshipped by the multitude, but he who affirms of the gods what the multitude believes about them is truly impious. 10.124. For the utterances of the multitude about the gods are not true preconceptions but false assumptions; hence it is that the greatest evils happen to the wicked and the greatest blessings happen to the good from the hand of the gods, seeing that they are always favourable to their own good qualities and take pleasure in men like unto themselves, but reject as alien whatever is not of their kind.Accustom thyself to believe that death is nothing to us, for good and evil imply sentience, and death is the privation of all sentience; therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not by adding to life an illimitable time, but by taking away the yearning after immortality. 10.125. For life has no terrors for him who has thoroughly apprehended that there are no terrors for him in ceasing to live. Foolish, therefore, is the man who says that he fears death, not because it will pain when it comes, but because it pains in the prospect. Whatsoever causes no annoyance when it is present, causes only a groundless pain in the expectation. Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. It is nothing, then, either to the living or to the dead, for with the living it is not and the dead exist no longer. But in the world, at one time men shun death as the greatest of all evils, and at another time choose it as a respite from the evils in life. 10.126. The wise man does not deprecate life nor does he fear the cessation of life. The thought of life is no offence to him, nor is the cessation of life regarded as an evil. And even as men choose of food not merely and simply the larger portion, but the more pleasant, so the wise seek to enjoy the time which is most pleasant and not merely that which is longest. And he who admonishes the young to live well and the old to make a good end speaks foolishly, not merely because of the desirableness of life, but because the same exercise at once teaches to live well and to die well. Much worse is he who says that it were good not to be born, but when once one is born to pass with all speed through the gates of Hades. 10.127. For if he truly believes this, why does he not depart from life? It were easy for him to do so, if once he were firmly convinced. If he speaks only in mockery, his words are foolishness, for those who hear believe him not.We must remember that the future is neither wholly ours nor wholly not ours, so that neither must we count upon it as quite certain to come nor despair of it as quite certain not to come.We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. 10.128. He who has a clear and certain understanding of these things will direct every preference and aversion toward securing health of body and tranquillity of mind, seeing that this is the sum and end of a blessed life. For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for anything else by which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. When we are pained because of the absence of pleasure, then, and then only, do we feel the need of pleasure. Wherefore we call pleasure the alpha and omega of a blessed life. Pleasure is our first and kindred good. 10.129. It is the starting-point of every choice and of every aversion, and to it we come back, inasmuch as we make feeling the rule by which to judge of every good thing. And since pleasure is our first and native good, for that reason we do not choose every pleasure whatsoever, but ofttimes pass over many pleasures when a greater annoyance ensues from them. And ofttimes we consider pains superior to pleasures when submission to the pains for a long time brings us as a consequence a greater pleasure. While therefore all pleasure because it is naturally akin to us is good, not all pleasure is choiceworthy, just as all pain is an evil and yet not all pain is to be shunned. 10.130. It is, however, by measuring one against another, and by looking at the conveniences and inconveniences, that all these matters must be judged. Sometimes we treat the good as an evil, and the evil, on the contrary, as a good. Again, we regard independence of outward things as a great good, not so as in all cases to use little, but so as to be contented with little if we have not much, being honestly persuaded that they have the sweetest enjoyment of luxury who stand least in need of it, and that whatever is natural is easily procured and only the vain and worthless hard to win. Plain fare gives as much pleasure as a costly diet, when once the pain of want has been removed 10.131. while bread and water confer the highest possible pleasure when they are brought to hungry lips. To habituate one's self, therefore, to simple and inexpensive diet supplies all that is needful for health, and enables a man to meet the necessary requirements of life without shrinking, and it places us in a better condition when we approach at intervals a costly fare and renders us fearless of fortune.When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or wilful misrepresentation. By pleasure we mean the absence of pain in the body and of trouble in the soul. 10.132. It is not an unbroken succession of drinking-bouts and of revelry, not sexual love, not the enjoyment of the fish and other delicacies of a luxurious table, which produce a pleasant life; it is sober reasoning, searching out the grounds of every choice and avoidance, and banishing those beliefs through which the greatest tumults take possession of the soul. of all this the beginning and the greatest good is prudence. Wherefore prudence is a more precious thing even than philosophy; from it spring all the other virtues, for it teaches that we cannot lead a life of pleasure which is not also a life of prudence, honour, and justice; nor lead a life of prudence, honour, and justice, which is not also a life of pleasure. For the virtues have grown into one with a pleasant life, and a pleasant life is inseparable from them. 10.133. Who, then, is superior in thy judgement to such a man? He holds a holy belief concerning the gods, and is altogether free from the fear of death. He has diligently considered the end fixed by nature, and understands how easily the limit of good things can be reached and attained, and how either the duration or the intensity of evils is but slight. Destiny, which some introduce as sovereign over all things, he laughs to scorn, affirming rather that some things happen of necessity, others by chance, others through our own agency. For he sees that necessity destroys responsibility and that chance or fortune is inconstant; whereas our own actions are free, and it is to them that praise and blame naturally attach. 10.134. It were better, indeed, to accept the legends of the gods than to bow beneath that yoke of destiny which the natural philosophers have imposed. The one holds out some faint hope that we may escape if we honour the gods, while the necessity of the naturalists is deaf to all entreaties. Nor does he hold chance to be a god, as the world in general does, for in the acts of a god there is no disorder; nor to be a cause, though an uncertain one, for he believes that no good or evil is dispensed by chance to men so as to make life blessed, though it supplies the starting-point of great good and great evil. He believes that the misfortune of the wise is better than the prosperity of the fool. 10.135. It is better, in short, that what is well judged in action should not owe its successful issue to the aid of chance.Exercise thyself in these and kindred precepts day and night, both by thyself and with him who is like unto thee; then never, either in waking or in dream, wilt thou be disturbed, but wilt live as a god among men. For man loses all semblance of mortality by living in the midst of immortal blessings.Elsewhere he rejects the whole of divination, as in the short epitome, and says, No means of predicting the future really exists, and if it did, we must regard what happens according to it as nothing to us.Such are his views on life and conduct; and he has discoursed upon them at greater length elsewhere.
14. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 135

15. Manilius, Astronomica, 1.778-1.779



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
animal sacrifice, epistemology Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca: Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (1995) 148
animal sacrifice, eschatology' Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca: Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (1995) 148
arnobius, concept of salvation Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca: Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (1995) 148
beasley, megan Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 168
carneades Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 210
causation, cause Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 210
ceres in lucretius, vergil, and ovid Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 167, 168
chance Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 210
chimaera Gee, Aratus and the Astronomical Tradition (2013) 94
cicero, allusion by lucretius to Gee, Aratus and the Astronomical Tradition (2013) 90, 91, 92, 93, 94
cicero, de natura deorum Gee, Aratus and the Astronomical Tradition (2013) 93, 94
cicero, prognostica Gee, Aratus and the Astronomical Tradition (2013) 90, 91
colotes Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 76
conte, g. b. Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 198
cornelius gallus Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 167, 168
crates, cynic Esler, The Early Christian World (2000) 63
cynics Esler, The Early Christian World (2000) 63
cyprian Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca: Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (1995) 148
democritus Esler, The Early Christian World (2000) 63
diogenes Esler, The Early Christian World (2000) 63
empedocleo-lucretian background in metamorphoses Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 167, 168
empedocles Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 167, 168
epicurean proems in lucretius drn Gee, Aratus and the Astronomical Tradition (2013) 90, 91, 92, 93, 94
epicureanism Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 198
epicureans, chance Esler, The Early Christian World (2000) 63
epicureans, pleasure Esler, The Early Christian World (2000) 63
epicureans Esler, The Early Christian World (2000) 63
epicurus, authority in the de rerum natura Bryan, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 224, 225; Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 224, 225
epicurus, on nature and the self Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 210
epicurus/epicureanism Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 167, 168
epicurus Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 198; Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 76
gigantomachy Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 168
god, gods, epicurean Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 76
godlikeness Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 76
gods, in the georgics Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 198
hercules Gee, Aratus and the Astronomical Tradition (2013) 93
hyperbole Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 198
immortal goods Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 76
immortality, achieved Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 76
imperishability Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 76
intelligent design Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 210
juvencus, christ as proper poetic topic for Ayres Champion and Crawford, The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions (2023) 369
juvencus Ayres Champion and Crawford, The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions (2023) 369
lactantius Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca: Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (1995) 148
latin christian poetry, juvencus Ayres Champion and Crawford, The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions (2023) 369
latin christian poetry Ayres Champion and Crawford, The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions (2023) 369
lucretius, allusion to ciceros aratea throughout drn Gee, Aratus and the Astronomical Tradition (2013) 90, 91, 92, 93, 94
lucretius, devotion to epicurus Wardy and Warren, Authors and Authorities in Ancient Philosophy (2018) 224, 225
lucretius, mirabilia in Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 198
lucretius, religion in Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 198
lucretius Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 210; Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 76; Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca: Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (1995) 148; Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 167, 168
metamorphoses, calliope Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 167, 168
metamorphoses, pierides contest with muses Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 167, 168
metamorphoses, typhoeus Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 167, 168
metrodorus Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 76
mind Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 210
mirabilia, in lucretius Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 198
mirabilia, in the georgics Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 198
mt. etna Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 167
nature, laws of Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 210
ovid, and empedocles Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 167, 168
ovid, metamorphoses Ayres Champion and Crawford, The Intellectual World of Late Antique Christianity: Reshaping Classical Traditions (2023) 369
ovid, remythologizing lucretius Williams and Vol, Philosophy in Ovid, Ovid as Philosopher (2022) 168
phaethon Gee, Aratus and the Astronomical Tradition (2013) 93
philosophy, and imperishability Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 76
philosophy, graeco-roman Esler, The Early Christian World (2000) 63
plutarch Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 76
pneuma Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 210
proems, in lucretius Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 198
religion, in lucretius Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 198
sedley, d. Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 210
self, concepts of Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 210
seneca Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 76
sirius Gee, Aratus and the Astronomical Tradition (2013) 92, 93, 94
stoicism, stoics Long, From Epicurus to Epictetus Studies in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy (2006) 210
stoicism Gee, Aratus and the Astronomical Tradition (2013) 93, 94
stoics Esler, The Early Christian World (2000) 63
tertullian Simmons, Arnobius of Sicca: Religious Conflict and Competition in the Age of Diocletian (1995) 148
value, in epicureanism Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 76
vestigia Gee, Aratus and the Astronomical Tradition (2013) 90
virgil, reception of lucretius Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 198
virtue Long, Immortality in Ancient Philosophy (2019) 76
zeno Esler, The Early Christian World (2000) 63