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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



7574
Lucretius Carus, On The Nature Of Things, 1.136-1.137


Nec me animi fallit Graiorum obscura repertaI know how hard it is in Latin verse To tell the dark discoveries of the Greeks, Chiefly because our pauper-speech must find Strange terms to fit the strangeness of the thing; Yet worth of thine and the expected joy Of thy sweet friendship do persuade me on To bear all toil and wake the clear nights through, Seeking with what of words and what of song I may at last most gloriously uncloud For thee the light beyond, wherewith to view The core of being at the centre hid. SUBSTANCE IS ETERNAL This terror, then, this darkness of the mind, Not sunrise with its flaring spokes of light, Nor glittering arrows of morning can disperse, But only Nature's aspect and her law, Which, teaching us, hath this exordium: Nothing from nothing ever yet was born. Fear holds dominion over mortality Only because, seeing in land and sky So much the cause whereof no wise they know, Men think Divinities are working there. Meantime, when once we know from nothing still Nothing can be create, we shall divine More clearly what we seek: those elements From which alone all things created are, And how accomplished by no tool of Gods. Suppose all sprang from all things: any kind Might take its origin from any thing, No fixed seed required. Men from the sea Might rise, and from the land the scaly breed, And, fowl full fledged come bursting from the sky; The horned cattle, the herds and all the wild Would haunt with varying offspring tilth and waste; Nor would the same fruits keep their olden trees, But each might grow from any stock or limb By chance and change. Indeed, and were there not For each its procreant atoms, could things have Each its unalterable mother old? But, since produced from fixed seeds are all, Each birth goes forth upon the shores of light From its own stuff, from its own primal bodies. And all from all cannot become, because In each resides a secret power its own. Again, why see we lavished o'er the lands At spring the rose, at summer heat the corn, The vines that mellow when the autumn lures, If not because the fixed seeds of things At their own season must together stream, And new creations only be revealed When the due times arrive and pregnant earth Safely may give unto the shores of light Her tender progenies? But if from naught Were their becoming, they would spring abroad Suddenly, unforeseen, in alien months, With no primordial germs, to be preserved From procreant unions at an adverse hour.
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20 results
1. Homer, Iliad, 4.422-4.426 (8th cent. BCE - 7th cent. BCE)

4.422. /and terribly rang the bronze upon the breast of the prince as he moved; thereat might terror have seized even one that was steadfast of heart.As when on a sounding beach the swell of the sea beats, wave after wave, before the driving of the West Wind; out on the deep at the first is it gathered in a crest, but thereafter 4.423. /and terribly rang the bronze upon the breast of the prince as he moved; thereat might terror have seized even one that was steadfast of heart.As when on a sounding beach the swell of the sea beats, wave after wave, before the driving of the West Wind; out on the deep at the first is it gathered in a crest, but thereafter 4.424. /and terribly rang the bronze upon the breast of the prince as he moved; thereat might terror have seized even one that was steadfast of heart.As when on a sounding beach the swell of the sea beats, wave after wave, before the driving of the West Wind; out on the deep at the first is it gathered in a crest, but thereafter 4.425. /is broken upon the land and thundereth aloud, and round about the headlands it swelleth and reareth its head, and speweth forth the salt brine: even in such wise on that day did the battalions of the Danaans move, rank after rank, without cease, into battle; and each captain gave charge to his own men, and the rest marched on in silence; thou wouldst not have deemed 4.426. /is broken upon the land and thundereth aloud, and round about the headlands it swelleth and reareth its head, and speweth forth the salt brine: even in such wise on that day did the battalions of the Danaans move, rank after rank, without cease, into battle; and each captain gave charge to his own men, and the rest marched on in silence; thou wouldst not have deemed
2. Empedocles, Fragments, 17 (5th cent. BCE - 5th cent. BCE)

3. Plato, Apology of Socrates, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

22b. and the rest, thinking that there I should prove by actual test that I was less learned than they. So, taking up the poems of theirs that seemed to me to have been most carefully elaborated by them, I asked them what they meant, that I might at the same time learn something from them. Now I am ashamed to tell you the truth, gentlemen; but still it must be told. For there was hardly a man present, one might say, who would not speak better than they about the poems they themselves had composed. So again in the case of the poets also I presently recognized this
4. Plato, Ion, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

534a. just as the Corybantian worshippers do not dance when in their senses, so the lyric poets do not indite those fine songs in their senses, but when they have started on the melody and rhythm they begin to be frantic, and it is under possession—as the bacchants are possessed, and not in their senses, when they draw honey and milk from the rivers—that the soul of the lyric poets does the same thing, by their own report. For the poets tell us, I believe, that the songs they bring us are the sweets they cull from honey-dropping fount
5. Plato, Phaedrus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

245a. ills is found. Socrates. And a third kind of possession and madness comes from the Muses. This takes hold upon a gentle and pure soul, arouses it and inspires it to songs and other poetry, and thus by adorning countless deeds of the ancients educates later generations. But he who without the divine madness comes to the doors of the Muses, confident that he will be a good poet by art, meets with no success, and the poetry of the sane man vanishes into nothingness before that of the inspired madmen.
6. Cicero, On Divination, 1.1 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.1. Vetus opinio est iam usque ab heroicis ducta temporibus, eaque et populi Romani et omnium gentium firmata consensu, versari quandam inter homines divinationem, quam Graeci mantikh/n appellant, id est praesensionem et scientiam rerum futurarum. Magnifica quaedam res et salutaris, si modo est ulla, quaque proxime ad deorum vim natura mortalis possit accedere. Itaque ut alia nos melius multa quam Graeci, sic huic praestantissimae rei nomen nostri a divis, Graeci, ut Plato interpretatur, a furore duxerunt. 1.1. Book I[1] There is an ancient belief, handed down to us even from mythical times and firmly established by the general agreement of the Roman people and of all nations, that divination of some kind exists among men; this the Greeks call μαντική — that is, the foresight and knowledge of future events. A really splendid and helpful thing it is — if only such a faculty exists — since by its means men may approach very near to the power of gods. And, just as we Romans have done many other things better than the Greeks, so have we excelled them in giving to this most extraordinary gift a name, which we have derived from divi, a word meaning gods, whereas, according to Platos interpretation, they have derived it from furor, a word meaning frenzy. 1.1. Why, my dear Quintus, said I, you are defending the very citadel of the Stoics in asserting the interdependence of these two propositions: if there is divination there are gods, and, if there are gods there is divination. But neither is granted as readily as you think. For it is possible that nature gives signs of future events without the intervention of a god, and it may be that there are gods without their having conferred any power of divination upon men.To this he replied, I, at any rate, find sufficient proof to satisfy me of the existence of the gods and of their concern in human affairs in my conviction that there are some kinds of divination which are clear and manifest. With your permission I will set forth my views on this subject, provided you are at leisure and have nothing else which you think should be preferred to such a discussion. 1.1. And what do you say of the following story which we find in our annals? During the Veientian War, when Lake Albanus had overflowed its banks, a certain nobleman of Veii deserted to us and said that, according to the prophecies of the Veientian books, their city could not be taken while the lake was at flood, and that if its waters were permitted to overflow and take their own course to the sea the result would be disastrous to the Roman people; on the other hand, if the waters were drained off in such a way that they did not reach the sea the result would be to our advantage. In consequence of this announcement our forefathers dug that marvellous canal to drain off the waters from the Alban lake. Later when the Veientians had grown weary of war and had sent ambassadors to the Senate to treat for peace, one of them is reported to have said that the deserter had not dared to tell the whole of the prophecy contained in the Veientian books, for those books, he said, also foretold the early capture of Rome by the Gauls. And this, as we know, did occur six years after the fall of Veii. [45]
7. Cicero, On The Ends of Good And Evil, 1.4-1.10, 2.15, 3.1, 3.3-3.4, 3.15 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.4. Iis iis Man. sec. Bai. ; his igitur est difficilius satis facere, qui se Latina latina A 1 B E latinia R latine A 2 NV scripta dicunt contemnere. in quibus hoc primum est in quo admirer, cur in gravissimis rebus non delectet eos sermo patrius, cum idem fabellas Latinas ad verbum e Graecis expressas non inviti legant. quis enim tam inimicus paene nomini nomini pene BE Romano est, qui Ennii Medeam aut Antiopam Pacuvii spernat aut reiciat, quod se isdem Euripidis fabulis delectari dicat, Latinas litteras oderit? Synephebos ego, inquit, potius Caecilii aut Andriam Terentii quam utramque Medri legam? A quibus tantum dissentio, ut, cum Sophocles vel optime scripserit Electram, tamen male conversam Atilii atrilii ( ut videtur )R acilii BE mihi legendam putem, de quo Lucilius: Lucilius Se. lucinius A 1 ; licinius (altera parte prioris u erasa) A 2 ; licinius BER, N (litin.), V; Licinus C.F.W. Mue. 1.5. 'ferreum scriptorem', verum, opinor, scriptorem tamen, ut legendus sit. rudem enim esse omnino in nostris poe+tis aut inertissimae segnitiae est aut fastidii delicatissimi. mihi quidem nulli satis eruditi videntur, quibus nostra ignota sunt. an Utina/m an Utinam Mur (ad Phil. 14, 5), at utinam ABERN aut umnam V ne in nemore nihilo minus legimus quam hoc idem Graecum, quae autem de bene beateque vivendo a Platone disputata sunt, haec explicari non placebit Latine? 1.6. Quid? quod BEN 2 si nos non interpretum fungimur munere, sed tuemur ea, quae dicta sunt ab iis, quos probamus, eisque eisque eisdem N his (hys) BE nostrum iudicium et nostrum scribendi ordinem adiungimus, quid habent, cur Graeca antepot iis, quae et splendide dicta sint dicta sint dett. dicta sunt neque sint conversa de Graecis? nam si dicent ab illis has res esse tractatas, ne ipsos ipsos NV ipso quidem Graecos est cur tam multos legant, quam legendi sunt. quid enim est a Chrysippo praetermissum in Stoicis? legimus tamen Diogenem, Antipatrum, Mnesarchum, Panaetium, multos alios in primisque familiarem nostrum Posidonium. quid? Theophrastus Theophrastus A. Man. theophrastum RNV theophastrum A theoprastum BE mediocriterne delectat, cum tractat locos ab Aristotele ante tractatos? quid? Epicurei epicuri BE num num BE non RV non ( superscr. ab alt. m. uel num) A non ( superscr. ab alt. m. nun) N desistunt de isdem, de quibus et ab Epicuro scriptum est et ab antiquis, ad arbitrium suum scribere? quodsi Graeci leguntur a Graecis isdem de rebus alia ratione compositis, quid est, cur nostri a nostris non legantur? 1.7. Quamquam, si plane sic verterem Platonem aut Aristotelem, ut verterunt nostri poe+tae fabulas, male, male AR 2 N 2 mali BEN 1 mole R 1 magis V credo, mererer de meis civibus, si ad eorum cognitionem divina illa ingenia transferrem. sed id neque feci adhuc nec mihi tamen, ne faciam, interdictum puto. locos quidem quosdam, si videbitur, transferam, et maxime ab iis, quos modo nominavi, cum inciderit, ut id apte fieri possit, ut ab Homero Ennius, Afranius a Medro solet. Nec vero, ut noster Lucilius, recusabo, quo minus omnes mea legant. utinam esset ille Persius, Scipio vero et Rutilius multo etiam magis, quorum ille iudicium reformidans Tarentinis ait se et Consentinis et Siculis scribere. facete is quidem, sicut alia; alia Urs. alias sed neque tam docti tum erant, ad quorum iudicium elaboraret, et sunt illius scripta leviora, ut urbanitas summa appareat, doctrina mediocris. 1.8. ego autem quem timeam lectorem, cum ad te ne Graecis quidem cedentem in philosophia audeam scribere? quamquam a te ipso id quidem facio provocatus gratissimo mihi libro, quem ad me de virtute misisti. Sed ex eo credo quibusdam usu venire, usui uenire superscr. ab alt. m. illud e; ut sit illud euenire, A; uenire usu R ut abhorreant a Latinis, quod inciderint in inculta quaedam et horrida, de malis Graecis Latine scripta deterius. quibus ego assentior, dum modo de isdem rebus ne Graecos quidem legendos putent. res vero bonas verbis electis graviter ornateque dictas dictas V dictatas quis non legat? nisi qui se plane Graecum dici velit, ut a Scaevola est praetore praetore P. Man. praetor salutatus Athenis Albucius. 1.9. quem quidem locum comit comit Se. c o N cum ABERV cf. ad p. 5,10; 23,1; 26,12; 44,8; 46,15; 160,31 multa venustate et omni sale idem Lucilius, apud quem praeclare Scaevola: Graecum te, Albuci, quam Romanum atque Sabinum, municipem Ponti, Ponti edd. pontii (pontu BE) Tritani, Tritani Bai. tritanii A 2 RV tiranii A 1 tritanu BE centurionum, praeclarorum hominum ac primorum signiferumque, maluisti dici. Graece ergo praetor Athenis, id quod maluisti, te, cum ad me accedis, saluto: 'chaere,' chaere care BE inquam, Tite! lictores, turma omnis chorusque: chorusque cohorsque 'primus quantum video Man.' Mdv. 'chaere, Tite!' hinc hic A 1 BERV mi BEV; om. in ras. A; m R; mi in fine versus N 1, add. itii ( ut sit mutii) N 2 hostis mi Albucius, hinc inimicus. Sed iure Mucius. 1.10. ego autem mirari satis mirari satis Mdv. satis mirari A. Man.; non mirari Böck. mirari (R in mg. ad aū in fine versus pos. adscriptum habet a man. rec. nō) non queo unde hoc sit tam insolens domesticarum rerum fastidium. non est omnino hic hic omnino BE docendi locus; sed ita sentio et saepe disserui, Latinam linguam non modo non inopem, modo non inopem N 2 modo inopem ut vulgo putarent, sed locupletiorem etiam esse quam Graecam. quando enim nobis, vel dicam aut oratoribus bonis aut poe+tis, postea quidem quam fuit quem imitarentur, ullus orationis vel copiosae vel elegantis ornatus defuit? Ego vero, quoniam quoniam Otto con (conforensibus superscr. ab alt. man. u sup. o priore ) N c vel ī (superscr.) R cum forensibus operis, laboribus, periculis non deseruisse mihi videor videor N 2 V videri praesidium, in quo a populo Romano locatus sum, sum dett. sim debeo profecto, quantumcumque possum, possum BE possim in eo quoque elaborare, ut sint opera, studio, labore meo doctiores cives mei, nec cum istis tantopere tanto opere N pugnare, qui Graeca legere malint, malunt BER modo legant illa ipsa, ne simulent, et iis servire, qui vel utrisque litteris uti velint vel, si suas habent, illas non magnopere desiderent. 2.15. Satisne igitur videor vim verborum tenere, an sum etiam nunc vel Graece loqui vel Latine docendus? et tamen vide, ne, si ego non intellegam quid Epicurus loquatur, cum Graece, ut videor, luculenter sciam, sit aliqua culpa eius, qui ita loquatur, ut non intellegatur. quod duobus modis sine reprehensione fit, si aut de industria facias, ut Heraclitus, 'cognomento qui skoteino/s perhibetur, quia de natura nimis obscure memoravit', aut cum rerum obscuritas, non verborum, facit ut non intellegatur oratio, qualis est in Timaeo Platonis. Epicurus autem, ut opinor, nec non vult, si possit, plane et aperte loqui, nec de re obscura, ut physici, aut artificiosa, ut mathematici, sed de illustri et facili et iam et iam P. Man. etiam (eciam V) in vulgus pervagata loquitur. loquitur (i in ras. ) N loquatur ( etiam A) Quamquam non negatis nos intellegere quid sit voluptas, sed quid ille dicat. e quo efficitur, non ut nos non intellegamus quae vis sit istius verbi, sed ut ille suo more loquatur, nostrum neglegat. 3.1. Voluptatem quidem, Brute, si ipsa pro se loquatur nec tam pertinaces habeat patronos, concessuram arbitror convictam superiore libro dignitati. etenim sit inpudens, si virtuti diutius repugnet, aut si honestis honestis honestati NV iucunda anteponat aut pluris esse contendat dulcedinem corporis ex eave natam laetitiam quam gravitatem animi atque constantiam. quare illam quidem dimittamus et suis se finibus tenere tenere (ten ab alt. m. in ras. ) N petere iubeamus, ne blanditiis eius inlecebrisque impediatur disputandi severitas. 3.3. ipse etiam dicit dicit cf. p. 13, 24—29 Epicurus ne ne nec RNV argumentandum quidem esse de voluptate, quod sit positum iudicium eius in sensibus, ut commoneri nos satis sit, nihil attineat doceri. quare illa nobis simplex fuit in utramque partem disputatio. nec enim in Torquati sermone quicquam sermone quicquam VN 2 sermone nec quicquam (quitquam ABE) implicatum inpl. R aut tortuosum fuit, nostraque, ut mihi videtur, dilucida oratio. Stoicorum autem non ignoras quam sit subtile vel spinosum potius disserendi genus, idque cum Graecis tum magis nobis, quibus etiam verba parienda sunt inponendaque nova rebus novis nomina. quod quidem nemo mediocriter doctus mirabitur cogitans in omni arte, cuius usus vulgaris communisque non sit, multam novitatem nominum esse, cum constituantur earum rerum vocabula, quae in quaque arte versentur. 3.4. itaque et dialectici et physici verbis utuntur iis, quae ipsi Graeciae nota non non BENV om. AR sint, sint Mdv. sunt geometrae vero et musici, grammatici etiam more quodam loquuntur suo. ipsae rhetorum artes, quae sunt totae forenses atque populares, verbis tamen in docendo quasi privatis utuntur ac suis. atque ut omittam has artis elegantes et ingenuas, ne opifices opifices N opificis AER opositis B opifex V quidem tueri sua artificia possent, nisi vocabulis uterentur nobis incognitis, usitatis sibi. quin etiam agri cultura, quae abhorret ab omni politiore elegantia, tamen eas eas V ea res, in quibus versatur, nominibus notavit novis. quo magis hoc philosopho faciendum est. ars est enim philosophia vitae, de qua disserens arripere verba de foro non potest. 3.15. Experiamur igitur, inquit, etsi habet haec Stoicorum ratio difficilius quiddam et obscurius. nam cum in Graeco sermone haec ipsa quondam rerum rerum om. BE nomina novarum * * non videbantur, novarum non videbantur ARV, N (syll. rum ab alt. m. in ras. compendio ser.); vocarunt non videbantur BE; excidisse aliquid vidit Mdv., qui suspicatur fuisse aut cum ... quondam rerum nomina novarum nova erant, ferenda non videbantur aut cum ... quondam nomina nova erant, ferenda non videbantur aut cum ... quondam nomina nova erant, ridebantur quae nunc consuetudo diuturna trivit; quid censes in Latino fore? Facillimum id quidem est, inquam. si enim Zenoni licuit, cum rem aliquam invenisset inusitatam, inauditum quoque ei rei nomen inponere, cur non liceat Catoni? nec tamen exprimi verbum e verbo necesse erit, ut interpretes indiserti solent, cum sit verbum, quod idem declaret, magis idem declaret magis magis idem declarat R usitatum. equidem soleo etiam quod uno Graeci, si aliter non possum, idem pluribus verbis exponere. et tamen puto concedi nobis oportere ut Graeco verbo utamur, si quando minus minus NV munus occurret Latinum, ne hoc ephippiis et acratophoris potius quam proe+gmenis et apoproe+gmenis concedatur; quamquam haec quidem praeposita proposita R posita V recte et reiecta dicere licebit. 2.15.  "Well, do you think I have properly grasped the meaning of the terms, or do I still require lessons in the use of either Greek or Latin? And even supposing that I do not understand what Epicurus says, still I believe I really have a very clear knowledge of Greek, so that perhaps it is partly his fault for using such unintelligible language. Obscurity is excusable on two grounds: it may be deliberately adopted, as in the case of Heraclitus, The surname of the Obscure who bore, So dark his philosophic lore; or the obscurity may be due to the abstruseness of the subject and not of the style — an instance of this is Plato's Timaeus. But Epicurus, in my opinion, has no intention of not speaking plainly and clearly if he can, nor is he discussing a recondite subject like natural philosophy, nor a technical subject such as mathematics, but a lucid and easy topic, and one that is generally familiar already. And yet you Epicureans do not deny that we understand what pleasure is, but what he means by it; which proves not that we do not understand the real meaning of the word, but that Epicurus is speaking an idiom of his own and ignoring our accepted terminology. 3.1.  My dear Brutus. — Were Pleasure to speak for herself, in default of such redoubtable advocates as she now has to defend her, my belief is that she would own defeat. Vanquished by the arguments of our preceding Book, she would yield the victory to true Worth. Indeed she would be lost to shame if she persisted any longer in the battle against Virtue, and rated what is pleasant above what is morally good, or maintained that bodily enjoyment or the mental gratification which springs from it is of higher value than firmness and dignity of character. Let us then give Pleasure her dismissal, and bid her keep within her own domains, lest her charms and blandishments put snares in the way of strict philosophical debate. 3.3.  In fact Epicurus himself declares that there is no occasion to argue about pleasure at all: its criterion resides in the senses, so that proof is entirely superfluous; a reminder of the facts is all that is needed. Therefore our preceding debate consisted of a simple statement of the case on either side. There was nothing abstruse or intricate in the discourse of Torquatus, and my own exposition was, I believe, as clear as daylight. But the Stoics, as you are aware, affect an exceedingly subtle or rather crabbed style of argument; and if the Greeks find it so, still more must we, who have actually to create a vocabulary, and to invent new terms to convey new ideas. This necessity will cause no surprise to anyone of moderate learning, when he reflects that in every branch of science lying outside the range of common everyday practice there must always be a large degree of novelty in the vocabulary, when it comes to fixing a terminology to denote the conceptions with which the science in question deals. 3.4.  Thus Logic and Natural Philosophy alike make use of terms unfamiliar even to Greece; Geometry, Music, Grammar also, have an idiom of their own. Even the manuals of Rhetoric, which belong entirely to the practical sphere and to the life of the world, nevertheless employ for purposes of instruction a sort of private and peculiar phraseology. And to leave out of account these liberal arts and accomplishments, even artisans would be unable to preserve the tradition of their crafts if they did not make use of words unknown to us though familiar to themselves. Nay, agriculture itself, a subject entirely unsusceptible of literary refinement, has yet had to coin technical terms to denote the things with which it is occupied. All the more is the philosopher compelled to do likewise; for philosophy is the Science of Life, and cannot treat its subject in language taken from the street. 3.15.  "Then let us make the attempt," said he, "albeit there is a considerable element of difficulty and obscurity in this Stoic system. For at one time even the terms employed in Greek for its novel conceptions seemed unendurable, when they were novel, though now daily use has made them familiar; what then to you think will be the case in Latin?" "Do not feel the least difficulty on that score," said I. "If when Zeno invented some novel idea he was permitted to denote it by an equally unheard‑of word, why should not Cato be permitted to do so too? Though all the same it need not be a hard and fast rule that every word shall be represented by its exact counterpart, when there is a more familiar word conveying the same meaning. That is the way of a clumsy translator. Indeed my own practice is to use several words to give what is expressed in Greek by one, if I cannot convey the sense ')" onMouseOut="nd();"otherwise. At the same time I hold that we may fairly claim the licence to employ a Greek word when no Latin word is readily forthcoming. Why should this licence be granted to ephippia (saddles) and acratophora (jars for neat wine) more than to proēgmena and apoproēgmena? These latter however it is true may be correctly translated 'preferred' and 'rejected.' 
8. Cicero, On Duties, 1.4-1.9, 3.15 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.4. Equidem et Platonem existimo, si genus forense dicendi tractare voluisset, gravissime et copiosissime potuisse dicere, et Demosthenem, si illa, quae a Platone didicerat, tenuisset et pronuntiare voluisset, ornate splendideque facere potuisse; eodemque modo de Aristotele et Isocrate iudico, quorum uterque suo studio delectatus contempsit alterum. Sed cum statuissem scribere ad te aliquid hoc tempore, multa posthac, ab eo ordiri maxime volui, quod et aetati tuae esset aptissimum et auctoritati meae. Nam cum multa sint in philosophia et gravia et utilia accurate copioseque a philosophis disputata, latissime patere videntur ea, quae de officiis tradita ab illis et praecepta sunt. Nulla enim vitae pars neque publicis neque privatis neque forensibus neque domesticis in rebus, neque si tecum agas quid, neque si cum altero contrahas, vacare officio potest, in eoque et colendo sita vitae est honestas omnis et neglegendo turpitude. 1.5. Atque haec quidem quaestio communis est omnium philosophorum; quis est enim, qui nullis officii praeceptis tradendis philosophum se audeat dicere? Sed sunt non nullae disciplinae, quae propositis bonorum et malorum finibus officium omne pervertant. Nam qui summum bonum sic instituit, ut nihil habeat cum virtute coniunctum, idque suis commodis, non honestate metitur, hic, si sibi ipse consentiat et non interdum naturae bonitate vincatur neque amicitiam colere possit nec iustitiam nec liberalitatem; fortis vero dolorem summum malum iudicans aut temperans voluptatem summum bonum statuens esse certe nullo modo potest. 1.6. Quae quamquam ita sunt in promptu, ut res disputatione non egeat, tamen sunt a nobis alio loco disputata. Hae disciplinae igitur si sibi consentaneae velint esse, de officio nihil queant dicere, neque ulla officii praecepta firma, stabilia, coniuncta naturae tradi possunt nisi aut ab iis, qui solam, aut ab iis, qui maxime honestatem propter se dicant expetendam. Ita propria est ea praeceptio Stoicorum, Academicorum, Peripateticorum, quoniam Aristonis, Pyrrhonis, Erilli iam pridem explosa sententia est; qui tamen haberent ius suum disputandi de officio, si rerum aliquem dilectum reliquissent, ut ad officii inventionem aditus esset. Sequemur igitur hoc quidem tempore et hac in quaestione potissimum Stoicos non ut interpretes, sed, ut solemus, e fontibus eorum iudicio arbitrioque nostro, quantum quoque modo videbitur, hauriemus. 1.7. Placet igitur, quoniam omnis disputatio de officio futura est, ante definire, quid sit officium; quod a Panaetio praetermissum esse miror. Omnis enim, quae a ratione suscipitur de aliqua re institutio, debet a definitione proficisci, ut intellegatur, quid sit id, de quo disputetur Omnis de officio duplex est quaestio: unum genus est, quod pertinet ad finem bonorum, alterum, quod positum est in praeceptis, quibus in omnis partis usus vitae conformari possit. Superioris generis huius modi sunt exempla: omniane officia perfecta sint, num quod officium aliud alio maius sit, et quae sunt generis eiusdem. Quorum autem officiorum praecepta traduntur, ea quamquam pertinent ad finem bonorum, tamen minus id apparet, quia magis ad institutionem vitae communis spectare videntur; de quibus est nobis his libris explicandum. Atque etiam alia divisio est officii. 1.8. Nam et medium quoddam officium dicitur et perfectum. Perfectum officium rectum, opinor, vocemus, quoniam Graeci kato/rqwma, hoc autem commune officium kaqh=kon vocant. Atque ea sic definiunt, ut, rectum quod sit, id officium perfectum esse definiant; medium autem officium id esse dicunt, quod cur factum sit, ratio probabilis reddi possit. 1.9. Triplex igitur est, ut Panaetio videtur, consilii capiendi deliberatio. Nam aut honestumne factu sit an turpe dubitant id, quod in deliberationem cadit; in quo considerando saepe animi in contraries sententias distrahuntur. Tum autem aut anquirunt aut consultant, ad vitae commoditatem iucunditatemque, ad facultates rerum atque copias, ad opes, ad potentiam, quibus et se possint iuvare et suos, conducat id necne, de quo deliberant; quae deliberatio omnis in rationem utilitatis cadit. Tertium dubitandi genus est, cum pugnare videtur cum honesto id, quod videtur esse utile; cum enim utilitas ad se rapere, honestas contra revocare ad se videtur, fit ut distrahatur in deliberando animus afferatque ancipitem curam cogitandi. 3.15. Cum autem aliquid actum est, in quo media officia compareant, id cumulate videtur esse perfectum, propterea quod volgus quid absit a perfecto, non fere intellegit; quatenus autem intellegit, nihil putat praetermissum; quod idem in poematis, in picturis usu venit in aliisque compluribus, ut delectentur imperiti laudentque ea, quae laudanda non sint, ob eam, credo, causam, quod insit in iis aliquid probi, quod capiat ignaros, qui quidem, quid in una quaque re vitii sit, nequeant iudicare; itaque, cum sunt docti a peritis, desistunt facile sententia. Haec igitur officia, de quibus his libris disserimus, quasi secunda quaedam honesta esse dicunt, non sapientium modo propria, sed cum omni hominum genere communia. 3.15.  On the other hand, when some act is performed in which we see "mean" duties manifested, that is generally regarded as fully perfect, for the reason that the common crowd does not, as a rule, comprehend how far it falls short of real perfection; but, as far as their comprehension does go, they think there is no deficiency. This same thing ordinarily occurs in the estimation of poems, paintings, and a great many other works of art: ordinary people enjoy and praise things that do not deserve praise. The reason for this, I suppose, is that those productions have some point of excellence which catches the fancy of the uneducated, because these have not the ability to discover the points of weakness in any particular piece of work before them. And so, when they are instructed by experts, they readily abandon their former opinion. The performance of the duties, then, which I am discussing in these books, is called by the Stoics a sort of second-grade moral goodness, not the peculiar property of their wise men, but shared by them with all mankind.
9. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 1.1-1.2, 1.4, 2.35, 3.3, 3.5-3.6 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.1. Cum 1 et 5 extr. imit. Paschasius Radb. Expos. in ps. 44 l. I praef. in. defensionum laboribus senatoriisque muneribus aut omnino aut magna ex parte essem aliquando liberatus, rettuli rettuli s retuli X Pasch. cf. p. 344, 24 me, Brute, te hortante maxime ad ea studia, quae retenta animo, remissa temporibus, longo intervallo intermissa revocavi, et cum omnium artium, quae ad rectam vivendi viam pertinerent, ratio et disciplina studio sapientiae, quae philosophia dicitur, contineretur, hoc mihi Latinis cf. Lact. inst. 3,14, 13 litteris litteris at libris V 2 inlustrandum putavi, non quia philosophia Graecis et litteris et doctoribus percipi non posset, sed meum semper hoc supra semper add. V 2 iudicium fuit omnia nostros aut invenisse per se sapientius quam Graecos aut accepta ab illis fecisse meliora, quae quidem digna statuissent, in quibus elaborarent. 1.2. Nam mores et instituta vitae resque domesticas ac familiaris nos profecto et melius tuemur et lautius, latius R 1 rem vero publicam nostri maiores certe melioribus temperaverunt et institutis et legibus. quid loquar de re militari? in qua cum virtute nostri multum valuerunt, tum plus etiam disciplina. iam illa, quae natura, non litteris adsecuti assec. KRH sunt, neque cum Graecia neque ulla cum gente cum ulla gente K sunt conferenda. quae enim tanta gravitas, quae tanta constantia, magnitudo animi, animi magnitudo K probitas, fides, quae tam excellens in omni genere virtus in ullis fuit, ut sit cum maioribus nostris comparanda? 1.4. non satis Graecorum gloriae responderunt. an censemus, cessemus KRH si Fabio, GFabio V 1 nobilissimo homini, laudi datum esset, quod pingeret, non multos etiam apud nos futuros Polyclitos et Parrhasios fuisse? honos alit artes, omnesque incenduntur acceduntur ( vel ac- cenduntur) Aug. incenduntur ex acc. H 1 ecl. 212 gloriae H ibid. cum Aug. plerisque codd. (gloriae L) Lup. ad studia gloria, iacentque ea semper, quae apud quosque improbantur. honos ... 219,2 improbantur Aug. civ. 5,13 (H ecl. 212 ) et ex eo Serv. Lupus ep. 1 summam eruditionem Graeci sitam censebant in nervorum vocumque cantibus; igitur et Epaminondas, princeps meo iudicio Graeciae, graecis X -ę pro -s V 1 aut c fidibus praeclare cecinisse dicitur, Themistoclesque aliquot ante annos annis edd. vett. cum in epulis recusaret recusasset V 2 s lyram, liram X est habitus indoctior. est... indoctior Quint. inst. 1,10,19 ergo in Graecia musici floruerunt, discebantque id omnes, nec qui nesciebat nesciebant V 1 satis excultus doctrina putabatur. 2.35. Interest aliquid inter laborem et dolorem. sunt finitima omnino, sed tamen differt differt ert in r. G 1 aliquid. labor est functio quaedam vel animi vel corporis gravioris operis et muneris, dolor autem motus asper in corpore alienus a sensibus. haec duo Graeci illi, quorum copiosior est lingua quam nostra, uno nomine appellant. itaque industrios homines illi studiosos studiosos R ( er. i) vel potius amantis doloris appellant, nos commodius laboriosos: laboriosos K ( exp. 2 ); item v. 17 aliud est enim laborare, aliud dolere. dolo re K (4 dolore V 1 ) o verborum inops interdum, quibus abundare habund. G 1 te semper putas, Graecia! aliud, inquam, est dolere, dolo re K (4 dolore V 1 ) aliud laborare. cum varices secabantur C. C. l g K 2 Mario, dolebat; cum aestu magno ducebat agmen, laborabat. est inter haec quaedam tamen similitudo: consuetudo enim laborum perpessionem dolorum dolorem X corr. K 2 R 2 efficit efficiat X (a R 1? ) faciliorem. 3.3. accedunt etiam poëtae, qui cum magnam speciem doctrinae sapientiaeque prae se tulerunt, audiuntur leguntur ediscuntur et inhaerescunt penitus in mentibus. cum vero eodem quasi maxumus quidam quidem K 1 R 1 H magister populus accessit accessit V c ( cf. rep. 4,9 ) om. X (accedit ante eodem add. multi s ) atque omnis undique ad vitia consentiens multitudo, tum plane inficimur opinionum pravitate a naturaque desciscimus, dessciscimus KR 1 ut nobis optime naturae vim vidisse naturae vim vidisse Mdv. ad fin. 3,62 naturam invidisse videantur, qui nihil melius homini, nihil magis expetendum, nihil praestantius honoribus, imperiis, populari gloria iudicaverunt. ad ad at K quam fertur optumus quisque veramque illam honestatem expetens, expe tens V quam unam natura maxime anquirit, unam s una anquirit Mos. inquirit in summa iitate versatur consectaturque nullam eminentem effigiem virtutis, virtutis del. Bentl. gloriae ( ex gloria V 2 ) del. Bai. sed adumbratam imaginem gloriae. est enim gloria solida quaedam res et expressa, non adumbrata; ea est consentiens laus bonorum, incorrupta et ante incorrupta add. V c vox bene iudicantium de excellenti excellenti ex -te V 1 excellente rell. ( ft. recte cf. de orat. 2, 85 fr. ap. Char. GL. I p. 138, 13 ) virtute, ea virtuti resonat tamquam imago; gloriae post imago add. X exp. V 1 quae quia recte factorum plerumque comes est, non est non est ea H est in r. V c bonis viris repudianda. repudienda in -anda corr. K 1 V 1 3.5. at et morbi morbi ex moribus K 1 perniciosiores pluresque sunt animi quam corporis; an ... 18 corporis add. G 2 in mg. hi enim ipsi hi...19 ipsi hoc. . ipso Ba. male: 'ipsi corporis morbi animi morbos efficere possunt eorumque numerum augent' (plures!) cf. p. 405,14 odiosi sunt, quod ad animum pertinent pertine t V eumque sollicitant, solicitant G 1 R 1 V 1 animusque aeger, ut ait Ennius, Enn. sc. 392 semper errat neque pati pati poti Ribb. sed cf. Va. neque perpeti potest, cupere numquam desinit. quibus duobus morbis, ut omittam alios, aegritudine et cupiditate, cupidldatẽ R 1 qui tandem possunt in corpore esse graviores? qui vero probari potest ut sibi mederi animus non possit, cum ipsam medicinam corporis animus invenerit, cumque ad corporum sanationem multum ipsa corpora et natura valeat nec omnes, omnis X corr. V 2 sint Tregd. sunt qui curari se passi sint, continuo etiam convalescant, convalescunt G animi autem, qui se sanari voluerint praeceptisque sapientium paruerint, sine ulla dubitatione sanentur? 3.6. est profecto animi medicina, philosophia; Cur igitur cum constemus ... 319,4 philosophia H cuius auxilium non ut in corporis morbis petendum est foris, omnibusque opibus viribus, et ante viribus add. V c s viribus om. Gr. ut nosmet ipsi nobis mederi possimus, elaborandum est. Quamquam de universa philosophia, quanto opere et expetenda esset et colenda, satis, ut arbitror, dictum est in Hortensio. ortensio G de maxumis autem rebus nihil fere intermisimus postea nec disputare nec scribere. his autem libris exposita sunt ea quae eaque G 1 a a om. K 1 nobis cum familiaribus nostris in Tusculano erant disputata. sed quo niam duobus superioribus de morte et de dolore dictum est, tertius dies disputationis hoc tertium volumen efficiet.
10. Varro, On Agriculture, 1.1.5 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

11. Catullus, Poems, 1 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

12. Horace, Sermones, 1.4.53, 1.10.26, 1.10.31-1.10.35 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

13. Lucretius Carus, On The Nature of Things, 1.1-1.135, 1.137-1.145, 1.922-1.950, 2.1-2.66, 2.257-2.258, 2.263-2.265, 2.730, 2.1150-2.1174, 3.1-3.2, 3.11-3.15, 3.22, 3.31-3.93, 3.296-3.307, 3.319-3.322, 3.419, 3.746-3.747, 3.995-3.1002, 4.1-4.41, 4.43, 4.547-4.548, 4.638-4.641, 4.678-4.683, 4.714-4.721, 4.962-4.1036, 4.1058-4.1287, 5.10-5.12, 5.50, 5.54-5.59, 5.64-5.66, 5.68-5.69, 5.73-5.90, 5.97-5.99, 5.206-5.217, 5.735, 5.865-5.870, 5.1020, 5.1028-5.1029, 5.1033-5.1055, 5.1081-5.1086, 5.1120-5.1128, 5.1131-5.1132, 6.1-6.80, 6.86, 6.90-6.95, 6.777-6.778, 6.786-6.787, 6.821-6.823 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

14. Vergil, Georgics, 1.1-1.5, 1.41-1.42, 1.293, 2.35-2.46, 2.438-2.439, 2.476, 2.486, 3.1-3.48, 3.237-3.241, 3.284-3.285, 3.289, 3.291-3.292, 3.294, 3.316-3.317, 3.323-3.338 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

1.1. What makes the cornfield smile; beneath what star 1.2. Maecenas, it is meet to turn the sod 1.3. Or marry elm with vine; how tend the steer; 1.4. What pains for cattle-keeping, or what proof 1.5. of patient trial serves for thrifty bees;— 1.41. With all her waves for dower; or as a star 1.42. Lend thy fresh beams our lagging months to cheer 1.293. Into fixed parts dividing, rules his way 2.35. Truncheons cleft four-wise, or sharp-pointed stakes; 2.36. Some forest-trees the layer's bent arch await 2.37. And slips yet quick within the parent-soil; 2.38. No root need others, nor doth the pruner's hand 2.39. Shrink to restore the topmost shoot to earth 2.40. That gave it being. Nay, marvellous to tell 2.41. Lopped of its limbs, the olive, a mere stock 2.42. Still thrusts its root out from the sapless wood 2.43. And oft the branches of one kind we see 2.44. Change to another's with no loss to rue 2.45. Pear-tree transformed the ingrafted apple yield 2.46. And stony cornels on the plum-tree blush. 2.438. Take heed to hide them, and dig in withal 2.439. Rough shells or porous stone, for therebetween 2.476. of their hard tooth, whose gnawing scars the stem. 2.486. Grim masks of hollowed bark assume, invoke 3.1. Thee too, great Pales, will I hymn, and thee 3.2. Amphrysian shepherd, worthy to be sung 3.3. You, woods and waves Lycaean. All themes beside 3.4. Which else had charmed the vacant mind with song 3.5. Are now waxed common. of harsh Eurystheus who 3.6. The story knows not, or that praiseless king 3.7. Busiris, and his altars? or by whom 3.8. Hath not the tale been told of Hylas young 3.9. Latonian Delos and Hippodame 3.10. And Pelops for his ivory shoulder famed 3.11. Keen charioteer? Needs must a path be tried 3.12. By which I too may lift me from the dust 3.13. And float triumphant through the mouths of men. 3.14. Yea, I shall be the first, so life endure 3.15. To lead the Muses with me, as I pa 3.16. To mine own country from the Aonian height; 3.17. I, placeName key= 3.18. of Idumaea, and raise a marble shrine 3.19. On thy green plain fast by the water-side 3.20. Where Mincius winds more vast in lazy coils 3.21. And rims his margent with the tender reed. 3.22. Amid my shrine shall Caesar's godhead dwell. 3.23. To him will I, as victor, bravely dight 3.24. In Tyrian purple, drive along the bank 3.25. A hundred four-horse cars. All placeName key= 3.26. Leaving Alpheus and Molorchus' grove 3.27. On foot shall strive, or with the raw-hide glove; 3.28. Whilst I, my head with stripped green olive crowned 3.29. Will offer gifts. Even 'tis present joy 3.30. To lead the high processions to the fane 3.31. And view the victims felled; or how the scene 3.32. Sunders with shifted face, and placeName key= 3.33. Inwoven thereon with those proud curtains rise. 3.34. of gold and massive ivory on the door 3.35. I'll trace the battle of the Gangarides 3.36. And our Quirinus' conquering arms, and there 3.37. Surging with war, and hugely flowing, the placeName key= 3.38. And columns heaped on high with naval brass. 3.39. And placeName key= 3.40. And quelled Niphates, and the Parthian foe 3.41. Who trusts in flight and backward-volleying darts 3.42. And trophies torn with twice triumphant hand 3.43. From empires twain on ocean's either shore. 3.44. And breathing forms of Parian marble there 3.45. Shall stand, the offspring of Assaracus 3.46. And great names of the Jove-descended folk 3.47. And father Tros, and placeName key= 3.48. of Cynthus. And accursed Envy there 3.237. And be like one that struggleth; then at last 3.238. Challenge the winds to race him, and at speed 3.239. Launched through the open, like a reinless thing 3.240. Scarce print his footsteps on the surface-sand. 3.241. As when with power from Hyperborean clime 3.284. Learns to fling wrath into his horns, with blow 3.285. Provokes the air, and scattering clouds of sand 3.289. As in mid ocean when a wave far of 3.291. Its rounded breast, and, onward rolled to land 3.292. Falls with prodigious roar among the rocks 3.294. Upseethe in swirling eddies, and disgorge 3.316. In blindest midnight how he swims the gulf 3.317. Convulsed with bursting storm-clouds! Over him 3.323. Or warlike wolf-kin or the breed of dogs? 3.324. Why tell how timorous stags the battle join? 3.325. O'er all conspicuous is the rage of mares 3.326. By Venus' self inspired of old, what time 3.327. The Potnian four with rending jaws devoured 3.328. The limbs of Glaucus. Love-constrained they roam 3.329. Past Gargarus, past the loud Ascanian flood; 3.330. They climb the mountains, and the torrents swim; 3.331. And when their eager marrow first conceive 3.332. The fire, in Spring-tide chiefly, for with Spring 3.333. Warmth doth their frames revisit, then they stand 3.334. All facing westward on the rocky heights 3.335. And of the gentle breezes take their fill; 3.336. And oft unmated, marvellous to tell 3.337. But of the wind impregnate, far and wide 3.338. O'er craggy height and lowly vale they scud
15. Vitruvius Pollio, On Architecture, 1.1.12 (1st cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

16. Seneca The Younger, Letters, 52.3-52.4 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

17. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 10.13, 10.118, 10.120 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

10.13. Apollodorus in his Chronology tells us that our philosopher was a pupil of Nausiphanes and Praxiphanes; but in his letter to Eurylochus, Epicurus himself denies it and says that he was self-taught. Both Epicurus and Hermarchus deny the very existence of Leucippus the philosopher, though by some and by Apollodorus the Epicurean he is said to have been the teacher of Democritus. Demetrius the Magnesian affirms that Epicurus also attended the lectures of Xenocrates.The terms he used for things were the ordinary terms, and Aristophanes the grammarian credits him with a very characteristic style. He was so lucid a writer that in the work On Rhetoric he makes clearness the sole requisite. 10.118. When on the rack, however, he will give vent to cries and groans. As regards women he will submit to the restrictions imposed by the law, as Diogenes says in his epitome of Epicurus' ethical doctrines. Nor will he punish his servants; rather he will pity them and make allowance on occasion for those who are of good character. The Epicureans do not suffer the wise man to fall in love; nor will he trouble himself about funeral rites; according to them love does not come by divine inspiration: so Diogenes in his twelfth book. The wise man will not make fine speeches. No one was ever the better for sexual indulgence, and it is well if he be not the worse.
18. Porphyry, On Abstinence, 1.7-1.8 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

1.7. 7.The Epicureans, however, narrating, as it were, a long genealogy, say, that the ancient legislators, looking to the association of life, and the mutual actions of men, proclaimed that manslaughter was unholy, and punished it with no casual disgrace. Perhaps, indeed, a certain natural alliance which exists in men towards each other, though the similitude of form and soul, is the reason why they do not so readily destroy an animal of this kind, as some of the other animals which are conceded to our use. Nevertheless, the greatest cause why manslaughter was considered as a thing grievous to be borne, and impious, was the opinion that it did not contribute to the whole nature and condition of human life. For, from a principle of this kind, those who are capable of perceiving the advantage arising from this decree, require no other cause of being restrained from a deed so dire. But those who are not able to have a sufficient perception of this, being terrified by the magnitude of the punishment, will abstain from readily destroying each other. For those, indeed, who survey the utility of the before-mentioned ordice, will promptly observe it; but those who are not able to perceive the benefit with which it is attended, will obey the mandate, in consequence of fearing the threatenings of the laws; which threatenings certain persons ordained for the sake of those who could not, by a reasoning process, infer the beneficial tendency of the decree, at the same time that most would admit this to be evident. SPAN 1.8. 8.For none of those legal institutes which were established from the |15 first, whether written or unwritten, and which still remain, and are adapted to be transmitted, [from one generation to another] became lawful through violence, but through the consent of those that used them. For those who introduced things of this kind to the multitude, excelled in wisdom, and not in strength of body, and the power which subjugates the rabble. Hence, through this, some were led to a rational consideration of utility, of which they had only an irrational sensation, and which they had frequently forgotten; but others were terrified by the magnitude of the punishments. For it was not possible to use any other remedy for the ignorance of what is beneficial than the dread of the punishment ordained by law. For this alone even now keeps the vulgar in awe, and prevents them from doing any thing, either publicly or privately, which is not beneficial [to the community]. But if all men were similarly capable of surveying and recollecting what is advantageous, there would be no need of laws, but men would spontaneously avoid such things as are prohibited, and perform such as they were ordered to do. For a survey of what is useful and detrimental, is a sufficient incentive to the avoidance of the one and the choice of the other. But the infliction of punishment has a reference to those who do not foresee what is beneficial. For impendent punishment forcibly compels such as these to subdue those impulses which lead them to useless actions, and to do that which is right. SPAN
19. Epicurus, Letter To Herodotus, 76, 75

20. Epicurus, Vatican Sayings, 27, 78, 23



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
adynata Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 93
allusion Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 13
ambition Lehoux et al., Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science (2013) 34
amor, in georgics Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 264
amor, in lucretius Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 91
amor, poetry and Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 191
anger / irascibility, empty Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 76
animals, in lucretius Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 91, 93
animals Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 91, 93, 191, 264
anthropomorphism Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 264
aratus Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 153
armstrong, david Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 147
ataraxia Lehoux et al., Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science (2013) 34
atticus, liber annalis Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 16
avernus Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 91
bailey, cyril Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 147
barbarians Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 16
bion of borysthenes, on apathy Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 147
birds Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 93
callimacheanism Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 153, 187
callimachus Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 13, 153
cattle Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 93, 264
cicero, verbal coinages Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 147
cicero Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 16
culture history Lehoux et al., Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science (2013) 34
cycle of growth and decay, in lucretius Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 24
cycle of growth and decay, in the georgics Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 24
de architectura, and greek knowledge Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 17
death, in lucretius Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 24
didactic plots, illumination Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 16, 17
didactic plots, initiation Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 16, 17
disposition (διάθεσις) Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 16
dreams Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 91
ennius Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 13
epicureanism Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 153
epicurus Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 13, 20, 24, 153
expertise Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 16, 17
explicatio Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 16
fabrica Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 17
feeney, denis Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 16
finales, book 1 Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 187
finales, book 2 Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 187
finales, in lucretius Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 20, 153
formulae Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 264
friends/friendship, instrumentality of Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 76
friends/friendship Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 76
friendship Lehoux et al., Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science (2013) 34
furor Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 191
gods Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 16
hermarchus Lehoux et al., Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science (2013) 34
hesiod Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 166
homer Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 24
horses Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 264
imagery, dionysiac Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 191, 264
imagery, light and darkness Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 20
imagery, military Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 264
imagery, storms Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 20
indelli, giovanni Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 147
intertextuality Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 13; Lehoux et al., Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science (2013) 34
io Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 152, 153
jupiter Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 166
justice Lehoux et al., Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science (2013) 34
knowledge, greek Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 16, 17
labor, in lucretius Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 152, 153, 166, 187
labor, in roman ideology Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 166
labor, in the georgics Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 166, 187, 191
language Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 16
law Lehoux et al., Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science (2013) 34
lucretius, agriculture in Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 93, 153
lucretius, animals in Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 91, 93
lucretius, culture-history in Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 93
lucretius, cycle of growth and decay in Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 24
lucretius, death in Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 24
lucretius, formulae in Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 264
lucretius, labor in Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 152, 153, 166, 187
lucretius Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 16, 76; Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 16
lucretius carus, titus Wynne, Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage (2019) 12
mars Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 152
mcosker, michael Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 147
memmius Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 24; Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 76
metempsychosis Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 93
metus Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 24
moral progress Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 76
muses Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 20, 264
nepos, chronica Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 16
obscurity Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 17
octavian Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 24
oltramare, andré Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 147
omniscience and omnicompetence, maximalistic of orator, opening, verbs of Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 16
pain Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 76
pastoral Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 264
philodemus Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 153
pindar Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 13
pleasure/happiness Lehoux et al., Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science (2013) 34
poetry and poetics Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 13, 152, 153, 187, 191, 264
politics, in the georgics Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 187, 191
porphyry Lehoux et al., Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science (2013) 34
proems, in lucretius Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 20, 24, 93, 166, 187
proems in the middle Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 20
property of language Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 17
property of subject matter Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 17
quirinus Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 147
ratiocinatio Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 17
rational calculus Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 76
rationem redde rerender account Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 16
sagehood Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 16
seelenheilung Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 76
sheep Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 93, 264
similes Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 264
society Lehoux et al., Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science (2013) 34
soul' Wynne, Horace and the Gift Economy of Patronage (2019) 12
spontaneity Lehoux et al., Lucretius: Poetry, Philosophy, Science (2013) 34
stoics/stoicism, condemned by horace Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 147
students Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 76
summum templum architecturae Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 17
sympathy (συμπάθεια) Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 76
teachers/teaching Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 76
trees Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 187
truth Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 16, 17
tsouna(-mckirahan), voula Yona, Epicurean Ethics in Horace: The Psychology of Satire (2018) 147
varro Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 24
velleius, historia romana Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 16
venus Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 20, 24, 91, 152
vice Nijs, The Epicurean Sage in the Ethics of Philodemus (2023) 16
virgil, and callimachean poetics Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 187
virgil, and ennius Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 13
virgil, and homer Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 24
virgil, reception of lucretius Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 24, 153, 191, 264
volumina Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 17
war, civil war Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 264
war, in the georgics Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 264
woodman, a. j. Oksanish, Vitruvian Man: Rome Under Construction (2019) 16
zoogony Gale, Virgil on the Nature of Things: The Georgics, Lucretius and the Didactic Tradition (2000) 93