Home About Network of subjects Linked subjects heatmap Book indices included Search by subject Search by reference Browse subjects Browse texts

Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



6793
Irenaeus, Refutation Of All Heresies, 2.14.4


nanThis opinion, too, that they hold the Creator formed the world out of previously existing matter, both Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Plato expressed before them; as, forsooth, we learn they also do under the inspiration of their Mother. Then again, as to the opinion that everything of necessity passes away to those things out of which they maintain it was also formed, and that God is the slave of this necessity, so that He cannot impart immortality to what is mortal, or bestow incorruption on what is corruptible, but every one passes into a substance similar in nature to itself, both those who are named Stoics from the portico (stoa), and indeed all that are ignorant of God, poets and historians alike, make the same affirmation. Those [heretics] who hold the same [system of] infidelity have ascribed, no doubt, their own proper region to spiritual beings,--that, namely, which is within the Pleroma, but to animal beings the intermediate space, while to corporeal they assign that which is material. And they assert that God Himself can do no otherwise, but that every one of the [different kinds of substance] mentioned passes away to those things which are of the same nature.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

24 results
1. Aristophanes, Birds, 694 (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

694. γῆ δ' οὐδ' ἀὴρ οὐδ' οὐρανὸς ἦν: ̓Ερέβους δ' ἐν ἀπείροσι κόλποις
2. Plato, Laws, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

3. Plato, Timaeus, None (5th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

29e. constructed Becoming and the All. He was good, and in him that is good no envy ariseth ever concerning anything; and being devoid of envy He desired that all should be, so far as possible, like unto Himself. Tim. This principle, then, we shall be wholly right in accepting from men of wisdom as being above all the supreme originating principle of Becoming and the Cosmos.
4. Cicero, On Fate, 29, 28 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

5. New Testament, Ephesians, 4.6 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

4.6. one God and Father of all, who is over all, and through all, and in us all.
6. New Testament, Galatians, 4.8 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

4.8. However at that time, not knowing God, youwere in bondage to those who by nature are not gods.
7. New Testament, Romans, 1.20-1.21, 1.25 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

1.20. For the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity; that they may be without excuse. 1.21. Because, knowing God, they didn't glorify him as God, neither gave thanks, but became vain in their reasoning, and their senseless heart was darkened. 1.25. who exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshiped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed forever. Amen.
8. Plutarch, On Fate, None (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

574e. But the "indolent argument," that of the "reaper," and that termed "contrary to fate" turn out on this view to be sophisms indeed. The order of points in the Stoic argument According to the opposing argument the chief and first point would appear to be that nothing occurs without cause, and that instead everything occurs in conformity with antecedent causes; the second, that this universe, at one with itself in spirit and in affections, is governed by nature; and in the third place comes what would rather seem to be evidence added to these points in contention: the good repute in which the art of divination is held by all mankind, in the belief that its existence and that of God are in fact involved in one another;
9. Seneca The Younger, De Beneficiis, 7.1.5 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

10. Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies, 3.3.3, 5.3.3 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

11. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.6.2, 1.8.1, 1.9.4, 1.25.6, 1.31.4, 2.1.2, 2.9.1-2.9.2, 2.10.2, 2.13.9, 2.14, 2.14.1-2.14.3, 2.14.5-2.14.6, 2.21.2, 2.26.3, 2.28.1, 2.29.1-2.29.3, 2.30.2, 2.30.4, 2.33.2, 3.24.2, 3.25.1, 3.25.5, 4.19.1, 5.19.2 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

12. Justin, Second Apology, 13.4 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

13. Justin, Dialogue With Trypho, 35.6 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

14. Sextus, Against The Mathematicians, 9.144 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

15. Tertullian, On The Soul, 23.4 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

16. Tertullian, Prescription Against Heretics, 7 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

17. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 9.19 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

9.19. Seven and sixty are now the years that have been tossing my cares up and down the land of Greece; and there were then twenty and five years more from my birth up, if I know how to speak truly about these things.He holds that there are four elements of existent things, and worlds unlimited in number but not overlapping [in time]. Clouds are formed when the vapour from the sun is carried upwards and lifts them into the surrounding air. The substance of God is spherical, in no way resembling man. He is all eye and all ear, but does not breathe; he is the totality of mind and thought, and is eternal. Xenophanes was the first to declare that everything which comes into being is doomed to perish, and that the soul is breath.
18. Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation For The Gospel, 15.5.2 (3rd cent. CE - 4th cent. CE)

19. Origen, Commentary On Romans, 4.12 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

20. Origen, Commentary On Romans, 4.12 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

21. Origen, Commentary On Romans, 4.12 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

22. Origen, Against Celsus, 2.20, 3.10-3.11 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

2.20. Let us see how he continues after this: These events, he says, he predicted as being a God, and the prediction must by all means come to pass. God, therefore, who above all others ought to do good to men, and especially to those of his own household, led on his own disciples and prophets, with whom he was in the habit of eating and drinking, to such a degree of wickedness, that they became impious and unholy men. Now, of a truth, he who shared a man's table would not be guilty of conspiring against him; but after banqueting with God, he became a conspirator. And, what is still more absurd, God himself plotted against the members of his own table, by converting them into traitors and villains! Now, since you wish me to answer even those charges of Celsus which seem to me frivolous, the following is our reply to such statements. Celsus imagines that an event, predicted through foreknowledge, comes to pass because it was predicted; but we do not grant this, maintaining that he who foretold it was not the cause of its happening, because he foretold it would happen; but the future event itself, which would have taken place though not predicted, afforded the occasion to him, who was endowed with foreknowledge, of foretelling its occurrence. Now, certainly this result is present to the foreknowledge of him who predicts an event, when it is possible that it may or may not happen, viz., that one or other of these things will take place. For we do not assert that he who foreknows an event, by secretly taking away the possibility of its happening or not, makes any such declaration as this: This shall infallibly happen, and it is impossible that it can be otherwise. And this remark applies to all the foreknowledge of events dependent upon ourselves, whether contained in the sacred Scriptures or in the histories of the Greeks. Now, what is called by logicians an idle argument, which is a sophism, will be no sophism as far as Celsus can help, but according to sound reasoning it is a sophism. And that this may be seen, I shall take from the Scriptures the predictions regarding Judas, or the foreknowledge of our Saviour regarding him as the traitor; and from the Greek histories the oracle that was given to Laius, conceding for the present its truth, since it does not affect the argument. Now, in Ps. cviii., Judas is spoken of by the mouth of the Saviour, in words beginning thus: Hold not Your peace, O God of my praise; for the mouth of the wicked and the mouth of the deceitful are opened against me. Now, if you carefully observe the contents of the psalm, you will find that, as it was foreknown that he would betray the Saviour, so also was he considered to be himself the cause of the betrayal, and deserving, on account of his wickedness, of the imprecations contained in the prophecy. For let him suffer these things, because, says the psalmist, he remembered not to show mercy, but persecuted the poor and needy man. Wherefore it was possible for him to show mercy, and not to persecute him whom he did persecute. But although he might have done these things, he did not do them, but carried out the act of treason, so as to merit the curses pronounced against him in the prophecy. And in answer to the Greeks we shall quote the following oracular response to Laius, as recorded by the tragic poet, either in the exact words of the oracle or in equivalent terms. Future events are thus made known to him by the oracle: Do not try to beget children against the will of the gods. For if you beget a son, your son shall murder you; and all your household shall wade in blood. Now from this it is clear that it was within the power of Laius not to try to beget children, for the oracle would not have commanded an impossibility; and it was also in his power to do the opposite, so that neither of these courses was compulsory. And the consequence of his not guarding against the begetting of children was, that he suffered from so doing the calamities described in the tragedies relating to Œdipus and Jocasta and their sons. Now that which is called the idle argument, being a quibble, is such as might be applied, say in the case of a sick man, with the view of sophistically preventing him from employing a physician to promote his recovery; and it is something like this: If it is decreed that you should recover from your disease, you will recover whether you call in a physician or not; but if it is decreed that you should not recover, you will not recover whether you call in a physician or no. But it is certainly decreed either that you should recover, or that you should not recover; and therefore it is in vain that you call in a physician. Now with this argument the following may be wittily compared: If it is decreed that you should beget children, you will beget them, whether you have intercourse with a woman or not. But if it is decreed that you should not beget children, you will not do so, whether you have intercourse with a woman or no. Now, certainly, it is decreed either that you should beget children or not; therefore it is in vain that you have intercourse with a woman. For, as in the latter instance, intercourse with a woman is not employed in vain, seeing it is an utter impossibility for him who does not use it to beget children; so, in the former, if recovery from disease is to be accomplished by means of the healing art, of necessity the physician is summoned, and it is therefore false to say that in vain do you call in a physician. We have brought forward all these illustrations on account of the assertion of this learned Celsus, that being a God He predicted these things, and the predictions must by all means come to pass. Now, if by by all means he means necessarily, we cannot admit this. For it was quite possible, also, that they might not come to pass. But if he uses by all means in the sense of simple futurity, which nothing hinders from being true (although it was possible that they might not happen), he does not at all touch my argument; nor did it follow, from Jesus having predicted the acts of the traitor or the perjurer, that it was the same thing with His being the cause of such impious and unholy proceedings. For He who was among us, and knew what was in man, seeing his evil disposition, and foreseeing what he would attempt from his spirit of covetousness, and from his want of stable ideas of duty towards his Master, along with many other declarations, gave utterance to this also: He that dips his hand with Me in the dish, the same shall betray Me. 3.10. But observe what he alleges as a proof of his statement: Christians at first were few in number, and held the same opinions; but when they grew to be a great multitude, they were divided and separated, each wishing to have his own individual party: for this was their object from the beginning. That Christians at first were few in number, in comparison with the multitudes who subsequently became Christian, is undoubted; and yet, all things considered, they were not so very few. For what stirred up the envy of the Jews against Jesus, and aroused them to conspire against Him, was the great number of those who followed Him into the wilderness - five thousand men on one occasion, and four thousand on another, having attended Him there, without including the women and children. For such was the charm of Jesus' words, that not only were men willing to follow Him to the wilderness, but women also, forgetting the weakness of their sex and a regard for outward propriety in thus following their Teacher into desert places. Children, too, who are altogether unaffected by such emotions, either following their parents, or perhaps attracted also by His divinity, in order that it might be implanted within them, became His followers along with their parents. But let it be granted that Christians were few in number at the beginning, how does that help to prove that Christians would be unwilling to make all men believe the doctrine of the Gospel? 3.11. He says, in addition, that all the Christians were of one mind, not observing, even in this particular, that from the beginning there were differences of opinion among believers regarding the meaning of the books held to be divine. At all events, while the apostles were still preaching, and while eye-witnesses of (the works of) Jesus were still teaching His doctrine, there was no small discussion among the converts from Judaism regarding Gentile believers, on the point whether they ought to observe Jewish customs, or should reject the burden of clean and unclean meats, as not being obligatory on those who had abandoned their ancestral Gentile customs, and had become believers in Jesus. Nay, even in the Epistles of Paul, who was contemporary with those who had seen Jesus, certain particulars are found mentioned as having been the subject of dispute - viz., respecting the resurrection, and whether it were already past, and the day of the Lord, whether it were near at hand or not. Nay, the very exhortation to avoid profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science falsely so called: which some professing, have erred concerning the faith, is enough to show that from the very beginning, when, as Celsus imagines, believers were few in number, there were certain doctrines interpreted in different ways.
23. Origen, On First Principles, 2.9.5, 3.1.5 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

2.9.5. Now, when we say that this world was established in the variety in which we have above explained that it was created by God, and when we say that this God is good, and righteous, and most just, there are numerous individuals, especially those who, coming from the school of Marcion, and Valentinus, and Basilides, have heard that there are souls of different natures, who object to us, that it cannot consist with the justice of God in creating the world to assign to some of His creatures an abode in the heavens, and not only to give such a better habitation, but also to grant them a higher and more honourable position; to favour others with the grant of principalities; to bestow powers upon some, dominions on others; to confer upon some the most honourable seats in the celestial tribunals; to enable some to shine with more resplendent glory, and to glitter with a starry splendour; to give to some the glory of the sun, to others the glory of the moon, to others the glory of the stars; to cause one star to differ from another star in glory. And, to speak once for all, and briefly, if the Creator God wants neither the will to undertake nor the power to complete a good and perfect work, what reason can there be that, in the creation of rational natures, i.e., of beings of whose existence He Himself is the cause, He should make some of higher rank, and others of second, or third, or of many lower and inferior degrees? In the next place, they object to us, with regard to terrestrial beings, that a happier lot by birth is the case with some rather than with others; as one man, e.g., is begotten of Abraham, and born of the promise; another, too, of Isaac and Rebekah, and who, while still in the womb, supplants his brother, and is said to be loved by God before he is born. Nay, this very circumstance — especially that one man is born among the Hebrews, with whom he finds instruction in the divine law; another among the Greeks, themselves also wise, and men of no small learning; and then another among the Ethiopians, who are accustomed to feed on human flesh; or among the Scythians, with whom parricide is an act sanctioned by law; or among the people of Taurus, where strangers are offered in sacrifice — is a ground of strong objection. Their argument accordingly is this: If there be this great diversity of circumstances, and this diverse and varying condition by birth, in which the faculty of free-will has no scope (for no one chooses for himself either where, or with whom, or in what condition he is born); if, then, this is not caused by the difference in the nature of souls, i.e., that a soul of an evil nature is destined for a wicked nation, and a good soul for a righteous nation, what other conclusion remains than that these things must be supposed to be regulated by accident and chance? And if that be admitted, then it will be no longer believed that the world was made by God, or administered by His providence; and as a consequence, a judgment of God upon the deeds of each individual will appear a thing not to be looked for. In which matter, indeed, what is clearly the truth of things is the privilege of Him alone to know who searches all things, even the deep things of God. 3.1.5. Seeing, then, that these positions are thus established by a sort of natural evidence, is it not superfluous to throw back the causes of our actions on those things which happen to us from without, and thus transfer the blame from ourselves, on whom it wholly lies? For this is to say that we are like pieces of wood, or stones, which have no motion in themselves, but receive the causes of their motion from without. Now such an assertion is neither true nor becoming, and is invented only that the freedom of the will may be denied; unless, indeed, we are to suppose that the freedom of the will consists in this, that nothing which happens to us from without can incite us to good or evil. And if any one were to refer the causes of our faults to the natural disorder of the body, such a theory is proved to be contrary to the reason of all teaching. For, as we see in very many individuals, that after living unchastely and intemperately, and after being the captives of luxury and lust, if they should happen to be aroused by the word of teaching and instruction to enter upon a better course of life, there takes place so great a change, that from being luxurious and wicked men, they are converted into those who are sober, and most chaste and gentle; so, again, we see in the case of those who are quiet and honest, that after associating with restless and shameless individuals, their good morals are corrupted by evil conversation, and they become like those whose wickedness is complete. And this is the case sometimes with men of mature age, so that such have lived more chastely in youth than when more advanced years have enabled them to indulge in a freer mode of life. The result of our reasoning, therefore, is to show that those things which happen to us from without are not in our own power; but that to make a good or bad use of those things which do so happen, by help of that reason which is within us, and which distinguishes and determines how these things ought to be used, is within our power. 3.1.5. Such being the case, to say that we are moved from without, and to put away the blame from ourselves, by declaring that we are like to pieces of wood and stones, which are dragged about by those causes that act upon them from without, is neither true nor in conformity with reason, but is the statement of him who wishes to destroy the conception of free-will. For if we were to ask such an one what was free-will, he would say that it consisted in this, that when purposing to do some thing, no external cause came inciting to the reverse. But to blame, on the other hand, the mere constitution of the body, is absurd; for the disciplinary reason, taking hold of those who are most intemperate and savage (if they will follow her exhortation), effects a transformation, so that the alteration and change for the better is most extensive — the most licentious men frequently becoming better than those who formerly did not seem to be such by nature; and the most savage men passing into such a state of mildness, that those persons who never at any time were so savage as they were, appear savage in comparison, so great a degree of gentleness having been produced within them. And we see other men, most steady and respectable, driven from their state of respectability and steadiness by intercourse with evil customs, so as to fall into habits of licentiousness, often beginning their wickedness in middle age, and plunging into disorder after the period of youth has passed, which, so far as its nature is concerned, is unstable. Reason, therefore, demonstrates that external events do not depend on us, but that it is our own business to use them in this way or the opposite, having received reason as a judge and an investigator of the manner in which we ought to meet those events that come from without.
24. Plotinus, Enneads, 2.9.1-2.9.3, 2.9.5, 2.9.13-2.9.14 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
adam, aeons Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena (2013) 212
anselm Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 34
anthropomorphism Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 34
argument Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 33
arianism Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena (2013) 212
aristotelianism, criticism of Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 121
basilides Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194; Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
blasphemy, heresy as Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 122, 232
church fathers, irenaeus Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
clement of alexandria Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194; Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 33
damnation, eternal Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
democritus Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 34
determinism Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194; Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
divine intellect Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 33, 34
dupied Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
election/elect Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
epicureanism, heresy assimilated to Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 121, 122
epicurus and epicureans Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 34
epiphanius Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
eschatology Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
exegesis, in gnosticism Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 232
exegesis, in irenaeus Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 232
exegesis, in valentianianism Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 232
free choice/free will Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
free will Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena (2013) 212
gnostic myth Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 34
gnosticism, as pagan Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 121, 122
gnosticism, cento Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 232
gnosticism/gnostics, πνευµατικοί Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
gnosticism/gnostics Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
gnosticism Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
harnack, a. von Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 33
historia augusta Pinheiro Bierl and Beck, Anton Bierl? and Roger Beck?, Intende, Lector - Echoes of Myth, Religion and Ritual in the Ancient Novel (2013) 130
ignatius Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
intellect Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 33, 34
irenaeus, criticism of gnostic exegesis Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 232
irenaeus, on heresy and paganism Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 121, 122
irenaeus Iricinschi et al., Beyond the Gnostic Gospels: Studies Building on the Work of Elaine Pagels (2013) 154; Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
isidorus Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
judaism Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
marcion Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194; Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
meijering, e. p. Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 33
metaphysic of mind Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 33, 34
milesian tale Pinheiro Bierl and Beck, Anton Bierl? and Roger Beck?, Intende, Lector - Echoes of Myth, Religion and Ritual in the Ancient Novel (2013) 130
myth, associated with heresy Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 121
myth (mythos), gnostic Pinheiro Bierl and Beck, Anton Bierl? and Roger Beck?, Intende, Lector - Echoes of Myth, Religion and Ritual in the Ancient Novel (2013) 130
nag hammadi Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194; Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
origen Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 33; Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
orphism Pinheiro Bierl and Beck, Anton Bierl? and Roger Beck?, Intende, Lector - Echoes of Myth, Religion and Ritual in the Ancient Novel (2013) 130
paganism, heresy assimilated to Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 121, 122
philosophy Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 33, 34
plato Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
platonism, gnostic Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena (2013) 212
platonism, pagan, neo- Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena (2013) 212
platonism Pinheiro Bierl and Beck, Anton Bierl? and Roger Beck?, Intende, Lector - Echoes of Myth, Religion and Ritual in the Ancient Novel (2013) 130
plotinus Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
pneumatics Iricinschi et al., Beyond the Gnostic Gospels: Studies Building on the Work of Elaine Pagels (2013) 154
porphyry Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
positive relationship to christianity Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 122
predetermination Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
psychics Iricinschi et al., Beyond the Gnostic Gospels: Studies Building on the Work of Elaine Pagels (2013) 154
pythagoreans Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena (2013) 212
salvation Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
sex Pinheiro Bierl and Beck, Anton Bierl? and Roger Beck?, Intende, Lector - Echoes of Myth, Religion and Ritual in the Ancient Novel (2013) 130
simon of samaria Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 122
sovereignty of god, judaeo-christian view Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
sovereignty of god Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
stoicism, pejorative comparison in heresiology Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 121
stoicism Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 34
stoics Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
subordinationism Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena (2013) 212
tertullian Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 33; Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
theodicy' Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena (2013) 212
totality Osborne, Irenaeus of Lyons (2001) 34
valentianism Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena (2013) 212
valentinian, anthropology Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
valentinian the gnostic Wilson, Augustine's Conversion from Traditional Free Choice to "Non-free Free Will": A Comprehensive Methodology (2018) 13
valentinians Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 121, 122
valentinus Leão and Lanzillotta, A Man of Many Interests: Plutarch on Religion, Myth, and Magic (2019) 194
προσάρμόζειν Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 232
ἀνατροπή Boulluec, The Notion of Heresy in Greek Literature in the Second and Third Centuries (2022) 121