| 2.15. Satisne igitur videor vim verborum tenere, an sum etiam nunc vel Graece loqui vel Latine docendus? et tamen vide, ne, si ego non intellegam quid Epicurus loquatur, cum Graece, ut videor, luculenter sciam, sit aliqua culpa eius, qui ita loquatur, ut non intellegatur. quod duobus modis sine reprehensione fit, si aut de industria facias, ut Heraclitus, 'cognomento qui skoteino/s perhibetur, quia de natura nimis obscure memoravit', aut cum rerum obscuritas, non verborum, facit ut non intellegatur oratio, qualis est in Timaeo Platonis. Epicurus autem, ut opinor, nec non vult, si possit, plane et aperte loqui, nec de re obscura, ut physici, aut artificiosa, ut mathematici, sed de illustri et facili et iam et iam P. Man. etiam (eciam V) in vulgus pervagata loquitur. loquitur (i in ras. ) N loquatur ( etiam A) Quamquam non negatis nos intellegere quid sit voluptas, sed quid ille dicat. e quo efficitur, non ut nos non intellegamus quae vis sit istius verbi, sed ut ille suo more loquatur, nostrum neglegat. 3.1. Voluptatem quidem, Brute, si ipsa pro se loquatur nec tam pertinaces habeat patronos, concessuram arbitror convictam superiore libro dignitati. etenim sit inpudens, si virtuti diutius repugnet, aut si honestis honestis honestati NV iucunda anteponat aut pluris esse contendat dulcedinem corporis ex eave natam laetitiam quam gravitatem animi atque constantiam. quare illam quidem dimittamus et suis se finibus tenere tenere (ten ab alt. m. in ras. ) N petere iubeamus, ne blanditiis eius inlecebrisque impediatur disputandi severitas. 3.3. ipse etiam dicit dicit cf. p. 13, 24—29 Epicurus ne ne nec RNV argumentandum quidem esse de voluptate, quod sit positum iudicium eius in sensibus, ut commoneri nos satis sit, nihil attineat doceri. quare illa nobis simplex fuit in utramque partem disputatio. nec enim in Torquati sermone quicquam sermone quicquam VN 2 sermone nec quicquam (quitquam ABE) implicatum inpl. R aut tortuosum fuit, nostraque, ut mihi videtur, dilucida oratio. Stoicorum autem non ignoras quam sit subtile vel spinosum potius disserendi genus, idque cum Graecis tum magis nobis, quibus etiam verba parienda sunt inponendaque nova rebus novis nomina. quod quidem nemo mediocriter doctus mirabitur cogitans in omni arte, cuius usus vulgaris communisque non sit, multam novitatem nominum esse, cum constituantur earum rerum vocabula, quae in quaque arte versentur. 3.4. itaque et dialectici et physici verbis utuntur iis, quae ipsi Graeciae nota non non BENV om. AR sint, sint Mdv. sunt geometrae vero et musici, grammatici etiam more quodam loquuntur suo. ipsae rhetorum artes, quae sunt totae forenses atque populares, verbis tamen in docendo quasi privatis utuntur ac suis. atque ut omittam has artis elegantes et ingenuas, ne opifices opifices N opificis AER opositis B opifex V quidem tueri sua artificia possent, nisi vocabulis uterentur nobis incognitis, usitatis sibi. quin etiam agri cultura, quae abhorret ab omni politiore elegantia, tamen eas eas V ea res, in quibus versatur, nominibus notavit novis. quo magis hoc philosopho faciendum est. ars est enim philosophia vitae, de qua disserens arripere verba de foro non potest. | 2.15. "Well, do you think I have properly grasped the meaning of the terms, or do I still require lessons in the use of either Greek or Latin? And even supposing that I do not understand what Epicurus says, still I believe I really have a very clear knowledge of Greek, so that perhaps it is partly his fault for using such unintelligible language. Obscurity is excusable on two grounds: it may be deliberately adopted, as in the case of Heraclitus, The surname of the Obscure who bore, So dark his philosophic lore; or the obscurity may be due to the abstruseness of the subject and not of the style â an instance of this is Plato's Timaeus. But Epicurus, in my opinion, has no intention of not speaking plainly and clearly if he can, nor is he discussing a recondite subject like natural philosophy, nor a technical subject such as mathematics, but a lucid and easy topic, and one that is generally familiar already. And yet you Epicureans do not deny that we understand what pleasure is, but what he means by it; which proves not that we do not understand the real meaning of the word, but that Epicurus is speaking an idiom of his own and ignoring our accepted terminology. 3.1. My dear Brutus. â Were Pleasure to speak for herself, in default of such redoubtable advocates as she now has to defend her, my belief is that she would own defeat. Vanquished by the arguments of our preceding Book, she would yield the victory to true Worth. Indeed she would be lost to shame if she persisted any longer in the battle against Virtue, and rated what is pleasant above what is morally good, or maintained that bodily enjoyment or the mental gratification which springs from it is of higher value than firmness and dignity of character. Let us then give Pleasure her dismissal, and bid her keep within her own domains, lest her charms and blandishments put snares in the way of strict philosophical debate. 3.3. In fact Epicurus himself declares that there is no occasion to argue about pleasure at all: its criterion resides in the senses, so that proof is entirely superfluous; a reminder of the facts is all that is needed. Therefore our preceding debate consisted of a simple statement of the case on either side. There was nothing abstruse or intricate in the discourse of Torquatus, and my own exposition was, I believe, as clear as daylight. But the Stoics, as you are aware, affect an exceedingly subtle or rather crabbed style of argument; and if the Greeks find it so, still more must we, who have actually to create a vocabulary, and to invent new terms to convey new ideas. This necessity will cause no surprise to anyone of moderate learning, when he reflects that in every branch of science lying outside the range of common everyday practice there must always be a large degree of novelty in the vocabulary, when it comes to fixing a terminology to denote the conceptions with which the science in question deals. 3.4. Thus Logic and Natural Philosophy alike make use of terms unfamiliar even to Greece; Geometry, Music, Grammar also, have an idiom of their own. Even the manuals of Rhetoric, which belong entirely to the practical sphere and to the life of the world, nevertheless employ for purposes of instruction a sort of private and peculiar phraseology. And to leave out of account these liberal arts and accomplishments, even artisans would be unable to preserve the tradition of their crafts if they did not make use of words unknown to us though familiar to themselves. Nay, agriculture itself, a subject entirely unsusceptible of literary refinement, has yet had to coin technical terms to denote the things with which it is occupied. All the more is the philosopher compelled to do likewise; for philosophy is the Science of Life, and cannot treat its subject in language taken from the street. |
