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Tiresias: The Ancient Mediterranean Religions Source Database



6038
Gellius, Attic Nights, 19.1


nanThe reply of a certain philosopher, when he was asked why he turned pale in a storm at sea. We were sailing from Cassiopa to Brundisium over the Ionian Sea, violent, vast and storm-tossed. During almost the whole of the night which followed our first day a fierce side-wind blew, which had filled our ship with water. Then afterwards, while we were all still lamenting, and working hard at the pumps, day at last dawned. But there was no less danger and no slackening of the violence of the wind; on the contrary, more frequent whirlwinds, a black sky, masses of fog, and a kind of fearful cloud-forms, which they called typhones, or "typhoons," seemed to hang over and threaten us, ready to overwhelm the ship. In our company was an eminent philosopher of the Stoic sect, whom I had known at Athens as a man of no slight importance, holding the young men who were his pupils under very good control. In the midst of the great dangers of that time and that tumult of sea and sky I looked for him, desiring to know in what state of mind he was and whether he was unterrified and courageous. And then I beheld the man frightened and ghastly pale, not indeed uttering any lamentations, as all the rest were doing, nor any outcries of that kind, but in his loss of colour and distracted expression not differing much from the others. But when the sky cleared, the sea grew calm, and the heat of danger cooled, then the Stoic was approached by a rich Greek from Asia, a man of elegant apparel, as we saw, and with an abundance of baggage and many attendants, while he himself showed signs of a luxurious person and disposition. This man, in a bantering tone, said: "What does this mean, Sir philosopher, that when we were in danger you were afraid and turned pale, while I neither feared nor changed colour?" And the philosopher, after hesitating for a moment about the propriety of answering him, said: "If in such a terrible storm I did show a little fear, you are not worthy to be told the reason for it. But, if you please, the famous Aristippus, the pupil of Socrates, shall answer for me, who on being asked on a similar occasion by a man much like you why he feared, though a philosopher, while his questioner on the contrary had no fear, replied that they had not the same motives, for his questioner need not be very anxious about the life of a worthless coxcomb, but he himself feared for the life of an Aristippus." With these words then the Stoic rid himself of the rich Asiatic. But later, when we were approaching Brundisium and sea and sky were calm, I asked him what the reason for his fear was, which he had refused to reveal to the man who had improperly addressed him. And he quietly and courteously replied: "Since you are desirous of knowing, hear what our forefathers, the founders of the Stoic sect, thought about that brief but inevitable and natural fear, or rather," said he, "read it, for if you read it, you will be the more ready to believe it and you will remember it better." Thereupon before my eyes he drew from his little bag the fifth book of the Discourses of the philosopher Epictetus, which, as arranged by Arrian, undoubtedly agree with the writings of Zeno and Chrysippus. In that book I read this statement, which of course was written in Greek: "The mental visions, which the philosophers call φαντασίαι or 'phantasies,' by which the mind of man on the very first appearance of an object is impelled to the perception of the object, are neither voluntary nor controlled by the will, but through a certain power of their own they force their recognition upon men; but the expressions of assent, which they call συγκαταθέσεις, by which these visions are recognized, are voluntary and subject to man's will. Therefore when some terrifying sound, either from heaven or from a falling building or as a sudden announcement of some danger, or anything else of that kind occurs, even the mind of a wise man must necessarily be disturbed, must shrink and feel alarm, not from a preconceived idea of any danger, but from certain swift and unexpected attacks which forestall the power of the mind and of reason. Presently, however, the wise man does not approve 'such phantasies,' that is to say, such terrifying mental visions (to quote the Greek, 'he does not consent to them nor confirm them'), but he rejects and scorns them, nor does he see in them anything that ought to excite fear. And they say that there is this difference between the mind of a foolish man and that of a wise man, that the foolish man thinks that such 'visions' are in fact as dreadful and terrifying as they appear at the original impact of them on his mind, and by his assent he approves of such ideas as if they were rightly to be feared, and 'confirms' them; for προσεπιδοξάζει is the word which the Stoics use in their discourses on the subject. But the wise man, after being affected for a short time and slightly in his colour and expression, 'does not assent,' but retains the steadfastness and strength of the opinion which he has always had about visions of this kind, namely that they are in no wise to be feared but excite terror by a false appearance and vain alarms." That these were the opinions and utterances of Epictetus the philosopher in accordance with the beliefs of the Stoics I read in that book which I have mentioned, and I thought that they ought to be recorded for this reason, that when things of the kind which I have named chance to occur, we may not think that to fear for a time and, as it were, turn white is the mark of a foolish and weak man, but in that brief but natural impulse we yield rather to human weakness than because we believe that those things are what they seem.


Intertexts (texts cited often on the same page as the searched text):

24 results
1. Aristotle, Soul, 1.1 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 2.3 (4th cent. BCE - 4th cent. BCE)

3. Cicero, Academica, 2.108 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

4. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 3.64, 3.66, 3.74-3.75, 3.80, 3.83, 4.14, 4.65 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

3.64. haec omnia recta vera debita putantes faciunt in dolore, maximeque declaratur declaratur hoc sana cf. Mue. ( off. 1, 61 ) hoc quasi officii iudicio fieri, quod, si qui forte, cum se in luctu esse vellent, aliquid fecerunt humanius aut si hilarius locuti sunt, revocant se rursus ad maestitiam peccatique se insimulant, quod dolere dolore K 1 V 1 intermiserint. pueros vero matres et magistri castigare etiam solent, nec verbis solum, sed etiam verberibus, si quid in domestico luctu hilarius ab is factum est aut dictum, plorare cogunt. Quid? ipsa remissio luctus cum est consecuta intellectumque intellectaque X corr. V c est est om. K 1 nihil profici maerendo, nonne res declarat fuisse totum illud voluntarium? 3.66. Ergo in potestate est abicere dolorem, cum velis, tempori servientem. an est ullum tempus, quoniam quidem res in nostra potestate est, cui cui cum V non ponendae curae et aegritudinis add. Dav. ex s . aut aegritudinis aut curae del. alii ( iam in V curaer sec. Str. ut vid. ) causa serviamus? vides ... 22 serviamus constabat eos, qui concidentem volneribus Cn. Pompeium vidissent, GN. X cum in illo ipso acerbissimo miserrimoque spectaculo sibi timerent, quod se classe hostium circumfusos viderent, nihil aliud tum egisse, nisi ut remiges hortarentur et ut salutem adipiscerentur fuga; posteaquam Tyrum venissent, tum adflictari lamentarique coepisse. timor igitur ab his aegritudinem potuit repellere, ratio ab sapienti viro ab sapienti viro Bentl. ac sapientia vera ( def. Linde Era- nos XII p. 175 ) non poterit? Quid est autem quod plus valeat ad ponendum dolorem, quam cum est intellectum nil nihil KH profici et frustra esse susceptum? si igitur deponi potest, etiam non suscipi potest; voluntate igitur et iudicio suscipi aegritudinem confitendum est. si timor aliquoties ab aegritudine potest repellere ... 351, 6 est H 3.74. Sed nimirum hoc maxume maxumum X me ss. B est exprimendum, exprimendum X ( con- fessio adversariis exprimenda est cf. Verr. 4, 112 Liv. 21, 18, 5 Lucan. 6, 599 manibus exprime verum ) experimentum ( et antea maxumum) edd. ( sed hoc uerbum Tullianum non est, illudque hanc—diuturna ratione conclusum, non ex experientia sumptum ) cum constet aegritudinem aegritudinem V -ne GKR vetustate tolli, tollit X sed ult. t eras. V hanc vim non esse in die diē V positam, sed in cogitatione diuturna. diurna X corr. B 1 s nam si et eadem res est et idem est homo, qui potest quicquam de dolore mutari, si neque de eo, propter quod dolet, quicquam est mutatum neque de eo, qui qui quod G 1 dolet? cogitatio igitur diuturna diurna X corr. B 1 s nihil esse in re mali dolori medetur, non ipsa diuturnitas. Hic mihi adferunt mediocritates. mediocritas X -tates V c Non. quae si naturales sunt, quid opus est consolatione? at hae mihi afferentur med.... 24 consolatione Non. 29, 27 natura enim ipsa terminabit modum; sin opinabiles, opinio tota tollatur. Satis dictum esse arbitror aegritudinem esse opinionem mali praesentis, satis arbitror dictum esse ... 355, 1 praesentis H in qua opinione illud insit, ut aegritudinem suscipere oporteat. 3.75. additur ad hanc definitionem a Zenone recte, ut illa opinio praesentis mali sit recens. hoc autem verbum sic interpretantur, ut non tantum illud recens esse velint, quod paulo ante acciderit, sed quam diu in illo opinato malo vis quaedam insit, ut ut s et X vigeat et habeat quandam viriditatem, tam diu appelletur appellatur K recens. ut Artemisia illa, Mausoli Cariae regis uxor, quae nobile illud Halicarnasi alicarnasi X fecit sepulcrum, quam diu vixit, vixit in luctu eodemque etiam confecta contabuit. huic erat illa opinio cotidie recens; quae tum denique non appellatur appellabatur X corr. V 2 recens, cum vetustate exaruit. Haec igitur officia sunt consolantium, tollere aegritudinem funditus aut sedare aut detrahere aut detr. V ( ss. 2 ) quam plurumum aut supprimere nec pati manare longius aut ad alia traducere. 3.80. Sed nescio quo pacto ab eo, quod erat a te a te ante K propositum, aberravit oratio. tu enim de sapiente quaesieras, cui aut malum videri nullum potest, quod vacet turpitudine, aut ita parvum malum, ut id obruatur sapientia vixque appareat, qui qui add. V 2 nihil opinione adfingat adsumatque ad aegritudinem nec id putet esse rectum, tum post rectum add. V c se quam maxume excruciari luctuque confici, quo pravius nihil esse possit. edocuit tamen ratio, ut mihi quidem videtur, cum hoc ipsum proprie non quaereretur hoc tempore, num num V x nunc X num quid We. sed cf. Mue. quod esset malum nisi quod idem dici turpe posset, tamen ut videremus, viderimus V 1 quicquid esset in aegritudine mali, id non naturale esse, sed voluntario iudicio et opinionis errore contractum. 3.83. Hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata illa ilia ita G 1 maerens, morsus tamen tamen tantum Bentl. sed cf. p. 323, 11 quo Cic. hic respicit et contractiuncula quaedam contractiuncuculae quaedam (quadam G quandam V 1 ) relinquentur W Non. (relincuntur) corr. Bentl. cf. 9 hanc et Sen. ad Marc. 7, 1 animi relinquetur. hoc... 9 relinquentur Non. 92, 24 hanc dicant sane naturalem, dum aegritudinis nomen absit grave taetrum funestum, quod cum sapientia esse atque, ut ita dicam, habitare nullo modo possit. At quae at quae Bentl. atque stirpes sunt aegritudinis, quam multae, quam amarae! quae ipso ipso om. V trunco everso omnes eligendae elidendae R 2 sunt et, si necesse erit, singulis disputationibus. superest enim nobis hoc, cuicuimodi cuicuimodi cuiusmodi V 3 est, otium. sed ratio una omnium est aegritudinum, plura sed plura H nomina. nam et invidere aegritudinis est et aemulari et obtrectare et misereri et angi, lugere, maerere, aerumna adfici, lamentari, sollicitari, sollicitari add. G 2 dolere, dolore V in molestia esse, adflictari, desperare. 4.14. praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum stultorum Dav. stulta autem aegritudo est, eaque eaque Ba. ea qua X (ea qu e M 1 ) adficiuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperantes. itaque haec prima definitio difin. V est, ut aegritudo sit animi adversante ratione contractio. itaque ... 6 contractio Non. 93, 1 sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam cf. Aug. civ. 14, 8 aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur. Sed omnes perturbationes iudicio censent fieri et St. fr. 3, 380 et 393 opinione. itaque eas definiunt pressius, ut intellegatur, non modo quam vitiosae, vitiose GKR sed etiam quam in nostra sint potestate. est ergo ergo igitur H s aegritudo aegritudo om. G 1 add. 1 et 2 opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique animo rectum esse videatur, laetitia opinio recens boni praesentis, in quo ecferri ecferri haec ferri VK c (eff. K 2 ) rectum esse videatur, laetitia...15 videatur om. G 1, add. G 2 in mg. inf. ( lemmata laetitia metus adscr. 1 cf. praef. ) metus opinio impendentis mali, quod intolerabile intollerabile V esse videatur, libido lubido K, in lib. corr. G 1 (libido etiam in mg. ) R 1 opinio venturi boni, quod sit ex usu iam praesens esse atque adesse. 4.65. videamus nunc de bonorum, id est de laetitia et de cupiditate. mihi quidem in tota ratione ea, quae eaque KR pertinet pertinet s pertinent X ad animi perturbationem, una res videtur causam continere, omnis eas esse in nostra potestate, omnis iudicio susceptas, omnis voluntarias. hic igitur error est eripiendus, haec detrahenda opinio haec detrahenda opinio ne consererent Gr atque ut in malis opinatis tolerabilia, tollerabilia X ( corr. R c? ) sic in bonis sedatiora sunt efficienda ea quae magna et laetabilia ducuntur. dicuntur W corr. Wo. atque hoc quidem commune malorum et bonorum, bonorum et malorum G 1 ut, si iam difficile sit persuadere nihil earum rerum, quae perturbent perturbant K 1 animum, aut in bonis aut in malis esse habendum, tamen alia ad alium motum curatio sit adhibenda aliaque ratione malevolus, alia amator, alia rursus anxius, alia timidus corrigendus.
5. Posidonius Apamensis Et Rhodius, Fragments, 164 (2nd cent. BCE - 1st cent. BCE)

6. Epictetus, Discourses, 3.24.108, 3.24.117, 3.28, 4.8.23, 4.10.23 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

7. Juvenal, Satires, 6.292-6.295 (1st cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

8. Lucan, Pharsalia, 1.1-1.2, 1.95, 2.142-2.144, 7.62-7.63 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

9. Persius, Satires, 3.66-3.72 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

10. Persius, Saturae, 3.66-3.72 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

11. Seneca The Younger, On Anger, 2.2.1-2.2.2, 2.4.1-2.4.2 (1st cent. CE - 1st cent. CE)

12. Apuleius, On The God of Socrates, 12 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

13. Galen, On The Doctrines of Hippocrates And Plato, 4.5.26-4.5.28, 4.7.28, 4.7.37 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

14. Gellius, Attic Nights, 1.2, 6.17, 8.14, 16.6, 19.1.15-19.1.16, 19.10, 20.10 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

15. Irenaeus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1.2.3 (2nd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

16. Posidonius Olbiopolitanus, Fragments, 164 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

17. Sextus Empiricus, Against Those In The Disciplines, 7.151 (2nd cent. CE - 2nd cent. CE)

18. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of The Philosophers, 7.46 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

7.46. There are two species of presentation, the one apprehending a real object, the other not. The former, which they take to be the test of reality, is defined as that which proceeds from a real object, agrees with that object itself, and has been imprinted seal-fashion and stamped upon the mind: the latter, or non-apprehending, that which does not proceed from any real object, or, if it does, fails to agree with the reality itself, not being clear or distinct.Dialectic, they said, is indispensable and is itself a virtue, embracing other particular virtues under it. Freedom from precipitancy is a knowledge when to give or withhold the mind's assent to impressions.
19. Nag Hammadi, The Tripartite Tractate, 77.11, 80.14 (3rd cent. CE - 3rd cent. CE)

20. Augustine, The City of God, 9.4 (4th cent. CE - 5th cent. CE)

9.4. Among the philosophers there are two opinions about these mental emotions, which the Greeks call παθη, while some of our own writers, as Cicero, call them perturbations, some affections, and some, to render the Greek word more accurately, passions. Some say that even the wise man is subject to these perturbations, though moderated and controlled by reason, which imposes laws upon them, and so restrains them within necessary bounds. This is the opinion of the Platonists and Aristotelians; for Aristotle was Plato's disciple, and the founder of the Peripatetic school. But others, as the Stoics, are of opinion that the wise man is not subject to these perturbations. But Cicero, in his book De Finibus, shows that the Stoics are here at variance with the Platonists and Peripatetics rather in words than in reality; for the Stoics decline to apply the term goods to external and bodily advantages, because they reckon that the only good is virtue, the art of living well, and this exists only in the mind. The other philosophers, again, use the simple and customary phraseology, and do not scruple to call these things goods, though in comparison of virtue, which guides our life, they are little and of small esteem. And thus it is obvious that, whether these outward things are called goods or advantages, they are held in the same estimation by both parties, and that in this matter the Stoics are pleasing themselves merely with a novel phraseology. It seems, then, to me that in this question, whether the wise man is subject to mental passions, or wholly free from them, the controversy is one of words rather than of things; for I think that, if the reality and not the mere sound of the words is considered, the Stoics hold precisely the same opinion as the Platonists and Peripatetics. For, omitting for brevity's sake other proofs which I might adduce in support of this opinion, I will state but one which I consider conclusive. Aulus Gellius, a man of extensive erudition, and gifted with an eloquent and graceful style, relates, in his work entitled Noctes Attic that he once made a voyage with an eminent Stoic philosopher; and he goes on to relate fully and with gusto what I shall barely state, that when the ship was tossed and in danger from a violent storm, the philosopher grew pale with terror. This was noticed by those on board, who, though themselves threatened with death, were curious to see whether a philosopher would be agitated like other men. When the tempest had passed over, and as soon as their security gave them freedom to resume their talk, one of the passengers, a rich and luxurious Asiatic, begins to banter the philosopher, and rally him because he had even become pale with fear, while he himself had been unmoved by the impending destruction. But the philosopher availed himself of the reply of Aristippus the Socratic, who, on finding himself similarly bantered by a man of the same character, answered, You had no cause for anxiety for the soul of a profligate debauchee, but I had reason to be alarmed for the soul of Aristippus. The rich man being thus disposed of, Aulus Gellius asked the philosopher, in the interests of science and not to annoy him, what was the reason of his fear? And he willing to instruct a man so zealous in the pursuit of knowledge, at once took from his wallet a book of Epictetus the Stoic, in which doctrines were advanced which precisely harmonized with those of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the Stoical school. Aulus Gellius says that he read in this book that the Stoics maintain that there are certain impressions made on the soul by external objects which they call phantasi, and that it is not in the power of the soul to determine whether or when it shall be invaded by these. When these impressions are made by alarming and formidable objects, it must needs be that they move the soul even of the wise man, so that for a little he trembles with fear, or is depressed by sadness, these impressions anticipating the work of reason and self-control; but this does not imply that the mind accepts these evil impressions, or approves or consents to them. For this consent is, they think, in a man's power; there being this difference between the mind of the wise man and that of the fool, that the fool's mind yields to these passions and consents to them, while that of the wise man, though it cannot help being invaded by them, yet retains with unshaken firmness a true and steady persuasion of those things which it ought rationally to desire or avoid. This account of what Aulus Gellius relates that he read in the book of Epictetus about the sentiments and doctrines of the Stoics I have given as well as I could, not, perhaps, with his choice language, but with greater brevity, and, I think, with greater clearness. And if this be true, then there is no difference, or next to none, between the opinion of the Stoics and that of the other philosophers regarding mental passions and perturbations, for both parties agree in maintaining that the mind and reason of the wise man are not subject to these. And perhaps what the Stoics mean by asserting this, is that the wisdom which characterizes the wise man is clouded by no error and sullied by no taint, but, with this reservation that his wisdom remains undisturbed, he is exposed to the impressions which the goods and ills of this life (or, as they prefer to call them, the advantages or disadvantages) make upon them. For we need not say that if that philosopher had thought nothing of those things which he thought he was immediately to lose, life and bodily safety, he would not have been so terrified by his danger as to betray his fear by the pallor of his cheek. Nevertheless, he might suffer this mental disturbance, and yet maintain the fixed persuasion that life and bodily safety, which the violence of the tempest threatened to destroy, are not those good things which make their possessors good, as the possession of righteousness does. But in so far as they persist that we must call them not goods but advantages, they quarrel about words and neglect things. For what difference does it make whether goods or advantages be the better name, while the Stoic no less than the Peripatetic is alarmed at the prospect of losing them, and while, though they name them differently, they hold them in like esteem? Both parties assure us that, if urged to the commission of some immorality or crime by the threatened loss of these goods or advantages, they would prefer to lose such things as preserve bodily comfort and security rather than commit such things as violate righteousness. And thus the mind in which this resolution is well grounded suffers no perturbations to prevail with it in opposition to reason, even though they assail the weaker parts of the soul; and not only so, but it rules over them, and, while it refuses its consent and resists them, administers a reign of virtue. Such a character is ascribed to Æneas by Virgil when he says, He stands immovable by tears, Nor tenderest words with pity hears.
21. Augustine, Letters, 138.19 (7th cent. CE - 7th cent. CE)

22. Epicurus, Letter To Menoeceus, 129-132, 128

23. Stobaeus, Eclogues, 2.39.5

24. Stoic School, Stoicor. Veter. Fragm., 3.394



Subjects of this text:

subject book bibliographic info
aeons Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94
angels O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn) (2020) 141, 142
apatheia\u2003 Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75
apuleius O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn) (2020) 141, 142, 285
aristippus, cyrenaic Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 375
aristotle, on impressions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
aristotle, on involuntary feelings Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
aristotle Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75
asclepius, hermetic treatise O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn) (2020) 141
assent, voluntary Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
athens, importance of returning to rome from Howley, The Single Life in the Roman and Later Roman World (2018) 40
athens, voyage home from Howley, The Single Life in the Roman and Later Roman World (2018) 40
athens, where gellius learned his methods Howley, The Single Life in the Roman and Later Roman World (2018) 40, 41
augustine, attack on stoic apatheia, misrepresents stoic acceptance of first movements as acceptance of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 375
augustine, degrees of sin Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 375
augustine, need for daily forgiveness through lord's prayer" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 375
becker, lawrence Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
ben-zeev, aaron Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
body Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75, 94
bonhöffer, adolf Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
celsinus, julius Johnson and Parker, ?Ancient Literacies: The Culture of Reading in Greece and Rome (2009) 322
celsus, cornelius O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn) (2020) 284, 285
chrysippus, stoic (already in antiquity, views seen as orthodox for stoics tended to be ascribed to chrysippus), hence emotion voluntary Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
chrysippus Howley, The Single Life in the Roman and Later Roman World (2018) 41
cicero, on species-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
cognitive theory Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75, 94
compassion (misericordia) O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn) (2020) 142
demons, in apuleius O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn) (2020) 141, 142
emotions, emotion voluntary? Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
emotions, examples of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
emotions, identified with judgements by chrysippus Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
emotions, modern theories Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
emotions (passio, perturbatio), movements) of Nisula, Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence (2012) 239
emotions (passio, perturbatio), peripatetic views of Nisula, Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence (2012) 239
emotions (passio, perturbatio), vocabulary of Nisula, Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence (2012) 238, 239
emotions passions Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75, 94
ennius, iphigeneia Johnson and Parker, ?Ancient Literacies: The Culture of Reading in Greece and Rome (2009) 322
epictetus, on unassented feelings Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
epictetus, stoic, first movements not escaped by sage Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
epictetus Howley, The Single Life in the Roman and Later Roman World (2018) 40, 41
epicurus/epicureans Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75
euhemerus and euhemerism O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn) (2020) 141
eupatheiai, and being carried away Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
eupatheiai, classified by species Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
father, the Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94
fear, pavor ambiguous between fear and trembling Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 375
feelings, involuntary, in aristotle Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
first movements, involuntary Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
first movements, not escaped by sage Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
free will Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94
gellius, aulus, compiler of philosophical doctrines, report on stoic first movements misunderstood by augustine Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 375
gellius, aulus, compiler of philosophical doctrines Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 375
gellius, aulus Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236; Nisula, Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence (2012) 238, 239; O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn) (2020) 141, 142, 284, 285
genus-level classification Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
grammarian, in gelliuss attic nights Johnson and Parker, ?Ancient Literacies: The Culture of Reading in Greece and Rome (2009) 322
grief, weeping griffiths, paul Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
happy life (beata uita) Nisula, Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence (2012) 239
harmony Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75
imagination Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
impressions Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
impulse (hormē), impulse not sufficient for action Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
iphigeneia (ennius) Johnson and Parker, ?Ancient Literacies: The Culture of Reading in Greece and Rome (2009) 322
juvenal O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn) (2020) 284
lucan O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn) (2020) 284
martyrs and martyr-cult O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn) (2020) 141
movement primus motus Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94
passions O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn) (2020) 141, 142
passions emotions Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75, 94
persius O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn) (2020) 284
philological investigation Johnson and Parker, ?Ancient Literacies: The Culture of Reading in Greece and Rome (2009) 322
plato Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75
platonism Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94; Nisula, Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence (2012) 239
platonists O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn) (2020) 141
pleroma Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94
pliny the elder O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn) (2020) 284, 285
posidonius, on causes of emotion Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
progressors, pain of Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
proto-passions primus motus and first motions Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94
reaching (orexis) Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
seneca, on involuntary feelings Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
seneca, the younger, stoic, contrast with emotion, which is a voluntary judgement Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
seneca, the younger, stoic, first movements involuntary, not escaped by sage Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
seneca, the younger, stoic, first movements of body or soul caused by appearance without assent or emotion having yet occurred Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
seneca, the younger, stoic, hence emotion subject to therapy Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
seneca Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94
socrates, model for apatheia Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
solinus O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn) (2020) 284, 285
sophia Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94
stoicism Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75, 94; Nisula, Augustine and the Functions of Concupiscence (2012) 239
stoics O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn) (2020) 141, 142
therapeia\u2003 Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 75
therapy, philosophical contributions to therapy (i) voluntariness of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45, 69
up to us/in our power (eph' hēmin)" Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 69
valentinian/valentinians Linjamaa, The Ethics of The Tripartite Tractate (NHC I, 5): A Study of Determinism and Early Christian Philosophy of Ethics (2019) 94
varro, antiquitates O'Daly, Augustine's City of God: A Reader's Guide (2nd edn) (2020) 284, 285
varro Johnson and Parker, ?Ancient Literacies: The Culture of Reading in Greece and Rome (2009) 322
voluntariness of emotion Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45, 69
will Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 45
zajonc, r. b. Graver, Stoicism and Emotion (2007) 236
zeno of citium, stoic, hence different conception of freedom from emotion(apatheia)' Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation (2000) 375